Iran and the IAEA: The Road to "Gridlock" and an Uncertain Path Forward

Introduction

On September 15, 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a report - the latest of 23 prepared so far - on the Islamic Republic of Iran's compliance with its safeguards agreement and Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008).[1] The report stated that the IAEA has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but reaffirmed that Tehran is making significant progress in centrifuge development and operation. While Iran's uranium enrichment program is not prohibited under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Security Council required Iran to halt enrichment work after several reports from the IAEA's Director General and its Board of Governors raised serious concerns about the nature of Iran's nuclear work. Iran has thus far refused and has in fact produced 480 kg of low enriched uranium (LEU) to date. The report notes further that from May 7 to August 30, 2008, Iran fed a total of 3,630 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride (UF₆₎ into its cascades, an amount that constitutes a significant increase over previously reported rates. [2] Assuming continuous operation, the most recent data on Iran's centrifuge program indicates that "the centrifuges now appear to be running at approximately 85 percent of their stated target capacity."[3]

Finally, the IAEA report focuses on Iran's present unwillingness to substantively address lingering concerns over the "Alleged Studies," a set of purportedly detailed documents provided to the Agency by the United States and other Member states. These documents, if authentic, indicate past Iranian efforts to pursue experiments consistent with a desire to acquire nuclear weapons expertise.

This report offers a synopsis of the recent history of Iran's nuclear program and Tehran's interactions with the IAEA in order to provide some perspective on the contents of the September 15, 2008 report and the contentious issues that have contributed to the current situation, described by IAEA officials as "gridlocked." It also examines the Agency's latest revelations about the present status of Iran's program and assesses future prospects for the Iranian nuclear file. Finally, this paper outlines a few policy options for both the next U.S. administration and Tehran to tackle this problem and avoid further escalation.

Background: Iran and the IAEA

The Iranian nuclear issue was brought to the forefront of global political attention in the summer of 2002, when an Iranian opposition group revealed that Tehran was developing an enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water plant at Arak. The Iranians had not notified the IAEA about these activities.[4] The subsequent six years can be divided into three separate stages: European negotiations, U.N. Security Council referral, and the IAEA work plan.

Stage 1: Negotiating with the Europeans

In 2003, the IAEA declared that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its safeguards agreement "with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed."[5] Nevertheless, Tehran managed to deflect attempts to refer its case to the United Nations Security Council by concluding an agreement with France, Britain, and Germany (referred to as the "EU3") to commit to temporarily suspending uranium enrichment, sign and implement the Additional Protocol (AP), and satisfy the Agency's concerns regarding its past nuclear activities.[6]

The IAEA investigative process, European diplomacy, and U.S. pressure constituted the three pillars of the process thereafter. Iran was compelled to revise its initial insistence that all enrichment-related technology and knowledge was developed indigenously when IAEA environmental samples at Natanz revealed traces of HEU.[7] In response to questions from the IAEA, Iran would ultimately admit to an 18-year covert nuclear program and link its activities to imports from Pakistan through the infamous A.Q. Khan network. The Iranians maintained, however, that they had never intended to acquire nuclear weapons, but had rather sought to expedite an indigenous civilian nuclear energy program.[8] Negotiations with the Europeans culminated in August 2005 with an EU3 proposal promising economic and political cooperation if Tehran relinquished its worrisome nuclear fuel cycle aspirations.[9] Without firm, analogous commitments from the United States, however, the incentives contained within the European package proved insufficiently tempting to the Iranians. The accession to power of the more radical President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did not help matters, and the deal fell apart.

Stage 2: Bringing in the Security Council

To the surprise and alarm of negotiators, Iran did not respond to the EU3 incentives package with counter-offers or attempts at compromise. Instead, Iran notified the IAEA in August of 2005 that it intended to resume enrichment work.[10] Mounting U.S. pressure, the existence of a number of serious unanswered questions about Iran's nuclear past, the sudden end of negotiations, and the suspension of Iran's confidence-building efforts left the IAEA with little choice. In the early 2006, the Agency's Board of Governors found Iran not in compliance with its NPT obligations and referred the issue to the UN Security Council (UNSC).[11] Iran responded with a decision to no longer abide by the provisions of the Additional Protocol (AP), which it had signed but not yet ratified, and stalled cooperation with the Agency's efforts aimed at clearing Iran's past nuclear activities.

