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Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary and chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani with EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana. View Map of Iranian Nuclear Sites: [Src: www.nti.org]

Iran's Nuclear Impasse: Give Negotiations A Chance

Sammy Salama and Elizabeth Salch

June 2, 2006

As direct negotiations between the United States and Iran may finally materialize, it is critical to remember that armed conflict is both unnecessary and would be mutually destructive. Following the decision to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council, rhetoric emanating from both Iran and the west, together with Iranian military exercises in the Gulf, Tehran's uranium enrichment announcement, and extensive media reports in early April of alleged U.S. administration war planning for an attack on Iran, gave the impression that a military confrontation over Iran's nuclear program was inevitable. Numerous worst case scenarios have been aired portraying Iran as on the verge of obtaining nuclear weapons, at the same time that reports of alleged Iranian support or cooperation with al-Qa'ida are increasing. Furthermore, discussion of regime change in Iran has grown as well. Not surprisingly, the rhetoric largely outpaces the evidence regarding the actual state of Iran's nuclear program, while there is as yet little credible evidence demonstrating concrete ties between Iran and al-Qa'ida.

This report examines the current impasse surrounding Iran's nuclear program. Specifically, it asks how close Iran is to enriching sufficient uranium for nuclear warhead production, assesses whether the increasing international alarm accurately reflects the state of Iran's nuclear program, explores increased Arab concern over Iran's nuclear program, and reviews the merits of allegations of Iranian support to al-Qa'ida and insurgents in Iraq. Western diplomatic efforts to hinder Iran's eventual attainment of a nuclear weapons capability have made significant gains in recent months. These include finding Iran in non-compliance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), reporting Iran to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), causing internal division among Iran's elite, and increasing regional opposition to Iran's nuclear program. As a result, military action against Iran remains unnecessary and would be quite risky at this juncture. Despite the heated rhetoric, cooler heads need to prevail. Diplomacy and negotiations with Iran should be given time to succeed.

U.S. Diplomatic Successes:

Iran Found in Non-Compliance of the NPT

The IAEA Board of Governors' September 24, 2005, resolution on Iran found Tehran to be in non-compliance with the NPT, as a result of its deceitful actions regarding the nature of its nuclear programs. Following the Board's decision, Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Manouchehr Mottaki stated that in an effort to "build confidence with the international community in this respect, we [Iran] have adopted a whole range of measures, including the signing and implementing of the additional protocol, voluntarily suspending enrichment activities for nearly two years and facilitating the IAEA to carry out 1,200 day/persons inspection in our facilities."[1] Yet, according to IAEA reports dating from 2004 to the present, it is evident that Iran was not in compliance with its safeguards obligations, as a member of the NPT. According to the September 24, 2005, resolution, Iran failed to fulfill its Safeguards Agreement over an extended period of time by failing to report nuclear materials, processing and using nuclear materials, and failure to make accurate declarations regarding facilities where nuclear materials have been stored or processed.[2] The September 24, 2005, resolution also states that Iran followed a "policy of concealment" until 2003 that breached the conditions of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.[3] Furthermore, the IAEA notes that Iran has not been forthcoming regarding its plutonium experiments. Details regarding Iran's attempts to obtain equipment for hot cells, dual use facilities that can be used for medical isotope production or for separating plutonium from spent reactor fuel, have not yet been disclosed to the IAEA.

According to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, the hot cells Iran attempted to build are more suited for plutonium separation than medical isotope production. The IAEA also determined that Iran inaccurately reported the dates of plutonium-separation experiments. Iranian officials originally claimed the plutonium separation experiments occurred in 1993, but subsequently divulged they did not end until 1998.[4] Another critical issue with regards to Iranian noncompliance concerns the P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programs that began in 1987. An August 11, 2005, IAEA resolution states that the IAEA has not yet been able to verify the "correctness and completeness" of the chronologies of P-1 and P-2 centrifuge enrichment programs that Iran has provided to officials.[5] Recent reports indicate Iran received nuclear assistance from the A.Q. Khan nuclear trafficking network from 1986 to 1995. Iran allegedly paid millions of dollars for P-1 and P-2 centrifuges, training programs for scientists, assistance in casting uranium metal, and nuclear weapons designs from the A.Q. Khan network.[6] All of these transactions were conducted covertly and without IAEA knowledge or supervision. Iran continues to be reluctant to cooperate with IAEA efforts to obtain answers to the true nature of its relationship with the A.Q. Khan network.

Report to the U.N. Security Council

In a surprising turn of events, on January 31, 2005, Russia and China announced their intention to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) after intense negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (known as the EU-3). Thus, on February 4, 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors agreed on a resolution to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council. The resolution passed by a large majority: 27 votes in favor, three against, and five abstentions.[7] The February 4, 2006, resolution expressed a greater sense of urgency than previous resolutions, and encouraged Iran to become more transparent and cooperate more fully with the IAEA. Moreover, the resolution declared that the director general is to report to the Security Council that Iran is "required" to implement a confidence-building program, which includes a suspension of uranium enrichment programs, reconsideration of a heavy water research reactor, ratification and implementation of the Additional Protocol, and adoption of extensive transparency measures.[8] At the behest of Russia and China, Iran was not to be reported to the Security Council until March 2006, thus allowing for further IAEA reporting and research. The resumption of uranium conversion and enrichment activities at Isfahan on August 8, 2005, and Natanz on January 10, 2006, was cited as key reasons to report Iran to the Security Council. Additionally, Iran's possession of a document detailing how to produce uranium metal hemispheres further contributed to its referral to the UNSC. The existence of this document, which the IAEA only recently discovered, is cited as an example of the IAEA's inability after three years of investigation to "clarify some important issues relating to Iran's nuclear program."[9]

Prior to the official decision of February 4, 2006, to report Iran to the Security Council, Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, stated that "We (Iran) consider any referral of Iran to the Security Council as the end of diplomacy."[10] It was therefore not surprising that Iran responded to its referral to the Security Council by resuming all nuclear-related activities without any restrictions and by extensively limiting access for IAEA monitoring.[11] Furthermore, Iran officially ended its voluntary adherence to the Additional Protocol via Minister Mottaki's statement that "we do not have any obligation toward the additional protocol (anymore)."[12] This resulted in limited IAEA inspections and the removal of IAEA monitoring equipment from nuclear facilities. Additionally, Iran publicly stated that it intended to resume uranium enrichment at Natanz despite any adverse consequences such actions may have on negotiations. In a statement to the IAEA in February, 2006, following its referral to the Security Council, Iran stated that it is "logically and legally bound" to invoke such measures even though such actions further erode the confidence and trust of the U.S., EU-3, and the IAEA.[13] Furthermore, Iran asserted that the referral had no "legal and technical basis" because it had extended its full cooperation to the IAEA and always acted within the boundaries of being a member party to the NPT.[14] Iran also expressed concern over the changes in Russian and Chinese views by saying that the recent "developments have revealed the political pressures over the Board."[15]

Iran caused the international community further alarm by taking additional decisions that went against Western attempts to halt Iranian uranium activities via a diplomatic solution. Talks with Russia initially scheduled to take place on February 16, 2006, were first postponed indefinitely and then moved to February 20, 2006, at the request of Iranian officials.[16] Iranian presidential spokesman Gholamhossein Elham reported that the talks had been temporarily called off because of the "new situation" regarding Russian's decision to vote in favor of reporting Iran to the Security Council.[17] Secondly, diplomats in Vienna reported that workers had begun to feed uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas into centrifuges at Iran's Pilot Enrichment Facility.[18] Iranian deputy nuclear negotiator to the IAEA Javad Vaeidi stated that "the order to resume uranium enrichment has been issued and, in accordance with that, the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization has restarted the process."[19]

Europe, Russia, and China still support a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. Despite recent reports concerning American planning for a preemptive strike against Iran, the U.S. administration maintains it is still committed to diplomacy.[20] Then British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw has emphatically and repeatedly stated Britain is opposed to military action against Iran. Russia has maintained its offer to continue negotiations on uranium enrichment. Furthermore Russian officials publicly are committed to a path of diplomacy rather than military action,[21] while China has taken a similar stance. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao has stated that "China expresses its concern over the current development of the Iran nuclear issues" and urges Iran to continue uranium enrichment talks with Russia as scheduled in hope of achieving "positive results."[22]

The IAEA finding that Iran is in noncompliance with the NPT and its subsequent referral of Iran to the UN Security Council are in line with the U.S. desire for Iran's nuclear program to be halted. While the effort to discourage Iran from enriching uranium on Iranian soil faces many impediments, the fact that Iran's file is at the Security Council gives the United States and its allies the opportunity to persuade the council to impose meaningful diplomatic and economic penalties if Iran continues to insist on flouting international will.

