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Special articles and reports on timely nonproliferation issues by CNS staff.
Updated: Apr 27, 2009

The North Korean Rocket Launch:
International Reactions and Implications

In reaction to the UNSC condemnation of its rocket launch, North Korea pulled out of the six-party talks. The current crisis will be a serious challenge to regional stability.
Author(s): East Asia Nonproliferation Program (EANP) [*]

Posted: April 27, 2009

On April 13, 2009, the UN Security Council (UNSC) officially condemned the April 5, 2009 rocket launch by North Korea as not in compliance with previous UNSC resolutions.[1] The UNSC President's Statement was accepted unanimously and came after a week of negotiations between the UNSC five permanent members, along with Japan. In reaction to the statement, North Korea announced, predictably, that it would pull out of the six-party talks. According to an official statement by the North Korean government, the DPRK would not "be bound to any agreement of the six-party talks" and that Pyongyang would restart its nuclear activities.[2] One day after the Security Council's statement, North Korea kicked international monitors out of their nuclear facilities. IAEA Director General Mohamed El-Baradei estimated that the DPRK facilities could be operational again in a matter of months.[3]

International reaction to the North Korean rocket launch was varied; while Japanese and South Korean officials called for resolute action to cope with a belligerent regime in Pyongyang, Russia and China called for restraint. Both Moscow and Beijing appeared willing to argue, at least initially, that the launch was not in contravention of earlier resolutions banning North Korean missile development. The United States and European powers took a more pragmatic approach, calling DPRK's actions detrimental for regional security but expressing willingness to compromise on what action should be taken. In the end, U.S. and Chinese diplomats brokered the UNSC statement in which the Security Council agreed "to adjust the measures imposed" by UNSC resolution 1718. These adjustments include the designation of "entities and goods" to be subject to the sanctions set forth under UNSCR 1718. [4]

The launch, which has been viewed by most analysts to be a test of North Korea's Taepodong-2 ballistic missile system, appeared to show some progress in the DPRK's long-range missile program since its last test in July 2006. However, the three-stage missile reportedly failed during the separation of the last stage and is unlikely to have a range above 4,000 kilometers. This launch marks the third test failure of the North Korean long-range systems. The 2006 test of a Taeopodong-2 ended with the missile exploding less than a minute after its launch; its 1998 test of the Taeopodong-1 is also thought to have failed in its third stage. The apparent failure of the rocket indicates that North Korea is not an imminent danger to the United States. Pyongyang does have significant medium and short-range missile capabilities that could theoretically threaten Japan and Seoul; however domestic instability in North Korea would suggest that Pyongyang would not be capable of a sustained campaign against its neighbors in the near future.

Launch Points to Problems with DPRK Long-Range Systems[5]

North Korea launched its Unha-2 space launch vehicle at 11:20am local time on April 5, 2009. Although North Korean media claimed that the rocket had successfully placed a communication satellite in orbit, outside observers have seen no evidence of this and most speculate that the rocket crashed into the Pacific Ocean with its payload still attached. The Unha-2 is a modified version of the Taepodong-2 long-range missile system. The Taepodong-2 has previously been tested as a two-stage model; the April 5 test saw a three-stage rocket being launched – with the third stage needed to place the satellite in orbit.

The first of the Unha-2's three stages appears to have operated as expected, separating without difficulty and landing within the specified splashdown zone. The fate of the missile following its flight over Japan is unclear. The guidance system apparently worked as expected, since the first stage fell well within its intended splash-down zone; the second stage evidently separated and achieved ignition, as the satellite successfully passed over Japan. Analysis released since the launch took place indicates that the second stage landed just short of the splashdown zone, 3,100 km from the launch site. As the second stage burn ended, the third stage appears not to have separated, causing it to crash to earth with the spent second stage. Malfunctions in stage separation, which is widely acknowledged as one of the most challenging aspects of building long-range missiles, is believed to have caused the failure of North Korea's 1998 satellite launch as well. If configured as a two stage rocket, as it was in the 2006 missile test, the Taepodong-2 is thought by most estimates to be able to carry a 1,000 kg payload 3,750 kilometers. Such a range, though considerable, would mean that Hawaii and possibly Alaska would remain out of range.