Faced with ongoing frustration in Iraq and a stalemate on the Iran issue due to potential veto-power opposition by China and the Russian Federation in the Security Council, the U.S. government dangled the prospect of direct negotiations in May 2006, with the precondition of uranium enrichment suspension on Iran's part. Iran declined this offer. Instead, it accelerated its nuclear research and uranium enrichment programs.

At the end of July 2006, the Security Council agreed on its first legally binding measure related to the Iranian nuclear situation. In resolution 1696, the UNSC demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities. Iran ignored the resolution, compelling the Security Council to adopt two sanctions resolutions - 1737 (December 2006)[12] and 1747 (March 2007).[13] These measures imposed sanctions and subsequently tightened them. Iran continued to ignore the Security Council and, at the end of March 2007, notified the IAEA that it would no longer provide advance notice of plans to build new facilities.[14]

Stage 3: ElBaradei's Work Plan

Concerned with the lack of progress at the Security Council, and troubled by Iran's technological advancement and the absence of any steps towards clarifying the nature of its past program, IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei successfully negotiated a work plan with the Iranian government in July and August of 2007. [15] Under the title "Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues," the Agency and Iran agreed upon a phased work plan aimed at providing the IAEA with information so that it could ultimately close the outstanding issues in the Iranian file. The work plan was to be run parallel to the Security Council and European negotiation processes. The plan's procedure was simple: the Agency would ask questions about each of six outstanding issues in turn. As soon as an item was resolved, the process would move to the next issue.[16]

During subsequent months, the IAEA succeeded in verifying both the source of a nuclear material discrepancy at the Technical University in Tehran and the exact construction timeline of a facility at the Gchine mine.[17] It was also able to explain the presence of Polonium-210 in Iran and to establish the origins of the centrifuge technology Iran was employing.[18] As confidence building measures during this process, Iran provided some additional access for inspections consistent with what would be required under an AP, and to abide by prior commitments to provide notice on certain planned facilities. Such transparency was provided, however, on a strictly ad hoc basis, with the Iranian government granting access to facilities and information in some cases, but not in others.[19]

When, in February 2008, the focus of the process shifted to thornier points on the work plan, the process became stalled. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1803, which strengthened existing sanctions by authorizing inspections of suspicious cargo to and from Iran, tightening the monitoring of Iran's financial institutions, and extending travel bans and asset freezes. These stricter-sounding measures nevertheless lacked the teeth to markedly increase decisive pressure on Iran.[20]

The IAEA's report in May of 2008 stated that Iran had agreed to address the "Alleged Studies," a set of documents provided to the Agency by the United States and other Member states that appear to indicate past Iranian efforts to pursue experiments consistent with a desire to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran confirmed that some of the information in the studies was factually accurate. Iran maintained, however, that it would not address the substance of the Alleged Studies (as they related to secret matters of national security), and dismissed them as "forged" and "fabricated."[21] In June, the EU3 presented Tehran with an updated package of incentives, including civilian nuclear cooperation and trade offers, but Tehran dismissed the offer because it required halting the country's enrichment program.[22]

The September 2008 IAEA Report

The Agency's latest report, issued on September 15, 2008, was noteworthy in at least four key respects:

1. It affirms that Iran is making steady progress in its program of enriching uranium via gas centrifuges;
2. It is the first report to explicitly quantify the amount of low enriched uranium (LEU) that Iran has to this point produced—480 kilograms;
3. It refers, for the first time, to the possible involvement of "foreign expertise" in alleged Iranian work on "symmetrical initiation of a hemispherical high explosive charge suitable for an implosion type nuclear device;" and
4. It focuses on Iran's present unwillingness to substantively address the Alleged Studies.

Uranium Enrichment

Iran operates almost 4000 P1/IR1 first generation centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), and is installing some 2000 more. The increased output of LEU at the FEP indicates that technical problems Iran struggled with in the past have largely been resolved.[23] The report also confirms a substantial increase in Iran's test work on more advanced centrifuge designs - the IR2 and IR3. The fact that Iran is feeding sizeable quantities of nuclear material into IR2 and IR3 centrifuges at its Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz could be an indication that the development of these more modern and efficient centrifuge models is progressing steadily.

