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James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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CNS Research StoryIndia and the New Look of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy[1]
William C. Potter August 25, 2005 Forthcoming in the summer 2005 issue of the Nonproliferation Review
In light of the magnitude of this policy shift and its potential to impact negatively on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), associated nonproliferation institutions, and even elements of the president's own nonproliferation initiatives, one would have expected the policy announcement to follow a careful and systematic review of the costs and benefits of the proposed change. A rational decision would have required input from all of the major governmental players with nonproliferation responsibilities, including the senior officials in charge of nonproliferation policy in the Departments of State and Energy. In fact, however, the new policy appears to have been formulated without a comprehensive high-level review of its potential impact on nonproliferation, the significant engagement of many of the government's most senior nonproliferation experts, or a clear plan for achieving its implementation. Indeed, the policy shift bears all the signs of a top-down administrative directive specifically designed to circumvent the inter-agency review process and to minimize input from any remnants of the traditional "nonproliferation lobby."[2] What
Precisely Has Changed?
The NSG politically obligates its 45 members to pursue two sets of guidelines for nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use exports. Central to the guidelines, which like other aspects of NSG policy were adopted by consensus, is the principle that only NPT parties or other states with comprehensive ("full-scope") safeguards in place should benefit from nuclear transfers. It is this principle of comprehensive safeguards as a condition for export, which the United States labored long and hard to persuade the NSG to adopt, that will have to be abandoned if the India-U.S. Joint Statement is implemented. The key provision of the Joint Statement that will necessitate a fundamental change in U.S. nuclear export policy is the promise by the U.S. president that he will seek to adjust U.S. laws and policies, as well as international regimes, to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India. These adjustments are necessary since India does not have full-scope safeguards in place and is one of only four states (along with Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea) that remain outside of the NPT. By promising that the United States will work to achieve full civil nuclear cooperation with India, President Bush has announced, for all practical purposes, that technology control is no longer the cornerstone of U.S. nuclear export and nonproliferation policy. Instead, it has given way to a strategy in which politics has primacy and regional security and international economic objectives trump those of nonproliferation. Although this shift is not the first time nonproliferation objectives have been subordinated to other U.S. foreign policy considerations, it represents the most radical change in recent nuclear export policy. The Underpinnings of the New Policy It always is dangerous to attribute much rationality to the process by which policy changes or to assume that policy will be internally consistent. Moreover, as suggested above, it is not obvious that nonproliferation considerations were given much weight in the decision to alter U.S. policy toward India. Nevertheless, to the extent that assumptions about proliferation influenced the shift in U.S. policy, they would appear to include the following perspectives:[3] 1. Nuclear proliferation is inevitable; at best it can be managed, not prevented. According to this perspective, nuclearization of the Indian subcontinent should have been anticipated and cannot be reversed. Although the pace of nuclear weapons spread globally has been much slower than predicted, we are approaching a new "tipping point" in which a number of second tier states may "go nuclear." U.S. policy to counter proliferation must be selective. In those instances in which the United States cannot prevent nuclear weapons spread, it can and should seek to influence the development of responsible nuclear weapons policies on the part of new nuclear nations that are consistent with U.S. national interests, including the adoption of enhanced safety and security procedures and practices.
2. There are good proliferators and bad
proliferators. U.S. decision-makers and scholars generally have viewed the
spread of nuclear weapons negatively. This perspective has persisted for most
of the post-World War II period and has not varied greatly regardless of the
orientation of the prospective proliferator. Throughout most of the 1970s and
1980s, for example, U.S. nonproliferation declaratory policy remained adamantly
opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons despite the fact that many of the
countries of greatest proliferation concern--states such as Argentina,
Brazil, Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, South Korea, and even India and
Pakistan--were either friends of the United States, or at least not its
adversaries. This prevailing perspective continued during the 1990s at a time
when the number of states of proliferation concern diminished but were seen to
be more anti-American in orientation (e.g., Iraq and Iran). A minority
viewpoint, however, has long questioned the assumption that proliferation
necessarily was undesirable. Kenneth Waltz, in particular, popularized the view
that the spread of nuclear weapons may promote regional stability, reduce the
likelihood of war, and make wars harder to
start.[4] Although it is not obvious that the
proponents of a re-orientation in U.S. policy toward India have been directly
influenced by Waltz's arguments, the India-U.S. Joint Statement indicates more
clearly than ever before that Washington is not opposed to the possession of
nuclear weapons by some states, including those outside of the
NPT.[5] This new policy of nonproliferation
exceptionalism is far more explicit and pronounced than prior routine efforts by
the United States and its allies to deflect criticism of Israel's nuclear
policies in different international fora. As one defense expert close to the
administration reportedly put it, unlike the Clinton administration which
"had an undifferentiated concern about proliferation," the Bush
administration is not afraid to distinguish between friends and
foes.[6]
4. Regional security and economic considerations
trump those of global nonproliferation.
