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Iran's Game of Nuclear Poker: Knowing When to Fold

IAEA Director-General El Baradei

By Jean du Preez & Melissa Kessler

August 26, 2005

In what many consider to be Iran's final chance, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, during an emergency meeting on August 11, called Iran's bluff by adopting yet another resolution[1] on the implementation of the country's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement. While the Board's resolution noted that the Agency has accounted for all declared nuclear materials in Iran, it also stated that it has not yet been able to verify that there are no undeclared nuclear materials in the country.[2] The Board urged Iran to allow the IAEA to reinstate seals and urged Iran to re-establish a full suspension of enrichment activities as a confidence-building measure. Although not evident from its decision, the request for the Director-General to issue a "comprehensive report on the implementation of Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement and this resolution" by September 3, 2005 may be a final ultimatum to Iran to continue with full suspension.

Potentially improving Iran's hand dramatically, the IAEA released a report this week prepared in secret by a group of scientists from the United States, France, Japan, the United Kingdom and Russia over the past nine months[3] that confirmed Iran's claims that the traces of weapons-grade uranium found at Iran's Natanz site were, in fact, a result of contamination of components bought from Pakistan, probably through the A.Q. Khan network. The origin of the uranium traces has been a highly contested issue until now. The IAEA report is likely to influence the next meeting of the Board, giving Iran the benefit of the doubt once again.

The Board's August 11 decision followed a 20 month-long voluntary suspension of Iran's civilian uranium enrichment activities. The Iranian government, however, notified the IAEA on August 1, 2005 that it intended to resume uranium conversion at Isfahan. The IAEA was requested to make appropriate preparations to accommodate the resumption of conversion activities consistent with Iran's Safeguard Agreements. On August 8, Iran began to feed uranium ore concentrate into the process line at the facility, subsequent to the installation of Agency surveillance measures. Iran subsequently removed the seals on the process lines and the UF4 at the facility following verification of the feed material and installation of Agency surveillance measures.

Iran's decision to resume uranium conversion activities came less than a year after the November 15, 2004 Paris Agreement, which announced Iran's intention to expand and extend its suspension pledge as a confidence building measure to facilitate talks with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (EU-3) regarding long-term arrangements for Iran's civilian nuclear program that could include eventual supply of light-water reactors and operation of certain enrichment-related facilities on a pilot scale.

Prior to the Board's special August 11 session, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, along with other EU members and the United States, expressed serious concerns over the resumption of Iran's conversion activities at Isfahan, arguing that there is little justification for the resumption of these activities in Iran since it has no current need for a nuclear power program.[4] Moreover, these States continue to view Iran's claim to the right to peaceful nuclear technology with skepticism considering the country's past discrepancies with the IAEA and furtive nuclear activities. While still in favor of continuing negotiations, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom say they will only resume negotiations under the framework of the Paris Agreement, while Iran maintains that it will return to negotiations "free of pre-conditions and with manifest good will." Iran's strongly worded statement immediately following the Board's decision called the resolution "a vote of no confidence to the credibility of the Agency and its Safeguards system" given that it is based on inconclusive evidence about Iran's nuclear program without applying the same treatment to "so many unsafeguarded facilities spread around in other parts of the world, in particular in (the Middle-Eastern) region.[5]

While some may consider the Board's request for the IAEA Director-General to submit a "comprehensive report" on the implementation of the resolution by September 3, 2005, it is important to note that the Board is not the implementer of the Paris Agreement. The implied threat by the Board is to cite Iran for its previous failures and for not maintaining suspension, which the Board has deemed essential for resolving outstanding issues.

Iran's continued claim that it does not seek to create nuclear weapons and that it is willing to respect and comply with the IAEA and the Safeguards system, stands in sharp contrast to the belief by many that Iran has over time deliberately deceived the IAEA and that it continues not to exhibit full compliance with its NPT Safeguard obligations. Although Iran agreed to sign the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards agreement, thereby allowing more extensive inspections by the IAEA, it has not yet ratified this important instrument. Questions remain whether Iran's signature of this agreement in 2003 was simply a diplomatic ploy to avoid potential referral to the Security Council at that time. As the European Union pointed out at the most recent Board meeting, Iran's recent decision to restart its conversion activities at Isfahan comes at a time when the outstanding questions relating to Iran's nuclear program have yet to be resolved, and when new questions about plutonium related activities have arisen.[6] While the August 11 Board of Governors resolution[7]--as others had done before it--noted that all declared materials have been accounted for and have not been diverted to prohibited activities, it also states that the Agency cannot yet conclude that there is an absence of undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. Although true that Iran has so far not been found to be in non-compliance, its actions--including the violation of the Paris Agreement--do not instill confidence about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. The resumption of currently suspended activities, including the uranium conversion, will only further heighten international concern about the real objective of Iran's nuclear program.