International Reactions

United States

Prior to the launch, U.S. officials threatened to take a hard-line approach if Pyongyang went through with their "satellite launch"; however after the launch, Washington softened its stance in order to leave open the possibility of North Korea returning to the six party talks process. Immediately following news of the missile test, U.S. President Barack Obama called North Korean actions "provocative." However, instead of further railing against North Korea's action, President Obama took a broader approach to the issue of nonproliferation and chose to focus on movement towards general disarmament. In the same speech where he criticized Pyongyang's missile test he also noted that he would push for U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and renew nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament efforts.[6]

The Obama administration also stepped back from initial calls for tougher sanctions on the DPRK. The U.S. delegation to the United Nations pushed, along with their Japanese counterparts, for a strong statement stating that North Korea had violated UNSCR 1718. However, U.S. diplomats noted that they wanted a measured response. In the end, the Obama administration came to a compromise with China and Russia over the UN Security Council reaction and did not demand increased sanctions. The UNSC President's statement notes that the Security council agreed to "adjust the measures" imposed by UNSCR 1718 by requiring the sanctions committee established under that resolution to create a list of entities and goods subject to UN sanctions. U.S government presented the committee with a list of companies it accused of involvement in Pyongyang's missile-related import and exports, including Korea Mining Development Trading Corp. (Komid) and Tanchon Commercial Bank.[7]

Many analysts in the United States characterized the North Korean launch as a failure. One top U.S. military officials questioned the North Korean missile capability and its danger as a proliferator stating that "would you buy from somebody that had failed three times in a row and never been successful?"[8] Despite the many reports that called into question the viability of the North Korean long-range missile systems, many missile defense supporters saw Pyongyang's action as an indication of North Korea's potential ability to strike U.S. assets. Texas Senator John Cornyn, a strong missile defense advocate, argued that the launch illustrated the need for a "robust and layered" missile defense system.[9]

The question of how to deal with North Korea is an early test for the Obama administration's foreign policy team. It remains to be seen if the new administration will try to avoid bilateral discussions with Pyongyang in the same way the Bush administration did. The previous administration created the six party talk construct as a way of making a point with Pyongyang that Washington was not going to give in to their demand to have bilateral agreements; instead the Bush administration pushed for multilateral arrangements and did not want to be seen as rewarding North Korea's "bad behavior." In raising its level of brinkmanship by testing its ballistic missile system, Pyongyang may be seeing what concessions it can get from the new administration; at the same time, the Obama administration may not feel beholden to the Bush era reliance on the six party talks. Unlike his predecessor, President Obama may take a more pragmatic approach and not see agreeing to direct talks with North Korea as a concession, especially if it were to alleviate the current level of tension on the Korean peninsula and return international inspectors to North Korea's nuclear sites.


The Japanese government expressed significant concern about Pyongyang's belligerent activities prior to the launch. In late March, Prime Minister Taro Aso authorized the mobilization for the first time of Japan's missile defense capabilities in order to shoot down a North Korean rocket if any debris were to fall toward Japanese territory.[10] The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) sent two Aegis destroyers to the Sea of Japan/East Sea, both equipped with the Aegis combat system and armed with Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors. A third Aegis ship was moved into the Pacific Ocean where the missile was expected to land, in order to track the North Korean rocket. Japanese PAC-3 batteries were also deployed throughout Japan.[11]

On April 4—a day prior to the actual North Korean launch—the Japanese government erroneously announced that Pyongyang had launched the rocket. Tokyo had to quickly rescind this announcement.[12] The false alarms raised a number of concerns about the SDF's readiness to deal with a military crisis. The SDF was able to detect the April 5 launch and tracked the rocket until it reached about 2,100 kilometers east of Japan's northern mainland.[13]

Prime Minister Aso condemned the launch as a clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions, and an extremely provocative act. [14] Immediately after the launch, Japan called on the UN Security Council to convene an emergency session. The Japanese government insisted that the missile launch was a violation of the UNSCR 1718, and requested to adopt a new resolution. However, negotiation at the Security Council among the six countries—five permanent members of the UNSC and Japan—deadlocked. Japan, initially backed by the United States, strongly insisted that a new resolution be adopted, an action that China and Russia opposed. However, after the United States favored a Chinese proposal for issuing a strongly worded Presidential Statement, Japan agreed to accept the compromise.

