CNS Research Story

Illustration
Artist conception of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon.

Relevant CNS Experts:

Clay Moltz | Bio
Deputy Director, CNS
cmoltz[at]miis.edu

Jing-dong Yuan | Bio
Director, CNS Education Program
jing-dong.yuan[at]miis.edu

Stephanie Lieggi | Bio
Research Associate, EANP
stephanie.lieggi[at]miis.edu


Relevant CNS resources:

CNS Forum: Experts Discuss China's ASAT Test
CNS held a panel discussion that included three presentations by CNS researchers.
February 2, 2007

"China Downplays Talk of Space-Weapon Race,"
Jing-dong Yuan interviewed on NPR's All Things Considered, January 23, 2007.

Profile of China's space program,
"Current and Future Space Security," on the CNS website.

"Space Conflict or Space Cooperation?"
CNS Research Story, January 26, 2006

"China's Manned Space Program: Trajectory and Motivations,"
CNS Research Story, October 6, 2003

"China's Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons,"
CNS Research Story, July 22, 2002

"Space Weapons: Then and Now,"
a recent briefing event hosted by The Nonproliferation Review in Washington D.C. [Includes recorded audio and other media.]

Space Arms Race: China's ASAT Test a Wake-up Call

By Stephanie C. Lieggi, Research Associate, East Asia Nonproliferation Program

24 January 2007

On January 11, 2007, China successfully tested a direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson confirmed the test on January 23, but gave few details aside from noting that the test was not aimed at any particular country.[1] This confirmation came over a week after initial U.S. reports that a rocket launched from the Xichang Launch Facility in China's Sichuan province had destroyed an aging Chinese meteorological satellite in a low-earth orbit.[2]

Despite Beijing's assurance that the test was not "aimed" at anyone, China's use of an ASAT weapon to destroy a satellite raises a number of questions about Beijing's intentions in space. Beijing has appeared in the past to take the moral high ground with regards to space arms control. Chinese diplomats have called for controls on the weaponization of space for over a decade despite a lack of reciprocity from the United States.[3] Skeptics, particularly in Washington, argued that Beijing was cynically using arms control as a ruse to hide its own military space program. Last week's test appears to lend some credibility to that view. Others, however, argue that it is the billions of dollars the United States has spent on research and development in the military use of space that ultimately triggered China to move forward with ASAT development.[4]

Last year, the U.S. National Space Policy reasserted Washington's intention to remain the world's dominant space power.[5] Additionally, the United States and Japan are developing a missile defense system that China views as threatening its national interests, especially with regards to a military conflict over Taiwan. These on-going developments, some argue, have forced China's military to strengthen its deterrent and defense capabilities, including testing potential countermeasures to space-based interceptors.

Chinese officials and academics have argued in the past that Beijing does not want to participate in a space arms race. Pointing to the vast investment that would be required for such an endeavor, most contend that China cannot afford to keep up with the U.S. military space program on the one hand and develop its economy on the other. Some international analysts, particularly in the West, have called China's ASAT test a direct challenge to U.S. space superiority. However, considering the economic and technical limitations still facing China's space program, this test was most likely an attempt by military hardliners in China to ensure that U.S. military planners took China's asymmetrical capabilities seriously.[6]

Evidently overlooked, or disregarded, by Chinese leaders in pushing forward with this test was the significant problem of having a large amount of debris in a low-earth orbit that is frequented by large numbers of civilian satellites. That debris--that likely includes hundreds of fragments of more than 10 cm and tens of thousands of smaller pieces--could damage the space assets of any number of nations.[7] The extent of debris that can be created by ASAT testing has been widely understood since the United States and Soviet Union conducted a small number of tests in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1985, the United States Air Force launched the only U.S. ASAT weapons test involving the destruction of a satellite. That test--in which a missile was launched from a high-altitude F-15 aircraft--destroyed an old scientific satellite producing over 250 pieces of trackable debris.[8] The debris from that explosion took almost 20 years to fall back to earth and one piece came dangerously close to the International Space Station in 1999.[9]

The potential international fallout resulting from Beijing's apparent lack of foresight on the matter of space debris may have long-term repercussions for China's global standing. It will also impact its economic bottom line in more ways than one. According to an assessment by the Teal Group--an aerospace consulting firm--a space arms race that includes potential ASAT development would increase the financial risk of any satellite program.[10] The report points out that this will be felt most in the commercial satellite market--a market in which China is heavily invested.