The Board's recent decision followed several rounds of tough negotiations, mainly between the European Union and the United States on the one side and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) on the other. The NAM statement on August 10 supported Iran's quest to develop a civilian nuclear program and opposed any possible referral of Iran to the Security Council. Playing the peaceful use card, the NAM emphasized that the development of peaceful nuclear energy is an absolute right of all countries, that Iran's two year suspension of nuclear activities was voluntary, and that Iran's willingness to suspend the program should not deprive it of the right to resume nuclear development. The NAM statement is indicative of the strong views held by the Movement that the pressure on Iran to limit or suspend its civilian nuclear activity is indicative of the desire by many developed states to curtail the right to develop peaceful nuclear energy guaranteed to non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) parties of the NPT.

While the NAM Board members were united in their opposition to stronger action against Iran, it is noteworthy that Western block countries are not as united in their approach. Divergent views, especially among the EU member states, may have impeded the negotiation process and prevented the EU-3 from providing any concrete proposals to diffuse the situation thus far. Also significant is what appears to be another feud between the United States and the United Kingdom on one side and Germany on the other. For example, in sharp contrast to several statements by President Bush that he considers military force against Iran a viable option, already supported by the United Kingdom, Germany's Chancellor Gerhard Schröder made it clear that military force is not being considered.[8] Although the use of military force is one of several options for the Council to consider, it is unlikely at this stage that Western countries would be unified in supporting any United Nations Chapter VII action.

From a legal perspective, Iran's recent decision to resume uranium conversion is not contrary to the requirements of the NPT or its IAEA safeguards obligations, even with the Additional Protocol in place. Bearing in mind that the purpose of safeguards agreements is for the IAEA to verify non-diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons, and since the IAEA has reported (as reflected in several Board resolutions including the most recent one) that all declared nuclear material is accounted for and thus has not been diverted to prohibited uses, it raises a serious challenge for the Board, and indeed the Security Council: Does the Board have a legal footing to report Iran to the Security Council, and on what basis could the Council consider Iran in non-compliance with its safeguard undertakings? In this regard, it should be borne in mind that the NPT State Parties have delegated to the IAEA the authority to verify compliance with the Treaty's safeguards obligations. In the event that the Board of Governors finds a Party in non-compliance, the IAEA statute clearly mandates the Board to report such non-compliance to all members of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations."[9] The Board is also mandated to take other corrective actions such as suspending assistance to the non-compliant State.

Moreover, Iran maintains that the pressure from the European Union and the United States to halt its civilian nuclear program curtails the "inalienable right" of every State Party to the NPT. In a statement issued to the IAEA, Iran noted that protest against peaceful nuclear activity in full conformity with the NPT and the Safeguard Agreements "constitutes a limited manifestation of the exercise of an inalienable right." [10] Iran has stated that it feels a particular responsibility not to bend under the pressure of the West to end its civilian nuclear fuel program because Iran's acquiescence may contribute to the ability of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to curtail the rights of other NNWS.

Also in this statement, Iran is quick to note that the pressure to halt its uranium enrichment activities comes from states that possess and rely upon nuclear weapons. Iran's position, shared by many states, is that these NWS, some of which hold many tons of separated plutonium available for direct conversion into nuclear weapons, have little justification in demanding that Iran cease its peaceful civilian program--a right enumerated by the NPT--when they do not faithfully pursue their obligation--nuclear disarmament. Moreover, Iran noted that that these states justify their nuclear activities due to their good standing within the NPT, but that they, and the IAEA, ignore the fact that many non-nuclear weapon States who desire civilian programs have not yet had the opportunity to establish good standing. Given a "fraction of that access" afforded to NWS and certain NNWS with developed civilian nuclear programs, Iran claims, the country will also become an example of transparency and "exemplary standing" in Safeguard Agreements. Iran's statement also emphasized that it can only prove its dedication to IAEA compliance once it is able to develop a peaceful nuclear program.