The September 2008 report is the first Agency report to provide a definitive figure on the amount of LEU Iran has to this point produced, namely 480 kilograms. [24] The IAEA confirms that the entire quantity of enriched uranium remains under safeguards.[25] Nevertheless, should Iran decide to break out from the NPT, this 480 kg of LEU represents a substantial fraction of the raw material necessary to obtain the 20-25 kg of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) needed for one nuclear weapon.[26] Nevertheless, according to sources close to the IAEA, Iran will need "on the order of two years" to reach the point where a breakout would be a feasible proposition. Additionally, Iran is extremely unlikely to undertake a breakout with only enough raw materials on hand for a single weapon.[27]

"Foreign Expertise"

In connection with a document contained in the materials provided by a Member state to the IAEA describing experimentation on the "symmetrical initiation of a hemispherical high explosive charge suitable for an implosion type nuclear device," the Agency stated in its latest report that it had obtained information indicating that Iran's experimentation might have involved the assistance of "foreign expertise." The Agency declined to provide additional details on the subject, though a senior official close to the IAEA did clarify that the alleged foreign involvement was not believed to be in any way connected to the notorious A.Q. Khan network.[28] A recent New York Times article citing "European and American officials" suggested that the foreign expertise may have been provided by a lone Russian scientist, operating without the knowledge or consent of his government.[29]

Security Council Resolutions, Early Information Provision, and the Additional Protocol

Despite the Security Council's requirement in three Chapter VII resolutions for Iran to cease enrichment related research and production activities as a confidence-building measure, Iran has refused to do so.[30] Moreover, since the passage of resolution 1803 in March 2008, Tehran has curtailed other voluntary confidence building measures such as those that would be required under an AP, refusing access to Agency inspectors to locations related to the manufacturing of centrifuges and withholding provision of preliminary design information on a nuclear power plant to be built at Darkhovin.[31] In addition, Iran has asserted that it has no intention of ratifying or implementing an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the Agency until the world acknowledges its right to the full nuclear fuel cycle and the Iranian case is taken out of the Security Council and returned to the IAEA.[32]

Agency officials have repeatedly stressed that the implementation of an Additional Protocol in Iran provides the only way for the IAEA to meaningfully verify that the country has no clandestine nuclear weapons program. The AP would extend the authority of IAEA inspectors, permitting them to verify both the non-diversion of declared nuclear material (as they can presently) and the absence of undeclared nuclear facilities or material. Such a step would have an enormously positive impact on international confidence regarding the intentions behind Iran's nuclear work.

The "Uranium Metal" Document

In 2005, Iran made available to the Agency a set of documents it received after its communication with A.Q. Khan in 1987. Included in these was a 15-page document related to procedural requirements for the reduction of uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) to metal in small quantities and the casting and machining of enriched, natural, and depleted uranium metal into hemispheric forms. These technologies are directly related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components and have no known applications in civilian activities.

Tehran immediately insisted that the document had been provided on the initiative of the A.Q. Khan network and not because of any request from Iran.[33] While it declined an Agency request for a copy of the document, Iran did permit the Agency to examine the document and to place it under an Agency seal.[34] The IAEA concluded in February 2006 that Iran's motives for conducting uranium reduction experiments appeared credible, especially as neither of Iran's experiments with casting and machining appeared to have followed procedures outlined in the 15-page document.[35] Nevertheless, conclusive evidence to the effect that Iran never requested the document was not forthcoming.

At the beginning of November 2007, Iran finally provided a copy of the 15-page document describing the UF6 reduction and hemisphere casting. The Agency passed it along to Pakistan in search of additional information, and it received in response a confirmation that "an identical document exists in Pakistan."[36] The latest IAEA report noted that Iran refuses to provide any additional information on this issue.

Alleged Studies

In the autumn of 2005, the United States informed the Agency about one alleged study, named "The Green Salt Project," concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF₄ (a substance known as "green salt").[37] Additionally, the Agency received reports from multiple sources concerning alleged tests related to high explosives and the design of a specialized re-entry vehicle for Iran's Shahab-3 missile. These reports, if authentic, would strongly suggest that Iran conducted work consistent with a desire to develop a deliverable nuclear warhead. The Agency has stressed that Iran must take the Alleged Studies seriously given their unusual level of detail and internal consistency.[38] In December 2006, Iran denied the authenticity of the Alleged Studies. The Agency ultimately confronted Iran with its information, but Iran held fast to its claim that these were baseless allegations derived from fabricated documents.[39]

After nearly two years without notable progress on resolving issues surrounding the Alleged Studies, the Agency's May 2008 report stated that Iran had confirmed the factual authenticity of some of the information, but repeatedly reiterated that the documents themselves were "forged" and "fabricated." The September 2008 report adds no substantive additional information, but stresses the fact that Tehran protested the Agency's admitted inability to provide Iran with copies of the documents in its possession, as the IAEA did not receive authorization to do so from the states these documents originate from. The Agency was, however, able to show some of the documents to Iranian officials and review particular allegations.[40]

In order to move forward, the Agency has reiterated that Iran must identify elements of the provided documents that it considers factually correct in addition to elements it claims are fabricated. Iran has thus far responded that such clarifications would necessitate divulging privileged national security information, violate Iran's sovereign right to keep such information private, and far exceed the Agency's investigative mandate (in that the documents pertain to conventional capabilities and not nuclear activities).

