James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction with training & analysis

CNS Research Story

17 February 2006

Setting the stage for what is likely to become a divisive and drawn-out brawl at the Security Council, on February 4, 2006, the Permanent 5 and Germany managed to persuade and arm twist the 35 member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors into agreeing to report Iran to the Security Council because of the country's many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement. The strong appeals by the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany), enthusiastically supported by the United States, to drag Iran before the Security Council were supported by all but eight countries: only three countries (Cuba, Syria and Venezuela) opposed the decision while five others abstained (Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya and South Africa).

While most governments and analysts agree that Iran's lack of transparency and repeated failures to comply with its safeguards agreement over the past three years are sufficient reason for Security Council involvement, very little consideration has been given to the potential consequences of the decision to so involve the council at this point in time. If not properly handled, this situation could undermine the credibility of the IAEA, if not the Security Council.

Given the political backlash by Tehran, the IAEA has already been effectively limited to operate only within the strict legal confines of Iran's NPT comprehensive safeguards agreement. At the same time, the political rhetoric coming from various quarters ranging from the use of military action against Iranian nuclear installations to threats by President Ahmadinejad to withdraw from the NPT are likely to fan the flames of the nuclear crisis. This issue is spiraling out of control as U.S., European, and Iranian leaders play to their respective domestic audiences, rather than looking clearly at their strategic interests. The situation plainly needs to be reined in. This is only possible through strong leadership and renewed diplomacy, not political posturing.

But the Iran issue has not reached crisis dimensions yet. Had Tehran announced its withdrawal from the NPT, kicked out the IAEA inspectors and made aggressive efforts toward developing nuclear weapons - as North Korea did three years ago - it would constitute a threat to international peace and security, and justify swift Security Council action. However, even if Iran is determined to develop nuclear weapons the latest U.S. National Intelligence Estimate indicates that it would take almost a decade before it has the ability to manufacture a nuclear bomb.[1] This of course assumes Tehran is committed to that course - which it strongly disputes - and that it would operate its nuclear facilities freely without IAEA monitoring. Other nuclear analysts have pointed out that Iran would need at least three years to produce enough HEU for one weapon, which would require Iranian facilities to concentrate only on that goal assuming they do not encounter any serious technical problems.[2] Several reports indicate that Iran appears to have been experiencing difficulties with its uranium-conversion and pilot centrifuge facilities, adding further doubt as to its capacity to develop a weapons program in the short to medium term. There is therefore still time to talk Tehran out of pursuing nuclear weapons, even if it currently intends to take this path.

Despite overwhelming support by Board members to "report" Iran to the Security Council, there is no unanimity about the Security Council's involvement at this time. While the IAEA Statute requires the Board to report a State found to be in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards agreements to all IAEA members, the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations, reference to this important requirement was left out of the resolution. Since the UN Charter mandates the Security Council to maintain international peace and security and "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression,"[3] the question that should be answered is whether or not suspicions over Iran's true nuclear intentions justifies Security Council consideration.

The Security Council is now faced with a serious challenge: On what basis should the Iran issue be considered? For not being in full compliance with its safeguard undertakings, or for diverting nuclear material to nuclear weapons? While the IAEA Board confirmed Iran's many failures to comply, it has found no evidence of diversion. In this regard it is telling that British Foreign Minister Jack Straw recently admitted that there was no proof but a "very high level of suspicion" that Iran was trying to build a nuclear weapon.[4] Therefore, it would be quite difficult for the Security Council to come to any decision regarding possible diversions to a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, given the varying interests of Security Council members, the council is unlikely to act assertively against Iran. And even if it did, Iran would likely defy it, resulting in yet another Security Council stalemate with consequences for the Council's credibility.

While time is running out quickly, there is still time for diplomacy to succeed. It is time for leaders in key capitals and at the United Nations to steer this volatile situation away from the nuclear abyss. Only through diplomatic negotiations benefiting both sides and not over the barrel of a gun - however hard that might be for certain capitals - will this nuclear crisis be averted. While using or threatening to use a "stick" always remains an option, it would be better to offer Tehran a handful of "carrots." These carrots should include assurances that the United States does not intend to attack Iran; that Iran's "inalienable right" to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes will in no means be undermined if it cooperates with the IAEA, and even if it agrees to enrich uranium in Russia; and that international efforts will intensify to deal with the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in a holistic manner.

