CNS Research Story
Chronology of Key Events Related to the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards in
Iran
Compiled by the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program (IONP) at the Center
for Nonproliferation Studies
Updated: 16 June 2006
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Bushehr, Iran Satellite Photo [Src: Space Imaging]
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In August 2002, an investigation by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) revealed serious questions about Iran's nuclear program. Since the
IAEA discovery of an undeclared uranium enrichment program, the international
organization has struggled to avert a crisis. Iran's government, however, has
been intransigent, arguing that it has a right to peaceful nuclear technology
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). At the same time, Tehran has
refused to fully cooperate with IAEA inspectors, thereby making it impossible
for the Agency to verify Iran's claim that its nuclear program is of a purely
peaceful nature. According to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei in a
January 12, 2006, interview with
Newsweek: "For the last three years we
have been doing intensive verification in Iran, and even after three years I am
not yet in a position to make a judgment on the peaceful nature of the [nuclear]
program."
In a move that has brought this issue to a head, on January 10, 2006, Iran
removed IAEA seals on its enrichment-related equipment at its research facility
in Natanz.
The removal of the seals threw into disarray the negotiations between the
European Three (France, Germany and the United Kingdom, also known as the EU-3)
and the Iranian government aimed at averting a crisis on Tehran's nuclear
program. Tehran's January 10 actions led the Europeans to join the United States
in a call to have the IAEA refer Iran to the Security Council when the nuclear
agency met during a special session in February 2006.
The Board of Governors on February 4, 2006 passed a resolution requesting
the Director General to "report" to the UN Security Council all IAEA
reports and resolutions related to the implementation of safeguards in Iran,
"immediately" following its March 2006 meeting. As a result of a
January compromise to get China and Russia on board, the resolution did not cite
two important articles in the IAEA Statute that would trigger a "report
(on) the non-compliance to all (IAEA) members, the Security Council and the
General Assembly of the United Nations." Instead, the Board requested the
Director General to report to the Security Council only on the need for Iran to
build confidence in the peaceful nature of its program by meeting a number of
requirements set forth in the resolution.
The March Board meeting, at which the Director General presented his latest
report, did not adopt another resolution. Instead, after a number of statements
by several Board members, the Board agreed to a carefully worded summary
prepared by its chairman, Ambassador Amano from Japan. While there continue to
be deep differences among Board members about the role of the Security Council
in addressing the Iran issue, the Director General conveyed his latest report,
together with all other reports and resolutions adopted by the Board, to the
Security Council. The Security Council is expected to start debating the issue
during the week of March 13, 2006.
The following is a timeline of key events in the IAEA examination of the
scope and nature of Iran's nuclear program from June 2003 to the present.
NOTE: The chronology contains links to relevant documents. If a date is linked it refers to
CNS reports or
NTI Issue Briefs prepared by the
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
2006
6 June: Iran is offered a new proposal on its controversial nuclear
program. Although the specifics of the proposal have not been unveiled, the
offer is known to include economic, technological and political incentives. The
offer is believed to include commitment from the P-5+1 (China, France, Germany,
Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) to: help Iran build
light-water power plants through joint projects; support Iranian membership in
the World Trade Organization (WTO); and a U.S. pledge to lift certain economic
sanctions against Iran to allow the purchase of agricultural appliances and the
sale of Boeing aircraft parts. On the issue of uranium enrichment, which is
expected to be the major sticking point, the proposal requires Iran to suspend
all enrichment related activities; however, this requirement does not preclude
the future possibility that Iran could eventually develop indigenous enrichment
capabilities once all outstanding questions have been resolved and international
confidence has been restored in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear
program. Iran's response has been cautious and measures thus far. Ali
Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator
stated
that "the proposals contain positive steps and also some ambiguities which
should be removed."
31 May: In an apparent policy shift, the United
States
announced
its intention to directly participate in negotiations provided that Tehran
suspends all enrichment and reprocessing activities. "To underscore our
commitment to a diplomatic solution and to enhance the prospects of success, as
soon as Iran fully and verifiably suspends its enrichment and reprocessing
activities, the United States will come to the table with our EU-3 colleagues
and meet with Iran's representatives," U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice said.