Still No Smoking Gun

Although the United States remains resolute in its view that Iran is working towards becoming a nuclear weapons state, the IAEA has been unable to uncover clear evidence of nuclear weapons programs on Iranian territory. Reports by U.S. officials allege that Iranian engineers have completed highly sophisticated drawings of a 400 meter long underground tunnel that has schematics similar to a nuclear test site. The drawings allegedly show that the tunnel has a remote-controlled heat system and pressure sensors that U.S. officials claim are indicative of Iran's ambition secretly to test nuclear weapons in a subterranean environment.[23] Yet, nowhere on the drawings does the word nuclear appear, there is no evidence of the authors' identities, and there is no known evidence of a program to acquire, assemble, and construct the parts and pieces of an underground test site.[24] Additional allegations are derived from a laptop computer allegedly smuggled out of Iran to Turkey in 2004 by a defector. Western officials claim that the laptop contains information on a small-scale facility, run by the Kimeya Madon firm, to produce UF4 gas, also known as "green salt," for the Iranian Republican Guard. The laptop also allegedly contains information for modifications to the Shahab-3 missile that would enhance its performance. Despite the detailed nature of the allegations, U.S. intelligence officials state that they cannot be proven because it is possible that the laptop, which contains large amounts of now classified information, could be part of "the biggest scam perpetrated on U.S. intelligence."[25] Furthermore, U.S. intelligence officials claim that the word "nuclear" does not appear on any of the documents found on the laptop.[26]

As the primary investigative body responsible for determining the purpose of Iran's nuclear research program, the IAEA has not found conclusive evidence corroborating the various allegations made by some Western officials. As a result of IAEA inspections and investigations, suspicious items and dual use items have been found in Iran, but none that provide full, overarching proof of nuclear research for anything other than peaceful purposes. In a September 24, 2005, resolution, the IAEA indicated that there are numerous instances of Iranian noncompliance, but indicated that conclusive evidence regarding Iran's pursuit of nuclear energy for weapons purposes has not been found. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reported in December 2005 that "there is lots of speculation" about Iran's nuclear-related activities, but says that "we (IAEA) try to work on the basis of facts. We haven't seen a smoking gun in Iran."[27]

The most recent report released by the director general regarding the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran indicates that after ongoing inspections at civilian and military sites through February 2006, there is still no evidence proving the existence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. The report, released on February 27, 2006, states that IAEA inspections have yet to provide evidence of "diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."[28] On April 13, 2006, while in Tehran, ElBaradei reiterated the conclusions of the February IAEA report when he stated that "we have not seen diversion of nuclear material for weapons purposes, but the picture is still hazy and not very clear."[29] The February report also indicates that "Iran has permitted the Agency to visit defense related sites at Kolahdouz, Lavisan, and Parchin. The Agency did not observe any unusual activities in the buildings visited at Kolahdouz and Parchin, and the results of environmental sampling did not indicate the presence of nuclear material at those locations. The Agency is still assessing the available information, and awaiting other additional information, in relation to the Lavisan site."[30] However, the report clearly states that Iran is still culpable because it has not provided a sufficient level of transparency in order for the IAEA categorically to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran.[31] Due to this lack of transparency and instances of perceived Iranian deception, the IAEA still can not give Iran a clean bill of health. The IAEA inspection and verification process will continue until a conclusive decision based on factual evidence can be reached regarding Iran's nuclear program. In mid-May 2006, it was reported that IAEA inspectors found some traces of HEU in Lavisan. The IAEA has yet to comment officially on this alleged finding. Diplomats have indicated that the findings were preliminary and need to be confirmed through lab tests.[32] It is unclear as yet if these alleged HEU traces were of foreign origin, like the contaminated centrifuge equipment imported from Pakistan.[33] Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi rushed to deny these allegations and stated, "They are not based on credible evidence and remind of the agency's previous charges that were later dismissed by IAEA itself."[34]

While the IAEA declared in the September 24, 2005, resolution that Iran has acted in a deceitful manner regarding the nature of its nuclear programs, it has indicated that the motives for Tehran's actions remain undetermined. The resolution states that there is uncertainty "of Iran's motives in failing to make important declarations...and pursuing a policy of concealment."[35] The resolution leaves open the possibility that what the U.S. and Europe interpret as deceit through concealment and lack of transparency could be Iran's method of protecting its sovereignty. The resolution in essence recognizes that deception does not necessarily indicate a hidden nuclear weapons program, but strongly clarifies that outstanding questions and issues will only be resolved by adhering to measures of transparency and international norms as outlined in the NPT and the Additional Protocol. The IAEA notes that Iran has demonstrated deceit through minimal levels of transparency and high levels of concealment regarding nuclear facilities, access to pertinent documents and key officials, and the chronologies of events pertaining to nuclear activities. The resolution urges Iran to allay the fears that have arisen as a result of its actions by implementing measures to provide transparency and allow full implementation of the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol.

Where weapons of mass destruction programs in the Middle East are concerned, deception does not necessarily mean that a country is hiding a viable WMD capability. In the Middle East, transparency is viewed as a weakness and as a major concession that is only worthwhile if handsomely rewarded (à la Libya). Transparency to international institutions is also viewed as an affront to sovereignty. Furthermore, the region has an inherent suspicion of the involvement of international institutions, which is often seen as a pretext for superpowers to interfere in regional affairs. Many in the region also believe that open-ended international inquiries are no more than pretexts for superpowers to pressure regional powers indefinitely irregardless of compliance--in the case of Iraq, many in the region argue Baghdad was unfairly penalized and attacked even after it complied with international demands to destroy its WMD arsenal. The fact that Iran has not been completely forthcoming with the IAEA is not surprising; it is rather to be expected. Middle Eastern nations are likely more often than not to resist international demands for transparency. In two specific cases of deception, Iran's behavior is not unexpected. While western observers will point to Iranian deception in not disclosing the existence of Natanz and Arak to the IAEA for many years, Iran contended that it had more than 180 additional days to make such disclosures and was not obligated to do so before that time. As for the procurement of nuclear material from the A.Q. Khan network, the Iranians claim that they had to pursue black market venues since the West would not allow them access to enrichment technologies on open markets, although this access is permitted under the NPT. Former lead Iranian nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani and others in Tehran have argued that Iran's acquisition of nuclear technology on the black market cannot be seen as an act of deception since it was common knowledge that Iranian firms were acquiring such technology or components from European and other sources.

As the case of Iraq clearly demonstrated, deception does not equal a WMD capability. We now know with certainty from the extensive investigations of the Iraq Survey Group, IAEA, and UNMOVIC that in spite of its posturing, Iraq did not posses a WMD capability in the few years prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Iraqi deception was meant to guard Saddam Hussein (who the Iraqis believed the United States wished to assassinate) and to save face and portray strength. Yet despite the inspections of the 1990s, countless Iraqi denials, and even Hussein Kamel's defection and unequivocal declaration that he had ordered the destruction of all Iraqi WMD[36], thanks to Iraqi deceitful behavior most Westerners simply did not believe that Iraq was not hiding a WMD capability. Yet the facts today indicate otherwise. Of particular concern is that many Iranian leaders believe that Western powers hostile to Iran will not be satisfied irregardless of any additional concessions from Tehran. They feel that Iran's voluntary signing of the IAEA Additional Protocol and voluntary commitment to the Paris Accord and resulting suspension of nuclear activities did not reduce western hostility; on the contrary, it emboldened Iran's enemies. This constitutes another formidable hurdle to a peaceful resolution.

Is Iran on the Brink of Nuclear Weapons Capability?

Impediments Faced by Iran's Nuclear Program - Mining

An investigation of individual aspects of Iran's known nuclear capabilities reveals that Tehran still faces several substantial hurdles to the construction of a nuclear explosive device. Uranium mining is the first step in any nuclear program, whether it be for energy or military purposes. In 1990, uranium deposits were found in Iran's Yazd province southeast of Tehran.[37] This discovery was critical because it gave Iran the potential to acquire an indigenous nuclear program if technologies for conversion and enrichment could be mastered. States lacking natural uranium deposits rely on imported uranium that is transported under strict export control systems. Lack of access to fissile material is often the largest obstacle to achieving a nuclear weapon capability. Iran clearly has proven uranium deposits within its borders, but Mohsen Aminzadeh, ex-Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran, recently claimed that Iran's limited uranium mining capabilities demonstrate an impediment to Iran's ability to have a nuclear program. On March 7, 2006, in a daring expose aimed at criticizing the dangerous direction chosen by President Ahmadinajad with regards to Iran's nuclear program as well as his generally hostile posture, Mr. Aminzadeh published the critique "The Biggest Diplomatic Defeat for the Islamic Republic of Iran" in the Iranian reformist daily Emrooz.[38] He stated that "Iran needs to import uranium for its [Bushehr] reactor, even if one day it can enrich uranium, because Iran's discovered uranium resources are limited. They are only enough for about four or five years of reactors' consumption."[39]

Mr. Aminzadeh argued that despite significant technological gains in recent years, Iran is still very much reliant on foreign assistance for the raw materials, components and expertise that is needed for the success of their nuclear program. Hence, were sanctions to be enacted and Iran subjected to further international isolation, the country would likely either face substantial difficulties or become unable to continue to develop its nuclear pursuits. While Mr. Aminzadeh does not provide exact estimates of Iran's uranium mining capabilities, his revelations of its limitations are nevertheless significant.

In addition to shining a light on technical hurdles in Iran's nuclear program Mr. Aminzadeh also exposed a rift within Iran's ruling elite: many reformists such as former President Khatami feel that the course chosen by the current Iranian administration is counterproductive to Iran's own interests. In late March it was reported that a group of notable Iranian reformists including former cabinet members sent a blunt letter to Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warning of the dangerous consequences of Ahmadinajad's policies.[40] Aminzadeh harshly criticizes the current administration's belligerence and lack of diplomatic prudence. He states with regard to Iran's predicament after it was found in non-compliance of the NPT and subsequent referral to the United Nations Security Council:

What has happened about Iran can be seen as the biggest American victory [of] its kind. All the friends of Iran in the world tried to convince it to change its diplomatic path and not endanger itself. All the friends of Iran told that the US looks for an international consensus against Iran; and if Iran does not behave prudently this consensus will emerge and then they would not be able to do anything. This issue has been frequently mentioned in the last months to the policy makers and even it was covered by the media; but those in authority did not pay attention to it. The consensus that has emerged against Iran is unfortunately unique of its kind; and that is why, this issue so far is seen as a big victory for the Bush government ... These decision makers exactly paved the path that the Americans desired, despite the efforts of all the friends of Iran to prevent it from walking in that path. Naturally, these decision makers will be [held] responsible. These people not only claimed that the file would not be referred to the Security Council, but also they were accusing with cowardice all who talked about such possibility and warned them for more prudence.[41]

These revelations by this former high ranking Iranian official are quite noteworthy, particularly since they highlight the fact that in the near term, despite continuing bravado, Iran's nuclear program is still reliant on foreign assistance for its success and viability, and they illustrate a growing rift within Iran's ruling elite concerning the direction of Iran's nuclear program. The statement also indicates that many Iranians as well as Iran's friends abroad have been warning the current administration that its persistence is playing into the hands of Iran's opponents. It is clear that this advice has fallen on deaf ears to date, as far as the hardliners are concerned. Their harsh rhetoric and unwillingness to compromise indeed have resulted in growing international opposition to Iran and ultimately to the referral of Iran's nuclear file to the U.N. Security Council, which has the authority to impose economic sanctions and other painful penalties. At the same time, any military attack on Iran would solidify the power of the hardliners, as the Iranian people will rally around their flag and the reformists will be forced to tow the line and shelve their criticisms for fear of being accused of sedition and lack of patriotism. On May 2, Iran announced the discovery of three additional sites with uranium deposits, in Khoshoomi region, Charchooleh, and Narigan.[42] The output of these new sites and whether in the short term they will yield sufficient uranium for Iran's nuclear needs remains to be seen.