This article examines the potential consequences of the Board's decision to report Iran to the Security Council "immediately following" the Board's March 6 meeting, and argues that far more time remains beyond this deadline for diplomacy to work, thereby preventing the issue from spiraling into a crisis. The article suggest that a negotiated solution to the problem can best take place in a multilateral framework mediated by the United Nations Secretary-General and involving key states such as Russia, China, the United States and South Africa as well as the IAEA. It also offers suggestions for a longer term solution to the ever increasing threat of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

Was the Board's judgment the right decision at the right time?

Although the Board decided that the IAEA Director-General should directly report all decisions and reports relating to the implementation of safeguards in Iran to the Security Council, it did not cite two important articles[5] in the IAEA Statute that would trigger a "report (on) the non-compliance to all (IAEA) members, the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations." Instead, and as a result of a deal hashed out in London[6] in late January to get Russia and China on board, it was decided that the Director-General should "report to the Security Council" only on the need for Iran to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its program by (i) re-establishing "full and sustained suspension" of all its enrichment and reprocessing activities; (ii) reconsidering the construction of the Arak heavy water research reactor; (iii) ratifying and implementing the Additional Protocol, and pending ratification to act in accordance with its provisions; and (iv) implementing transparency measures "requested by the Director-General which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol." In addition, the Board expressed "serious concern" over a January 31 IAEA report that Iran has yet to explain the nature and origin of more than 60 recently discovered documents, including one that describes the procedures for UF6 reduction to metal in small quantities, and the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres, which could be related to the fabrication of nuclear weapons components.

Although there exist differences of opinion among Board members over the legal basis of these required measures (they are mostly anchored in the November 2004 Paris agreement[7] with the EU-3), they have now become the "trip wire" for the initiation of possible Security Council actions against Iran.

Legally, Iran's recent decision to resume uranium conversion is not contrary to the requirements of the NPT or its IAEA safeguards obligations, even with the Additional Protocol in place. The purpose of safeguards agreements is to verify non-diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons, and the IAEA has reported (as reflected in several Board resolutions) that all declared nuclear material in Iran is accounted for and thus has not been diverted to prohibited uses. But the IAEA found that many aspects of Iran's fuel cycle activities and experiments, particularly in the areas of uranium enrichment, uranium conversion and plutonium research, had not been declared to the Agency in accordance with Iran's obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. Iran's policy of concealment, resulting in many breaches of its obligation to comply with that Agreement, continued until October 2003, and would probably have continued had the IAEA not followed up on allegations that Iran is completing two secret nuclear facilities - a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant near Arak - eventually leading to the Board's most recent findings that Iran has indeed failed to comply with its safeguards agreement.

By essentially rolling back its own decision of September 2005, when it requested that the Director General submit another report on Iran and address "the timing and content" of that report under the relevant articles of the IAEA Statute[8] at its next meeting, in March 2006, the Board's recent resolution puts in question "the role, authority, impartiality and integrity of the Agency."[9] Dr. ElBaradei announced in January that he will submit his report for consideration at the Board's March meeting. However, the special February Board meeting - essentially called by the EU-3 and the United States - preempted his report by deciding to report Tehran directly to the Security Council "immediately" following the March meeting. The implication of this unusual mechanism is that no matter what ElBaradei reports to the Board at its March meeting, or what the Board may subsequently decide to do, the Security Council has now effectively become the judge, jury and executioner on the Iranian case.

Although Russia and China reluctantly supported the resolution, they clearly disagree with their U.S., French and British counterparts that it is in the interest of international peace and security to report Iran to the Security Council as being in noncompliance with legally binding NPT obligations. Following the adoption of the resolution Russia's envoy to the IAEA, Grigory Berdennikov, emphasized that while Russia supported the resolution, it did so on the understanding that the Iranian problem "will be solved within the framework of the IAEA without additional interference."[10] His Chinese counterpart Ambassador Wu HaiLong shared his concern by calling "all relevant parties to exercise restraint and patience" and "refrain from taking any action that might further complicate or deteriorate the situation."[11]

While the resolution's EU proponents, backed, of course, by the ever hawkish Bush administration, continue to be adamant that Iran's violations and failures justify the Security Council's involvement, there seems to have been very little foresight on the next step, or how to deal with any potential reaction by Iran to the resolution.