Iran maintains that it has resolved all of the outstanding issues set forth in its work plan with the Agency. It claims that as a result, the Agency should downgrade its activities in Iran to the level of "routine safeguarding" that it would employ in any other state with a safeguards agreement, and remove the Iranian file from the Security Council.[41]

The Way Forward?

One year after its initiation in August 2007, the approach of the IAEA and its Director-General to advance the negotiation process via a step-by-step question-and-answer work plan has apparently reached its limits. Unless Iran agrees to provide additional information so that the IAEA can resolve unanswered questions raised by the Alleged Studies, no further progress on the work plan appears possible. To settle questions about Iran's nuclear past, the Agency needs Tehran to specify elements of the Alleged Studies it considers true in addition to those it considers false. Iran has stated that it will not do this. Iran also appears unwilling to comply with Security Council demands to halt its enrichment work. Given a number of pressing domestic concerns, the United States and Israel are unlikely to pursue aggressive responses to Iran at this time. Meanwhile, the international community, which overwhelmingly favors a diplomatic solution to the crisis, will continue to be characterized by a lack of consensus on meaningfully strengthened sanctions. Without new and more innovative diplomacy within the Security Council, Iran will soon acquire a breakout nuclear capability.

The IAEA Process Meets the Alleged Studies Roadblock

To its credit, the work plan process succeeded in shedding a substantial amount of light on Iran's nuclear past and in avoiding direct confrontation. Meanwhile, however, Tehran seized the opportunity to advance its nuclear enrichment program. In both its May and September reports this year, the Agency was not able to certify any substantive progress in elucidating the true nature of the Alleged Studies (green salt project, high explosive testing, redesign of the payload chamber of the Shahab-3 missile reentry vehicle, etc). According to sources close to the IAEA, Iran-IAEA cooperation on ElBaradei's work plan will remain "gridlocked" until Iran musters the willingness to provide sufficient information to assuage concerns raised by the Alleged Studies.

Tehran has refused to do so. In fact, immediately after the release of the September 2008 IAEA report, Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Ali-Asghar Soltaniyeh, stated that Tehran will not take any steps beyond its "legal obligations." Furthermore, he claimed that Iran has fulfilled the work plan in its entirety. His government, he asserted, considers the matter closed and is calling upon the IAEA to return to routine safeguards-related activities in his country.[42]

From Iran's perspective, the Alleged Studies investigation constitutes an extra-legal reach by the IAEA. The Agency, according to Iran, has no right to pry into matters related to military research that do not involve nuclear material. The Agency, on the other hand, maintains that the Security Council has charged it with resolving Iran's nuclear past to the satisfaction of the international community and that the Alleged Studies could constitute evidence of weapons intent that must be addressed.[43]

While Iran has previously provided plausible explanations for engaging in activities that appeared weapons related, it would be extremely difficult at this point to provide any sort of acknowledgement of the veracity of the Alleged Studies without incriminating itself in some fashion. Iran's denials that any such projects ever existed are thus understandable, and (it is important to note) have not conclusively been proven untrue. If however, it is proved that Iran did conduct work on redesigning the payload chamber of missiles - for example - that revelation would indeed be somewhat damning.

It should be noted that even if Iran changed its mind and opted to be completely open about its past activities, the ongoing reality of an accelerating enrichment program constitutes, in and of itself, the root cause of international consternation and fear. The fact of the matter is that Iran's past (and thus the majority of the IAEA's work plan) is largely a sideshow from the perspective of the United States and Israel so long as uranium enrichment proceeds and accelerates. It is not Iran's historical intentions that many countries fear, but rather its future capabilities.

The history of this six-year-long process shows that stalemates can invite escalation. This suggests that the recent halt in Iran-IAEA progress on elucidating past activities will lead not only to "gridlock" between Iran and the IAEA, but also to increased tensions between Tehran on the one side, and Washington and Jerusalem on the other side. For the moment, the U.S. presidential campaign, the global financial crisis, and the government-building process in Israel demand the attentions of key actors involved. A prolonged stalemate, however, has the potential to exacerbate rhetoric on both sides and further diminish any hope for an acceptable resolution of the situation.

