Special articles and reports on timely nonproliferation issues by CNS staff.

Updated: Apr 8, 2009

Launch of North Korean "Communications Satellite" Draws Near, Raising Concerns of Regional Instability

Tensions have increased significantly on the Korean Peninsula since the declaration by the DPRK of its intent to place a Kwangmyŏngsŏng-2 satellite into orbit in early April. The space launch vehicle used for this launch—the Unha 2—is derived from the same technology that is used in North Korea's Taepodong-2 long-range ballistic missile system. While the full ramifications of the launch are difficult to predict, the announcement alone has had a significant impact on the threat perceptions of North Korea's neighbors and the United States.

Summary

By announcing the launch window of April 4-8, 2009, for the Kwangmyŏngsŏng-2 communications satellite, North Korea has dramatically raised the stakes in its ongoing confrontation with the United States and regional stakeholders. Plans call for the launch of the satellite from Musudan-ri, a missile testing facility in northeastern North Korea, using an Unha-2 space launch vehicle, which is a modified three-stage Taepodong-2 missile.[1] If successful, the satellite will fly eastward over the Japanese mainland before achieving orbit. With the six-party talks stalled and unable to reach agreement on a verification plan for disarming North Korea's nuclear program, the launch—which most outside analysts believe amounts to a test of Pyongyang's Taepodong-2 system—will likely result in further deterioration of the East Asian security situation.

The impending launch has raised serious concerns internationally, particularly in Japan and the United States. Both nations have threatened to shoot down the rocket if it is assessed to be a threat, although subsequent clarifications seem to rule out interceptions unless the missile veers off course, threatening populated areas. North Korea has made clear that it would consider the interception of its satellite an act of war.

If the Taepodong-2 launch is a success, North Korea will theoretically have the ability to strike Alaska, as well as the potential to attack Hawaii. However, reaching the continental United States would require severe cuts to the missile's payload, which would likely mean that any warhead placed on the rocket would not be nuclear. The payload issue, combined with the missile's poor accuracy, has generally called into question the military utility of its use against the United States. However, the mere possession of a strike capability would be viewed as a tremendous political coup for North Korea.

Given the already tense environment, any response to the launch would need to be carefully considered. While the serious implications of a success cannot go unacknowledged, harsh sanctions and threats of military strikes could easily cause the situation to degenerate into a series of tit-for-tat exchanges which would do nothing to improve security in the region.

Context and Timing

Although North Korea has portrayed the mission as a follow-up to the supposed orbiting of the Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1 on August 31, 1998, claims of a prior satellite's success have been widely discredited. Despite the release of orbital parameters and Russian recognition, the inability of independent observers to verify the satellite's existence has led many commentators to conclude that the 1998 launch was either a failure or a front for the testing of multiple-stage missile technology.

The Taepodong-2 was built as the successor to the Taepodong-1 launch platform which was used in the 1998 test. The Taepodong-2 has been the subject of intense scrutiny in the U.S. intelligence community and media. Range estimates for this system vary from 3,750 km for the two-stage version to as high as 6,700 km for a three-stage variant[2], assuming a payload of 700-1,000 kg. Assessments of Taepodong-2 performance characteristics carry large margins of error, however, as the only test in July 2006 failed roughly forty seconds after launch.

Concerns about the DPRK's missile development have been heightened by progress North Korea has made in its nuclear program. On October 9, 2006, North Korea tested a nuclear device. While the device's sub-kiloton yield was seen by many as a failure, it raised alarm for many about the possibility that North Korea could have a nuclear-capable long-range ballistic missile in the not-so-distant future. North Korea's declaration of its planned "satellite launch" closely follows Iran's successful launching of a satellite on February 2, 2009. International response to Tehran's action was generally muted. It is unlikely that the Iranian launch initiated North Korea's decision, as preparations at Musudan-ri were already underway as early as October 2008.[3] At the same time, the lack of a serious international reaction to Iran's action may have ameliorated North Korean concerns about a possible backlash against its own launch announcement.

Such a comparison between the North Korean and Iranian programs, however, overlooks the key issue of legality: two United Nations Security Council resolutions—UNSCR 1695 and 1718—explicitly prohibit North Korea from any activities related to ballistic missile development. Despite the North Korean claim that the launch of the Kwangmyŏngsŏng-2 is not related to its missile program, the United States, Japan, and a number of other nations have specifically referenced UNSCR 1718 in condemning the launch as illegal. Whether the SLV's origins in the ballistic missile program would constitute a violation of international law is a crucial question—one which could potentially be used to justify the shooting-down of the satellite by U.S. or Japanese interceptors.