All the resolution has accomplished so far has been to provoke Tehran to lash out by announcing that it would execute an equally shortsighted decision by the Majlis "to cancel all voluntary measures (Iran) has taken and implement all scientific, research and executive programs to enable the rights of the nation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." Given the voluntary nature of the measures under the Additional Protocol, IAEA inspectors are now restricted to operate only under the comprehensive safeguards agreement with Iran, which significantly hampers the Agency's ability to monitor Iran's nuclear activities. The result of this situation is likely to be yet another inconclusive report to the Board.

This backlash was expected and could have been avoided had the proponents of the resolution been a bit more patient and accepted minor amendments. Instead of waiting until the March 6 Board meeting to consider a full and potentially definitive IAEA assessment of Iran's nuclear program, the Board pressed ahead forcing a decision based on inconclusive evidence. Rather than insisting that IAEA Director-General ElBaradei "report" directly to the Security Council, the Board could have asked ElBaradei to "inform" the Council about Iran's misbehavior, allowing him to submit a detailed report to the Board's next meeting on March 6. This approach would have reaffirmed that the final determination to report Iran to the Security Council would lie with the Board. This could also have deterred Tehran from playing a dangerous card by executing a legally binding decision by the Majlis to limit the Agency's ability to prepare a conclusive report.

In what appears to be no-win scenario for all concerned, the political rhetoric coming out of Washington, London, Paris and Tehran - aimed to satisfy their respective political agendas - is pushing this crisis to a point of no return. The political grandstanding by President Ahmadinejad in a February 11 speech marking the anniversary of the 1979 Islamic revolution, when he announced that Iran will withdraw from the NPT,[12] in addition to his other threatening statements aimed at Israel, do not help to address concerns over his claims that Iran aspires only to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Iranian Foreign Ministry did, however, affirm Tehran's commitment to the NPT saying that "We are still committed to the provisions of the NPT. But we can't accept its use as a (political) instrument. We will cooperate in the treaty and the safeguards' framework."[13]

Equally foolish are noises coming from Paris and Washington about possible military strikes against Iran. President Chirac's untimely remark[14] that France would retaliate with nuclear weapons if its interests are attacked by terrorists was irresponsible and unnecessarily provocative. While he restated an already mind-boggling French position that its nuclear arsenal is also used to deter terrorism, the timing of his ill fated remark sent a threatening message to Tehran - a message that expands the role of nuclear weapons and makes it more difficult to argue against an Iranian nuclear weapons program. While Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently tried to placate concerns that the United States intends to push for punitive measures, Washington has not been willing to rule out a military option. Given the current turmoil in the Middle East, the uncertainty over the nature of the Iranian program, and the strong anti-American sentiments in Tehran and elsewhere, any thought of punitive actions, in particular military operations, against Iran would only lead to a further escalation of the crisis along North Korean lines.

If unchecked, this political grandstanding could lead to another international crisis. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's warning that "we cannot continue to lurch from crisis to crisis, until the regime is buried beneath a cascade of nuclear proliferation" now hangs over the IAEA and the UN Security Council as the "sword of Damocles."

The eagerness to put Iran on the Security Council's agenda prematurely starkly reminds of the way the United States and Britain dismissed calls by ElBaradei and his UNMOVIC counterpart Hans Blix almost four years ago when they requested that the Security Council give them three more months to conclude their search for evidence of Iraqi nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Not wanting to be faced by facts presented by the IAEA or UNMOVIC, they invaded Iraq in search of these weapons and started a deadly war with no end in sight.