Conversion

Iran's nuclear program faces further impediments in effectively converting yellowcake (concentrated uranium oxide) to uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6). In order to temporarily disable Iran's progress in perfecting uranium conversion techniques, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (EU3) concluded the Paris Accord with Iran on November 15, 2004, that ultimately resulted in a nine-month moratorium on uranium research. This ended on August 1, 2005, when Iran notified the IAEA of its intention to resume uranium conversion activities at the Isfahan facility in central Iran.[43] Soon after on August 8, 2005 the report by the Director General of the IAEA stated that Iran had begun to feed uranium ore concentrate into the first section of the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Isfahan.[44] Iran's announcement triggered serious alarm within the international community and widespread conjecture that it was moving closer to becoming a nuclear weapon state.

Yet despite the alarm, several Western sources speculate that Iran has not been successful in producing high quality UF6. This could prove to be a crucial impediment to a nuclear program, whether it is for peaceful or military purposes. One Western diplomat claimed that Iran's UF6 is "worthless" while another stated that Iranian UF6 is not "worthless, but UF6 produced in Isfahan is of such a low quality that if it is injected into centrifuge equipment it will damage them."[45] Furthermore, it is reported that the low quality UF6 produced at Isfahan is contaminated with molybdenum and other elements, which will require Iran additional time to overcome.[46] Impure UF6 further complicates the uranium enrichment process and cannot be used as feed material for centrifuges. If these statements are accurate, nuclear weapons construction via uranium enrichment would be very difficult, and take a considerable amount of time. Moreover, in order to produce one kilogram of highly enriched uranium 176 kilograms of UF6 gas are required (20-25 kilograms are needed for nuclear warhead assembly). If the quality of the UF6 is lower than normal, production of adequate amounts of HEU would be a more daunting and distant endeavor.

Enrichment

Uranium enrichment is another critical and intricate phase of the nuclear fuel cycle that must be mastered to perfection in order to have a uranium based successful nuclear weapons program. In order to quell Western fears related to the use of Iranian uranium enrichment facilities, particularly Natanz, in November 2005 Russia proposed that it develop a joint enterprise with Iran to convert UF6 gas into enriched uranium on Russian territory. The low enriched uranium (LEU) that results would be returned to Iran for use in nuclear power plants. According to French foreign ministry spokesman Jean-Baptiste Mattei, the Russian proposal was a response "to the worries of the international community in terms of proliferation and, at the same time, gives Iran the means to develop a pacific nuclear program."[47] Iran rejected the initial Russian proposal in late November and suggested an "improvement" to a December 24, 2005, proposal because it did not consider the plan to be "complementary and workable," according to Hamid Reza Asefi, an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman.[48] More recently, Iran further alarmed the international community by resuming nuclear research at its Natanz facility on January 10, 2006. In an act of defiance, Iranian officials removed IAEA seals on the uranium enrichment equipment there. The Russian offer was also turned down once again in March 2006.

Uranium enrichment is a process that requires high levels of technical accuracy in addition to sufficient amounts of time to complete testing phases. Therefore, until a country with a budding nuclear program reaches the point of efficient technical accuracy on a large scale, it cannot produce large quantities of enriched uranium. Iran is currently in this situation. Prior to the November 2004 suspension, Iran had an estimated 700 centrifuges in working condition at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz, but had constructed only one test cascade of 164 centrifuges. The 164 centrifuge test cascade at the PFEP was never operated in full because Iran had only tested UF6 in a very small centrifuge cascade of 19 machines before agreeing to the voluntary suspension in November 2004. Numerous technical hurdles must be overcome before Iran can seriously engage in uranium enrichment activities. Approximately 30 percent of the 164 centrifuges broke or crashed when the cascade was shut down at the start of Iran's voluntary freeze of nuclear-related activities and would therefore have to be repaired in order to continue uranium enrichment. If proper repairs are made and Iran begins to feed UF6 into the centrifuges, it is possible that major setbacks will be encountered, such as excessive vibration of the centrifuges or leakage of the vacuum inside the cascade. If these technical hurdles are not overcome, Iran will not be able to duplicate cascades and subsequently construct larger cascades to produce enough enriched uranium for a nuclear warhead.[49]

Current estimates state that the PFEP can hold a total of six, 164-machine cascades, which is a total of approximately 1,000 centrifuges. By this estimate, the Natanz facility would need modifications to produce sufficient quantities of HEU for nuclear weapons. Time is an important factor in producing a successful and efficient nuclear program. At Natanz, preparing the 164-machine test cascade alone is likely to take at least two months, added to which approximately 6 months to 1 year will be needed to prove that the test cascade can operate successfully. Some experts estimate that if Iran were to decide to build a nuclear bomb it could do so no earlier than 2009, given the progress of its gas centrifuge program, which is believed to be the pivotal factor in uranium enrichment. These worst-case time estimates are based on the assumption that the Iranians will not encounter major production problems. Yet many experts do anticipate that Iran will encounter technical difficulties that could delay operation of the centrifuge plant, such as trouble constructing large quantities of centrifuges in a small period of time or taking long periods of time to overcome problems in operating the cascades, during the testing phase at Natanz.[50] On April 11, 2006, Iran announced that it had produced a limited quantity of LEU suitable for fueling a power station.[51] Enrichment of sufficient amounts of HEU will be much more arduous and time consuming. Equally important, Western diplomats indicated a high probability that the UF6 used by the Iranians for this limited enrichment was of Chinese origin, namely a small stock of uranium hexafluoride gas Iran imported from China in 1991. As previously discussed, this illustrates the fact that despite Tehran's bravado, Iranian indigenous conversion capabilities remain sub-par and its UF6 contaminated with impurities.[52]

While worse-case scenario estimates predicting Iranian enrichment of adequate amounts of fissile material within three years may be possible, longer-term scenarios are more likely. The U.S. intelligence community and other notable observers such as Hans Blix, former head of UNMOVIC and previous IAEA director general, indicate that Iranian mastery of enrichment technology and production of large amounts of HEU will likely take more than 5 years and could well take up to a decade.[53] As stated by Mr. Blix, "We have time. Iran will not be able to have an (atomic) bomb ready within five years."[54] Similarly, John Negroponte, the director of U.S. National Intelligence, told the BBC on June 2, 2006, that Iran will not reach a nuclear weapon capability prior to 2010 and may take up to ten years. He stated, "We don't have a clear-cut knowledge but the estimate we have made is some time between the beginning of the next decade and the middle of the next decade they might be in a position to have a nuclear weapon, which is a cause of concern."[55]

The fact remains that in the short term Iran still has various challenges to overcome. More so, Iran relied heavily on foreign assistance to procure much of its nuclear technology and components, but such assistance in the future is less likely due to increasing Iranian isolation and the possibility of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran. As the former Deputy Foreign Minister Aminzadeh warned, with regard to technological procurement for conversion, enrichment, and the nuclear program as a whole, "The partial achievements of the previous government, for example the construction of Isfahan's UCF factory and providing the necessary requirements... via informal international markets, were only possible under the conditions of global trust. In the situations of crisis, it will not be possible anymore to have access to the informal market. Therefore, having these experiences again will be either impossible or too time-consuming."[56] Mr. Aminzadeh's warning is on point; the mounting diplomatic pressure on Iran has resulted in increased international scrutiny of Iranian technological procurement. Just this March, the German government broke a supply ring involving up to 41 companies that allegedly had supported Iran's nuclear program, and the Japanese government added 4 Iranian companies to its export control list for fears of high technology exports to Iran in support of WMD programs.[57] The above-mentioned impediments facing Iran's mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle demonstrate that the threat of Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability remains long-term and at this point does not warrant excessive alarm or military action. As noted on May 30, 2006 by IAEA Director General ElBaradei during a discussion in Monterey, "There is no imminent threat... there is no clear and present danger... We still have lots of time to investigate that, we still have lots of time to negotiate with Iran in the international community."[58]

Russia and China - A Change of Heart?

Until Iran resumed uranium enrichment at the Natanz facility, Russia and China had used their political powers to protect Iran vis-à-vis the West and the IAEA. China has declared its support for using the IAEA diplomatic framework to resolve outstanding nuclear issues while insisting that "Iran's legitimate concerns should be treated fairly and objectively."[59] Both Russia and China played substantial and successful roles in thwarting Western attempts to bring Iran before the Security Council in September 2005. China has made significant economic investments in Iran, worth approximately $70-100 billion. Chinese investment in Iran includes a 50 percent stake in the Yadavaran oil fields and a contract for 250 million tons of liquefied natural gas.[60] A Chinese government delegation was scheduled to visit Iran in March to formally sign an agreement that would award Sinopec (China Petrochemical Corporation) the rights to develop Yadavaran.[61] Despite Western opposition, Russia continued to cooperate with Iran, providing aid to Iranian nuclear and military programs. Russia is currently helping Iran to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant and in December 2005 agreed to sell Iran a Tor-M1 mobile surface-to-air missile defense system.[62] Russia has further cooperated on nuclear issues with Iran through its proposal to enrich uranium on Russian territory in an attempt to placate both Iranian and Western powers. Iran has turned down previous Russian proposals to regarding uranium enrichment, but Russia has pledged to continue negotiations and "develop dialogue" with its "Iranian partners," according to Russian President, Vladimir Putin.[63]