Sanctions

The consensus among the members of the Security Council on strengthened sanctions that existed in August 2008 following Iran's dismissal of a new European incentive package has all but vanished since then.[44] Immediately after the release of the September report, the United States, France, and Britain, supported by Germany, signaled a desire to ratchet up the pressure on Iran.[45] Due to the increased tensions between Washington and Moscow, Russia refused participation in a P5+1 meeting discussing additional sanctions.[46] British officials were reported to have stated that their Russian counterparts had dismissed sanctions for the next half-year.[47]

The common denominator that members of the Security Council could agree upon proved to be resolution 1835, adopted on September 27, 2008, which contained no additional sanctions, and instead merely underlined previous sanctions and called upon Iran to comply with them.[48] This last resolution forestalls escalation to some degree, limiting U.S. options towards Iran and granting Russia and China additional leeway to pursue a range of responses to the next IAEA report. The next U.S. administration, be it Republican or Democrat, will probably take at least a few months to formulate its approach towards Iran. As a result, agreement on further sanctions resolutions in the first half of 2009 is highly unlikely.

Military Intervention

Following the publication of the December 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, discussions about military intervention decreased markedly in the United States.[49] In recent months, however, military option discussions have resurfaced periodically in statements from both Israeli and American politicians. Engaged in an unusually foreign policy focused election campaign, both presidential candidates affirm that the military option has to be kept on the table.[50] Nonetheless, the U.S. military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan seems likely to monopolize the attention of the candidates and the electorate, with the notoriously complex Iran issue taking a backseat to these struggling operations. Many former government officials and legislators on both sides of the aisle have called for direct negotiations or increased pressure on Iran, and numerous voices have outlined the convincing impracticability of military strikes.[51] In Israel, the new leader of the Kadima party, Tzipi Livni, appears to be a more dovish character than Prime Minister Olmert. She too will be submerged in domestic concerns and the process of forming a new coalition government for weeks to come, with little time to focus on Iran at the level that launching air strikes would require.[52]

Conclusion

The international community's options vis-à-vis Iran are, at this stage, uncertain. Despite its slow, tenuous, and reversible nature, the IAEA's 2007 work plan had provided the world with a sense of forward momentum. Even in retrospect, it was probably the best option for real progress among a set of alternatives that were unpalatable, unsustainable, or entirely counterproductive. But it should also be recognized that its objective was as much confidence-building as it was fact-finding. With Iran protesting Agency efforts to acquire more information, international confidence in Iran is now no greater than it was at the work plan's unveiling, and it appears that the endeavor has reached its limits.

Recently, IAEA Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei stated in an interview that the Iranians "have the cookbook [...] but right now they don't yet have the ingredients - enough nuclear material to make a bomb overnight."[53] Ideally, pragmatism will prevail on both sides, in Washington and in Tehran. The next U.S. administration would be better served by policies that tone down aggressive rhetoric, invite serious, direct negotiations, and avoid creating the impression in Iran (and among Iran's key developing country allies) that U.S. policy seeks to prohibit the right of every nation in compliance with NPT safeguards to pursue nuclear research for peaceful purposes. Such a strategy may help to establish confidence in Iran regarding U.S. motivations, and ultimately convince Tehran that it can depend on a reliable, external source of fuel and enjoy the benefits of no longer being considered a pariah by the West.

On the other hand, the leadership in Tehran needs to more credibly demonstrate that no nefarious intentions are driving the decision to exercise its inalienable right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. First and foremost, Iran should agree to suspend enrichment as a confidence building measure. Iran could also greatly strengthen its case that it does not intend to pursue weapons by ratifying the Additional Protocol as soon as possible. This would permit the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared material and facilities, and do much to assuage international concerns.

If none of these policy shifts occur, Iranian nuclear capability may soon become a reality, and Iran will have entrenched its status as a pariah, inviting (at best) further isolation and sanctions.

The authors extend their thanks to Jean du Preez for his invaluable support and commentary during the process of drafting this Story. The authors would also like to thank Kenley Butler and Stephanie Lieggi for help with editing the final product.

View previous Feature Stories.