In addition, when Iran decided to resume its uranium conversion activities, it offered open and advance notification to the Agency about its intention to break the Isfahan facility seals while allowing time for the installation of monitoring equipment. It is unclear whether another meeting of the Board of Governors in September would result in Iran's referral to the Security Council, or in light of the most recent IAEA report, lead to further investigations. However, Iran may already be preparing for such a possibility and may decide not only to refuse to suspend its activities at Isfahan, but also resume the uranium enrichment process at Natanz. While Iran's nuclear program remains a divisive one within Iran, the recent replacement of Hassan Rohani, the former moderate leader of Iran's nuclear negotiating team, with ultra-conservative Ali Larijani--a close advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei--in the negotiation process may be an intentional strategy by the more radical elements in Teheran paving the way towards a more aggressive pursuit of a nuclear program. While the best option for Iran would be to seek negotiations with the IAEA over a timeline for resumption at Isfahan and to continue its suspension at Natanz, the close association between nuclear power and national pride in Iran may have already led the government to view referral to the Security Council as a fait accompli.[11]

Should Iran be referred to the Security Council, it will be important to consider the international implications of such a move. Any decision (by voting) to refer Iran over the protest of the Non-Aligned Movement[12] and other developing countries--assuming that developing countries influenced by the United States would support such referral-- could send a negative message to States inside and outside of the NPT. In this regard, it is important to note that while voting is allowed under the Board's rules of procedure, the "spirit of Vienna" calls for decisions without a vote. [13] However, the latest IAEA report could bolster the NAM's position and result in further deadlock.

To maintain that Iran poses a threat to international peace and security, absent proof of more than the ability to eventually develop a nuclear weapon, ignores countries like India and Iran's Middle Eastern neighbor, Israel. The double standard evident in the treatment of Israel's undeclared weapons program has long been a source of concern not only to its Middle Eastern neighbors, but to most countries. It is ironic that while the United States is leading the charge against Iran for not being in full compliance with the NPT, it again chose to completely ignore another nuclear weapon powered nation outside the treaty. Instead, President Bush promised to award India lucrative nuclear and military related trade deals.

The countries outside the NPT treaty not only possess more than the ability to make nuclear weapons, but they are holding actual nuclear weapons in their arsenals. Moreover, they are not bound by NPT Safeguards and other obligations such as those required by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). That these countries would not be considered a threat (and in fact receive various forms of aid from the United States) would seem to indicate that a state would be better off outside the confines of the NPT than trying to operate within its boundaries. This might have been a point North Korea understood when it announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, opting to join those nations outside the confines of the NPT. It is ironic that so far no attempts have been made to bring the issue of North Korea to the Security Council despite clear evidence (as stated in several IAEA Board resolutions) that it has been in non-compliance with the NPT since entering the Treaty in 1985.

In the event that the IAEA Board--at its next meeting or thereafter--decides to report Iran to the Security Council, the Council will be faced with two equally bleak options: The Council could choose to criticize Iran's refusal to terminate its conversion and enrichment activities, calling on it to do so with immediate effect, and request that the IAEA report to the Council on further progress towards this end. This would likely result in the issue being yet again deferred, with negative implications for the Council. An equally bleak option would be to consider Iran as a Chapter VII issue. This leaves the Council two more options: either impose economic sanctions on Iran--the world's fourth largest oil producer--with potential economic implications not only for Iran's trading partners, but the world economy as a whole; or to take military action--as recently intimated by President Bush. Either option could provide further justification by the new conservative government in Teheran to aggressively pursue a nuclear program, if not a military one.

While highly unlikely that the Council would support any form of military action, a resolution by the Security Council threatening Iran with "serious consequences" if it continues to violate its Safeguards and other related agreements, might leave a back door open for unilateral action or action by a coalition of willing forces.[14] Not only would another military campaign led by the United States further exacerbate an already volatile political debate in the United States and elsewhere about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it would most certainly further destabilize the Middle East peace process. An even more serious potential consequence would be that such a resolution could prompt Israel to launch an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, claiming that these facilities pose a direct threat to Israel's security.