However if Iran remains defiant, and fails to respond to calls by the IAEA and UN Security Council to suspend its enrichment activities, Russia and China are increasingly likely to abandon their Iranian ally to face harsh international pressure. A March 29, 2006, Security Council Presidential Statement called upon Iran to begin a full and sustained suspension of all uranium-related activities within 30 days.[64] Iran did not heed the call of the UNSC. As the United States and EU3 put increasing pressure on Iran after January 10, 2006, Russian and Chinese relationship with Iran appeared less and less friendly. Recently, Russia and China demonstrated a significant shift in their attitude towards Iran, as well as their impatience with Iran, by demanding that it halt uranium conversion as the United States and EU3 prepared to bring Iran to the Security Council to face possible sanctions.[65] Russian and Chinese votes on February 4, 2006, in favor of bringing Iran before the Security Council were a decisive sign of a marked change in the Iranian allies' attitudes. This change in attitude was a direct result of a perception that Iran has been unreasonably stubborn in the face of broad international resolve to settle the issues revolving around Iran's nuclear problem through diplomatic means. Furthermore, it appears that Russia and China felt blindsided by some recent Iranian actions, including the re-start of uranium enrichment activities at the Natanz facility on January 10, 2006. While Russia and particularly China are likely to continue to provide diplomatic and symbolic support to Iran's position, it is unlikely that in the long term they will continue to do so at the expense of their relationship with the West, especially if Iran continues to ignore calls to suspend its conversion and enrichment activities by the IAEA and the UN Security Council. Russia is likely to balk at imposing sanctions but will find it difficult to aggressively block any such moves by the United States and Europe if Iran continues not to accede to UN Security Council demands.[66]

As for China, while it values its considerable economic investments in Iran and is likely to continue to try to moderate any international action taken against Tehran, Beijing places a higher value on its relationship with the United States and Europe. There is reason to believe that if Iran continues to flaunt UN Security Council calls and reject full cooperation with the IAEA, it will be increasingly difficult for China to continue to stand against the will of other permanent members and veto penalties. In the end, it is most likely that Chinese support for Iran will give way to tacit acceptance of Iran's self-imposed predicament. In the absence of a pre-emptive attack on Iran's nuclear facilities in the near future, it is unlikely that China will vociferously object to Western efforts in the UN Security Council. While China is not likely to support any sanctions on Iran, if the rest of the Security Council members choose to impose penalties on Iran, China would probably abstain during such a vote. Indeed, one Iranian source indicated that during a visit to Iran in 2005, the Chinese foreign minister specifically warned his Iranian hosts to not rely on Chinese diplomatic backing during a confrontation with the UN Security Council for it may not be forthcoming.[67] It appears that many level-headed Iranian leaders who have warned the current administration of the dangers of flouting the IAEA and violating the Paris Accord have realized that the finding that Iran was in noncompliance of the NPT and its subsequent referral to the UN Security Council is a major defeat and has validated their suspicion that Iran cannot rely on any foreign entity to rescue it regardless of their relationship to date. As admitted grudgingly in Aminzadeh's exposé:

Through half a century of the function of the UN Security Council, files regarding Iran have been discussed several times in the Security Council; but this is the first time that an international organization, with a concession of all the powerful countries of the world, sues Iran and takes the case of complaint to the Security Council. Such characteristics in the files of Security Council are exceptional. These characteristics will cause exceptional troubles and challenges in the Security Council for the government and nation of Iran. In the previous cases, Iran had the advantage of the Cold War structure, and it could benefit from the balance of power between the two superpowers. During the Soviet occupation of Iranian Azerbaijan, Iran had the Western support in the Security Council. With the assistance of the Security Council, the Soviet Union was forced to exit Azerbaijan. This situation also prevented the Arab countries, provoked Saddam Hussein, to make any improvements in their claims over the three islands in the Persian Gulf. During the invasion of the American embassy in Tehran, Iran was implicitly supported by the Soviet Union. In the Cold War framework, the United States could not utilize the tool of the Security Council to apply pressures over Iran. Today, the Cold War era is over and the Security Council is somehow the undisputed circus of the United States.[68]

Increasing Regional Opposition to Iran's Nuclear Program

Israel has long been an opponent of the Iranian nuclear program. In the past few months, however, many Arab governments, especially Iran's Persian Gulf neighbors, have voiced their own pointed criticisms and concern over the program, in part due to a perception that Iran has refused to compromise. In late November 2005, the senior officials of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) began expressing such concerns. GCC Secretary General Abdul-Rahman al-Attiya declared that "Iran's nuclear program has become worrisome for the region and a fundamental concern for all the countries of the world".[69] Secretary General al-Attiyah also lashed out at Iran in a lengthy presentation during a conference with NATO officials stating "Iran attaining nuclear weapons will lead to instability in the region and an arms race that will spread an unjustified climate of mistrust," adding that "Iran is forcing the GCC states to 'side' with the superpowers due to Iran's insistent pursuit of nuclear weapons."[70] In response Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi rejected al-Attiyah's claims. Asefi stated that "such claims are only in the interest of, and in-line with, the illegitimate goals of the enemies of regional stability and security."[71] In late January 2006, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal urged Iran to rethink its plans to enrich uranium and asked Iran to "remember the Chernobyl reactor."[72] Two weeks later, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Turki Al-Faisal, also criticized Iran's uranium enrichment program, noting that this technology can also be used for nuclear warheads.[73]

Arab leaders are also concerned about the location of Iran's nuclear facilities. GCC Secretary General Al-Attiyah stated that an Iranian nuclear energy program has repercussions for the Persian Gulf, since Bushehr is physically closer to some Arab Gulf states, such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, than to Tehran itself.[74] Reflecting these various concerns, on February 4, Egypt and Yemen voted with the United States at a special meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors to forward the matter of Iran's noncompliance with the NPT to the UN Security Council. Both joined the IAEA Board, through normal rotational procedures, in September 2005. Other Arab countries on the board include Algeria and Syria (Algeria abstained at the February vote, and Syria, also recently added to the board, voted to oppose sending the measure to the Security Council).

Increased Arab concern over Iran's nuclear program and recent posturing could benefit the United States; however, their alarm may also motivate Arab leaders to reconsider their commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and embark on similar nuclear ventures, for fear that an Iranian nuclear weapon coupled with Israel's existing nuclear arsenal would leave the Arab nations at a military and strategic disadvantage. On March 28, 2006, Secretary General of the Arab League Amr Moussa called for Arab nations to enter "the nuclear club and make use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."[75] It is still unclear if this statement at the conference of the Arab League implies any sincere interest by major Arab governments in pursuing such a capability.

There are many reasons for Arab governments' concerns over Iran's nuclear program. In addition to historical rivalries and a legacy of distrust between Arabs and Persians, there are several other reasons why Arab governments are keen to deter Iranian hegemony in the region. Sunni Arab leaders fear increased Iranian influence in post-war Iraq and the rise of Shi'a power in the region. Furthermore, many Arab governments are beginning to see Iran's nuclear program as a liability for the region. They fear that the increased tensions caused by the Iranian program may eventually lead to an additional military confrontation in the region that would further increase instability, heighten tensions, and instigate terrorism. Equally important, while always critical of Israel's nuclear arsenal, Arab regimes fear that Iran's eventual acquisition of a comparable nuclear capability combined with irresponsible rhetoric and hostility from Iran's hardliners toward Israel increases the chances of an Iranian-Israeli military confrontation. This scenario worries Arab leaders for a military exchange between Israel and Iran would undoubtedly result in the death of many Arabs civilians who are literally caught between these regional competitors, as pointedly stated by the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Turki Al-Faisal, "Where is Iran going to use these weapons? If their intention is to bomb Israel, they will kill Palestinians, Syrians, Jordanians and Saudis, as well."[76] Not surprisingly, the new Iraqi government dominated by Iran's Shi`a allies has just voiced its support for the Iranian nuclear program and asked the international community to drop its demands that Iran prove its peaceful intent.[77] It is important to note that despite most Arab governments' increasing opposition to Iran's nuclear program, it appears that most Arab citizens in the Middle East do not consider Iranian acquisition of a nuclear capability a threat. Recent unofficial polls conducted by various Arab media outlets demonstrate considerable support by the Arab street for Iranian nuclear achievements.[78]

Other Major Allegations Concerning Iran

Is Iran supporting insurgents in Iraq (UK allegations)?

The United Kingdom has alleged that Iran has supported Iraqi insurgent groups in southern Iraq that have attacked UK armored military convoys. Specifically, the British allege that Iranian Revolutionary Guards have supplied Iraqi insurgent groups with shaped bombs (for a description of these weapons, see the next paragraph). UK officials claim that the improvised explosive devices used by the Iraqi insurgency groups are similar to those used by Lebanon-based Hezbollah, which is supported by Iran. The United Kingdom contends that Iran is interfering with UK affairs in Iraq in retaliation for UK opposition to the Iranian nuclear program. UK Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that the United Kingdom will not "be subject to any intimidation in raising the necessary and right issues to do with the nuclear weapons obligations of Iran under the Atomic Energy Agency Treaty."[79] Iran vociferously denies all claims of providing improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to insurgent groups in Iraq. Mohammad Adeli, the Iranian ambassador in London, stated that "we (Iran) have already rejected categorically any link between Iran and the incidents that have taken place in Iraq for the British troops. There is not any kind of direct or indirect connection with Iran."[80]

Shaped bombs are more powerful than the standard IED and hit targets at very high velocities. Therefore shaped bombs are very effective in piercing armored military vehicles that transport soldiers. In comparison to a standard IED, these explosives have a cone-shaped hollow area that is lined with copper because it has a low melting point. The open end of the cone faces the target and upon detonation the copper is compressed and expended at extremely high velocities from the IED.[81] However, the acquisition of shaped bomb designs by Iraqi insurgents does not necessarily implicate Iran; such technology is not exclusive to Iran or Hezbollah. In the past year, al-Firdaws (Paradise) and other al-Qa'ida websites have proliferated a manual that details the assembly and utility of shaped bombs. The 14 page document, entitled "A Collection of Instructions ... Concerning Explosives," instructs the would-be Jihadi on how to assemble these deadly IEDs and provides numerous diagrams and precise specifications dealing with width, height, weight, and explosive load of a shaped bomb. It also details the trajectory of explosive force and shrapnel, and instructs the Jihadi on preferred deployment techniques.[82]

Salafi Iraqi insurgents are more likely to have acquired assembly and usage techniques of shaped bombs via communications with other al-Qa'ida cells with the capability to assemble and use these deadly designs than from Hezbollah. It is highly unlikely that Iran is providing assistance to most Iraqi insurgent groups, since the majority has been targeting Iranian allies in Iraq. Iran is not going to provide arms to former Ba`athists or Salafi (al-Qa'ida and other radical Sunni) insurgents who despise the Shi'a in Iraq and Iran. On the other hand, as the main ally and long-time supporter of Shi'a militias in Iraq, including the Dawa party and Badr Brigade, it is likely that Iran is providing arms and explosives to these latter groups to strengthen its allies and increase its influence along sectarian lines. Furthermore, Tehran is interested in helping these militias better protect Shi'a holy sites and communities, which have been extensively targeted in post-war Iraq by both Ba`athists and the Zarqawi network alike.