Reminiscent of then Secretary of State Colin Powell's infamous February 2003 speech to the Security Council about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program, the United States, Britain and now also France want the world to believe that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear weapons. This while IAEA inspectors are still trying to find sufficient evidence of Tehran's failure to comply with its NPT obligations. Other Security Council members must be asking themselves how credible these claims are. Since U.S. and British intelligence assessments remain questionable to say the least, the sudden hard line position of France - vs. its position on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction - also appears dubious. Some wonder if the reason might be because France had more commercial interests in Iraq than it has in Iran. Similarly, in contrast to its strong criticism of American and British efforts to frame Iraq in 2002, Berlin too has been taking a tough line on Iran, raising the question of whether German aspirations for a permanent seat on the Security Council might outweigh its own commercial interests in Iran.

The process whereby the 15 member Security Council would become more substantially involved in the Agency's verification activities, with a diminishing and possibly subservient and even marginal role for the Board, is of even greater concern. This "green light" approach contradicts longstanding agreements that the IAEA - not the Security Council - is the competent authority to verify a state's compliance with its safeguard agreements.

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference agreed, as part of a number of packaged deals that included the treaty's indefinite extension, that the IAEA is the "competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with its statute, compliance with its safeguards agreements" and that "nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard."[15] In 2000, the NPT States Parties went further by also agreeing that concerns regarding noncompliance should be directed to the IAEA to "consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate."[16] It seems that these agreements, along with the "unequivocal" undertaking by the five NPT nuclear powers - China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States - to eliminate their nuclear weapons as part of a series of concrete practical steps have long been forgotten, or conveniently ignored.

It is ironic that the state with the largest nuclear arsenal - the United States - supported by two other nuclear weapons powers - France and the United Kingdom - has the loudest voice in calling for Security Council action against a state suspected of developing, but not yet having, a nuclear weapons capability.

To maintain that Iran poses a threat to international peace and security, absent proof of more than the ability eventually to develop a nuclear weapon, ignores countries like India, Pakistan and Iran's Middle Eastern neighbor, Israel. The double standard evident in the treatment of Israel's undeclared weapons program has long been a source of concern not only to its Middle Eastern neighbors, but to most countries. While India and Pakistan openly declared themselves as nuclear weapon powers in 1998, the Security Council has done virtually nothing in response. Although the United States imposed some economic restrictions against these two states for a time, their nuclear sins were soon forgiven in exchange for supporting Washington's war against terrorism. Instead of taking a lead in maintaining pressure on India to forgo its nuclear weapon option, President Bush promised to award India lucrative nuclear and military related trade deals. The United States is now even attempting to influence the Nuclear Suppliers Group nations in order that they too forgive India for breaching the nuclear weapons taboo.

The message sent by those leading the charge against Iran for not being in full compliance with the NPT, while completely ignoring other nuclear weapon possessing nations outside the treaty, informs others that it is possible to acquire nuclear weapons and get away with it as long as you are on Washington's right side.

India's involvement in the judgment to report Iran to the Security Council raises another principled concern with a negative message. How can a country in clear defiance of the most widely adhered to nuclear nonproliferation norm be allowed to cast a judgment over another state that is part of the norm, but suspected of being in violation of its provisions? India at first indicated that it was unlikely to support the resolution. But despite its good diplomatic and trade relations with Iran, New Delhi supported the resolution in the end, ostensibly as a result of U.S. pressure, but also thanks to arguments put forward by Russia. India's vote was particularly influential in the context of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

Is the world lurching towards yet another nuclear crisis? How can it be avoided?

All concerned should use the little time left before the next Board meeting as "a window of opportunity," as it was so aptly described by Dr ElBaradei recently.[17] While this window might soon slam shut, it is still possible to coerce Iran diplomatically into full cooperation with the IAEA and to build confidence within the broader international community that it is not aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons. As opposed to pushing its longstanding political agenda vis-à-vis Iran, the Bush administration should take the lead in search of a diplomatic solution. This will inevitably require the unthinkable: sitting down face to face with their opposites in Tehran and negotiating a way out of a potential nuclear abyss. The United States has taken the lead in averting nuclear crises in the past. The time has come to again step up to the plate and show leadership.

A good start would be for Washington to give diplomacy a chance and to refrain from ratcheting the issue into a yet another crisis through it own political rhetoric. The United States seems to be set on having the Security Council consider the Iran file, and although Bush administration officials have publicly stated that they do not expect the UN Security Council to take punitive action against Iran, they have yet to rule out military action.