Sources

[1] IAEA Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV/2008/38, 15 September 2008, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-38.pdf.
[2] Uranium hexafluoride is a volatile compound of uranium and fluorine and the feedstock for all uranium enrichment processes.
[3] David Albright, Jacqueline Shire, and Paul Brannan, "IAEA Report on Iran: Centrifuge Operation Significantly Improving; Gridlock on Alleged Weaponization Issues," Institute for Science and International Security website, 15 September 2008,
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/ iran/ISIS_Report_Iran_15September2008.pdf.
[4] Iran has not formally adopted Code 3.1 of the modified Subsidiary Arrangement to its Safeguards Agreement, which would require it to provide early design information on new and planned nuclear facilities. As a result, in failing to notify the Agency about these plans, Iran was not technically in breach of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the Agency. Iran later decided to voluntarily implement Code 3.1 on an ad-hoc basis (providing the Agency with some information about planned facilities), but has since suspended this cooperation (as of 29 March 2007). See paragraph 12 of IAEA Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV/2007/22, 23 May 2007, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-22.pdf.
[5] See IAEA Director General, "Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV/2003/40, 6 June 2003, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf.
[6] For an earlier analysis of the Iranian issue, see Jean du Preez and Maya Nakamura, "Iran and the IAEA: A Troubling Past with a Hopeful Future?," NTI Issue Brief, December 2003, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/iran-and-the-iaea/. For a more detailed analysis of the Iran-IAEA negotiations process, see Shahram Chubin, Iran's Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).
[7] See IAEA Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV/2003/63, 26 August 2003, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-63.pdf.
[8] See IAEA Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number, GOV/2003/75, 10 November 2003, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf.
[9] See the text of the proposal at http://www.basicint.org/countries/iran/IranIAEA20050808.pdf. BASIC's Paul Ingram characterized the offer as "vague on incentives and heavy on demands," as it contained an entire set of processes for further dialogue with the potential for cooperation, but very few concrete offers. See Paul Ingram, "Preliminary analysis of E3/EU proposal to Iran," BASIC Notes (11 August 2005), http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN050811-IranEU.htm.
[10] See IAEA Board of Governors Resolution, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV/2005/64, 11 August 2005, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-64.pdf.
[11] See IAEA Board of Governors Resolution, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV/2006/14, 4 February 2006, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf. For an analysis of the conditions which led to Iran's referral to the Security Council and the consequences of this act see Jean du Preez, "Defusing The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Carrot and Stick Approach," CNS Research Story, (17 February 2006), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060220.htm.
[12] The resolution was mainly directed at blocking imports and exports of sensitive nuclear material and equipment, and freezing the financial assets of individuals involved with sensitive activities. See UN Security Council Resolution 1737, Document number S/RES/1737(2006), 26 December 2006, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1737-2006.pdf.
[13] The resolution tightened sanctions on Iran by imposing a ban on arms sale and extending the freeze on assets. See UN Security Council Resolution1747, Document number S/RES/1747(2007), 24 March 2007, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1747-2007.pdf.
[14] Iran unilaterally ceased to implement the modified Code 3.1 (regarding the provision of design information) of the General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement, a political move whose legality is hotly debated.
[15] Agence France-Presse, "UN nuclear chief says Iran should stop expanding enrichment," 14 June 2007, http://www.spacewar.com/2006/070614133550.38c6gccl.html.
[16] See "Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues," Document number GOV/2007/48, 21 August 2007, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-48.pdf.
[17] During investigations in 2004 concerning the Physics Research Center at the Lavisan-Shian site in Tehran, the IAEA had taken samples from equipment in the University of Tehran. These samples had shown contamination with natural uranium and HEU. See IAEA Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV/2006/27, 28 April 2006, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEAreport28Apr06.pdf and also IAEA Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV /2006/38, 8 June 2006, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-38.pdf. While still implementing the Additional Protocol, Iran included in its declaration from May 2004 information on the location, operational status, and estimated annual production of its uranium mining and ore concentration. The very short declared construction time for the processing plant at the Ghine mine raised questions with the IAEA, as Iran was known to have limited experience in uranium reprocessing. See IAEA Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV/2004/83, 15 November 2004, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/iaea1104.pdf. In April 2005, Iran presented the drawings upon which the engineering company was said to have completed the plant. In addition to this, a chronology of the construction of the plant and in particular, of the construction of the grinding process line, stating that procurement of parts for that line had been started in September 2000, that the construction begun in February 2001 and the equipment was first tested in April 2001. See IAEA Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV/2005/67, 2 September 2005, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-67.pdf.