With China and Russia, and other key peaceful use proponents on the Security Council such as Argentina, Brazil and Algeria, unlikely to support a "punishing" resolution against Iran, the Council may find itself yet again deadlocked and ineffective. This is hardly the time to set the Council up for yet another "failure." At a time when proposals are being considered to revitalize the United Nation in the face of criticism that it is outdated and incapable of taking concrete action, a deadlocked Security Council would lead to further criticism. More daunting, unilateral action by a militarily dominant country using the Security Council's mere consideration of Iran's non-compliance as justification, will lend credence to critics' complaints that the Security Council is illegitimate in its current structure and would further undermine the overall effectiveness of international agreements under its auspices.

Perhaps it would be overly optimistic to hope that Iran and the EU-3 reach an agreement on Iran's nuclear activities prior to the September 3 deadline. It seems that the Iranian government is convinced it is holding all the cards in this game of nuclear poker. The newly elected conservative government Iran is likely to find increasing domestic and international support in its quest to maintain a civilian nuclear program as a right and a matter of national pride. Also, with its divergent views on viable options, the EU-3 do not seem likely to develop a plan for a middle ground, especially with the United States pushing a doctrine of force over diplomacy in the background.

The situation needs to be defused urgently. Instead of continuing with its bluffing game, Iran should fold its hand, and fully cooperate with the Agency in setting a timeline that will ensure Iran's right to a civilian nuclear program while still allowing the IAEA to develop a conclusive report on its nuclear weapons program. Iran should under all circumstances avoid a situation in which the Security Council be requested to consider its case. While conclusive action by the Security Council, in particular under Chapter VII, may not be possible at first, the pressures resulting from a deadlocked Council may eventually force less powerful members to acquiesce to the desires of states such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and even France. Moreover, the positions of the Russians and Chinese are unpredictable at best. These two veto-wielding members may out of self interest decide not to oppose a Security Council resolution on Iran.

Finally, leading members of the NAM, such as South Africa and India, as well as other influential developing countries such as Brazil, in cooperation with longstanding Iranian allies Russia and China, should increase their mediation efforts and use their influence in Tehran to resolve the matter before the IAEA Board is forced to play its hand and report Iran to the Security Council.

While true that Iran has repeatedly maintained that it embraces the tenants of the NPT and does not plan to withdraw from the Treaty, a failure by all concerned to find an area of convergence prior to the September 3 deadline that prompts the Board to report Iran to the Security Council may force Iran's hand, with potential disastrous consequences for the nuclear nonproliferation regime and international security in general. Given the hard-line approach by the new Iranian leadership, they may conclude--as others have--that staying inside the NPT without nuclear weapons is no longer in Iran's supreme national interest. Such a development would seriously undermine the nuclear treaty regime, with potentially fatal consequences.

[1] Resolution GOV2005/64 adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on August 11, 2005

[2] It should be noted that it can take the Agency years to verify and assess a state's nuclear program once it has ratified the Protocol additional to its comprehensive safeguards agreement. For example, it took more than 5 years to verify Japan's program. Despite having ratified the Additional Protocol 5 years ago, Canada's program has not yet been fully verified and assessed.
[3] "No Proof Found of Iran Arms Program: Uranium Traced to Pakistani Equipment," Washington Post, August 23, 2005.
[4] Statement by the United Kingdom on behalf of the European Union at the IAEA
Board of Governors, August 9, 2005.

[5] Statement issued by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors following the release of Resolution GOV/2005/64, http://www.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-17/0508124494133339.htm.

[6] Statement by the United Kingdom on behalf of the European Union at the IAEA
Board of Governors, August 9, 2005.

[7] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and related Board resolutions." GOV/2005/64. Adopted August 11, 2005.
[8] "Schröder, the Underdog, Plays an Old Card With a New Face: Iran," New York Times, August 16, 2005.
[9] The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (as amended), Article XII, section C.
[10] Statement issued by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors following the release of Resolution GOV/2005/64.
[11] Views expressed by Dr. Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, Professor of International Relations at Tehran University and Senior Researcher for the Center for Strategic Research in Tehran, during a briefing at the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies on August 16, 2005.
[12] There are 17 Non-Aligned Movement and other developing countries on the Board (including Brazil and Argentina and Mexico).
[13] The IAEA Board of Governors has an established practice of passing resolutions dealing with non-compliance, suspension, and referral to the Security Council by at least a 2/3 majority vote (as statute requires in the instance of suspension) and often by full consensus.
[14] The Security Council resolution on Iraq used the language "serious consequences," which President George W. Bush used on several occasions to justify the United States invasion of Iraq in 2002.

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