9 May: In an effort to forge UN Security Council
(UNSC) unity, the P5+1 have agreed to delay UNSC action and postpone voting on a
resolution drafted by France and the United Kingdom. Instead, the
representatives of the EU-3 will work on devising a comprehensive
package
of incentives and disincentives to lure Iran to the negotiating table.
8
May: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sent a
letter
to President Bush in which he criticized and blamed U.S. foreign policy for the
chaos he feels it has created around the world. The letter made only a brief
reference to the nuclear issue. Nevertheless, this letter holds significance in
that it was the first direct communication between the heads of state of Iran
and the United States since 1979. Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Ali
Larijani,
expressed
his hope that "it could lead to a new diplomatic opening" between
the two countries. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice rejected the letter
saying that it does not address "the issues that we're dealing with
in a concrete way."
3 May: Britain and France presented their
draft
Security Council resolution which calls on Iran to "suspend all
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and
development...and suspend the construction of a reactor moderated by heavy
water." The resolution also urges states to restrict nuclear trade with
Iran by "preventing the transfer of items, materials, goods and technology
that could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities and missile programmes." While the resolution does not specify
punitive actions in the case of Iran's noncompliance, by citing Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, it leaves the door open for possible sanctions and other
enforcement measures.
29 April: The Iranians indicated their willingness
to allow greater access to IAEA inspectors as envisioned in the Additional
Protocol, under the condition that the Security Council returns the case to the
IAEA Board of Governors. The deputy head of Iran's Atomic
Energy Organization, Mohammed Saeedi,
stated
that "if the case returns to the agency again, we will begin the section
that concerns the Additional Protocol."
28 April: The Director
General of the IAEA submitted his
report on Iran to the IAEA Board
and the Security Council as requested by the March 29 Security Council
presidential statement. As in the case of previous reports, the Director General
could not provide evidence to verify that Iran's nuclear program is
intended exclusively for peaceful purposes. The report confirmed Iran's
claims to have enriched uranium to the level of 3.6 percent. With respect to
Iran's statements that it is conducting R&D and testing on P-2
centrifuges, the Director General's report did not offer any insights.
Furthermore, the report stated that Iran's lack of cooperation in
providing additional transparency measures, including access to certain military
sites, in addition to its decision to cease implementation of the Additional
Protocol, has severely crippled the agency's ability to proceed with its
verification work and provide assurance as to the absence of undeclared nuclear
materials and activities.
23 April: Iran's foreign ministry
spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi
declared
that the Iran's nuclear activities are "irreversible." He also
stated that the Iranians are "determined not to give up our rights to
nuclear energy, and suspension of relevant activities are not on our
agenda."
11 April: Iranian President Ahmadinejad
announced that
Iran had successfully enriched uranium. As such, he stated that Iran had
officially "joined the group of those countries which have nuclear
technology." Iran claimed to have enriched small amounts of uranium to a
level of 3.6 percent. Such announcement came on the eve of the Director
General's visit to Iran. In a separate announcement, Ahmadinejad, also
announced that Iran is testing a P-2 centrifuge for enriching uranium.
29
March: The Security Council issued a
Presidential Statement
calling on Iran to re-establish full and sustained suspension of all
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and
development. The statement also requests the Director General of the IAEA to
report back within 30 days on Iranian compliance with the steps required by the
Board.
20 March: The five permanent members of the Security Council plus
Germany met in Berlin to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue. The EU-3 and United
States pushed for a Security Council statement that would call on Iran to
reinstate full suspension of all enrichment related activities. While the EU-3,
backed by the US, wanted the statement to specify a deadline by which the
Director General of the IAEA would be required to report back to the Security
Council on Iran's compliance, China and Russia expressed their
reservations about imposing an immediate deadline.
8 March: In his
remarks
at the conclusion of the IAEA Board meeting, Director General ElBaradei
emphasized the importance of finding a comprehensive political settlement. He
stated that it is entirely up to the Security Council to decide on when to take
up the issue of Iran's nuclear program, and if it decides to at all, what
action it deems necessary. ElBaradei stressed that this is "simply a new
phase of diplomacy" and meanwhile that the IAEA will continue with its
verification work and urge Iran's cooperation on implementing full
transparency.