[18] Agency inspections revealed at the end of 2003 that bismuth metal samples had been irradiated in the past. While bismuth is not a nuclear material requiring declaration under Iran's Safeguards Agreement, its irradiation was of interest as it produces Polonium-210. Po-210 is an intensely radioactive alpha emitting radioisotope that can be used not only for civilian applications, but also, in conjunction with beryllium, for military purposes - specifically as a neutron initiator in some designs of nuclear weapons. See IAEA Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV/2004/11, 24 February 2004, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-11.pdf.
[19] See IAEA Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV/2008/4, 22 February 2008, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-4.pdf.
[20] Warren Hoge and Elaine Sciolino, "Security Council Adds Sanctions Against Iran," New York Times, 4 March 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/world/ middleeast/04nations.html?_r=1&sq=nuclear& st=nyt&oref=slogin&scp=3&pagewanted=print.
[21] See "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV/2008/15, 26 May 2008, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-15.pdf.
[22] "Major powers to offer Iran deal to end nuclear row," Reuters, 13 June 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/ idUSDAH33916920080613?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews and Associated Press, "Iran signals no plans to stop its nuclear regime," 5 July 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25542732/.
[23] See the analysis of David Albright, Jacqueline Shire, and Paul Brannan, "IAEA Report on Iran: Centrifuge Operation Significantly Improving; Gridlock on Alleged Weaponization Issues," 15 September 2008, ISIS Report, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-38.pdf.
[24] Despite the lack of official statistics on prior LEU figures, the Agency's reports have been providing analysts with the means to calculate LEU production at Natanz for some time. Many such calculations have been carried out by the Institute for Science and International Security. See, for example, the analysis of Albright, Shire, and Brannan in "IAEA Report on Iran: Centrifuge Operation Significantly Improving; Gridlock on Alleged Weaponization Issues," http://www.isis-online.org/publications/ iran/ISIS_Report_Iran_15September2008.pdf.
[25] An article that appeared in the U.K.-based Daily Telegraph earlier in the month asserted that 50-60 tons of uranium yellowcake had been diverted from an Iranian facility in Isfahan. This allegation, which Agency spokesperson Melissa Fleming called "fictitious," was further undermined by the latest IAEA report's confirmation that no such diversion had taken place. See Con Coughlin and Tim Butcher "Iran renews nuclear weapons development," Daily Telegraph, 12 September 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/2800255/ Iran-renews-nuclear-weapons-development.html, and Jeffrey Lewis, "DG Report on Iran," Arms Control Wonk, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2040/iaea.
[26] Estimates for the amount of LEU required to produce a nuclear weapon vary widely and depend on a number of factors. For a summary of the variables involved and estimates of the amount of LEU Iran would need for a nuclear weapon, see former Harvard physicist Andrew Foland, "Enrichment; How Much Time?," 1 July 2008,
http://nuclearmangos.blogspot.com/2008/07/how-much-uranium.html. Also recommended is the brief discussion of LEU requirements in the Albright, Shire and Brannan piece cited above:
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/ iran/ISIS_Report_Iran_15September2008.pdf.
[27] Iran would likely desire 1,700 kg of LEU or more for enough HEU to ensure a lone viable bomb, according to IAEA officials. See Mark Heinrich, "Iran blocks probe into alleged atom bomb work: IAEA," Reuters, 15 September 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSLF9390120080915.
[28]Albright, Shire, and Brannan in "IAEA Report on Iran: Centrifuge Operation Significantly Improving; Gridlock on Alleged Weaponization Issues," http://www.isis-online.org/publications/ iran/ISIS_Report_Iran_15September2008.pdf.
[29] Elaine Sciolino, "Nuclear Aid by Russian to Iranians Suspected" New York Times, 10 October 2008,: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/10/world/ 10nuke.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin.
[30] Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter allows the UN Security Council to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" and take military and nonmilitary actions to "restore international peace and security." Decisions taken under Chapter VII are binding upon all UN member states.
[31] The New York Times quoted an Iranian official in December 2007 citing his country's plans to build an indigenous 360-megawatt nuclear power plant in Darkhovin. The 15 September 2008 report from the IAEA affirms that no preliminary information on these plans has yet been provided: "The Agency requested in December 2007, but has not yet received, preliminary design information for the nuclear power plant that is to be built in Darkhovin." See Helene Cooper, "Iran Receives Nuclear Fuel in Blow to US," New York Times, 18 December 2007 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/18/world/middleeast/18diplo.html. See also IAEA Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV/2008/38, 15 September 2008, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-38.pdf.
