CNS Research Story
Nonproliferation Issues Raised by U.S.-India Nuclear Deal
March 2, 2006
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U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
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With few details yet known regarding
the content of the
agreement signed by U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, it is too early to provide a comprehensive
authoritative analysis and evaluation of the accord. Nonetheless, what has been
initially disclosed about the pact raises a range of important issues, which
will require further attention as the agreement is assessed by the U.S.
Congress, the 45-member
Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the broader
international community.
A fundamental question raised by the
agreement is whether it strengthens or weakens efforts to curb the spread of
nuclear weapons.
Issue I: In explaining the agreement the Bush
Administration has stressed that India has enacted tough export control
regulations, agreed to continue its moratorium on nuclear testing, agreed not to
export sensitive uranium enrichment and plutonium separation (reprocessing)
technologies, and to work with the United States on negotiating a global ban on
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
- An assessment will be needed of which of these undertakings were already Indian
policy prior to the July 18, 2005, Bush-Singh Summit, where the contours of the
March 2 agreement were endorsed; which are required by international law,
irrespective of the March 2 agreement; and which are the product, specifically
of the March 2 agreement.
Issue II: Under the
agreement India will undertake to divide its nuclear facilities into civilian and
military installations and to place the civilian facilities under International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection, precluding their use for nuclear
weapons. Information released on March 2 indicated that India will place approximately two-thirds of its
nuclear installations under IAEA monitoring.
- An assessment will be needed as to whether the division between civilian and
military facilities constrains Indian nuclear weapons production capabilities or
leaves such capabilities intact, or actually facilitates India's ability to produce more fissile material.
Issue III: Based on
available information, a number of nuclear power reactors, using
Canadian-supplied technology, will not be placed under IAEA inspection. These
facilities can be used both to produce electricity and weapons-quality
plutonium. In the agreement it appears that a number of these reactors will be
placed on India's military list, intended for use in the country's
nuclear weapons program.
- An assessment will be needed as to whether the division means that
technology originally supplied by outside states that was intended for peaceful
uses will now be used for military purposes. If India has now declared a
diversion of technology from peaceful to military use, an assessment will be
required as to whether India can be expected to reliably abide by future civil
nuclear trade agreements.
Issue IV. It appears
that plutonium (separated and in spent fuel) that was created previously in
reactors that will now be placed under IAEA inspection will not, itself, be
subject to inspection. This will provide a substantial stockpile of material
for the enlargement of the Indian nuclear weapons arsenal.
- An assessment will be needed of the impact of this uninspected stockpile of
material on the overall dimensions of the March 2 agreement.
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Professor William Potter, Director of CNS, expresses concern about US-India agreement:
"Based on
available information about the accord, the Bush administration appears to be
heading toward a train wreck with Congress over the agreement, which was
hurriedly patched together and fails to meet even minimal nonproliferation
concerns. Unless major revisions are undertaken, the casualties could
include a seriously weakened NPT and an increasingly irrelevant Nuclear
Suppliers Group."
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Issue V. It appears that new civil
nuclear cooperation by the United States and other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group could provide uranium supplies for the Indian nuclear power
program that will enable India to use more limited indigenous uranium supplies
for nuclear weapons.
- An assessment will be needed of whether such assistance from the United
States would violate its obligation under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to
"not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices...." Other nuclear supplier states have similar
obligations.
Issue VI. Ending the nuclear trade
embargo against India could create important precedents.
- An assessment will be needed as to whether the U.S.-India agreement will
encourage other similarly situated states, such as Pakistan, to seek comparable
exceptions from existing international rules of nuclear commerce; will
encourage other states, such as Iran, to leave the nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty; will encourage states like Brazil, which joined the NPT in the
expectation that this would provide access to civil nuclear technology denied to
states out side the treaty, to reconsider their support for the treaty.
Issue VII. More broadly, in promoting the
agreement, the Bush Administration has emphasized that it is a key factor in
cementing U.S.-Indian relations on such important issues as meeting the threat
of radical Islam and serving as a military counter-weight to China.
- With U.S-Indian relations already flourishing, including in the area of
defense cooperation, an assessment will be needed as to whether the agreement is
central to the enhancement of U.S.-Indian strategic relations or merely an
additional, non-essential element in improving ties between the two nations.
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