6 March: The Board of Governors at its regular March 2006 meeting
reviewed the Director General's 27 February report and discussed
Iran's nuclear program. No resolution was adopted. Instead, the Board
agreed to a carefully worded summary prepared by its chairman, Ambassador Amano
from Japan.
27 February: Director General ElBaradei issued a
report
for consideration at the Board of Governors' meeting on 6 March 2006. The
report provided an update on the developments that had taken place since
November 2005. It stated that although the IAEA has not seen indications of
diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, there remain uncertainties with regard to both the scope and the nature
of Iran's nuclear program. It also emphasized that two outstanding issues
concerning the origin of LEU and HEU particle contamination found at various
locations in Iran, and the extent of Iran's efforts to import, manufacture
and use centrifuges of both the P-1 and P-2 designs, require further
clarification.
7 February: Iran requested the IAEA to remove the seals and
surveillance systems from safeguarded Iranian facilities.
4 February:
The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a
resolution
requesting the Agency's Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to report all IAEA
reports and resolutions relating to the Iran's nuclear program to the UN
Security Council.
31 January: The IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards
submitted an
update brief
about the latest developments in the implementation of the safeguard agreements.
According to the brief, Iran handed over a document dealing with uranium metal
which is related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components.
18 January: The representatives of France, Germany and the United
Kingdom to the IAEA sent a letter to the Chair of the IAEA Board of Governors
requesting that a special meeting be held to discuss the implementation of IAEA
Safeguards in Iran and resolutions related to Iran. The Special Meeting has been
scheduled for 2 February.
10 January: According to a report by the IAEA Director General, Iran
began to remove, in the presence of Agency inspectors, the IAEA seals on its
enrichment-related equipment at Natanz. The cascade hall, as well as the UF6
feed and withdrawal stations continued to be covered by Agency containment and
surveillance measures.
8 January: The Secretariat received a Note Verbale from the
Permanent Mission of Iran stating that the "intended scale of R&D is small"
and that "all reprocessing in relation to this small scale R&D will be
carried out."
7 January: Iran requests that the IAEA remove 52 Agency seals
installed at the facilities of Natanz, Pars Trash, and Farayand Technique before
January 9, 2006.
3 January: Mohamed ElBaradei informed the Board of Governors that
Iran has decided to resume "R&D activities on the peaceful nuclear energy
programme which has been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and
non-legally binding suspension".
[top]
2005
27 November: The United Kingdom, France, and Germany (the EU-3)
agreed to hold talks with Iran on resuming negotiations on the country's
disputed nuclear program, which broke down in August 2005. As a precondition,
Iran must be ready to discuss a Russian proposal allowing Iran to maintain a
civilian nuclear program but without uranium enrichment capabilities. Uranium
enrichment, the most sensitive stage of the nuclear fuel cycle that can be used
to make fuel for bombs, would be transferred to Russia under a joint venture.
24-25 November: The Director General
reported
to the Board of Governors that Iran had provided additional documentation,
permitted interviews with relevant individuals, and allowed further access.
While the Agency intends to continue its efforts to clarify the extent and
nature of Iran's nuclear program, Iran was urged to further cooperate on the
scope and chronology of its centrifuge enrichment program. However, the Agency
observed no deviations from Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment
activities, and the Board adopted no resolution on the issue.
21 November: Iranian lawmakers voted to oblige their government to
stop allowing snap U.N. checks of its atomic sites and to resume uranium
enrichment if Tehran is referred to the U.N. Security Council for possible
sanctions.
24 September: The Board of Governors adopted a
resolution
that found Iran's failures and breaches to constitute non-compliance with its
IAEA safeguards agreements and called on Iran to return to the negotiating process.
11 August: The Board of Governors adopted a
resolution that
urged Iran to re-establish full suspension of all enrichment related activities
and to re-instate the IAEA seals that were removed at its Uranium Conversion Facility in
Esfahan.
10 August: Iran begins to remove the seals on the process lines and
the UF4 at the Uranium Conversion Facility in
Esfahan.