Reports that Pentagon strategists are already planning to bomb Iranian nuclear sites, including with submarine-launched ballistic missiles, border on stupidity. These reports serve no purpose other than to heighten the equally irresponsible rhetoric coming from Tehran. Any attack against Iranian installations could spark a full military confrontation with Iran - something that Washington cannot afford militarily, economically or politically. Tehran's hard line leadership - fully aware of American constraints - has already issued equally threatening responses. Of even more concern is Israel's reaction. Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz has already warned that "Israel will not accept Iran's nuclear armament" and implied that Tel Aviv is preparing for military action to stop Iran's nuclear program.[18]

Not only would an aerial attack on nuclear installations cause death and misery to thousands of Iranian civilians, but it would likely not eliminate all of Iran's nuclear installations. It would behoove Pentagon planners to consider carefully the possible consequences of such attacks. Although Iran's Bushehr reactor is not yet fueled, it could come on line some time later this year, presumably providing the excuse the Pentagon is waiting for. Any attack on the containment structure could lead to a serious dispersal of radiation, affecting not just Iran's Gulf coast, but other west coast Gulf states such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.[19] Radioactive dispersal would of course be far worse if other nuclear installations were hit simultaneously. Iran's reaction to such attacks would likely be to withdraw immediately from the NPT and develop a nuclear weapons capability, much as North Korea did in 2003. It is also likely to launch or encourage retaliatory action by the Lebanese-based Hezbollah group against Israel. Iranian paramilitary units could probably cause mayhem in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, while the Iranian Revolutionary Guard could step up its links with insurgents in Iraq. Any such conflict would definitely cause a global oil crisis, not only because Iran would likely cut off its own oil supply, but also because Tehran is likely to block the Strait of Hormuz, one of the main access routes for oil from the Gulf region. Hopefully common sense will prevail in Washington.

Buying "regime change" in Iran is also not an option. Secretary of State Rice's request for $75 million[20] to somehow pressure the hard line Ahmadinejad government and Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamanei to abdicate and allow a Western style democracy to take over, is completely devoid of any reality. Similar efforts by Washington in Iran and elsewhere have backfired, and in fact worsened relations between the two capitols. All this announcement can possibly accomplish is to solicit another harsh response from Tehran - hardly needed at this dangerous time.

Tehran too should tone down its political rhetoric. While statements coming out of Tehran might serve to rally Iranians and to frustrate Washington and other Western powers, a failure by the Iranian leadership to adopt a more conciliatory and responsible approach before the Security Council gets involved could lead to a disastrous outcome. However, the hard-liners in Tehran may have already concluded--as Kim Jong Il has--that staying inside the NPT without nuclear weapons is no longer in Iran's supreme national interest. If Tehran chooses to leave the Treaty and to develop nuclear weapons it would seriously undermine the nuclear treaty regime, if not blow it wide open.

The situation needs to be defused urgently. It is in Tehran's best interest to avoid the Security Council's involvement. While conclusive action by the Security Council, in particular under Chapter VII, may not be possible at first, the pressures resulting from a deadlocked Council may eventually force less powerful members to acquiesce to the desires of states such as the United States, Britain, and now France. Since the positions of Russia and China are unpredictable at best, Iran should not rely on these powers to bail it out through a Security Council resolution veto.

What are the alternatives?

Instead of beating their war drums in New York, Security Council members should take a sober look at all their options before blindly dragging Iran before the Council.

Firstly, they should avoid placing the issue on the Council's docket. While this might not satisfy the agendas of some, it could defuse a potentially explosive situation. Once the Security Council starts considering a case involving a threat to international peace and security, it triggers a "funnel-like" mechanism which can have less-than-desirable outcomes. The Iranian issue has the potential to spiral down this funnel without serving to resolve the issue. Instead matters could get worse.

There are of course several options at the Security Council's disposal--ranging from the quite mundane to endorsement of a military campaign. The first option would be to issue a presidential statement criticizing Iran's refusal to terminate its conversion and enrichment activities, calling on it to abide by the IAEA's resolutions and to ratify and implement the Additional Protocol with immediate effect. It is also likely to request that the IAEA Director-General report to the Council on further progress towards this end. The Council issued a similar statement in April 1993 in reaction to the IAEA's report on North Korea's noncompliance.

