The Race Towards Entry Into Force of the Pelindaba Treaty: Mozambique Leading the Charge

Almost 50 years after France detonated it first nuclear test in Algeria, spurring African nations to call for an African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, and more than 11 years after the Pelindaba Treaty was finally concluded at the site where the uranium for South Africa's former nuclear weapon program was enriched, there is renewed hope that this longstanding goal could soon enter into force. After some years of no ratifications, the Mozambican parliament - the Assembly of the Republic - decided on March 26 to ratify the accord, bringing the number of state parties to 26 — only two short of the 28 required to push the treaty into force. This decision by Mozambique could be just the spark needed to set in motion a series of ratifications.

Given that there are a number of other southern African states who have yet to ratify (Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Seychelles and Zambia), Mozambique's example could potentially result in southern African states taking the prize for racing the treaty toward its entry into force point. This would not only be important from a political perspective, but it would be very symbolic as well. Although the impetus to establish an African NWFZ started as a result of the French tests in Algeria, the drive towards this goal started many years later as result of suspicions over a nuclear armed apartheid South Africa. The driving force behind this initiative was the Front Line States, a group of mostly southern African countries that today represent the Southern African Development Community (SADC). It is significant that one of these states - a state without any nuclear industry but with a deep commitment to nonproliferation and disarmament - is yet again taking the lead in moving the goal of an African nuclear weapons free zone forward. It is also significant, and certainly welcomed, that a southern African state — represented by Ambassador Boniface Chidyausiku from Zimbabwe — has been nominated to chair the very important 2009 Preparatory Committee session for the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. If Mozambique's ratification leads to more ratifications in the region, potentially bringing the treaty into force before the 2009 PrepCom, it would significantly enhance southern Africa's, and indeed the wider continent's, profile at the PrepCom. In an angry ocean full of proliferation "tsunamis" a significant event like the entry into force of the longest aspired NWFZ would be a welcome positive development.

It is for this reason that the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISIS), with the support of the Norwegian government are hosting a workshop in Pretoria, South Africa on March 31 and April 1. The purpose of the workshop is to examine what can be done to encourage and assist southern African states to ratify the treaty, how the treaty's entry into force would strengthen Africa's role in the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime, and what benefits could be expected from the establishment of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) which will be created upon the treaty's entry into force. As if by design, if not fate, the Mozambican parliament's ratification decision provides the ideal backdrop to this workshop. Mozambique will be represented at the meeting and is expected to share its experience in taking the necessary legal and technical measures to ratify the treaty. In addition to other southern African states, the workshop will also be attended by representatives from several international organizations including the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America & the Caribbean (OPANAL).
As one of 5 NWFZs[1]covering more than 110 states, the Pelindaba Treaty is a key component of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, designed not only to further enhance African nations' obligations under the NPT, but to represent a zonal approach to global nuclear weapon elimination by significantly shrinking the areas for which nuclear weapons are seen as a requirement for national or regional security. The Pelindaba Treaty is unique in this regard as it is the first NWFZ accord to include a disarmament provision setting a new standard for future NWFZs, including the already established Central Asia zone and, even more importantly, a future NWFZ in the Middle East.

The Pelindaba Treaty in fact represents a more balanced and comprehensive approach to nonproliferation and disarmament than the NPT. While reaffirming African states' legal commitments under the NPT not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons programs, and to implement comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA (also an NPT requirement), the Pelindaba Treaty requires the dismantlement and destruction of any nuclear explosive device manufactured prior to the treaty coming into force. States are also required to destroy or convert facilities for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. The IAEA, together with the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), will be responsible for the verification of this process. The treaty also provides for more rigorous peaceful use cooperation in the nuclear field and provides for a regional commission — AFCONE — to promote cooperation among African states, and with states and organizations outside the region.