The Japanese parliament passed a resolution condemning North Korea's missile launch as a violation of previous Security Council resolutions and urged the Japanese government to impose new sanctions on North Korea.[15] On April 10, based on the parliament resolution, Japan's unilateral sanctions against North Korea were extended. The Japanese Cabinet reauthorized and strengthened these economic sanctions which were put in force after the 2006 missile tests. The new sanctions reduced the amount of remittance to North Korea allowed to go unreported to the Japanese government from 30 million yen (US$300,000) to 10 million yen (US$100,000.) Tokyo also lowered the amount of money subject to reporting by travelers to North Korea from 1 million yen (US$10,000) to 300,000 yen (US$3,000.) The Cabinet also decided to extend for another year the ban on North Korean ships entering Japanese ports.[16]

North Korea's missile launch intensified concerns about Japanese security, particularly among more hawkish politicians. Some Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members including Shoichi Nakagawa, former Finance Minister, supported an idea to debate the possibility of preemptive attacks against North Korea's missile launch pad.[17] The missile launch even provoked another conservative Japanese politician, Goji Sakamoto, head of LDP Organization Headquarters, to indicate his support for Japan's nuclearization.[18]

Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada noted that Japan should consider deploying an early warning satellite system into space to detect the launch of a ballistic missile.[19] Currently, Japan relies on the United States for warning information on ballistic missile launches. The Japanese Ministry of Defense recently released its basic policy on space development, highlighting the importance of the use of space for defense purposes in conjunction with further improvements in Japan's missile defense system.[20] Many obstacles stand in the way of developing these warning satellites, however, including technical difficulties, high costs, political disputes, and possible negative reaction from the United States.[21]

While Japan's reliance on missile defense system seems to have increased, the utility of these systems remains limited. Japan's missile defense system is designed to shoot down medium-range missile such as the Nodong within the range of 1000 km. Japan does not yet have the capability to intercept a longer range system like the Taepodong. The Japanese and U.S. governments are jointly developing an advanced version of the SM-3 Block II A missile to improve its defensive capabilities against longer-range missiles. The new SM-3 is scheduled to be available by 2014.[22]

South Korea

South Korean Foreign Minister Yoo Myung-hwan issued a statement criticizing the DPRK's rocket launch.[23] In the statement, Seoul called Pyongyang's action "a clear violation" of UN Security Council resolutions and "a provocative act which jeopardizes the stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia." In close cooperation with Washington and Tokyo, Seoul took diplomatic efforts to push the Security Council to take action against North Korea.

In the aftermath of the launch, the government of Lee Myung-Bak appears ready to become an active participant in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Previous South Korean administrations refused to be part of the initiative aimed at stopping the illicit transfer of WMD-related materials because ROK participation in the program could raise tension with North Korea, which was a main target of the PSI. Following the North Korean missile launch, President Lee said that "regardless of North Korea's missile and nuclear threats, South Korea should be a member of the PSI."[24] If the ROK decides to fully participate in the PSI, the inter-Korean relations are expected to be further strained, given that North Korea has considered it as a hostile policy against them.

Although the North Korean test raised some questions about the reliability of the North Korean long-range systems, the resulting heightened tension has led some within the Lee administration to seek enhanced missile capabilities. Currently, under a bilateral agreement with the United States, the ROK is limited to developing missiles with a range of 300 km and a maximum payload of 500 kg. After Pyongyang's launch, ROK Prime Minster Han Seung-soo implied that South Korea could pursue a revision of the missile agreement with the United States aimed at extending the range of ROK missile capabilities.[25]

The current political tension caused by Pyongyang's rocket test and Seoul's subsequent strong response has further hampered the inter-Korean economic cooperation. Since the inauguration of the more conservative Lee Myungbak's government in February 2008, inter-Korean relations have hit a new low. Even though President Lee said it would not be possible to close the Kaeseong joint industrial complex after North Korea's rocket launch[26], he called for thorough and detailed plans for its North Korea policy.[27]


Chinese official statements both leading up to and following the North Korean launch were muted and called for a calm and measured response by all parties concerned. As in the past, the Chinese have shown a preference for the gradual resolution to the nuclear question in North Korea via the six party talks. In public statements, Chinese officials recognize that the DPRK was testing a space launch vehicle for a communications satellite, and have maintained that it is the legal right of the DPRK to engage in a peaceful use of space. [28]

Immediately following the missile test, Chinese media outlets did not characterize the nature of the launch or offer an official description of what was launched. Instead, the reactions or statements of different countries were presented with little to no commentary or context. Official DPRK statements about the success of the satellite launch were placed side by side with statements about the failure of the rocket test by the Japanese government. [29]