Nevertheless, it may be that some Iranian agents have targeted UK troops in southern Iraq to send a message to the UK government that adverse pressure or hostility against Iran's nuclear facilities will result in an immediate response in the Iraqi theater. If Iran is providing shaped bomb technology to its allies in Iraq it is likely meant to give the United Kingdom a "taste of hell," an illustration of Iran's formidable capabilities in post-war Iraq. Iran's impressive list of allies in southern Iraq has emboldened Iran; on February 17, 2006, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki called on UK troops to withdraw immediately from Basra, calling their presence "destabilizing."[83]

At a Pentagon briefing, reports of U.S. proof of Iranian weaponry and military smuggling networks in Iraq were denied by a top U.S. military official, Marine Corps General Peter Pace, who stated that the United Stated does not have direct evidence to that effect. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld supported General Pace's statement but added that "all you know is that you find equipment, weapons, explosives, whatever, in a country that came from the neighboring country...it's very difficult to tie a thread precisely to the government of Iran."[84]

Is Iran Sheltering al-Qa'ida?

Recent statements by some U.S. officials contend that Iran and al-Qa'ida currently share a relationship that is strengthening despite mutual, deep-rooted enmity between Sunnis and Shi'a. It is reported that some U.S. officials have said that Iranian President Ahmadinajad may be forming an alliance with al-Qa'ida agents or at least tacitly allowing them to conduct operations out of Iran.[85]

History of Confrontation

It is believed that Iran has custody of numerous al-Qa'ida operatives and some high ranking members wanted by the U.S. government, including Sa`ad bin Laden, Osama bin Laden's son, as well as Saif al-Adel, al-Qa'ida's military commander. While this may be true, it is important to recognize that Iran is apparently holding, not sheltering, these al-Qa'ida members. Iran seems to be holding al-Qa'ida suspects as bargaining chips to exchange for Iranian Mujahideen e-Khalq (MEK) terrorists that are operating out of Iraq. Mujahideen e-Khalq is an Iraqi-based Iranian opposition group and former ally of the Saddam regime that is officially designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department. After the United States took control of Iraq, there were indications that it might be seeking to work with the MEK in efforts to overthrow the Iranian regime. In response, Iran announced on May 22, 2003, that it was holding several al-Qa'ida members in custody. In order to hinder the prospects of joint U.S. and MEK attempts to overthrow the Iranian government, the Iranians proposed handing over al-Qa'ida members in exchange for the return of MEK terrorists in U.S. custody.[86] In 2003, Ali Younesi, then Iranian Information Minister, stated that "the handing over of MEK leaders is one of our serious demands from America."[87]

The sole goal of Iranian custody of high-ranking al-Qa'ida members is likely the hope of gaining custody of MEK terrorists from Iraq. It does not indicate that Iran is supporting al-Qa'ida activities or harboring its members. More recently Mr. Younesi the Current Iranian Intelligence Minister further stated that "the U.S. is accusing us of supporting a group (al-Qa'ida) that we have fought for years."[88] While there were reports of contacts between Iran and Osama bin Laden in the early 1990s, in 1996, after bin Laden was forced to move from Sudan to Afghanistan and subsequently became a close ally of the Taliban, he became an ardent foe of Iran. Prior to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, the Taliban and al-Qa'ida orchestrated the assassinations of many Iranian officials in Afghanistan.[89] In 1998, numerous Iranian diplomats and an IRNA reporter where massacred by the Taliban when they seized control of Mazar-e-Sharif. At that time, the Taliban also massacred thousands of Hazara Shi'a, Iran's allies in Afghanistan.[90] In 2001, Mowlawi Mousa Karimpour, an Iranian Sunni cleric, was slain in a bomb blast in Herat, Afghanistan.[91] Reports in 2003 indicated that al-Qa'ida and Taliban members made assassination threats against diplomats at the Iranian embassy in Kabul, which included placing bombs in diplomatic vehicles and causing an explosion in front of the embassy's main entrance.[92] These past events indicate that it is extremely unlikely that Iran would be engaged in sheltering or protecting al-Qa'ida members.

Al-Qa'ida's Explicit Anti-Shi'a Racism

An equally important cause for animosity between these two entities is the flagrant al-Qa'ida racism against Shi'a Muslims. Pro al-Qa'ida outlets and communiqués regularly refer to Shi'a Muslims as the Rafida (rejectionists) or Mushrikun (polytheist unbelievers). Al-Qa'ida supporters claim that the Shi'a have rejected the true meaning and calling of Islam and are in essence no more than infidel heretics that must be fought and killed. Al-Qa'ida's primary literature and websites are full of blatant anti-Shi'a treatises and diatribes.[93] They preach that the Rafida (Shi'a Muslims) are traitorous fifth column heretics who always act as agents of foreign forces, from the alleged Shi'a alliance with Hulagu in 1258 A.D. through the current Shi'a assistance to the United States in Iraq.[94] An example is the following statement posted on the official al-Tawhid Wal Jihad (al-Qa'ida in Iraq) website: "As stated by Sheik Ibn Taymiyya ... the Rafida (Shi'a) ... always align with and aid the infidel Christian and Jews, in fighting the Muslims."[95] In addition, many pro al-Qa'ida websites post extensive condemnations of the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who al-Qa'ida refers to as the "verse of the devil."[96]

In some instances, Salafi hatred of Shi'a Muslims is reminiscent of fascism, in its arguing for the biological inferiority of persons adhering to this prominent Islamic faith. Recently a pro al-Qa'ida website portrayed a diagram of a Shi'i brain, together with claims that biology leads to: distorting the Qur'an, blasphemy, treason, ignorance, stupidity, fairytales, bad odors, lies, self-interest and hedonism.[97] An examination of these deeply ingrained anti-Shi'a attitudes is often absent from western analyses of al-Qa'ida, which mainly concentrate on the threat that this movement poses to the West. Such scrutiny brings to light the considerable animosity between al-Qa'ida and Iran. Finally, and perhaps most important the head of al-Qa`ida in Iraq , Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, declared an open war on all Shi'a and bombed Shi'a holy sites in Iraq, killing scores of Iranian pilgrims and numerous close Iraqi allies of Iran including Ayatollah Mohamed Baqr al-Hakim, the founder of the Supreme Council for Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, al-Qa'ida's strategy in Iraq has been centered on attacking the Shi`a population in order to drag Iraq into a bloody civil war that will make it ungovernable. Cooperation between these two entities is highly unlikely and is only probable in the event of a U.S. attack on Iran, which could cause Iran's traditional security calculus to give way to a desire for revenge. While Iran has been active in its support of terrorism, it is difficult to imagine that the guardian of the global Shi'a community is supporting al-Qa'ida, the same Salafi network that displays a visceral hatred of Shi'i faith and institutions; has killed thousands of Shi'a civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan; has killed Iranian diplomats and civilians; and has bombed the holiest sites in Shi'a Islam in Karbala, Najaf, and Sumarra. In the lead-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, similar allegations were irresponsibly directed at the secular regime of Saddam Hussein, claiming that the Ba'athists were supporting and harboring al-Qa'ida. Since then, it has become clear that these allegations were highly erroneous. A popular accusation made prior to the war, that the Iraqi government provided Abu Musab al-Zarqawi medical treatment in Baghdad following the loss of his leg in an American bombing, has also been proven faulty. A recent video of al-Zarqawi released in early May 2006 shows Abu Musab in full possession of his limbs as he sat to discuss strategy with his colleagues and then walked around the Iraqi desert wielding a machine gun and wearing a new pair of American-made athletic shoes.[98] Accusations that Iran is supporting or harboring al-Qa'ida remain weak, speculative, and unconvincing; they undermine the campaign against the legitimate threat posed by Iran's budding nuclear ambitions and support to regional militants in the Levant.

The Impact of the New Iranian Government

The 2005 election of a hardliner, conservative government in Iran had a negative effect on international perceptions of the Iranian nuclear program. The inflammatory rhetoric of the new Iranian president, together with Iran's withdrawal from the Paris Accord and resumption of conversion and, ultimately, enrichment activities heightened international concern even among Iran's traditional friends. Many key figures in the new Iranian government, such as President Ahmadinajad and Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, are former members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran). These key government officials are also veterans of the Iran-Iraq war, during which the international community was demonstrably indifferent towards Iraqi atrocities against the Iranians (such as chemical attacks). It can be argued that the experiences of President Ahmadinajad and his allies during the Iran-Iraq war shaped their strategic outlook and added to their suspicion in dealing with the West.[99] At a public meeting in Zahedan, President Ahmadinajad stated that "countries which have arsenals of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons which can be used against other countries at their whim and those who supplied the Ba'athist regime with (chemical) weapons that killed thousands of innocent Iranians in the cities of Sardasht and Halabja now go to all lengths to block Iran from gaining access to peaceful nuclear technology."[100] The new Iranian government is more likely to view current actions being taken against it as Western plotting rather than as repercussions for its own violations of the NPT or international norms.