Some might argue that the treaty's disarmament provision is obsolete given that South Africa, the only African country to have developed nuclear weapons, dismantled its program long before the treaty was signed in 1996. These critics of the treaty also argue that the treaty, as many other new nonproliferation initiatives, is aimed at "disarming the disarmed." These criticisms are clearly baseless. For one, the Pelindaba Treaty — just like the NPT — requires its members to implement comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA. Since all African states are already NPT members, this is not an additional obligation and requires no additional legal measures from African states. Although the legal and technical aspects of CSAs are often held as reasons by some for not being able to ratify the Pelindaba Treaty, adherence to safeguards is not a precondition since the treaty allows states parties an 18 month grace period to implement this obligation.[2] In this regard, it is interesting to note that 13 of the non-ratifying states already have CSAs in place, and should therefore have no legal problems in ratifying the treaty.[3]

Given Libya's 2006 denouncement of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, there are no further suspicious of nuclear weapons related activities on the continent. Therefore, while the disarmament clause may never be invoked, it does establish a unique disarmament mechanism by linking a regional organization — AFCONE — to and international institution — the IAEA — to ensure that nuclear disarmament in the region is complete. Not only would such a mechanism provide enhanced confidence that all African states remain nuclear weapons free, but this model could be used in other regions such as the Middle East when the time is right for establishing a NWFZ in that part of the world. As the Mozambican Foreign Minister Oldemiro Baloi pointed out on March 26, 2008, "nuclear weapon free zones are one of the most effective means of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and of promoting general and complete disarmament."[4] Bringing the African zone into force will therefore be a significant building block towards a world free of nuclear weapons. In fact, the entry into force of the African zone would create a de facto nuclear weapons free zone in the Southern Hemisphere. But if there continues to be apathy about, or even worse, opposition to the Pelindaba Treaty, then it will bring to doubt the seriousness of African states, including leading nuclear disarmament advocate states such South Africa, Egypt, and Algeria, about their demands for complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

A third, and perhaps one of the most important political and security incentives of the treaty is that it requires the nuclear weapons states (NWS) to provide legally binding security guarantees that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any African state. While the United Kingdom, France and China have already signed and ratified the "negative security assurances" protocol to the treaty, the United States and Russia have yet to ratify. Soon after the signing of the treaty in 1996, the United States threatened that if what they suspected as a chemical weapons production site at Tarhunah in Libya could not be destroyed with conventional weapons, that "by the end of the year, the United States would have a nuclear warhead based on the B61 that would be able to do the job."[5] A senior White House official later added that "each party (to the negative assurances protocol) pledges not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against an ANFWZ party. However, [the treaty] will not limit options available to the United States in response to an attack by an ANWFZ party using weapons of mass destruction." [6] The United States has since not made any effort to ratify this very important security guarantee to African states, not even after combined US/UK intelligence operations verified that Libya no longer has any remnants of a WMD program. Russia's ratification of the protocol is clearly linked to that of the United States. Bringing the treaty into force would not only increase pressure on these two NWS to provide legally binding negative security assurance to all African states, but would make the Pelindaba Treaty a significant zonal approach to global legally binding assurances. While African states such as South Africa and Nigeria have taken several initiatives to promote a global legally binding instruments on security assurances — either as a protocol to the NPT or as a separate treaty — their efforts are meaningless if the Pelindaba Treaty continues to be left in limbo.

A fourth advantage of the Pelindaba Treaty is that it would ban forever any nuclear testing or placement of nuclear weapons on African territory. Given that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is likely to take several years to enter into force, it would be very important for African states to permanently shut the door on any (albeit remote) possibility of nuclear weapons testing on the continent.