The Chinese foreign ministry offered a relatively neutral response, and urged calm on all sides. On the day of the launch Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu noted that North Korea had "announced it would launch a communications satellite beforehand. We have noted its launch this morning, as well as the reactions of relevant parties. We hope all parties concerned will stay calm, exercise restraint, and handle it properly so as to jointly maintain the overall interest of peace and stability in the region. China stands ready to continue to play a constructive role in this regard."[30] That day, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi held phone conversations with Hillary Clinton, Sergei Lavrov, Hirofumi Nakasone, and Yu Myung Hwan, his counterparts in the United States, Russia, Japan and South Korea respectively. In these conversations Yang reiterated China's position that no moves should be made that might increase tension or escalate the situation on the Korean Peninsula. He expressed China's willingness to address this issue through dialogue, consultation and the six party talks.[31]

Chinese officials did not support efforts by the United States and Japan to pass an additional Security Council resolution that would increase the sanctions against North Korea in the aftermath of the test. Following the launch, China's ambassador to the United Nations, Zhang Yesui noted that "we are now in a very sensitive moment," and that the UNSC response needed to be "cautious and proportionate."[32] As a compromise, Chinese diplomat sponsored a draft of a UNSC President's statement that condemned the test but did not impose any new sanctions against Pyongyang. Ultimately it was the diplomatic efforts of Ambassador Zhang and his U.S. counterpart Ambassador Susan Rice which brought about the compromise language of the April 13 statement.

Russian Federation

In reaction to the April 5, 2009 rocket launch, Russia issued a press release stating that the DPRK sent a satellite into a low-earth orbit. According to Russian aerospace monitoring data, the launch trajectory did not pass over the territory of the Russian Federation. The Russian government further called on all concerned states to show restraint in judgments and action and to proceed from "objective data on the nature of the DPRK launch."[33]

Shortly after this, another press release stated that Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, had a phone conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton "at the American side's initiative." It was indicated simply that "the sides spoke in favor of joint efforts to prevent the situation from being destabilized in Northeast Asia and for preserving the six-country negotiation process on the Korean Peninsula nuclear problem." The two spoke again the next day about the launch of the "carrier rocket... along with further joint work on the UN Security Council."[34]

Considering the general understanding that the rocket did not successfully place a satellite into space, it is notable that the first Russian press release referred to the DPRK launch as a success. This mirrors Russian reaction to the 1998 test of the North Korean Taepodong-1, where the DPRK claimed it had placed a satellite into orbit and the Russian Federation concurred with the North Korean claim; however no other independent source could verify the success of this satellite launch.

According to Reuters, Russia began calling on other powers to stay focused on nuclear talks with the DPRK. Russian UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin said "the core element in this situation is the six-party talks... the key thing is to make sure that we do not confine ourselves to an emotional knee-jerk reaction because what we do need is a common strategy and not losing sight of the goal -- and this is the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula."[35]

Russia, in addition to China, indicated it would accept a UNSC warning to the DPRK, pressing it to return to the six-party talks, but oppose any binding resolutions aimed at punishing the DPRK. While the United States, South Korea and Japan were seeking a strong response to the launch, Russia urged restraint so as to convince the DPRK to return to the negotiating table. According to diplomats, Russia prefers agreement by consensus on a "non-binding statement expressing concern about the launch, as well as urging Pyongyang to return to the six-party talks and respect UN resolutions."[36]

European Nations

European states unanimously condemned the "experimental communications satellite" launch by North Korea. At the United Nations, British and French diplomats worked together with their U.S. and Japanese counterparts to draft a strongly worded Security Council statement.

The British Foreign Secretary David Miliband condemned the launch calling the DPRK's actions a hostile act; he noted that "while Pyongyang continues to pursue a hostile policy towards the rest of the world, it cannot hope to take its rightful place within the international community."[37] While attending the EU-USA-Summit in Prague, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said the DPRK violated international rules. In addition, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier stated "provocations like the North Korean missile launch do not achieve greater security for anyone".[38]

The European Union (EU) condemned the missile launch in a declaration by the EU-Presidency as well as in a joint statement with the United States. The EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana said: "The launch constitutes a clear breach by North Korea of the UNSCR 1718. Once again, North Korea has disregarded the position of the international community."[39] A declaration from the Czech Republic, which currently holds the EU Presidency, condemned the DPRK's actions as placing additional strains on regional stability at a time when the unresolved nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula required mutual confidence building.[40] A joint statement with the United States went even further calling on the DPRK to abandon all nuclear weapons programs and to work to promote peace and stability in northeast Asia. Furthermore, it stated that "North Korea's development of a ballistic missile capability [...] is aimed at providing it with the ability to threaten countries near and far with weapons of mass destruction." This action demanded that the United Nations Security Council, in particular, demonstrate that its resolutions cannot be defied with impunity. The DPRK could not share the prosperity and development achieved by the remainder of northeast Asia until it ceased its threatening behavior and cooperated with other parties to implement the September 19, 2005 Six-Party Joint Statement.[41]

Implications of DPRK Missile Test

North Korea's rocket launch has serious implications for the stability on the Korean peninsula, the future of the six-party talks, and regional stability. It provides both challenges and opportunities for the Obama administration as it seeks to retake the leadership role in international nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament based on multilateral consultation and cooperation rather than unilateral actions.

