Special articles and reports on timely nonproliferation issues by CNS staff.

Updated: Oct 2, 2009

Cold War Redux?
China's Cold War Era Thinking When it Comes to Nuclear Disarmament

Cold War Thinking

Chinese analysts and officials frequently state that much of the difficulty in achieving the aims of arms control and disarmament stems from Cold War thinking on the part of the West. At the same time, there remain Cold War era vestiges in China's own thinking.

When levied against the United States and Russia, the charge of "Cold War thinking" equates with an inability to relinquish balance-of-power politics, whether through arms racing or extended deterrence. In the case of China, this term is temporal in nature, as China has continued its call for disarmament throughout the Cold War into the present day.

Yet, the question remains as to whether or not these long-held Chinese principles of disarmament are compatible with the current U.S. push for nuclear zero. Understanding the logic that underpins these principles is essential to engaging China more effectively on disarmament.

Old Wine in New Bottles

China's perpetuation of "old wine in new bottles" becomes abundantly clear when surveying the writings of Chinese analysts on the subject of disarmament and arms control. References to Mao Zedong's support for global disarmament and his famous counsel that in order to eradicate nuclear weapons, a country must first possess them continue to punctuate this literature.

In fact, many of China's basic arms control and disarmament principles have been retained for more than four decades.[1] The most frequently mentioned milestones date to China's stated commitment to disarmament following its first nuclear test in 1964, later expounded upon in its "Proposal on Essential Measures for an Immediate Halt to the Arms Race and for Disarmament" put forward by the Chinese delegation at the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on Disarmament in 1982.[2]

Such Cold War era tenets continue to be cited in everything from the Arms Control Handbook, a review of the perspectives of 40 Chinese arms control and weapons experts published in 2000, to a paper entitled Nuclear Weapons in a Changing Security Environment in North East Asia issued in 2009 by the oft-quoted retired Chinese General Pan Zhenqiang.[3] At meetings and conferences, such as 11th PIIC Beijing Seminar on International Security in October 2008 and the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) meeting in May 2009, Chinese participants continue to cite a decades old position on disarmament as the contemporary cornerstone of China's nuclear stance. When it comes to disarmament China has not greatly altered its public position since the end of the Cold War.

Rather than lament this ossified stance, Chinese analysts rightly argue that this persistence of principles reflects China's consistent support for disarmament. Yet, while some of these principles are in line with those put forward by the American "Gang of Four," namely George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn,[4] there remains a vast gulf between support for the principles and implementation of the steps necessary to achieve nuclear disarmament.

Cynicism Behind Closed Doors

In the over 20 private discussions on arms control issues held by the author with experts from the arms control and security community in China, the aforementioned solid support for disarmament is mixed with deep underlying cynicism and reservations regarding the current disarmament euphoria in the United States. Many of the Chinese disarmament-related principles that carry over from the Cold War reflect these concerns over the actual level of U.S. commitment to and intentions behind disarmament.

One such Cold War remnant of Chinese thinking paves a bilateral path towards nuclear zero. According to this logic, the United States and Russia should undertake the disarmament process first before attempting to engage others. Multilateralism, which is a recurrent theme in Chinese arms control of today, takes a back seat to the bilateralism of the Cold War era when it comes to disarmament.

Such retroactive shifts belie a desire for reassurance that rhetoric will match reality and that this pursuit is not simply about constraining China. One Chinese analyst noted that as the natural shift away from U.S.-Russian bilateral arms talks towards multilateral ones occurs, such negotiations will aim squarely at China. But China's tendency to emphasize past disarmament principles as a means of addressing current security concerns extends beyond the identity of the countries that must lead the way.

Chinese analysts continue to present conditions for nuclear disarmament, such as international security, lack of hegemonic activities, conventional disarmament,[5] and any range of conditions that few can oppose, but even fewer can envision as achievable goals in the near or even distant future. As one Chinese arms control analyst communicated to the author, China's best defense of its interests is to make proposals that are unlikely or at least difficult for other parties to achieve. In doing so, China maintains the moral high ground, while exposing the targets of its criticisms or proposals as insincere.

At the same time, such calls may also be interpreted as an effort to elicit greater concessions on the part of the United States to reassure China. This approach is most evident in China's repeated calls for Japan and the United States to renounce their nuclear umbrella as a meaningful step towards disarmament. Until such larger gestures that encapsulate doctrine and arsenal are met, Beijing maintains a rationale for postponing or even precluding its involvement in the disarmament process.

Disarmament also illustrates the "principles versus action" tension. The moral high ground is easy to endorse, since no one wishes to publicly oppose the eradication of nuclear weapons. And yet, in private, few Chinese analysts maintain that calls for disarmament have much chance of success. As one arms control expert described his stance, as an idealist, he supports disarmament, but as a pragmatist, he recognizes its limits. A number of other analysts surveyed were even more categorical in asserting that global disarmament does not have a chance of succeeding. A few maintained that if some of the steps necessary to achieve disarmament were reached then the undertaking could be deemed worthwhile. Nonetheless, given ever present and legitimate concerns over security, domestic politics and verification issues, the Chinese analysts surveyed saw more drawbacks than advantages to getting involved prematurely in what promises to be a lengthy, arduous and ultimately uncertain endeavor.