IAEA Director General ElBaradei called for maximum restraint, no unilateral
actions, and continued negotiations by all parties.
8 August: Iran begins to feed uranium ore concentrate into the first
part of the process line at its Uranium Conversion Facility.
8 March: In briefings to the Board and the press, Director General
ElBaradei emphasized that IAEA inspectors are making "good progress" in
verifying Iran's nuclear program while underlining the need for Iran to be "more
transparent"
[top]
2004
29 November:
The Board of Governors adopted a
resolution
that welcomed Iran's voluntary decision to "continue and extend its suspension
of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities." The Board also expressed
"its strong concern that Iran's policy of concealment up to October 2003 has
resulted in many breaches of Iran's obligations to comply with its NPT
Safeguards Agreement."
25 November: Director General ElBaradei
reported
to the Board of Governors that two important issues remained: the origin of the
low enriched and highly enriched uranium particle contamination found at various
locations in Iran and the extent of Iran's efforts to import, manufacture and
use centrifuges of both the P-1 and P-2 designs.
18 September:
The Board of Governors adopted a
resolution
stating it "deeply regrets" that Iran's suspension of enrichment and
reprocessing activities "fell significantly short of the Agency's understandings
of those commitments."
18 June:
The Board of Governors adopted a
resolution
that deplores Iran's lack of timely cooperation with the IAEA and failure to act
in full compliance with its safeguards obligations.
1 June: Director General ElBaradei, in his
report
to the Board of Governors, identified three outstanding concerns regarding
Iran's nuclear program: the origin of highly enriched uranium at several nuclear
sites, previously undeclared centrifuge technology, and Iran's suspension of
uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.
21 May: Iran submitted its initial declaration under the Additional
Protocol to its NPT safeguards agreement.
7 April: During a visit to Iran, Director General ElBaradei
announced that Iran had agreed to accelerate its cooperation with the IAEA in
addition to a joint action plan with a timetable to deal with outstanding
issues.
15 March: The Board of Governors adopted a
resolution
on the IAEA's verification of Iran's nuclear program, noting "outstanding
issues" and questions, and requesting Director General ElBaradei to report back
to the Board on these matters before the end of May.
8 March: Director General ElBaradei
expressed
his concern to the Board of Governors that Iran's declaration of 21 October 2003
did not include any reference to its possession of P-2 centrifuge designs and
related R&D, which he viewed as a setback to Iran's stated policy of
transparency.
[top]
2003
18 December: Iran signed the
Additional Protocol
to its NPT safeguards agreement, granting IAEA inspectors greater authority in
verifying the country's nuclear program.
26 November: The Board of Governors adopted a
resolution
on the implementation of NPT safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
10 November: In a letter to the IAEA, Iran's representative conveyed
his government's acceptance of the text of the Additional Protocol and
officially announced that Iran had agreed to suspend all uranium enrichment and
reprocessing activities.
31 October: Director General ElBaradei remarked that the active and
intense period of talks and inspections, started on October 2, is making good
progress.
21 October: Iran and the EU-3
agreed
on measures aimed at the settlement of all outstanding issues. Iran agreed to
engage in full co-operation and transparency with the IAEA in order to address
and resolve all requirements and outstanding issues while clarifying and
correcting any possible failures and deficiencies raised by the IAEA.
Furthermore, Iran has decided to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol, commence
ratification procedures for the Protocol, and to voluntarily suspend all uranium
enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.
12 September: The Board of Governors adopted a
resolution
calling on Iran to accelerate cooperation with the IAEA and provide full
transparency.
8-9 September: Director General ElBaradei
urged
greater cooperation from Iran in order for the IAEA to complete the verification
job. In his
remarks,
he comments that, "it is obviously not sufficient to rely just on the rights
granted in the safeguards agreement," emphasizing the need for "full
transparency and proactive co-operation by Iran."
9 July: Director General ElBaradei met with President Khatami; they
agreed that a team of senior IAEA experts would remain in Iran to hold technical
discussions with Iranian experts on outstanding issues.
16-20 June:
The Board of Governors discussed allegations made in a
report
by Director General ElBaradei that Iran has failed to meet its obligations under
its safeguards agreements.
[top]
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