Iran would in all likelihood ignore such a statement, forcing the Council to adopt more forceful measures. The Russians and Chinese, having already expressed clear opposition to a Security Council resolution may threaten to exercise their right of a veto, and are likely call for a deferral of the issue. This would leave the Council deadlocked even before serious discussion on the issue is begun. In reaction, Tehran may allow even less access to IAEA inspectors, or still worse, kick them out.

Even if the Council succeeds in adopting a resolution, it is unlikely to reflect the sentiments likely to be included in a presidential statement given China's and Russia's positions. Again the Council's history with North Korea comes to mind. The last time the Council adopted a resolution in reaction to North Korea's noncompliance was in May 1993. That resolution called on the DPRK to reconsider its 1993 announcement that it was leaving the NPT, and to comply with its safeguards agreements. It also requested that the IAEA Director-General continue to consult with the DPRK to resolve these issues. Despite the IAEA Board of Governor's decision in January 2003 to report North Korea to the Council for its unprecedented withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003 and its subsequent actions to reprocess plutonium and possibly build a number of nuclear warheads, the Council has yet to take up the issue. History has an eerie tendency to repeat itself, leaving Tehran to believe that it can toy with the IAEA and the Security Council and get away with it.

An even bleaker option would be to consider - or even talk about - punitive action against Iran under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This provides the Council with additional two options: Under Article 41 of the Charter it could threaten or impose some sort of restrictions on Iran. These could range from the symbolic and mundane such as travel restrictions and limiting diplomatic ties with Tehran, to economic measures such as freezing Iranian financial assets abroad or trade sanctions, including an embargo on Iranian oil exports. Symbolic measures alone are not likely to change Tehran's position. Economic sanctions, in particular an oil embargo, would clearly be unpalatable for many. At a time when world gas prices at a premium, it would just not make sense to slap sanctions on the world's fourth largest oil producer. In addition to China and Russia's possible negatives votes, other council members such as Argentina, Algeria, Tanzania, Congo and Peru are not likely to support a "punishing" resolution that could lead to sanctions. The Council may find itself yet again deadlocked and blamed for being ineffective. The Council could of course eventually mandate military action as provided for under Article 42 of the Charter, but executing this option remains highly unlikely given the veto powers of Russia and China. Even British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw recently dismissed by stating that military action "is genuinely" not on the table.[21]

A potentially serious pitfall that the Council should avoid is the adoption of a resolution that leaves the door open for unilateral action by a coalition of willing forces or an individual state. In this regard a resolution that threatens Iran with "serious consequences" - as Security Council Resolution 1441 did in Iraq's case - could leave open such options. Another military campaign led by the United States is unthinkable given the already volatile political debate in the United States about the war in Iraq. But such a resolution, likely prompting a strong reaction from Tehran, could provide Tel Aviv with sufficient political motivation to launch a pre-emptive attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, claiming that these facilities pose a direct threat to Israel's security.

Instead of immediately placing the issue on the Council's docket, the option of enriching Iranian uranium in Russia should be fully explored. While indications are that Tehran might be backing out of this deal too, the opportunity still exists. As Moscow clearly has vested political and commercial interests in such an arrangement, it should increase its efforts to convince Tehran that such an arrangement offers a win-win scenario for both Tehran and Moscow, while at the same time delaying, if not averting, involvement by the Security Council. It is time for Tehran to get serious and embrace this opportunity. An agreement to meet its uranium enrichment needs in Russia would not impact on Iran's right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Nor would it mean that Iran could not develop its own capability to enrich uranium in the future. In the meantime, it would serve to allay fears about Iran's current program while building buying time for Tehran to start building much needed confidence in its nuclear intentions. Coupled with its legally required cooperation with the IAEA (to which Iran is committed under its NPT safeguards agreement) and the Additional Protocol (which Iran has already signed), a temporary arrangement would provide proof that Iran is not planning to develop a latent nuclear weapons program. For Russia, on the other hand, such an arrangement, while not commercially attractive at face value, would place it in the center of a diplomatic solution to the current crisis. In the long run, if coupled with ElBaradei's idea of centralizing enrichment activities in multilateral or regional centers, it could have significant financial benefits.