The convergence of U.S. and Indian national security interests vis à vis China is emphasized by Robert Blackwill, U.S. ambassador to India during President Bush's first term and often cited as the most influential proponent of the shift in U.S. policy toward India.[7] According to Blackwill, there are "no two [other] countries which share equally the challenge of trying to shape the rise of Chinese power."[8] This argument is made even more explicitly by Ashley Tellis in a report issued by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace four days before the Joint Statement by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh.[9] According to Tellis, who served as Senior Policy Advisor to Blackwill during his tenure in India and is also credited to be one of the principal intellectual architects of the new U.S. policy, it would be a mistake to attempt to integrate India "into the nonproliferation order at the cost of capping the size of its eventual nuclear deterrent."[10] To do so would be "to place New Delhi at a serious disadvantage vis à vis Beijing, a situation that could not only undermine Indian security but also U.S. interests in Asia in the face of the prospective rise of Chinese power over the long term."[11] To his credit, Tellis openly acknowledges the fundamental danger to the global nonproliferation regime posed by the shift in U.S. policy that his report anticipated. However, he believes the risk is manageable and is justified by U.S. geopolitical interests that transcend nonproliferation. In this regard,
it should be noted that some elements of the new U.S. policy toward India have
antecedents in which nonproliferation considerations in South Asia also took a
back seat to other foreign policy and national security objectives. This
situation prevailed vis à vis Pakistan throughout most of the 1980s
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It also can be discerned after
9/11 in the less than forceful manner in which the United States has pressed
Pakistan to reveal the full scope of the A.Q. Khan network. Prior to the July
18th Joint Statement, however, the trade-offs between pursuing global
nonproliferation objectives and those of regional security were never linked as
directly or publicly.
It is difficult to isolate the nonproliferation impact
of the India-U.S. Joint Statement from a number of other developments. It also
is premature to assess the longer-term nonproliferation consequences of the
reorientation in U.S. policy toward India. To some extent, the impact of the
July statement will depend on its implementation by Washington and New Delhi,
how widely it is emulated and/or supported by other major states, and the degree
to which it is reflected in further departures from traditional U.S.
nonproliferation policy. Nevertheless, one can venture a number of hypotheses
about how the turn in U.S. policy may affect the international dynamics of
nonproliferation.