The debris issue and heightening concerns about Beijing's intentions in space may lead many of China's space partners to rethink bilateral collaboration. Much of China's space-related cooperation includes areas such as small satellite development and satellite tracking. These areas of collaboration have significant value in the commercial satellite market, but also involve important technologies for developing ASAT technology. China's civilian and military space programs are intertwined and knowledge and technology flow freely between the two sectors. The possible transfer of technology and expertise to China's space program is likely to now be looked at in a more critical light.

The repercussions of China's ASAT test will not only affect Beijing's relationship with the United States and its major space partners. The test is also making other nations think about their space security needs. India, for instance, has recently shown increasing interest in certain technologies that could be converted to use in a military space program. Notably, in November 2006 India successfully tested an anti-ballistic missile system that used a hit-to-kill vehicle.[11] After the Chinese test, a senior Indian defense official said that New Delhi would take the necessary steps to counter Chinese ASAT capabilities, including through the use of ballistic missiles.[12]

China and its military leaders have been widely criticized for their decision to test an ASAT weapon. Despite this rhetoric, the international community still faces a choice with regards to further ASAT development. Major space-faring powers, like the United States, Russia and the European Union, can take the initiative and push for a moratorium on the development and testing of anti-satellite weaponry. With China's space program still benefiting greatly from cooperation with other space powers, a pledge from China to forgo further testing could be made a requirement for future collaborations in space.

China is not the only nation with both security concerns and greater space aspirations. As with nuclear weapons, one nation gaining anti-satellite weapons may motivate others--such as India--to acquire the same technology. The international community as a whole will suffer greatly from the instability this proliferation would cause. China's successful test should be seen as a wake-up call--not to start an arms race in outer space, but to stop one before it picks up too much steam.


[1] Joseph Kahn, "China Confirms Test of Anti-Satellite Weapon," New York Times, January 23, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/23/world/asia/23cnd-china.html?hp&ex=1169614800&en=d9317a9a60f6aebb&ei=5094&partner=homepage.
[2] The first public account of the test was posted by Dr. Jeffery Lewis on his blog ArmsControlWonk. See "Chinese Test ASAT?" ArmsControlWonk, January 17, 2007, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1359/chinese-test-asat. Lewis's post was soon followed by an article in Aviation Week & Space Technology that detailed the test. See Craig Covault, "Chinese Test Anti-Satellite Weapon," Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 17, 2007, http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/CHI01177.xml. Although it took the Chinese government almost another week to confirm the test, the original Aviation Week article was published on the website of the government-run China Daily, signifying that Beijing was not distancing itself from the report.
[3] For an overview on this issue, see "China: Arms Control Proposals and Statements," CNS database Current and Future Space Security, http://cns.miis.edu/research/space/china/arms.htm.
[4] Marc Kaufman and Dafna Linzer, "Chinese Satellite Test Draws Sharp Protest From Other Nations," Washington Post, January 19, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/18/AR2007011801029.html?nav=rss_email/components.
[5] Full text of the U.S. National Space Policy document, published October 10, 2006, is available on the website of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, http://www.ostp.gov/html/US%20National%20Space%20Policy.pdf
[6] For an earlier assessment of China's ASAT development, see Phillip Saunders etal, "China's Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons," CNS Research Story of the Week, July 22, 2002 http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020722.htm
[7] Jeffrey Lewis, "Chinese ASAT Likely Made Massive Debris," ArmsControlWonk, January 18, 2007, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1360/chinese-asat-test-massive-debris-creation-likely. In his post, Lewis quotes David Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientist who noted that this test could have led "to nearly 800 debris fragments of size 10 cm or larger, nearly 40,000 debris fragments with size between 1 and 10 cm, and roughly 2 million fragments of size 1 mm or larger. Roughly half of the debris fragments with size 1 cm or larger would stay in orbit for more than a decade."
[8] Laura Grego, "A History of Anti-Satellite Weapons Programs," Space Weapons Basics, Union of Concerned Scientist website, http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/a-history-of-asat-programs.html.
[9] "The Death of the Solwind Satellite," Space Security Brief, Stimson Center website, July 14, 2005, http://www.stimson.org/?SN=WS20050714867.
[10] "Teal Group Assesses Satellite Market Impact of China ASAT Test," Press Release, Teal Group website, January 22, 2007, http://www.tealgroup.com/releases/2007-1-22.htm.
[11] A.K. Dhar, "India develops new anti-missile system," Press Trust of India, November 27, 2006, http://www.indiadaily.com/editorial/14438.asp.
[12] "India to counter China's anti-satellite test, says DRDO," Tribune News Service, January 20, 2007, http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070121/nation.htm#15


View previous Research Stories.

Author(s): Stephanie C. Lieggi
Related Resources: Missile, East Asia, Research Story
Date Created: January 24, 2007
Date Updated: March 7, 2007
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