In addition to a delay in placing the issue on the Security Council's agenda, Secretary-General Annan should urgently use the narrow "window of opportunity" available by offering his "good offices" to mediate a way out of what could potentially unfold into a major crisis. Not only would the Secretary-General be within his rights to play an intermediary role between the parties, but he can use his influence and diplomatic skills to bring the parties together and avert a confrontation in the Security Council chamber.

A good way for Annan to play an intermediary role would be to call multiparty talks on the highest levels involving all stakeholders (including Iran, Russia, the United States, China, South Africa and the IAEA). Such talks are urgently needed. Precedent for such a diplomatic approach exists. Despite the IAEA Board's call on the Security Council just over three ago to react to North Korea's unprecedented withdrawal from the NPT, the Council has yet to consider the matter. Instead China initiated the Six-party talks. Although these talks have had mixed results they have served to reduce tensions and bring opposing parties together. If Washington is prepared to discuss mutual concerns with Kim Jong Il's representatives, so too should it find ways to sit down face to face with Tehran. Especially since concerns over the Iranian nuclear program pale in comparison to that of North Korea. Pyongyang is suspected of having already built at least a few nuclear bombs after reprocessing plutonium. Iran is years away from developing the capacity to enrich uranium. Kim Jong Il kicked out the IAEA, while Tehran announced that it will no longer extend its voluntary cooperation with agency inspectors beyond its already legally binding comprehensive safeguards obligations.

In addition to the obvious involvement of Russia and China, Annan should also encourage South Africa to play an intermediary role. Pretoria is a leading force in the Non-Aligned Movement with close political and economic ties with Iran: its abstention from the Board's February resolution made it one of a few countries - if not the only country - that could play an impartial role. Pretoria's abstention should, however, not be seen as necessarily endorsing Iran's position, but it is based on a principled concern that the resolution "initiates a process whereby the Security Council will become more substantially involved in the Agency's verification activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, with a diminishing and possibly subservient and even marginal role for the Board."[22] Echoing his delegation's position at the Board, South African president Thabo Mbeki said that the "board should have waited for a report by Mohammed El-Baradei."[23] South Africa, however, also called on Iran to continue to implement its voluntary, non-legally binding confidence building measures, including the suspension of its enrichment activities, and also called for Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol as soon as possible.[24]

Pretoria is well positioned to convince Tehran and Washington to back away from this unfolding crisis. South Africa has moral standing as the only country that voluntarily dismantled a nuclear weapons program based on a strong principled position that national security does not rely on nuclear weapons, but rather on being a responsible member of the international community. Pretoria's ties with Tehran are equally deeply rooted. In addition to longstanding political relations with South Africa's governing African National Congress (ANC), Iran is South Africa's main supplier of oil. South Africa in return is an important supplier of Iranian industrial equipment, steel and automotive parts. Pretoria maintains equally good relations with Washington with an open line between Presidents Bush and Mbeki. It is time for these two leaders to have a frank discussion, based on mutual respect for each other's positions, on how to resolve the Iranian problem.

Since the most obvious solution - direct talks between Washington and Tehran - would politically be unpalatable for both sides, multiparty talks - using the North Korean six-party talks concept as a basis - would provide a multilateral framework in which all parties' political interests would be protected on the one hand, while offering a venue for a negotiated diplomatic solution on the other. While the option of using the Security Council would of course still be on the table given the IAEA Board's decision, a multiparty form would allow key countries - friends and foes of Tehran - to use their combined political influence to search for diplomatic options to coerce Iran back into compliance. The success of such talks would much depend on the choice of negotiators on each side. Grandstanding would serve no purpose, but would likely derail any possible solution. Instead it would require the involvement of seasoned negotiators with a vested interest in a mutually acceptable outcome and a reputation of being fair, yet tough.

Ultimately the only real solution to prevent Iran, or any other country in the region, from aspiring to have nuclear weapons is to create conditions in the Middle East where no nation has a need for any weapons of mass destruction. However, any convincing initiative to address the aspirations--real and potential--of states in the region to acquire nuclear weapons or other of mass destruction weaponry would need to involve all states there, including Israel. Israel's nuclear weapons program has long been the motivation for radical leaders in the region to argue for acquisition of such weapons themselves. Dealing with the weapons of mass destruction threat in the Middle East on a piecemeal basis has not paid off to date, but the search for a solution to the Iranian crisis could very well offer a timely platform to once and for all deal with this ever increasing threat.