In the aftermath of the August 1998 Taepodong-1 launch which flew directly over Japan, the North Korean missile threat has been a growing subject of concern for the Japanese public. The ensuing outcry galvanized support for the joint development of a sea-based AEGIS ballistic missile defense system with the United States. Two Japanese ships equipped with the system have been deployed between Japan and North Korea and instructed to shoot down any debris which falls towards Japanese territory. Whether an interception attempt would be successful is unknown—while the system has been demonstrated, its performance has been mixed—in U.S. tests, the current interceptor design has achieved fourteen kills and four failures;[4] for Japanese attempts, the record is one to one.[5] Regardless, the probability that discarded stages of the North Korean launch vehicle will fall outside of the designated stay-clear zones and trigger a Japanese interception attempt is extremely low.

As a result of recent changes in the U.S. administration, the upcoming launch will take place in an uncertain and changing environment. Christopher Hill, the long-standing and widely respected U.S. envoy for the six-party talks, ended his term in February 2009 and was succeeded by Stephen Bosworth, who took up the position just as North Korea formally announced its launch plans. More broadly, the new U.S. administration has yet to clarify its position and present a united front on a number of issues surrounding North Korea. In a move which was almost certainly interpreted as belying President Obama's early overtures, the United States and South Korea went ahead with Operations Key Resolve and Foal Eagle in early March over vigorous North Korean protests. The massive annual joint defense exercise—involving large-scale redeployments from other U.S. bases and a combined total of over 76,000 troops—is perceived by North Korea as a preparation for invasion. As a result of these exercises, Pyongyang severed all communication with Seoul.

Even prior to the military exercises, relations between North and South Korea had been in decline. Since South Korean president Lee Myung-bak took power in February 2008, the previous administration's "sunshine policy" of investment and aid without setting demands has been abandoned in favor of a more aggressive stance. North Korea has blamed this harder line for major diplomatic setbacks, including the North's January 2009 abandonment of all military and political agreements with South Korea.

Reactions and Implications

The development of a long-range, possibly intercontinental, ballistic missile opens the door to a number of possibilities, one of which is the future sale of the technology to other states. Pyongyang's past proliferation raises legitimate questions of whether a successful Taepodong-2 launch might portend the system's availability on the black market. North Korean exports are already viewed with suspicion, however, and the launch is likely to further increase scrutiny of potential weapons transfers. Counter-proliferation measures such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, a U.S.-led effort to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles through cooperative activities that include maritime interdictions of suspect vessels, will in a sense benefit from increased attention and support following the launch. South Korea has been wary of fully participating in the initiative in order to avoid antagonizing the North; following recent developments, however, statements by government officials in Seoul have clearly indicated that the impending satellite launch would cause South Korea to take a more proactive approach to the PSI.[6]

Japan, for its part, has also reacted strongly to the North Korean announcements. The Japanese government has denounced the upcoming launch and proclaimed its readiness to shoot down any object which falls towards Japan, [7] although a successful launch would propel the Taepodong-2 upwards over Japan and drop spent stages far outside its territorial waters. While the launch of the Taepodong-2 would not represent a significant new ability to strike Japan, the likely backlash which would follow such a test could shape the debate over what is already an evolving interpretation of the Japanese constitution's ban on military force. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution prohibits the use of force to settle international disputes and places strict limits on military development. Nevertheless, after North Korea's 2006 missile tests (including the first attempted launch of a Taepodong-2) several senior officials argued that a pre-emptive strike against North Korean missile bases would fall within the purview of self-defense.[8] Although this view has gained only limited support, the upcoming launch will almost certainly lend credence to this argument.