Some Iranian experts assert that the Iranian government perceives Europe and the United States as playing a "good cop, bad cop routine" in an international system dominated by "American preeminence and unilateralism."[101] Iranian officials see the United States and Europe as applying double standards, one standard for official weapon states and their allies and another for Iran and other nuclear capable states.[102] Ahmadinajad and his allies are very patriotic and desire to protect Iran's sovereign rights. Defying Western demands has become symbol of nationalism in Iran and a means to "validate one's revolutionary ardour and nationalistic fidelity."[103] Moreover, it appears that among high ranking officials in Iran's new government the issue of its nuclear program and Iranian national identity are one and the same.[104] It is not surprising that Iran's nuclear program enjoys extensive support from the Iranian population that sees the program as a sign of progress and technological achievement. Together, these factors pose a challenge for cooperative and transparent relations between Iran and the West. Since 2005, the impact of the more conservative Iranian government has been a negation of previous nuclear negotiations, particularly the voluntary Paris Accord. Change in the Iranian government has caused a new defiance towards the international community and its efforts to find a suitable compromise on Iran's nuclear programs.

While many of the irresponsible statements made by the Iranian president concerning Israel, including his denial of the Holocaust, are rightfully viewed as outrageous in the West; it is not the West that Ahmadinajad considers his primary audience. Ahmadinajad and the Iranian hardliners are drawing a line within the Iranian political landscape forcing Iranians to take sides (you're either with us or with them) and hindering any diplomatic solution that includes an Iran disavowal of its "sovereign right" to the full fuel cycle, including enrichment. More so, Ahmadinajad is appealing to his base among Iranian hardliners and perhaps to the greater Muslim world where many share these sentiments. These constituents are his primary audience.

Why would Iran's new government embark on such a controversial and dangerous endeavor? In the last few years, partly due to American rhetoric post 9/11 (President Bush's "axis of evil" speech, the neoconservatives' alleged plans to redraw the Middle East, Operation Iraqi Freedom, references to regime change in Iran, etc.), Iran's hardliner leadership has become all but convinced of the inevitability of a U.S. attack on Iran. Therefore, it is rallying its base and enhancing Iranian nationalist sentiment in preparation for this conflict.[105] In early February 2006, President Ahmadinajad declared: "I ask our people to prepare themselves to a great struggle," adding, "fasten your seat belts and pull up you[r] sleeves."[106] Ahmadinajad is making these statements to rally his base and prepare his public for what he sees as an upcoming and protracted military conflict with the United States, in order to lay the ground work for an effective and committed popular insurgency.

Yet at the same time, in spite of their fear of an impeding U.S. attack, hardliner Iranian policymakers are also emboldened by the U.S. involvement in Iraq. These Iranian leaders prefer to engage in this inevitable battle now, when the United States is preoccupied in Iraq and is militarily, financially and politically exhausted, rather than at some time in the future. They do not wish to postpone a war they view as inevitable war to a later date when the United States has had a chance to regroup. Moreover, thanks to the removal of Saddam Hussein, Iran's primary enemy, Iran's strategic situation is much improved. Iran feels that it is stronger now than it has been in decades, given its increased influence in post-war Iraq due to the dominance of its Shi'a allies (SCIRI, Dawa, etc.) who make up the majority of the Iraqi population. Even Muqtada al-Sadr, the once nativist Iraqi Shi'a leader who in the past called on Iranian-born Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani and Iranian-supported Ayatollah al-Hakim to leave Iraq, has more recently embraced Iran and even vowed to respond with his Mahdi Army if it is attacked by the West.[107]

Equally disturbing, the Iranian hardliners are not intimidated by the U.S. military performance in Iraq. Many of these veterans of the Revolutionary Guards are observing the severe difficulties encountered by the United States in fighting a minority Sunni Iraqi insurgency and a limited number of foreign Salafi fighters. It is likely that they reason that if the United States cannot pacify the Sunni Triangle, it will not defeat the extensive Shi'a insurgency in Iran and southern Iraq that Iran will certainly ignite if attacked by the United States. In the past three decades, these Pasdaran veterans have learned that a well trained, armed, and organized guerilla insurgency can counterbalance the most formidable modern militaries. This was demonstrated by the experience of Israel in South Lebanon and Gaza, the Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan, and now the Coalition in Iraq. These views may prove to be the greatest hurdles in the way of a diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear dilemma.

In response to Iran's decision to break the IAEA seals on nuclear equipment at Natanz on January 10, 2006, the United States stated that it would continue to move ahead in conjunction with its European counterparts in a "peaceful and diplomatic manner," but would not take any options off of the table, referring to Iran's actions a "serious escalation."[108] In answer to U.S. accusations that Iran is violating its NPT obligations and maintaining a clandestine nuclear weapons program, Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei stated that "we (Iran) are not after nuclear arms. Western states know that manufacturing nuclear arms is contrary to political and economic interests of the nation and is in violation of the commands of Islam."[109] In this game of "nuclear poker" it behooves Iran not to overplay its hand, realizing that in a post-September 11 world the United States will simply not accept Iranian possession of nuclear weapons, regardless of the consequences. While many in the United States acknowledge the severe risks of a military attack on Iran, the current U.S. administration has already shown that it is willing to undertake substantial risks, and unilaterally pursue a forceful policy in the Middle East.

At the same time, while one should take note of the Iranian president's bellicose rhetoric and actions, it is important to keep in mind that in the Iranian political system, the elected president of the Islamic Republic is not the foremost decision-maker or the commander in chief. In the Iranian system, the top two decision-making entities are the Supreme Leader, and the Expediency Council, while the president and the cabinet have limited power, particularly over issues of foreign and military affairs. The Expediency Council was established in February 1988 as an advisory body to the Supreme Leader and is appointed by him. Its main function is to resolve the differences between the Iranian parliament (majlis) and the powerful Guardian Council.[110] By October 2005, the current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had granted the Expediency Council supervisory power over the Iranian government and all its branches. The Council exercises ultimate adjudicating powers over legislative disputes. At present, the Expediency Council is headed by former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, a more pragmatic and powerful cleric.[111] Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is the final authority in the Iranian system and most importantly is the only person who appoints the military leaders of Iran. The commanders of the Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) and other Iranian military forces are only answerable to the Supreme Leader.[112] These distinctions are quite important in analyzing Iran's potential threat and course of military action. While Ahmadinajad's posture is provocative, his authority is still limited, as there are two additional levels of authority above him that possess the real power in Iran, and have on many occasions contradicted his statements.

A Possible Way Out - Direct Negotiations with Iran

Previous Missed Opportunities

Earlier this year Flynt Leverett, a former senior director for Middle East Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council, revealed that in May 2003, Iran's ambassador to France, Sadegh Kharazi, (the nephew of then-foreign minister Kamal Kharazi) offered via a Swiss emissary to open a direct dialogue with the United States on numerous issues, including its nuclear program. Mr. Leverett stated, "The Iranians acknowledged that WMD and support for terror were serious causes of concern for us, and they were willing to negotiate." He added that the Iranian offer "had been approved by all the highest levels of authority. They wanted us to deal with sanctions, security guarantees, normalization of relations, and support for integration of Iran into the World Trade Organization."[113] It has also come to light that Iran was also sending messages through back channels, as indicated by Paul Pillar, a former CIA national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia.[114] More recently, in May 2005, Iran's former president and current head of the powerful Expediency Council Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani stated that he wanted to repair relations with the United States but that the United States, as the stronger party, had to take the first step. He claimed that Iran could not take the first step publicly for it "would indicate that we are weak or might be considered as a display of fear."[115] It is possible that following the initial success and quick toppling of the Ba'athist regime in Iraq, the U.S. administration was somewhat overconfident and did not see a benefit in direct talks with Iran. In hindsight, it is unfortunate that the May 2003 offer by the reformist Iranian government for direct negotiations was rejected by the U.S. administration; such negotiations may have alleviated many of the current tensions and been helpful in resolving some of the issues that remain problematic, including Iran's insistence on nuclear enrichment. Equally important, such negotiations may have been fruitful in mustering visible support from Iran's extensive list of allies in Iraq for the U.S. project there.

Winds of Change - Prospective Negotiations

By mid-March 2006, following calls by Iraqi Shi'i leader Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad indicated that he was interested in holding direct talks with Iran on Iraq.[116] Other administration officials concurred, although they indicated that these talks would be limited to Iraq and not deal with Iran's nuclear file. The Iranians accepted the offer. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated on Iranian television that "there is no problem with negotiations," thus ending a prohibition against official dealings with the United States imposed by previous Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini.[117] In early April 2006, Ayatollah Khamenei and other senior Iranian officials suggested that they support negotiations over a wide range of issues, including regional security and Iran's nuclear program, as well as Iraq. Javad Zarif, the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations, stressed Iran's willingness to talk, saying that "pressure and threats do not resolve problems. Finding solutions requires political will and a readiness to engage in serious negotiations. Iran is ready."[118] On April 7, the Financial Times reported that Mohammad Nahavandian, a deputy for economic affairs to Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, had flown to Washington to "lobby" for direct talks with the U.S. government.[119]

These calls have recently been answered. Although on May 25, 2006, it was reported that the United States had ruled out direct negotiations with Iran concerning Iraq (a White House official stated "we have decided not to pursue it"[120]), six days later, on May 31, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice indicated that the United States would in fact be willing to join the EU-3 in direct multinational talks with Iran if the latter suspended all of its nuclear activities. Dr. Rice said, "as soon as Iran fully and verifiably suspends its enrichment and reprocessing activities, the United States will come to the table with our EU colleagues [France, Germany and Britain] and meet with Iran's representative."[121] In response, Iran rejected the U.S. precondition of the suspension of nuclear activities but welcomed direct negotiations with the United States. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi stated, "We believe that under the current circumstances, negotiations without any preconditions would be best solution to put an end to Tehran-Washington logjam."[122] Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki added, "Iran welcomes dialogue under just conditions but won't give up our rights... We won't negotiate about the Iranian nation's natural nuclear rights, but we are prepared, within a defined, just framework and without any discrimination, to hold dialogue about common concerns."[123] Currently the United States, the EU-3, Russia, and China have agreed to present Iran with a package of "carrots and sticks" that includes new incentives and threats to persuade Iran to halt uranium enrichment and reprocessing.[124] The specific details of this nuclear offer remain unclear as is the official Iranian response.