The six-party talks process is under serious threat of collapse now that Pyongyang has announced that it is no longer relevant. But all is not lost. If the past offers any clue, at the right moment and with the right incentives, it is still possible that North Korea might return to the talks, as it did after the 2006 missile and nuclear tests. If anything, the September 19, 2005 joint statement and the package deal agreed to by all the participant states still offers the best prospect not only for de-nuclearization on the Korean peninsula but also—and perhaps more critically—for North Korea's long-term economic viability and regime survival.

While North Korea's rocket launch again failed—this time in its third stage—it nonetheless represented an improvement over the 2006 test. The long-term implication for North Korea's missile program, should it eventually succeed in achieving its designed range, making it possible to target parts of the U.S. territories, and assuming that it continues with its efforts in weaponization of nuclear warheads, is whether and to what extent this could undermine the confidence of Japan and South Korea in the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. Tokyo has already moved toward strengthened its military capabilities, including both military space and missile defense systems. South Korea is now also seriously reconsidering its position on missile defense.

The United States remains the most critical player in any prospects of defusing the current impasse and reaching a final solution of the North Korean nuclear (and now also ballistic missile) issues. Pyongyang's long-term strategy is to seek direct and bilateral negotiation with Washington to address its security concerns. During the final years of the Bush administration, Washington's willingness to engage North Korea led to important breakthrough, including the implementation of the nuclear disablement process. While North Korea's defiance and brinkmanship should not be condoled and tolerated, the issue is how the end goal should inform and guide the particular formats and processes of engagement, not the other way around. The Obama administration should seize the moment and turn the crisis into opportunity for formulating policy toward a comprehensive solution to the North Korean nuclear and missile issues. Overreaction is ill-advised under the circumstance but inaction is recipe for future crises.