As in Japan, a successful Taepodong-2 flight will without doubt provide substantial ammunition for U.S. supporters of ballistic missile defense. The Taepodong-2 is often cited as posing a threat to the continental United States by missile defense advocates, and is often mentioned in conjunction with the North Korean nuclear program.[9] These claims appear to ignore the fact that missile payloads have a direct impact on maximum range. Currently, worst-case estimates of Taepodong-2 range (given a 700-1000 kg payload) place all of Alaska within reach, with Hawaii falling just out of range.[10] By some estimates, the Taepodong-2 could reach other parts of the U.S. mainland, but not without reducing its payload to 500 kg, or perhaps even lower.[11] Most analysts suggest that a first-generation North Korean nuclear warhead would probably have a mass of roughly one metric ton. Leaked reports from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency have previously estimated that the lightest North Korean first-generation warhead would fall within the range of 650-750 kg.[12] Some progress may have been made since the 2006 missile tests, but without further testing North Korea would not be able to miniaturize its warhead to the 200-300 kg range. Nevertheless, the prospect of some future combination of the two capabilities merits serious consideration. The launch will draw the attention of the new Obama administration which has been focused elsewhere for some time, bringing renewed calls for progress on North Korean disarmament.

A Measured Response

In light of the gradual breakdown in the six-party talks on North Korean denuclearization, Operations Key Resolve and Foal Eagle, and the upcoming launch, a hasty response to the satellite launch could easily cement impressions of a tit-for-tat exchange which would prove counterproductive to all stakeholders. Indications have already surfaced that the current uneasy standoff could easily degenerate: North Korea has preemptively suggested that retaliatory sanctions would risk termination of the six-party talks, a setback from which recovery would be difficult.[13] While the U.S., Japan, and South Korea have all commented that the launch will have a "detrimental effect" on the six-party talks, they have each—along with China and Russia—publicly called for a return to the forum.

In fact, the six-party framework, though initially geared towards the North Korean nuclear program, provides a potential forum in which to handle the delicate subject of missiles as well. Some elements in South Korea have called for an approach along these lines, and if hard-liners in the South Korean, Japanese, and U.S. administrations can be persuaded to hold off on unilateral reprisals, coordinated efforts could prove productive. While Russia has issued a carefully worded statement saying, "... it would be better if... North Korea abstained from this launch," it is unlikely to either derail or contribute significantly to a deal. China has thus far remained publicly neutral. Even assuming both maintain their current stance, the presence of perceived allies would serve to blunt the North Korean response to post-launch criticism. In other words, North Korea would be less likely to cut off discussions in response to pressure presented in the six-party format, as opposed to uncoordinated South Korean, Japanese, or U.S. efforts at punishment.

Perhaps more promisingly, however, China has maintained high-level communications channels with North Korea throughout the crisis. These channels, including a proposed visit by North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il to Beijing which could take place after mid-April, suggest that Chinese support in post-launch diplomacy would make Pyongyang far more receptive to international advances. Although even Chinese pressure would not be able guarantee a halt in North Korean weapons development, bringing China's far greater influence to bear on the issue would drastically increase the chances of success.

Sources

[1] International Civil Aviation Organization, "ICAO Officially Advised of DPRK Plans for Rocket Launch," March 12, 2009, http://www.icao.int/icao/en/nr/2009/pio200902_e.pdf.
[2] Joseph Bermudez, "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2 (1999), Center for Nonproliferation Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/op2/op2.pdf.
[3] Doug Richardson, "North Korea May be Planning Taepodong-2 Trials," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, October 6, 2008, http://www.janes.com.
[4] "Ballistic Missile Defense Flight Test Record," Missile Defense Agency, February 18, 2009, http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/testrecord.pdf.
[5] "MSDF's SM-3 Test Fails to Shoot Down Missile," Japan Times, November 21, 2008.
[6] Global Security Newswire, "South Korea Might Reconsider PSI if North Launches Missile," NTI website, March 16, 2009, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090316_1900.php.
[7] Choe Sang-Hun, "Japan Warns North Korea Over Rocket Launch," New York Times, March 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/world/asia/14korea.html?ref=asia.
[8] Martin Fackler, "Japan Finds Still Sterner Words for North Korea's Missile Tests," New York Times, July 11, 2006, in Lexis-Nexis.
[9] The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States , "Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States," Washington, DC: 1998; available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/index.html.
[10] Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, "North Korea's Nuclear Program, 2005," NRDC Nuclear Notebook 61, no. 3 (2005), http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/hn1576020176wg02/fulltext.pdf.
[11] David Wright, "Examining North Korea's Satellite Launch Vehicle," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 24, 2009, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/examining-north-koreas-satellite-launch-vehicle.
[12] Defense Intelligence Agency, "A Primer on the Future Threat (The Decades Ahead: 1999-2020)," July 1999, p. 78.
[13] "North Korea to reject six-party talks if US impose sanctions - pro-North paper," Yonhap via BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, March 19, 2009, in Lexis-Nexis.