In this unfolding drama, it is unclear if direct negotiations between the United States and Iran will truly come to fruition. However, if they do materialize, direct negotiations could be an important step in resolving U.S. disputes with Iran. If productive, these negotiations could lead to ongoing bilateral contacts between the two nations that could address numerous issues of contention, namely Iran's nuclear program, involvement in Iraq, and support for terrorism in the region. These negotiations give U.S. officials the opportunity to clarify to the Iranians U.S. expectations and the consequences of Iran's insistence on maintaining a nuclear enrichment capability. At that time, the United States needs to explain firmly that in a post-9/11 world it simply cannot accept a military nuclear capability in the hands of a regime with a proven history of support for terrorism, and will go to great lengths to stop it. At the same time, Washington could use the talks to alleviate Iranian fears of a U.S. attack and clarify that the United States does not intend to force regime change on Iran if the latter forswears a nuclear military capability, accepts a moratorium on significant enrichment activities, and does not support terrorist attacks aimed at the United States. A U.S. offer of a "security guarantee" that is contingent on altered Iranian behavior could go a long way towards bringing both sides closer to an enduring negotiated settlement, as the Iranian sense of insecurity and expectation of an inevitable U.S. attack remains a major motivator behind nuclear acquisition. Only by clarifying these two distinct options can the United States entice Iran to change its hostile policies in the region. Insisting on regime change in Iran is a non-starter, and virtually eliminates any incentive for the Iranian leadership to cooperate on the nuclear issue.

In recent months, thanks largely to the heightened rhetoric, much of the analysis on Iran has rightfully focused on the state of its nuclear program and the consequences of a pre-emptive attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. Numerous studies on the topic have indicated that a military attack on Iran is likely to be very costly to U.S. interests in the region, and debilitating for Iran. However, it is also important to note the substantial benefits to U.S. interests in the region that can be gained from fruitful negotiations with Iran. While official dialogue between the United States and Iran has yet to occur, it is important to keep in mind the enormous potential benefits that the United States can attain from mending fences with Iran after three decades of strife. Improved relations would be of great benefit to U.S. interests in Iraq and the Middle East as a whole, in addition to clearing up issues related to Iran's nuclear program.

Iran's allies in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories have gained additional power and influence in the past year. The Shi'i United Iraqi Alliance has, as expected, won the Iraqi elections and also controls many of the Shi'i militias in Iraq, including the Badr Brigade and the Mahdi Army. In Southern Lebanon, the Shi'i Hezbollah remains the controlling force and together with AMAL has won increased representation in the Lebanese parliament. In the West Bank and Gaza, Hamas won a surprisingly sweeping victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections and heads the new Palestinian government. Iranian support for and alliance with these important Islamist entities in the region gives it important influence over matters in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian/Israeli arena. While Iran does not control these independent national Islamist parties, if relations with the United States are improved Iran can encourage these popular and powerful entities to pursue a more moderate path that is likely to benefit U.S. interests in the region. After all, during the Oslo process it was mainly Iran that encouraged Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad to oppose a possible Palestinian settlement with Israel. In Iraq, the prospects for a further escalation of the conflict rests mainly with the majority Shi'i bloc, which has endured egregious provocations from Salafi and Ba`athists insurgents who continue to target the Shi'a population and their holy shrines. At any moment the Shi'a bloc may choose to abandon restraint and take their revenge, plunging Iraq into an ungovernable civil war. Recent cases of revenge killings of innocent Sunnis by Iraqi Shi'a militias are of particular concern. With Iranian encouragement, Shi'i militants in Iraq and Lebanon could become more amenable to U.S. interests while Palestinian militants could develop a more constructive attitude toward Israel.

Finally, and equally important, Iran and its allies possess considerable intelligence capabilities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the region in general. They could prove a great boon to the United States in its battle against al-Qa'ida, America's primary enemy. In this global war against al-Qa'ida and Salafi Jihadi terrorism, the United States needs all the help it can get from Muslim and Arab governments. Even rogue regimes such as Iran and Syria could become important U.S. allies if they are brought in from the cold. To do so, cooler heads need to prevail, and skillful direct diplomacy should be given a chance, through sincere engagement, to curtail the increasing hot rhetoric and posturing. Left unchecked, the situation is likely to deteriorate. A military confrontation is unnecessary and would be very destructive for all parties involved. As compellingly stated on April 10, 2006, by then U.K. Foreign Minister Jack Straw "There is no smoking gun, there is no casus belli... the reason why we're opposed to military action is because it's an infinitely worse option [than diplomacy] and there's no justification for it."[125]

