21st International Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs for 2009

About thirty-five young scientists (graduate students and post docs) and some international security experts from four continents - Asia, Africa, North America and Europe — launched the International Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs, which took place from July 17 to 25, 2009, at the Center for American Studies (CAS) at Fudan University in Shanghai, China. The meeting brought together participants from established organizations and research institutions with a wide range of experience and expertise in arms control and nonproliferation issues - everyone made a presentation. Lectures covered five broad categories relevant to contemporary security questions: monitoring and verification, nuclear energy and fuel cycle, nuclear weapons and nuclear policy, space security, missiles and missile defense. About six lectures were delivered each day for six days of the eight-day symposium, with plenty of time for discussion. Others engaged to learn from the talks, provide feedback and suggestions to the speaker. A day was dedicated for structured sightseeing to Suzhou, an attractive city for tourists in Jiangsu province and important center for China's silk industry. There were also informal evening discussions to brainstorm on interesting topics proposed by participants, among others, nuclear policy and disarmament.

Participants in the 21st International Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Pakistan, Russia, UK and US.

The Summer Symposium grew out of discussions in the 1980s between U.S. physicist Frank von Hippel and Soviet physicist Roald Sagdaev about the lack of knowledge within the younger generation of Russian scientists on the subjects of arms control and cooperation. The first symposium was organized in 1989 by a group of students and faculty at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MPTI), an elite technical university. This meeting led to the establishment of the Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies at MPTI, the only university-based program in Russia for teaching and research on technically-related policy issues in the arms control, energy, and environmental fields. Because international security is imperative for the survival of humanity—that is, the security of individual nations is best attained by enhancing the security of all nations—the symposium has grown to include participants from around the world. It is geared to fostering a new generation of young scientists and analysts interested in the technical issues associated with international security.

The recent scope of participants, focused presentations and discussions on WMD issues is timely and appropriate. During the past three decades, independent scientists working on arms control and security issues have played an increasingly important role in policy debates. These experts have acted as watchdogs over government and industry practices and have provided the technical basis for new policy ideas. In an increasing number of countries, scientists and other experts are involved in the analysis and, in some cases, formation of arms control policy, and this wave is swelling worldwide. There is no magic bullet, at least in history, to puzzle out the myriad sides that exist for every WMD security question. A key purpose for the Summer Symposium meetings is to help develop analysts who not only know the technical issues, but who also understand the policy issues involved in the field: arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. Choosing important issues to work on requires an understanding of the policy context of technical topics; and scientists perceive the policy issues as the drivers of their work.

The Symposium consisted of three main components: presentations, discussions, and structured sightseeing. Presentations were either on ongoing or planned projects, building on the past successes of "peer mentoring," connecting scientists to relatively established networks. It was also a forum for information-sharing. Participants -introduced their originating institutions, what kind of work they do, research topics and opportunities. The format provides unique career opportunities to participants new to the field. Since the inception of the symposium, more than twenty scientists from Russia, China, India, Pakistan, South Korea, and Iran have worked, or currently work, as research fellows at UCS, MIT, and Princeton. Experienced researchers shared techniques on information gathering and conducting research, particularly on what to guard against since the methodologies can be different to those employed in the natural sciences.

Be it work in progress or analysis results of accomplished projects, there were interesting findings that are worth highlighting. One lecture discussed extended/expanded nuclear deterrence for Japan and how it could influence a new U.S. nuclear weapons posture review in the context of advancing U.S. President's vision for disarmament. There are concerns that some members of the U.S. administration could oppose making the recommendations for change in U.S. nuclear policy. In early April, US Presidential leadership pledge America's commitment to collaborate in seeking world peace and security without nuclear weapons, a generational statement from Washington on nuclear disarmament. Some Japanese arms control and security experts in the foreign policy establishments could lobby vigorously against a change in U.S. nuclear weapons policy over concerns that a smaller role of atomic weapons in U.S. defense policy will reduce Japan's national security. This view can be shared by nuclear reduction opponents in the Obama administration, having profound impact on nuclear freeze movement. The way Japan views U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is turning out to be a key sticky point, which may end up blocking progress on nuclear disarmament. Whether Japan is being used by disarmament opponents in the U.S. government as an excuse to prevent the Obama administration from making the single most important policy change necessary to enable a drastic reduction in its nuclear arsenal, or whether the Japanese government is willing to jeopardize progress on nuclear disarmament in order to maintain Tokyo's place under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, remains another component of the disarmament puzzle. The question remains: how much U.S. nuclear deterrence is enough for Japan?

Another lecture described an ongoing project that is expected to provide strategic thinking into Iran's nuclear intentions. The work suggests that ambiguity in Iran's nuclear intentions has been the cause of increased international pressure to suspend its enrichment program. The project seeks to develop the best estimate of Iran's nuclear capabilities and potential based on public data. The lecture described problems of clear and "circular" referencing while synthesizing open source data to develop an estimate of Iran's IR-1 and IR-2 centrifuge performance, and thus questions much of the current publicly available data drawn from existing literature. However, it is possible to derive independent data from technical analysis and match them with statements made by Iranian officials. The project aims to derive a realistic estimate of optimum and off-optimum centrifuge performance. These estimates provide information about separative work unit (SWU), a function of the amount of uranium processed, the composition of the starting material, and the degree to which it is enriched. The results can pave the way for new policy ideas and the making of informed policy decisions about Iran's nuclear program.