Related Resources

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[*] This report was compiled by CNS staff members Jing-dong Yuan, Stephanie Lieggi and Masako Toki, and CNS graduate research assistants Dong-jun Kim, Dean Knox, Eben Lindsey, Philip Schell, and Anthony West.
[1] "Statement by the President of the Security Council," UN Security Council, April 13, 2009, The exact wording of the statement says that UNSC "condemns the 5 April 2009 (local time) launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), which is in contravention of Security Council resolution 1718 (2006)." Notably the nature of what exactly was launched is left vague.
[2] "N. Korea loudly declares its withdrawal from six-party talks," The Hankyoreh, April 14, 2009,
[3] Alexa Olesen, "UN says N. Korea could restart nuclear facilities," Associated Press, April 20, 2009,
[4] "UN Vows Push on North Korea Sanctions for Rocket Test," Bloomberg, April 14, 2009, UNSCR 1718 was passed in October 2006 in reaction to North Korea's nuclear test and banned the trade in military and WMD dual-use related items with North Korea, imposed a travel ban on certain North Korean officials, and halted exports of certain "luxury goods" to the DPRK. See UNSCR 1718 (2006), October 14, 2009,
[5] This section is adapted from a web report by Dean Knox, "North Korean Satellite Falls Short of Expectations," CNS Feature Story, April 8, 2009, See also Dean Knox, "Launch of North Korean "Communications Satellite" Draws Near, Raising Concerns of Regional Instability," CNS Feature Story, April 1, 2009,
[6] Michael D. Shear and Colum Lynch, "After Launch, Obama Focuses On Disarmament," Washington Post, April 6, 2009,
[7] Colum Lynch and Glenn Kessler, "U.S. Looks to Balance Response to N. Korea," Washington Post, April 16, 2009,
[8] Walter Pincus and Mary Beth Sheridan, "After Launch, U.S. Stance Veers Between Tough and Dismissive," Washington Post, April 7, 2009,
[9] "Cornyn: Missile defense spending needed," UPI, April 13, 2009,
[10] "Japan orders N. Korean rocket destruction in event of launch failure," Japan Economic Newswire, March 27, 2009.
[11] "Interception order issued / SDF to shoot down DPRK missile if it threatens Japan's territory," Daily Yomiuri Online, March 28, 2009,
[12] Steve Herman, "False Alarm Sounded Saturday in Japan over North Korean Missile Launch," Voice of America, April 4, 2009,
[13] Hidemichi Katsumata and Shozo Nakayama "Missile's path followed from moment of liftoff," Daily Yomiuri Online, April 7, 2009,
[14] Jun Hongo and Masaki Ito, "North Korea fires rocket over Tohoku," Japan Times, April 5, 2009,
[15] The Japanese House of Representatives Website,
[16] Prime Minister of Japan and Cabinet Website,
[17] "North Korea rocket revives Japan pre-emptive strike talk," Reuters, Aprl 6, 2009,
[18] "Jimin Sakamoto Soshiki Honbucho, "Nihon mo Kakuhoyuu, Kokuren Dattai [LDP head of Organization: Japan should have nuclear weapons and withdraw from the UN]" Yomiuri Shimbun, April 7, 2009,; "Dealing with Defiance / Missile launch impacts on security in East Asia," Yomiuri Shimbun, April 11, 2009,,
[19] "Japan may need missile early warning satellite: minister," Space War, April 11, 2009,
[20] "Uchuu Kaihatsu Riyou ni Kansuru Kihonhoushin ni tsuite, [Basic Policy on Space Development]," Japanese Ministry of Defense Website. January 15, 2009,
[21] "Defense Ministry May Develop Early Warning Satellite," Japan Times, January 18, 2009,
[22] "Missile Defense Needs Japan-U.S. Teamwork," Yomiuri Shimbun, December 21, 2007
[23] "Government Statement on North Korea's Launch of a Long-Range Rocket," ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade website, April 5, 2009,
[24] Na Jeong-ju and Do Je-hae, "Seoul to Join Non-Proliferation Program," Korea Times, April 6, 2009.
[25] "Calls for Greater Missile Range for S.Korea," ChosunIlbo, April 8, 2009.
[26] Hwang Jang-jin, "Lee wants Gaeseong above politics," Korea Herald, April 8, 2009.
[27] Byun Duk-kun, "President Lee Calls for Detailed N Korea Policy," Yonhap News Agency, April 8, 2009.
[28] "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on April 7, 2009," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, April 8, 2009,
[29] "DPRK Rocket Believed Carrying Satellite: S Korea Gov't Official," Xinhua News Agency, April 5, 2009,; "Japan Not Intercept DPRK's Rocket But Lodges Protest," Xinhua News Agency, April 5, 2009,
[30] "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Remarks on the Launch by the DPRK," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, April 5, 2009,;"China calls for restraint on DPRK launching activity," Xinhua News Agency, April 5, 2009,
[31] "Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Holds Phone Talks Respectively with U.S., Russian, Japanese, ROK Counterparts" Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, April 5, 2009,; "Chinese FM holds phone talks with U.S., Russian, Japanese, S.Korean counterparts on DPRK's launching activity," Peoples Daily Online, April 6, 2009,
[32] "UN action on N.Korea launch must be cautious-China," Reuters, April 5, 2009,
[33] "Russian MFA Spokesman Andrei Nesterenko Commentary on DPRK's Launch of Artificial Earth Satellite into Low-Earth Orbit," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, April 5, 2009, in
[34] "Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov Speaks to US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton by Telephone," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, April 6, 2009, in
[35] Louis Charbonneau, "Focus on North Korea Nuclear Talks after Launch: Russia," Reuters, April 6, 2009,
[36] Gerard Aziakou, "Major Powers Hold Inconclusive Talks on NKorea," AFP, April 9, 2009, in; Scott Snyder, "North Korea's Missile Test: Off-Target?" Council on Foreign Relations, April 6, 2009, in; Sheila Smith, "After Latest Brinksmanship, Engaging North Korea," Council on Foreign Relations, April 9, 2009, in
[37] Foreign and Commonwealth Office: "North Korea Satellite Launch," April 4 2009,
[38] Federal Foreign Office of Germany: "North Korean Missile Launch Condemned," April 6 2009,
[39] Council of the European Union, "Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP Condemns the Launch of a Satellite by North Korea," April 5 2009,
[40] "Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU on the 'experimental communications satellite' launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," April 7 2009,
[41] "European Union-United States Joint Statement on the North Korean Missile Launch," April 6 2009,

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