The timing of the Joint Statement, coming on the heels of the disappointing and largely unproductive 2005 NPT Review Conference, will be perceived by many states as further evidence that the United States cannot be counted on to honor its nonproliferation obligations. Contributing to this view is the not unrealistic assessment on the part of many NPT members that U.S. policy in the lead-up to the Review Conference and during its negotiation was characterized by relatively low-level and inexperienced representation, inadequate preparation, little interagency coordination, inconsistent policy implementation, and little concern for the consequences of a failed conference. NPT members also will not overlook the parallels between the U.S. readiness to disavow political commitments it undertook with respect to arms control and disarmament at the 2000 NPT Review Conference (i.e., the "13 Practical Steps") and the further disavowals that the Joint Statement will require if it is implemented. These pertain to the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament taken at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference that "New supply arrangements...should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance of IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally-binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" (paragraph 12), and the reaffirmation of this principle at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Given this recent proclivity by the United States to interpret selectively its NPT and NSG obligations, other NPT members may reasonably question the value Washington attaches to the current fabric of nonproliferation treaties, regimes, and guidelines and reduce their own investments in nonproliferation accordingly. How, one may ask, does the United States persuade Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, or China to strengthen their nuclear export controls when it announces its intention to weaken its own nuclear export regulations? The Joint Statement also is apt to be reviewed particularly closely and critically by a number of NPT members who themselves previously possessed nuclear weapons or pursued their acquisition. Although the United States did not formally recognize India as an nuclear weapon state in the Joint Statement, the voluntary nature of IAEA safeguards that the Indian prime minister agreed to accept and the limitation of these safeguards to India's civilian nuclear program convey the impression that the United States is prepared to treat India for some purposes as it does other nuclear weapons states recognized by the NPT. This change in posture, which will almost certainly be viewed most states as a reward to India for its nuclear weapons tests, is apt to be resented strongly by countries such as South Africa and Ukraine that previously claimed nuclear weapons but relinquished them in order to join the NPT as NNWS. It will be regarded with equal resentment by regional powers such as Argentina, Brazil, and Egypt that explored a nuclear weapons option, but voluntarily chose to forego that possibility in favor of membership in the NPT. It is reasonable to assume that these and
other states that at one time or another seriously contemplated and/or pursued
military nuclear programs may reconsider the wisdom of their prior
nonproliferation decisions in light of the new U.S. posture toward India. A
similar reassessment of the value of the NPT for their national security may be
undertaken by a set of NNWS that have not actively pursued a nuclear weapons
option, but made explicit the conditionality of their NPT membership on
assurances that the international community would not recognize any additional
NWS. Japan is perhaps the best example of this group. Not only has it has been
the most consistent and outspoken critic of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear
tests, but its senior officials repeatedly have emphasized that if the
assurances Japan received prior to joining the NPT were not honored, it would
have to reconsider the role of the Treaty in promoting its security. The point
to emphasize in this regard is not that Japan or any other state necessarily
will repudiate their NPT membership as a direct consequence of the shift in U.S.
policy toward India, but rather to acknowledge that decision-making about
nonproliferation is a dynamic process that does not end with accession to the
NPT. Just as U.S. policy preferences regarding nonproliferation may change over
time, so may those of countries that currently adhere to the NPT as non-nuclear
weapon states.
The shift in U.S. policy toward India also coincides
with growing frustration by many non-nuclear weapons states with the pace of
nuclear disarmament and the commitment on the part of the nuclear weapon states
to their Article VI legal obligations, as well as those political commitments
assumed under the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives and the 13
Practical Steps of the 2000 NPT Review Conference final declaration. If, as is
likely, the re-orientation in U.S. policy toward India is embraced, or at least
accepted, by the four other NWS parties to the Treaty, one or more NNWS may
decide that dramatic action is required to demonstrate the erosion of the NPT
and its diminished value as a means to achieve disarmament. Although the Joint
Statement by itself is unlikely to lead directly to the defection by one of
these disenchanted NNWS, it could provide further impetus for such an act by a
country such as Mexico or Egypt. In the case of Mexico, the defiant action
almost certainly would be only symbolic. In the Egyptian case, however, a
desire to highlight the disarmament shortcomings of the NPT may coincide with
other less symbolic reasons for leaving the treaty, including dissatisfaction
with the lack of implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and
wariness in Cairo that Iran has embarked on a dedicated nuclear weapons program.
If, as a consequence of the Joint Statement, Egyptian decision-makers perceive
the costs of leaving the NPT to be diminished, their overall nonproliferation
calculus could be significantly altered.