The Pelindaba Treaty also holds significant advantages for peaceful regional nuclear cooperation with potential commercial benefits. The treaty actually does more for peaceful nuclear cooperation than the NPT since it requires its state parties to promote "individually and collectively" the use of nuclear science and technology for economic and social development. Given the worldwide renewed interest in the peaceful application of nuclear energy as an alternative energy source, and the proven advantages of other peaceful applications of nuclear science (e.g. the eradication of the tsetse fly in Africa), this aspect of the treaty should be one of the most attractive incentives to move the treaty into force. AFCONE will, once established, play a central role in this regard. At a time when most, if not all, African countries are concerned that current initiatives aimed at strengthening general nonproliferation obligations (e.g. the additional protocol, limitations on domestic fuel cycle developments, etc) are designed to further limit their rights to peaceful nuclear uses, the role and function of AFCONE should be emphasized and further explored. In addition to its confidence building activities, including verifying safeguards implementation, AFCONE could potentially become a regional partner of the IAEA as part of a network of international nuclear fuel centers. Given the current rush of initiatives in Europe and in Russia to expand enrichment capacities, at nuclear facilities such as URENCO, AREVA and Angarsk, so as to enable these facilities to become major suppliers of enrichment services (as opposed to national facilities) with obvious lucrative benefits for the hosting countries, why should Africa not have a fuel center of its own? Why should major uranium exporting countries such as Namibia, Niger and South Africa not directly benefit from their natural resources? And why should African nations potentially be subjected again to northern control of not only their strategic natural resources, but also their future livelihood — energy. AFCONE could not only work in conjunction with the IAEA as a regional fuel center, but it could facilitate, and perhaps over time even offer, more economically viable options to African states. Instead of establishing very expensive and potentially dangerous national nuclear fuel enrichment facilities, nuclear fuel could be acquired through AFCONE without political intervention. AFCONE could also work with more nuclear advanced states such as South Africa to provide much needed training to African nuclear scientists and engineers.

Conclusion

If one looks at the current state of affairs regarding the Pelindaba Treaty, then the conclusion should clearly be that the glass is half full instead of the more negative half empty perspective. With the right mix of political will and enthusiasm for the treaty coming not only from the capitals of non-ratifiers, but also from Pretoria, Abudja, and Algiers, the treaty could enter into force relatively quickly. Since 13 countries of the non-ratifying countries already have CSAs in place, there should be no technical or legal reasons why they cannot ratify in quick succession following Mozambique's example. Bearing in mind the political turmoil in the Sudan, it is however highly unlikely that Khartoum will do so soon. Despite having hosted the treaty's signing ceremony in April 1996, Cairo is also not likely to ratify until there is significant progress toward, if not complete establishment of, a Middle East NWFZ. But Sudan and Egypt's ratifications are not required for the treaty to enter into force. Any combination of two countries with or without a CSA in place could tip the treaty over its entry into force point. And since implementing CSAs is not a precondition to ratifying the treaty, the legal preparation for ratification would in most cases not require more than decisions by two additional legislative bodies. Moreover, given that Namibia, Seychelles and Zambia already have CSAs in place, their ratification procedure should be relatively easy to accomplish in a short timeframe.

The challenge before African countries, and in particular those that have not yet ratified the treaty, should therefore not be how to implement the accord, but who will become the 28th state party, thereby taking credit for ensuring that the longest aspired NWFZ in the world will finally become a reality. Then the symbolism attached to the Zulu name of the treaty, which roughly translates into "the matter or discussion is settled", will have true meaning. It will not only signal the end of the struggle to make Africa free of nuclear weapons, but it would be a real step towards a nuclear weapons free world, and not simply a vision of such a goal.

Sources

[1] Other nuclear weapon free zones are Latin America and the Caribbean, Southeast Asia the South Pacific and Central Asia.
[2] State parties to the treaty have 18 months to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
[3] These states include: Cameroon, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ghana, Niger, Malawi, Morocco, Namibia, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia.
[4] "Mozambique: Assembly Ratifies Nuclear Weapon Free Zone" Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique (Maputo), 26 March 2008 http://allafrica.com/stories/200803260899.html
[5] See Greg Mello "The Birth of a New Bomb", Washington Post, June 1 1997.
[6] Robert Bell, Special Assistant to President Clinton for National Security Affairs and NSC Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control quoted in "The Birth of a New Bomb", Washington Post, June 1 1997.

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