[32] Islamic Republic News Agency, "Conditions not ripe for ratification of additional protocol re-implementation," 25 November 2007, http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/menu-234/0711256674171029.htm.
[33] See IAEA Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV/2005/87, 18 November 2005, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-87.pdf.
[34] See IAEA Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV/2006/53, 31 August 2006, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-53.pdf.
[35] See IAEA Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV/2006/15, 27 February 2006, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-15.pdf.
[36] See IAEA Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV/2008/15, 26 May 2008, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-15.pdf.
[37] The U.S. was reported to have acquired a laptop computer, believed to be of Iranian origin, containing information documenting what appeared to be several projects that may have constituted a nuclear weapons program. See Paul Kerr, "Question Surround Iran's Nuclear Program," Arms Control Today (3 March 2006), http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran-IAEA-Issues.asp.
[38] See Mark Heinrich, "Iran blocks probe into alleged atom bomb work: IAEA," Reuters, 15 September 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSLF9390120080916.
[39] See IAEA Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Document number GOV/2006/15, 27 February 2006, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-15.pdf.
[40] In his opening statement to the Board of Governors on September 22, Dr. ElBaradei publicly requested that the states that have provided the Alleged Studies to the Agency grant permission to Agency negotiators seeking to share copies of the documents with Iran. To date, the Agency has not secured that permission. See IAEA Director General, "Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors," IAEA, 22 September 2008, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2008/ebsp2008n007.html/.
[41] See Islamic Republic News Agency, "Soltanieh: Safeguards implementation should follow normal course," 24 September 2008, http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/menu-234/0809249055193418.htm.
[42] PressTV, "Iran will not go beyond it's obligations," 18 September 2008, http://www.presstv.ir/Detail.aspx?id=69799&sectionid=351020104.
[43] Nonetheless, should Iran ultimately decide to provide detailed information, it will be interesting to follow how the IAEA will cope with the material it receives. The Agency has not traditionally been equipped with the necessary technical and human means with which to investigate such issues.
[44] Voice Of America News, "US warns of further sanctions against Iran," 5 August 2008, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0808/S00054.htm.
[45] Voice Of America News, "US Raises Questions of Iran Missile Modification," 16 September 2008, http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-09-16-voa11.cfm, Associated Press, "France pushing for more sanctions against Iran," 16 September 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/09/16/europe/EU-France-Iran.php, and Deutsche Welle, "Talks with Iran Leave Germany Disappointed," 16 September 2008, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/ 0,,3647775,00.html?maca=en-rss-en-ger-1023-rdf.
[46] P5+1 refers to the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany.
[47] Telegraph, "Russia forces West to go it alone against Iran nuclear program," 25 September 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/3081271/ Russia-forces-West-to-go-it-alone-against-Iran-nuclear-programme.html.
[48] New York Times, "Security Council Presses Iran on Nuclear Program," 27 September 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/world/28nations.html ?_r=2&hp&oref=slogin&oref=slogin.
[49] National Intelligence Council, "National Intelligence Estimate: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities," November 2007, http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf, and Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh, "How Iran's president is being undercut," Christian Science Monitor, 14 December 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1214/p09s02-coop.htm.
[50] Cable News Network, "Transcript of Presidential Debate," 26 September 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/09/26/debate.mississippi.transcript/.
[51] ABC News, "Kissinger backs direct talks "without conditions" with Iran," 16 September 2008, http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/ 2008/09/kissinger-backs.html, Richard Holbrook, James Woolsey, Dennis Ross, and Mark Wallace, "Everyone needs to worry about Iran," Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB122204266977561331.html?mod=googlenews_wsj, David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Jacqueline Shire, "Can military strikes destroy Iran's gas centrifuge program? Probably not," ISIS Report, 7 August 2008, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/ Centrifuge_Manufacturing_7August2008.pdf, or these recent interviews with Dan Ephron, "Iran Nukes: Out of Reach," Newsweek, 29 September 2008,
http://www.newsweek.com/id/160089.
[52] Associated Press, "Livni gets approval to form Israeli government," 22 September 2008, http://ap.google.com/article/ ALeqM5hcX49mNGhMPjANq3C-wSH833a0swD93BT7700.
[53] Reuters, "Iran on way to atomic bomb capability, ElBaradei says," 26 September 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2008/09/26/ africa/OUKWD-UK-NUCLEAR-ELBARADEI-WORLD.php.

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