[1] "Iranian Foreign Minister Says Not Ready to Compromise on Nuclear Rights," IRNA, in FBIS Document IAP2005092401129, September 24, 2005.
[2] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran - Resolution adopted 24 September 2005," IAEA, September 24, 2005.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Paul Kerr, "Unresolved IAEA Questions Regarding Iran's Nuclear Program," Arms Control Association, February 1, 2006.
[5] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Related Board Resolutions - Resolution adopted 11 August 2005," IAEA, August 11, 2005.
[6] Michael Laufer, "A.Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology," Proliferation Brief, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Vol. 8, No. 8 (September 7, 2005), <http://www.CarnegieEndowment.org/static/npp/Khan_Chronology.pdf>.
[7] "4, Saturday: IAEA Board Adopts Resolution on Nuclear Safeguards in Iran," IAEA, February 4, 2006.
[8] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran - Resolution adopted on 4 February, 2006," IAEA, February 4, 2006.
[9] Ibid.
[10] "Iran nuclear case will go to UN," BBC, January 31, 2006.
[11] "Letter Dated February 2, 2006, from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran Addressed to the Director General, IAEA document INFCIRC/666," IAEA, February 2, 2006.
[12] Ali Akbar Dareini, "Tehran bars IAEA reviews of nuke sites," Associated Press, February 6, 2006.
[13] "Letter Dated February 2, 2006, from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran Addressed to the Director General, IAEA document INFCIRC/666."
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] "Russia still hopeful for breakthrough in nuclear talks with Iran," RIA Novosti, February 13, 2006.
[17] "Iran 'resumes' nuclear enrichment," BBC, February 13, 2006.
[18] "Iran shelves Russia nuclear talks," BBC, February 13, 2006.
[19] Molly Moore and Fred Barbash, "Iran begins Small-Scale Uranium Enrichment," Washington Post, February 14, 2006.
[20] Seymour Hersh, "The Iran Plans," New Yorker, April 10, 2006; Peter Baker, Dafna Linzer and Thomas Ricks, "U.S. Is Studying Military Strike Options on Iran," Washington Post, April 9, 2006; Nazila Fathi, "Tehran Dismisses Report of Planned Attacks by U.S.," New York Times, April 10, 2006.
[21] "Russia still hopeful for breakthrough in nuclear talks with Iran," RIA Novosti.
[22] Ali Akbar, "Russia, France, Oppose Iran's Atomic Plan," Associated Press, February 14, 2006.
[23] Philip Sherwell, "Pentagon plans to derail Iranian atomic bomb test," London Telegraph, February 12, 2006.
[24] Dafna Linzer, "Strong Leads and Dead Ends in Nuclear Case Against Iran," Washington Post, February 8, 2006.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] David Horovitz, "ElBaradei to 'Post': No 'smoking gun' in Iran," Jerusalem Post, December 6, 2005.
[28] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran - Report by the Director General," IAEA, February 27, 2006.
[29] "IAEA Chief Finds No Early Evidence of Iranian Weapons Program," Online News Hour, April 13, 2006, <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/iran_04-13-06.html>.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.
[32] "Diplomats: Enriched uranium found in Iran," Associated Press, May 12, 2006.
[33] Jean du Preez and Melissa Kessler, "Iran's Game of Nuclear Poker: Knowing When to Fold," CNS Research Story, August 26, 2005, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/050826.htm>.
[34] "IAEA inspectors found traces of highly enriched uranium in Iran," Regnum News Agency, May 13, 2006.
[35] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran - Resolution adopted by the board on 24 September 2005," IAEA, September 24, 2005.
[36] The full text of the interview with General Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's son in law and head of the Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI) and the Military Industrial Commission (MIC) can be viewed at "UNSCOM/IAEA SENSITIVE - NOTE FOR THE FILE," UNSCOM/IAEA, August 22, 1995, <http://www.casi.org.uk/info/unscom950822.pdf/>.
[37] Joseph Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 269.
[38] Mohsen Aminzadeh, "The Biggest Diplomatic Defeat for the Islamic Republic of Iran," Emrooz, March 7, 2006, <http://news.iran-emrooz.net/index.php?/news1/more/7338/>.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ali Nuri Zadeh "Tehran: Reformists and Former Ministers Warn Khamenei of Dangers of Ahmadenajad Policies," Asharqalawsat, March 29, 2006; Morteza Sadeghi, "Reformists Write to the Leader," Rooz, April 5, 2006, <http://roozonline.com/english/014788.shtml>.
[41] Mohsen Aminzadeh, "The Biggest Diplomatic Defeat for the Islamic Republic of Iran."
[42] Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran Discovers New Uranium Deposits," Associated Press, May 2, 2006.
[43] "The right course," Hindustan Times, December 12, 2005.
[44] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran - Resolution adopted 24 September 2005," IAEA, September 24, 2005.
[45] "Tehran Paper Views Iranian, Western Stances on Nuclear Issues," Tehran E-temad, in FBIS Document IAP20050929011023, September 29, 2005; Francois Murphy and Louis Charbonneau, "Iran's Uranium Gas Unusable for Atomic Fuel - Diplomats," Reuters, 27 September 2005.
[46] John Chipman, "Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A net Assessment," The International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 6, 2005, <http:www.iiss.org>.
[47] "EU Opposes Iranian Move on Nuclear Research," Deutche-Welle, January 5, 2006.
[48] "Iran asks for improvement on Russian nuclear proposal," Xinhua, January 3, 2006.
[49] David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Iran's Next Steps: Final Tests and the Construction of a Uranium Enrichment Plant," Institute for Science and International Security, January 12, 2006.
[50] Ibid.
[51] "Iran joins world nuclear technology club," IRNA, April 11, 2006.
[52] Jonathan Marcus, "Iran enrichment: A Chinese puzzle?" BBC, May 18, 2006.
[53] Dafna Linzer, "Iran is Judged 10 Years from Nuclear Bomb; U.S. Intelligence Review Contrasts With Administration Statements," Washington Post, August 2, 2005; "Former UN Weapons Inspector Blix says Iran needs more time," Deutsche Presse-Agenture, April 3, 2006; John Diamond, "U.S. Intelligence agencies say Iran is years away from building nukes," USA Today, April 14, 2006.
[54] "Former UN Weapons Inspector Blix says Iran needs more time," Deutsche Presse-Agenture, April 3, 2006.
[55] "Iran nuclear bomb 'in 10 years,'" BBC, June 2, 2006.
[56] Mohsen Aminzadeh, "The Biggest Diplomatic Defeat for the Islamic Republic of Iran."
[57] "N. Korea, Iran firms on WMD watch list," Japan Times, April 5, 2006; "German nuclear material smuggled to Iran," United Press International, March 28, 2006; "Germany breaks Iran supply ring," BBC, March 27, 2006.
[58] "Nuclear Proliferation Challenges & Nonproliferation Opportunities - A Conversation with Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei," Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 30, 2006, <http://cns.miis.edu/cns/media/pr060531.htm>.
[59] "Chinese ambassador expounds China's position on Iran nuke issues," Xinhua, September 22, 2005.
[60] George Jahn, "Dealing with Iran a Conundrum for West," Associated Press, January 13, 2006.
[61] Elaine Kurtenback, "Reports: China, Iran Near Huge Oil Deal," Associated Press, February 17, 2006.
[62] "Tehran gives first praise for Russian nuclear plan," Khaleej Times, December 14, 2005.
[63] "IAEA can solve Iran's nuclear row with West: Putin," Reuters, December 7, 2005.
[64] "Security Council, In Presidential Statement, Underlines Importance of Iran's Re-Established Full, Sustained Suspensions of Uranium-Enrichment Activities, Security Council document SC/8679," United Nations, March 29, 2006.
[65] "Big Security Council Members Agree on Iran," Associated Press, January 16, 2005.
[66] Nikolai Sokov, "The Prospects of Russian Mediation of the Iranian Nuclear Crisis," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, February 17, 2006, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060217.htm/>.
[67] Views expressed by Dr. Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, Professor of International Relations at Tehran University and Senior Researcher for the Center for Strategic Research in Tehran, during a briefing at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California, on August 16, 2005.
[68] Mohsen Aminzadeh, "The Biggest Diplomatic Defeat for the Islamic Republic of Iran."
[69] "GCC Calls on Tehran to Enforce Stability, Security in Gulf Region," Arab Times, November 28, 2005.
[70] Ibid.
[71] "Foreign Ministry Spokesman Criticizes GCC Official's Misperceptions," Mehr News Agency, November 29, 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20051129011022.
[72] Huda al-Huseini, "Nuclear Iran Brings Back the Persian Empire," Asharqalawsat, January 26, 2006.
[73] Amanda Lee Myers, "Saudi Ambassador Decries Iran Nuke Program," Associated Press, February 8, 2006.
[74] Mohammad Abd al-Salam, "Problems in the Gulf Region due to Nuclear Weapons," al-Ahram, January 18, 2006.
[75] Tanalee Smith, "Arab Nations Urged to Enter Nuclear Club," Associated Press, March 28, 2006.
[76] Amanda Lee Myers, "Saudi Ambassador Decries Iran Nuke Program," Associated Press.
[77] "Iraqi minister defends Iranian nuclear program," CNN, May 26, 2006.
[78] "Do you believe that the Iranian nuclear program is in the best interest of the region?" al-Jazeera, April 16, 2006; "Poll," al-Quds al-Arabi, January 26, 2006.
[79] "Transcript of News Conference by Britain's Blair, Iraq's Talabani," London 10 Downing Street, in FBIS Document EUP20051006099001, October 6, 2005.
[80] "UK, US Warn Iran Not to Support Iraqi Insurgents After Blair Meets Rice," Guardian, in FBIS Document EUP20051017015006, October 17, 2005.
[81] Neil Arun, "Shaped Bombs magnify Iraq attacks," BBC, October 13, 2005.
[82] "A Collection of Instructions ... Concerning Explosives," al-Firdaws (Paradise) Website, undated, p. 6-14.
[83] "Iran calls for UK Iraq pull-out," BBC, February 17, 2006.
[84] U.S. General Says No Proof Iran behind Iraq Arms," Reuters, March 14, 2006.
[85] Josh Meyer, "Some U.S. Officials Fear Iran is Helping al-Qaeda," Los Angeles Times, March 21, 2006.
[86] Ali Farassati, "Iran and Al Qaeda," The Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor 1 (September 11, 2003), pp 8-10.
[87] "Iran Asks for extradition of MKO members from US," Xinhua, May 23, 2003.
[88] "Iran demands US extradite suspect in 1994 shrine bombing," Agence France Presse, May 22, 2003.
[89] Ali Farassati, "Iran and Al Qaeda."
[90] Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, "The Iran-Pakistan Nexus," Asia Times, January 13, 2006.
[91] "Tehran condemns assassination of Iranian Sunni cleric in Afghanistan," Tehran IRAN, in FBIS Document IAP20010506000005, May 6, 2001.
[92] "Tehran Times: Al-Qa'ida threaten to assassinate Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan," Tehran Times, in FBIS - IAP20030109000048, January 9, 2003.
[93] "Shi'a," al-Tawhid wal Jihad Website, as viewed on November 3, 2004; "Al-Rafidha," Defense of Sunna Network Website, as viewed on February 10, 2005.
[94] Al-Ayubi, "The Rafida Are Always Readily Available Collaborators - The Example of Ibn al-`Alqami," Ansar al-Sunna Magazine, Vol. 12, September 2005, P. 6; Abu Hamza al-Baghdadi, "Why Do We Fight? and Who do We fight?" al-Qa'ida in the Land of Two Rivers (Iraq), undated.
[95] "Shi'a," al-Tawhid wal Jihad Website, as viewed on November 3, 2004.
[96] Ibid.
[97] Usama's Islamic Webpages, "The Following is the Internal Dissection of a Shi'i Brain," al-Mjlah Website, as viewed on November 16, 2005.
[98] "US Military Says It is Closer to Capturing Al-Qaida's Leader in Iraq," Voice of America, May 4, 2006, <http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-05-04-voa3.cfm/>.
[99] Ray Takeyh, "Diplomacy will not end Iran's nuclear program," Council on Foreign Relations, December 21, 2005.
[100] "President Ahmadinejad: Iran to Defend Its Nuclear Achievements," IRNA, December 14, 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20051214011007.
[101] Kaveh Afrasiabi and Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Negotiating Iran's Nuclear Populism," Brown Journal of World Affairs 12 (Summer/Fall 2005), p. 3.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ray Takeyh, "Diplomacy will not end Iran's nuclear program."
[104] "The Iran Nuclear Crisis," Council on Foreign Relations, January 31, 2006.
[105] Views expressed by Dr. Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, August 16, 2005.
[106] Nazila Fathi, "Bracing for Penalties, Iran Threatens to Withdraw From Nuclear Treaty," New York Times, February 12, 2006.
[107] Ellen Knickmeyer and Omar Fekeiki, "Iraqi Shiite Cleric Pledges to Defend Iran," Washington Post, January 24, 2006.
[108] "Iran Risking "Escalation" of Nuclear Standoff, White House Says," United States Department of State, January 11, 2006, <http://usinfo.state.gov/>; Steven R. Weisman and Nazila Fathi, "Iranians Reopen Nuclear Centers," New York Times, January 11, 2006.
[109] "Khamene'i Tells Tajikistani President Iran is Not Seeking Nuclear Weapons," IRNA, in FBIS Document IAP20060118011058, January 18, 2005.
[110] Nikkie R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 260.
[111] "Iran: Who holds the power?" BBC, February 2006.
[112] Nikkie R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, p. 244-246; "Iran: Who holds the power?"
[113] Gregory Beals, "US accused of blowing chance for Iran deal," Sydney Morning Herald, February 22, 2006.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Paul Holmes and Barry Moody, "Rafsanjani urges U.S. to begin thaw in ties," Reuters, May 19, 2005.
[116] Steven Hurst, "U.S. Envoy Wants Iran Talks in Iraq," Associated Press, March 17, 2006.
[117] Alissa Rubin, "Iranian Leader Reaffirms Offer of Talks," Los Angeles Times, March 22, 2006.
[118] Guy Dinmore, "Tehran 'lobbies' for US talks," Financial Times, April 7, 2006.
[119] Ibid.
[120] Julian Borger and Ewen MacAskill, "U-turn by White House as it blocks direct talks with Iran," Gaurdian, May 25, 2006.
[121] Steven R. Weisman and John O'Neil, "Rice Proposes Path to Talks With Iran on Nuclear Issue," New York Times, May 31, 2006; "U.S. offers direct talks with Iran, with condition," CNN, May 31, 2006.
[122] "Asefi: There is no obstacle for US talks on equal footing," IRNA, June 1, 2006.
[123] William Branigin and Karl Vick, "Bush Threatens Iran With UN Action: Iran Says It Welcomes Dialogue But Not U.S. Conditions," Washington Post, June 1, 2006.
[124] "'Carrot-stick' deal agreed on Iran," CNN, June 2, 2006; Glenn Kessler, "Six Powers Reach Accord on Iran Plan," Washington Post, June 2, 2006.
[125] Daniel Bombey, "Straw uses tough language to rule out Iran strike," Financial Times, April 10, 2006.

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