Special articles and reports on timely nonproliferation issues by CNS staff.

Updated: Jul 21, 2009

Full-Scale Exercise Mocking Up Non-Nuclear State Verification of Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Held

As experts, scholars and officials the world over look for ways to move nuclear disarmament forward, the issue of verification has taken on new urgency. Traditionally, verifying that a nuclear weapon has been dismantled has been a task undertaken by Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) alone. The United States and Russia (and before it, the Soviet Union), were the sole parties to verify compliance with bilateral arms control agreements, for example. Both countries, as well as the United Kingdom, have undertaken a great deal of research on verification issues, the latter in particular looking at multilateral verification options.[1] In 2007, London joined Oslo in launching the first joint study with a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) to examine and develop equipment and procedures to make it possible for a NNWS to verify the dismantlement of a nuclear warhead without obtaining access to weapons secrets.

Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), NNWS may not have access to such information, nor may NWS transfer information that could aid a nuclear weapons program. In order to achieve this goal, information barrier (IB) systems were developed under the UK-Norwegian project, which involved Norway's Institute for Energy Technology (IFE), NORSAR, the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI), and the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA), along with the United Kingdom's Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE plc), Ministry of Defence, and the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) NGO. In June 2009, Norway and the United Kingdom held their first full-scale warhead dismantlement exercise as part of the joint initiative, testing the IB systems as well as other technique such as ensuring chain of custody. A full analysis of the results of the exercise will take months. However, the British and Norwegian media have recently published reviews of the exercise, as summarized below.[2] The BBC story includes a voice broadcast taped during the exercise, including comments by CNS director William Potter, who observed a portion of the event. As he notes in the interview, the UK-Norwegian project could help to bridge the gap between NNWS and NWS and provide concrete examples about how these states can cooperate in the nuclear disarmament sphere.

The exercise scenario centered on the dismantlement of a warhead by a mock Nuclear Weapon State (NWS), called Torland (played by Norway). Torland had concluded a bilateral agreement with Luvania, a NNWS (played by the United Kingdom), whereby Luvania would be allowed to monitor the dismantlement without having access to any classified information. For the exercise, Norway built a mock nuclear warhead using Cobalt-60 in place of plutonium, which was placed in the jointly designed IB system. Non-destructive assay technologies that detect gamma ray and neutron emissions were employed to detect the mock fissile material (Cobalt-60) — but the instrument measurements were not visible to the inspectors (such instruments can determine the existence, isotopic ratio, mass, and age of fissile material). Instead, the inspectors were only able to read a pass/fail response transmitted by the IB system, to avoid the transfer of sensitive information. (Green indicated the presence of Cobalt-60, red its absence.)

Despite the fact that a dry run of the exercise was held in November 2008, as well as a familiarization visit to the site in December of last year, the June exercise nevertheless faced several hiccoughs that had to be overcome through last-minute negotiation. One of the first difficulties was that the Luvanian inspectors arrived with personal computers that they wanted to use during the inspections. The Torland weapons laboratory security chief (played by Per Ivar Wethe of IFE) would not allow the computers into the mock lab, noting that they could be used to contact people outside of the "secret" facility. He insisted that Torland officials be contacted—noting later that the success of the exercise depended upon all procedures being taken very seriously, as they would in an actual dismantlement effort. The impasse was solved when the Luvanians were provided with computers cleared by Torland. Soon thereafter, however, another interruption: the Luvanians asked how many warnings they would be given before the guards would shoot. While the guards' weapons were not loaded with real bullets (they were similar to paint guns), the physical security of nuclear weapons must be very strict, and even fake bullets can be harmful at close range.

Once the procedures were agreed, the exercise moved forward. The mock weapon was in a container—the inspectors could only observe the red/green light on the black box located on a table next to the weapon container. After 30 minutes, the light turned green, indicating the presence of the mock fissile material. This was the ok for advanced seals to be placed on the container, which Torland then transferred to a dismantlement room that had already been inspected by the Luvanians. While the weapon was in the dismantlement room, nothing could be brought into or out of that room. The room, the transfer container, etc., were monitored by the inspectors, who would not complete their visit until five days later, when the weapon dismantlement was completed and the mock nuclear pit had been removed to a permanent storage site, at which point the weapon would finally be considered destroyed.

As the world considers how to move closer to nuclear zero, developing the means for NNWS to verify dismantlement of nuclear warheads is of critical importance. Arsenal reductions to date have been monitored by NWS, as noted above. The involvement of NNWS would do much to increase confidence, but it must be done in a way that does not reveal proliferation-sensitive information. The UK-Norway Initiative on Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Verification, thus, is working to develop the information barrier technology and on-site inspection methodology needed to meet this goal. The chief scientific adviser to the UK Ministry of Defence, Professor Mark Welland, is quoted in A-magasinet as noting that other countries are likely to want to repeat the UK-Norwegian effort. The UK and Norwegian participants undertook this experiment as rigorously as possible, keeping both those who may want to follow up as well as skeptics in mind. Some critics have particularly questioned the motives of the United Kingdom, which has no current plans to dismantle its nuclear weapons. However, if the UK-Norway Initiative succeeds in building states' confidence in their ability to monitor weapons dismantlement it could prove to be far more than a public relations triumph. It could contribute directly to progress in nuclear disarmament.

Notes

[1] Already a decade ago, the UK Ministry of Defence undertook a Strategic Defence Review (SDR98) that called for the development of capabilities to verify reductions in nuclear weapons. See "A Summary Report by the Ministry of Defense on the Study Conducted by the Atomic Weapons Establishment Aldermaston into the United Kingdom's Capabilities to Verify the Reduction and Elimination of Nuclear Weapons," http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/uk/000000-uk1.htm.
[2] "Nedrustnings-kappløpet" [The Race to Disarmament], A-Magasinet, June 19, 2009, pp. 20-23; Gordon Corera, "How to dismantle a nuclear bomb," BBC News, July 16, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8154029.stm.