No doubt, policymakers in Russia feel vindicated by the shift in U.S. policy signaled by the July 2005 Joint Statement. Nuclear vendors in France and a number of other NSG states that have long eyed the market opportunities in India also will applaud the new U.S. approach and can be expected to encourage their governments to support the creation of a special export regime for India under the NSG even if it means establishing the principle of exceptionalism.[14] Although numerous NSG members are likely to have major reservations about the negative nonproliferation impact of nuclear exports to a non-NPT state, most are likely to hold their noses and not overtly oppose Washington's efforts to modify the NSG export guidelines. According to several U.S. officials who asked not to be named, ultimately the NSG will adopt the change in policy advocated by the United States, although at the cost of undermining the ability of President Bush to achieve what had been the priority objective of limiting exports of uranium enrichment technology and equipment.[15] Already
Iranian nuclear negotiators have pointed out the inconsistency of U.S. efforts
to deny enrichment technology to a NNWS party to the NPT while supporting
nuclear trade with a non-NPT state that has a dedicated and demonstrated nuclear
weapons program. The tenuous logic of the new U.S. position also is not apt to
be lost on the DPRK or some NPT NNWS that would like to acquire dual use
technology capable of producing weapons grade fissile material under the guise
of a civilian nuclear energy program. In addition, one must assume that new NSG
members such as China will find it much more difficult to internalize the
argument about the importance of stringent nuclear exports when U.S. policy is
applied in an exceptionalist fashion. A Congressional Research Service Report
for Congress, for example, observes that the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation
could prompt other suppliers, like China, to justify nuclear exports to
Pakistan.[16]
The Bush administration is apt to meet resistance initially at the NSG, which operates on the principle of consensus, to create a separate export control regime for India. Critics of the new approach will remind Washington of its own powerful arguments against such a move, and some NNWS members of the NSG, such as South Africa, Germany, and Canada, may oppose an exceptionalist approach as it will appear to devalue the benefits of NNWS membership in the NPT. Although it would be desirable for the NSG to resist the Bush administration's new plan, ultimately Washington is apt to get its way, particularly given the support its proposal will have from Russia, France, and possibly other NWS. This victory, however, is likely to be at the cost of losing any prospect for obtaining the restrictions it previously sought on the export of uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology and equipment. The best that can be hoped for from a nonproliferation perspective, is that NSG members can be persuaded that indeed India is an exceptional case and that similar exceptions should not be granted to other states that are outside of the NPT and do not subscribe to full-scope safeguards. Ashley Tellis, for example, argues that "[s]eeking exceptions while still trying to maintain universal goals need not weaken the larger nonproliferation order if the United States uses its power artfully to bring along leading countries within the regime...."[19] That expectation, however, probably is unrealistic given the less than artful exercise of power typically displayed by the United States, the precedent that the Indian case will set, and the history of nuclear trade between other NSG and non-NPT members (e.g., China and Pakistan). The Bush administration has avoided commentary on the possible impact of the Joint Statement on Indian-Pakistani relations. Although it is not obvious how the new U.S. stance toward India will enhance regional stability in South Asia, that objective needs to be pursued as a priority, as does the goal of improving the security of both nuclear weapons and fissile material. If the Joint Statement provides the United States with additional leverage to influence the nuclear posture of India and to reinforce prudent practices with respect to securing nuclear weapons and material, that opportunity should be exploited. In particular, the United States should discourage strongly any further expansion of the Indian nuclear arsenal and the production of additional fissile material for that purpose. India and Pakistan also both should be encouraged to refrain from nuclear weapon practices that could reduce crisis stability and prompt rapid employment of nuclear arms. Although the Joint Statement also should be utilized to reinforce India's prior good behavior in the nuclear export sphere, the far greater risk of imprudent exports resides in Pakistan, and it is not apparent how the new U.S. approach to India will improve Pakistani practices with respect to either nuclear exports or the safeguarding of its nuclear assets.
A number of the more harmful nonproliferation outcomes identified above could be mitigated were India and the United States to demonstrate that as part of their new strategic relationship they also were committing themselves or strengthening their existing commitments to a number of disarmament and nonproliferation measures highly valued by most members of the international community. Although there is no prospect that either state will undertake what would be the most powerful and significant gesture--ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty--it is conceivable, if unlikely, that several more modest but important measures could be supported. Both countries, for example, should express their support for an indefinite moratorium on nuclear testing. India also should agree to a moratorium, already in place for the United States, on the production of fissile material for military purposes, and both countries should support the conclusion of a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. In addition, Washington should initiate the return to the United States of the small number of non-strategic nuclear weapons currently deployed in Europe and propose steps to reduce its stockpile of nuclear warheads in addition to its deployed weapons.[20] Although implementation of these measures by India and the United States would not rectify all of the negative nonproliferation consequences of the Joint Statement, it would help to replenish what currently is a serious disarmament and nonproliferation credibility deficit in both countries. Conclusions
Some backsliding by both the United States and India is probably inevitable given complaints in both countries about who has to do what first. If treated as a target of opportunity, this slippage actually might be a good thing. It could afford the United States the opportunity to refurbish its nonproliferation credentials while still offering India the prospect of greater cooperation in the realm of nuclear safety and security, as well as research in nuclear fusion for power generation. Such a package could be crafted creatively so as not to collide directly with the NPT and the NSG, and could serve as a basis for similar arrangements with Pakistan. To return to the football analogy,
it is now an appropriate moment to call timeout. It is not too late to change
the game plan. The stakes are very high and neither the United States nor the
international community can afford to lose this nonproliferation
match.