To this end it is encouraging that, at Egypt's insistence, the IAEA Board recognized that a "solution to the Iranian issue would contribute to realizing the objective of a Middle-East free of weapons of mass destruction"[25] thereby indirectly alluding to Israel's nuclear weapon program. In addition to strong NAM support, several key European countries pressured Washington to accept this reference. After apparently checking the wording with the Israelis, the United States finally agreed to insert a paragraph to this effect, thereby ensuring Egypt's support for the resolution. If the Security Council issues a presidential statement, it is very important that this reference be included. Not only could it serve to placate Tehran, but it would also show the Council's eagerness to deal with the Middle East situation in a comprehensive manner.

The Council could also request that the Secretary-General convene a "regional dialogue"[26] on the post-Iraq war future of the Persian Gulf region with the aim of devising principles, rules, and confidence-building measures to structure security relations both among states in the region, and with states outside of the region, including the United States. To this end, regional states would need to clarify that they are not seeking weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, while the United States needs to provide credible assurances that it will not threaten these states through its military presence in the region, and even worse, by making them potential targets of U.S. nuclear weapons.

[1] "Iran Is Judged 10 Years From Nuclear Bomb: U.S. Intelligence Review Contrasts With Administration Statements," Washington Post, August 2, 2005.
[2] "Iran's Next Steps: Final Tests and the Construction of a Uranium Enrichment Plant," A report by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein for the Institute for Science and International Security, January 12, 2006.
[3] Articles 24 and 39 of the UN Charter.
[4] Interview Foreign Secretary Jack Straw gave with the BBC Persian Service, February 7, 2006, http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391629&a=KArticle&aid=1138870938917
[5] Articles XII.C and Article III.B.4 of the IAEA's Charter mandate the Board of Governors to report a case of non-compliance to the Security Council.
[6] At this meeting the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany and the High Representative of the European Union called upon Iran to restore in full the suspension of enrichment-related activity, including R&D, under the supervision of the IAEA. The meeting resulted in an agreement that the Security Council should wait for the March report of the Director General before deciding to take action.
[7] INFCIRC 637, November 26, 2004.
[8] Article XII.C and Article III.B.4 of the IAEA Statute.
[9] Quote taken from the statement by Mr. Abdul Samad Minty, Governor of the Republic of South Africa, at the Special Meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Related Board Resolutions, Vienna, Austria, February 4, 2006.
[10] As quoted in "Iran's Nuclear Challenge: The Resolution," New York Times February 5, 2006.
[11] Explanatory Remarks by Ambassador Wu HaiLong, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/t233958.htm.
[12] IRNA, February 11, 2006, http://www.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-24/0602117847144128.htm.
[13] IRNA, February 12, 2006, http://www.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-17/0602124998115100.htm.
[14] "France delivers Nuclear Threat," FT.Com, January 20, 2006.
[15] 1995 Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, paragraph 9.
[16] Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
[17] IAEA Director General Press Release, February 2, 2006.
[18] Statement by Minister Shaul Mofaz on January 21, 2006
[19] "Thousands would die in US strikes on Iran, says study," Guardian, February 13, 2006.
[20] "State Dept. tells how U.S. plans to confront Iran," Washington Post, February 16, 2006.
[21] "Straw rules out threat of military action against Iran," January 29, 2006, News.telegraph www.telegraph.co.uk.
[22] Statement by Mr. Abdul Samad Minty, Governor of the Republic of South Africa at the Special Meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Related Board Resolutions, Vienna, Austria, February 4, 2006.
[23] Interview with South African president Thabo Mbeki, SABC, February 6, 2006.
[24] See statement by Abdul S. Minty.
[25] IAEA Board of Governors resolution adopted on February 4, 2006 (GOV/2004/14).
[26] George Perkovich referred to the need for a regional dialogue in his article "Wooing Iran Away From the Axis of Evil," published in the San Diego Union-Tribune, June 8, 2003.

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