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CNS Research Story

Space Conflict or Space Cooperation?

Dr. James Clay Moltz, CNS Deputy Director

26 January 2006

A current assumption of U.S. defense policy is that the potential vulnerability of U.S. space assets to foreign attack will eventually need to be addressed by the U.S. deployment of space weapons. However, given the breadth of U.S. policy tools, an equally viable option may be a strategy of "cooperative engagement" with possible rivals in space, with the aim of steering these programs into directions favorable to U.S. interests. This could create a "positive sum" game in space for all actors, whereas today we tend to view space competition in Cold War "zero sum" terms.

In order to test this hypothesis regarding the possible use of cooperation as a threat prevention tool, the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Space Policy Institute of George Washington University co-sponsored a seminar on January 19, 2006, in Washington, D.C. The meeting featured five speakers, each of whom analyzed the viability of a U.S. "cooperative engagement" strategy in space toward a specific country (or countries) that have been seen as possible U.S. rivals. Approximately 80 persons attended the event, including representatives from the space industry, various non-governmental organizations, local universities, the State Department, the Defense Department, the U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate, and NASA. Speakers (and topics) included Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese (China), Dr. Victor Zaborsky (Russia and Ukraine), Dr. Randall Correll (India), Dr. Daniel Pinkston (North and South Korea), and Dr. John Sheldon (Iran).

Dr. Johnson-Freese's presentation on China provided considerable information about China's interest in space cooperation with the United States, but also noted its desire not to appear to fall into an "unequal" relationship with Washington, given China's priority to develop its own national space capabilities. Dr. Johnson-Freese called U.S.-Chinese space relations today "the last active venue of the Cold War" and urged U.S. policymakers to reconsider the current U.S. strategy of seeking to isolate China in space, largely on non-space-related political grounds. Her remarks emphasized the questionable effectiveness of current U.S. policy, given the ample availability of Russian and European space technologies to China. Instead, she argued that NASA and U.S. companies could play a positive role--if allowed--in helping to "shape" Chinese space policy and to steer it in a direction favorable to U.S. interests. More specifically, she suggested that space cooperation should be on the agenda of the upcoming summit between President George Bush and Chinese Premier Hu Jintao.

Dr. Zaborsky began his presentation with a review of the success of the U.S. policy of cooperative engagement in dealing with the proliferation threat posed by the Russian and Ukrainian space industries over the past 15 years. By providing Russian and Ukrainian aerospace firms with launch quotas, access to U.S. corporations, and participation in the International Space Station (ISS), Dr. Zaborsky argued, the United States was able to strengthen export compliance within these industries and help provide needed space technologies to assist in the ISS's development. Russian and Ukrainian engines and launch vehicles have also played a key supporting role in ensuring U.S. civilian and military space access over the past decade. Dr. Zaborsky noted Russia's willingness to cancel a lucrative cryogenic engine deal with India as evidence of real compromises made by Russian industry in the 1990s in order to support U.S. nonproliferation goals. Looking ahead, Dr. Zaborsky urged a continuation of U.S. policies and the expansion of cooperation as a means of maintaining U.S. influence and leverage.

The presentation by Dr. Correll explored the still relatively untilled soil of possible U.S.-Indian cooperation in space. While noting past U.S. concerns about nuclear proliferation, Dr. Correll urged rapid expansion of U.S. space ties with India as a means of cementing the bilateral relationship and developing a valuable new cooperative partner. He suggested such specific areas of cooperation as communications satellites, military-to-military ties, robotic Moon missions, and ground tracking (including possible use of Indian ground stations to correct "drift" in U.S. Global Positioning System satellites). Dr. Correll argued that--if properly managed--space cooperation could become the "jewel in the crown" in the emerging U.S.-Indian strategic partnership. Today, he lamented, there is little evidence of dynamic U.S. proposals in this area.

Dr. Pinkston's remarks covered the disparate, but emerging space programs in North and South Korea. He emphasized the highly political nature of both programs and both countries' eagerness to use space as a means of building domestic support and establishing international respect for their scientific prowess. While Dr. Pinkston focused mainly on cooperative opportunities with South Korea, he did not rule out future space cooperation with North Korea in the context of a nuclear settlement on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, Dr. Pinkston suggested that space cooperation could be a low-cost tool for the United States to employ in seeking to provide a tangible, non-nuclear benefit to Pyongyang as a carrot for ending its nuclear program.

Finally, Dr. Sheldon's presentation, appropriately entitled "A Really Hard Case: Iranian Space Ambitions and the Prospects for U.S. Engagement," provided a unique summary of Tehran's past and current space efforts. While Iran's space accomplishments remain minimal, he said, its ambitions, as in the nuclear sector, are high. Dr. Sheldon cited economic development, security (reconnaissance, mainly), and regional prestige as Iran's main goals. He noted that the United States could undercut Tehran's aims by establishing a regional space consortium in the Middle East (excluding Iran), which could effectively overshadow any Iranian space advances. On the other hand, Dr. Sheldon suggested that space cooperation might play a positive role in the future, if Iran decided to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accepting limits on its nuclear program. In this context, U.S.-Iranian space cooperation could be used both as a confidence building tool and a lever to help ensure continued compliance.

Overall, the experts speaking at the seminar confirmed the possible contribution of space cooperation to threat prevention in space, albeit with certain limitations. Most participants cited current U.S. export control restrictions as a major impediment and urged reform of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). ITAR guidelines to allow trade at least in commercial space technologies already widely available on the international market. Such a move, according to the authors, could free up U.S. companies to compete more effectively in opening up new markets, expand opportunities for NASA, and increase U.S. knowledge of foreign space programs. In general, the experts agreed that space cooperation has been an under-appreciated tool in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. They urged its more active consideration by policymakers for helping to reduce future space threats, increase transparency, and build bridges in the service of U.S. commercial, scientific, and political goals in space.

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Author(s): James Clay Moltz Related Resources: Missile, Research Story Date Created: January 26, 2006 Date Updated: January 26, 2006