ENDNOTES:
[1] The author is
grateful to Gaurav Kampani, Jean duPreez, Scott Parrish, Lawrence Scheinman,
Nikolai Sokov, Leonard Spector, and Jonathan Tucker for their comments on an
earlier draft of this
paper.
[2]
Telephone interviews by the author and other CNS staff with U.S. government
officials (names withheld by request), July 19, 2005 and July 25, 2005. Gaurav
Kampani compares the strategic shift and the manner in which it was accomplished
to Kissinger's opening with China. Gaurav Kampani, correspondence with
author, August 13,
2005.[]
[3] A
number of these assumptions are shared by actors other than those wielding power
in the Bush administration and several variants of them also found expression
during the Clinton
administration.
[4]
See Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be
Better, Adelphi Paper 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 1981). For an updated version of Waltz' argument see Scott D.
Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate
Renewed (New York: Norton,
2003).
[5] One
prominent advocate for the new policy who is familiar with Waltz' arguments is
Ashley J. Tellis. See his important study, India's Emerging Nuclear
Posture (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,
2001).
[6]
Defense Science Board Chairman William Schneider quoted by Edward Alden and
Edward Luce, "A New Friend is Asia," The Financial Times
(August 21, 2001),
<http://globalarchive.ft.com/globalarchive/articles.html>.[]
[7]
See, for example, Dana Milbank and Dafna Linzer, "U.S.,
India May Share Nuclear Technology," Washington Post (July 19,
2005) and Zlatica Hoke, "U.S. and India Getting Closer than Ever,"
Voice of America New Analysis (July 22,
2005).
[8]
Robert Blackwill quoted in Hoke, "U.S. and India Getting Closer."
See also, the Honorable Robert Blackwill, "Why is India America's
Natural Ally?" In the National Interest (May 2005),
<http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/May%202005/May2005Blackwill.htm>l.
[9]
See Ashley J. Tellis, India As a New Global Power
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2005).
[10]
Ibid, p. 25: For relevance to Tellis' role in the plan
to change U.S. policy, see Milbank and
Linzer.
[11]
Ibid. Consistent with this perspective is the absence in the Joint Statement of
any commitment by India to stop production of fissile material for
weapons.
[12]
Albert Wohlstetter et al., Moving toward Life in a Nuclear
Armed Crowd? Report to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Los
Angeles: Pan Heuristics, 1976, p. 1. A revised version of the report was
published as Swords from Plowshares (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press,
1979).
[13]
See Henry Sokolski, "The India Syndrome: U.S. Nonproliferation Policy Melts
Down," The Weekly Standard (August 1,
2005).
[14]
Great Britain already has moved in this direction by
announcing its intent to alter its nuclear export laws consistent with
Washington's wishes. See "Britain to ease sanctions against
India," The Hindu (8-12-05) and Ashish Kumar Sen, "Nuclear
battle lines drawing," India Monitor (August 14,
2005).
[15]
Telephone and personal interviews by CNS staff in the week following the July
18th Joint Statement.
[16] See
Sharon Squassoni, "U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for
Congress," CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: The Library of
Congress, July 29, 2005), p. 7,
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33016.pdf>.[]
[17]
See Dennis M. Gormley and Lawrence Scheinman, "Implications
of Proposed India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation," NTI Issue Brief, July
2005,
<www.nti.org>.
[18]
On the issue of prior consent, see Sokolski, "The India
Syndrome."
[19]
Tellis, India As a New Global Power, p.
27.
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