A discussion on China's foreign and defense policies in relation to NPT commitments stimulated participants to examine the intricacies of the nuclear weapons issue in Asia particularly North Korea - hurdles for the Six Party Talks and the UNSC diffidence. The discussions delved into normative and operational challenges in arms control regimes, inter alia, economic and security concerns surrounding China-U.S. cooperation in the aircraft sector and their competition in the space technology arena. A project on the DPRK's early April 2009 "ballistic missile" launch described the analysis of a satellite image of the Unha-2 flyout trail, how it can be used to reconstruct the trajectory of the launcher, infers considerable amount of information on the pitch program used by North Korea, and possible technical implications for why the 2006 Taepodong-2 launch might have failed.

As space militarization remains another strategic subject in arms control and global security, issues relating to the use of space as a vantage point for surveillance, remote sensing, and satellite communication are increasingly shaping space policy. Regarding missiles and missile defense, one of the projects, modeling ballistic missiles with a post-launch examination of Unha-2, is a technical analysis that makes it possible to develop a fairly complete description of the main physical characteristics of the Unha-2 launcher. The discussion was multidisciplinary in nature and structured, treating the policy context as being as important as the technical research that occupies most of the actual work. The project is part of international effort and initiatives in developing informed policy decisions on curbing North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Clear statements of specific questions that the research is trying to answer and how those questions are relevant to the larger policy issue include—ballistic missile capability, limits on North Korea's indigenous missile technology development and next nonproliferation thoughts.

The results of the analysis suggests two important ideas about the launcher, North Korea's missile capability and domestic development program. First, the Unha-2 launcher represents a major technological progress over North Korea's previous launchers, with the potential to deliver over a one-ton payload to the continental United States (if it can be modified by North Korea for use as a ballistic missile). The analysis also suggests that the Unha-2 launcher appears to be constructed from domestic and foreign components. It is likely that critical rocket components were acquired from other countries and, if true, this could mean that North Korea's indigenous missile capability could be substantially constrained if Pyongyang is denied further access to such sensitive components. The results give rise to important future research questions such as: what are the key foreign components of North Korea's missile program? What critical rocket components are indigenously manufactured in North Korea? It can be argued that knowledge about North Korea's indigenous missile technology capability and the level of reliance on foreign components could provide ideas on informed policy decisions in limiting the DPRK's ambition to further increase the capability of its launchers. If Pyongyang's missile program relies heavily on core foreign components acquired clandestinely, the capacity of North Korea's domestic missile development could be much more limited than is commonly assumed. There could be a dead-end to North Korea's missile program if the supply of these components is cut off.

Other lectures explored breakthrough technical and engineering projects, the results of which could have profound impacts in arms control and international security. The projects are aimed at providing the technical basis for transparency and confidence-building in the enforcement of disarmament and nonproliferation regimes. In the context of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a credible and reliable monitoring measurement of radio-xenon plumes from nuclear explosions can serves as a complementary and confirmatory radionuclide technology to the three waveform verification technologies — seismic, infrasound and hydrocaustic - employed by the CTBT verification regime. The simulation and analysis of radioactive xenon emissions (or lack thereof) from the DPRK underground nuclear tests in May can be used to corroborate information on whether or not the explosions were actually nuclear. Still within the context of CTBTO, a prototype Movable Argon-37 Rapid Detection System, for on-site inspection, could be used to definitively and unambiguously confirm underground nuclear explosions. As a verifiable mechanism for the production of fissile materials, that could be used for future Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), an ongoing project explores the possibility of verifying past production of HEU. Although in the early phase of development, nn ongoing Norwegian-UK nuclear weapon disarmament technology verification project is a promising transparency tool and confidence building measure for both NNWS and NWS. Regarding nuclear energy and the fuel cycle, two projects on microbial and nuclear forensics explore the feasibility for use in verification of U.S. uranium enrichment and plutonium production programs and the capacity to deter terrorists. Another project investigated the incorporation of nuclear power into both well-established and underdeveloped electrical grids in developing countries. Other discussions on space security issues include a project on the analysis of debris from the first ever on-orbit collision between Russian Cosmos 2251 retired satellite and American iridium active satellite on February 10 2009. Another lecture examined international security concerns for recent developments in dual laser technologies usable in missile defense system as well as an anti-satellite weapon. One other space security threat is future of the space-based High Powered Microwave weapons in disabling the electronic circuitry of space objects.

Recent revival of disarmament and nonproliferation movement, globalization of security and peace issues, multicultural and interdisciplinary epistemic community contributed to increasing the numbers of involved scientists across the globe sharing a common vision for public-interest science. Connecting them to well-established international networks of arms control researchers enhances new global thinking and access to information resources vital to analyze global security issues. Informed policy decisions can be realized if the growing arms control and nonproliferation movement is supported by the next generation of scientists to provide the technical basis for new policy ideas and act as watchdogs over government and industry practices. It is important to raise global public awareness on the role of science and technology in the formulation of policy decisions and promote the active integration of young scientists into an established network. The meetings, therefore, assist new participants with their plans for research projects, helping to ensure their projects are well-formulated, manageable in scope, and policy-relevant, and helping them to locate relevant information or experts. As a result of participating, young participants learn from counterparts and established experts during the symposium debates and discussions, which continues above and beyond the time of the Symposium itself.

All the participants thank the following sponsors for their support of the 21st International Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs: The Carnegie Corporation, the Union of Concerned Scientists, and the Center for American Studies at Fudan University.