Obstacles Abound

Among the frequently cited obstacles are concerns over the ability of the United States and Russia to relinquish deterrence as a means of defense. Several Chinese experts surveyed by the author argued that nuclear disarmament missed its window of opportunity, which they saw as existing prior to India, Pakistan and North Korea acquiring nuclear capabilities outside of the regime.[6]

Some Chinese arms control experts in the scientific community assert that nuclear weapons are necessary for maintenance of stability while China continues its rise. Others simply state that the world has not achieved the level of security and peace necessary for such an undertaking. Most importantly, recent efforts to engage China early in disarmament negotiations elicit a strong degree of skepticism that this process is not actually about the United States and Russia reducing their bloated arsenals, but rather about containing China or forcing it to be more transparent.

The climate that bolsters Chinese analysts' concerns is often evident at arms control conferences at which discussions about nuclear disarmament shift from considerations of U.S.-Russian reductions to questions about China's willingness to participate in the process and to increase transparency. For example, during the 2009 ICNND Northeast Asia Regional Meeting in Beijing, a renowned Russian expert squarely linked Russian and U.S. comfort with engaging in deep arms reductions to China revealing the size of its arsenal and level of commitment to eliminating its own forces. Frequently, disarmament becomes a pretext for getting China to make commitments that the United States and Russia have yet to agree upon, much less implement.

The prevalent view among those surveyed by the author is that under the auspices of disarmament the United States and Russia are simply engaging in measures such as de-alerting or elimination of redundant or outmoded weapons that would occur without regard to commitments to reach nuclear zero. Nuclear disarmament is frequently viewed as allowing the United States to solidify its hegemony through its already established conventional military superiority, while other countries lose their ability to deter the United States.

Conversations with Chinese arms control analysts suggest that China's hesitation to embrace disarmament was conditioned by prior experiences in "going-first," such as during the ratification process of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). One analyst pointed out that just as China felt that it had "lost out" when the United States made its own ratification of the CWC contingent upon a series of demands, early action by China on the nuclear disarmament front may result in it sacrificing more than the United States or Russia.

Prague and Beyond

Since China envisions its limited arsenal and doctrine as a response to the actions of others, namely the United States, it will take more than rhetoric or a powerful speech by a U.S. president in Prague to get China on board. And even if China does engage in the process, its initial participation is most likely to be reactive and linked to historical principles. By responding to the actions and initiatives of others, China can shrewdly maintain its flexibility and fall back on reiteration of old principles rather than engage in action if its existing standards and conditions for disarmament are not met.

As during the Cold War era, China today remains predominantly focused on arms control and disarmament principles rather than technological or numeric indicators. Chinese analysts, thus, will continue to emphasize the need for changes in nuclear doctrine and international security rather than simply reductions in the number of warheads. This approach remains very much at odds with the fixation of U.S. and Russian arms control negotiators on numerical ceilings and verification.

China is unlikely to agree to a multilateral disarmament process in which the United States and Russia pursue a reduction in the number of warheads and delivery systems, if such a process ignores the issue of qualitative restraints. The fact that U.S. hegemony might be enhanced by the global eradication of nuclear weapons due to its conventional military superiority reinforces concerns on the part of the Chinese arms control community that much like missile defense the United States is pursuing absolute military superiority.

Faced with the prospect that new disarmament momentum might enhance the nuclear deterrent capabilities of others at its own expense, China is apt to retain its Cold War reactive approach to disarmament diplomacy. Efforts to engage China in the disarmament process before the United States and Russia have committed to deep weapons reductions, combined with revised strategies that place less dependence on nuclear weapons are likely to be received with polite acknowledgement, but deep-seated skepticism by China. Under this Cold War Redux, it is not nuclear weapons that threaten to become the paper tiger, but rather nuclear disarmament.

The author would like to thank Dr. William Potter, Dr. Jing-Dong Yuan and Miles Pomper for their helpful comments.

Lora Saalman is currently pursuing her Ph.D. at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China, where she promises to be the first American to earn a doctorate from its Department of International Relations. A CNS/MIIS alumna, Ms. Saalman spent the summer of 2009 as a Visiting Fellow in the CNS Washington DC office. Ms. Saalman has published articles in such Chinese journals as Dangdai yatai [Contemporary Asia Pacific] and Nanya yanjiu [South Asia Studies] on a range of topics including Sino-Indian energy diplomacy, China's reaction to the U.S.-India nuclear deal and Sino-Indian lobbying efforts in the United States. Her English language articles have appeared in various publications of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, as well as Japan Focus and Asia Times. Her dissertation, which she will write in Chinese and later translate into English, covers the impact of U.S. and European export control shifts on Sino-Indian military modernization.

Notes

[1] Wang Zhongchun, Hewuqi, Heguojia, Hezhanlue (Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Powers, and Nuclear Strategies),] (Beijing: Shishi chubanshe [Public Affairs Press], 2007), pp. 303–304, 391–392.
[2] "Guanyu liji tingzhi junbei jingsai he jinxing caijun de zhuyao cuoshi de jianyi" (Proposal on Essential Measures for an Immediate Halt to the Arms Race and for Disarmament), submitted by the Chinese Delegation at the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, June 21, 1982, English version available at http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/ch0682.htm.
[3] Pan Zhenqiang, "Dongbeiya bu duan bianhua de anquan huanjing xia de hewuqi" (Nuclear Weapons in a Changing Security Environment in Northeast Asia), International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, May 12, 2009; Liu Huaqiu, ed., Junbei kongzhi yu caijun shouce (Arms Control and Disarmament Handbook), (Beijing: Guofang gongye chubanshe, 2000), p. 3.
[4] George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "Toward a Nuclear-Free World," Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2008, p. A13. This idea was referred to as a "joint enterprise" in an earlier piece; see George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, p. A15.
[5] Pan, 2009; Wang , 2007), pp. 74, 213, 391–92; Huang Hong and Cheng Weihua, eds., Zouxiang xiandaihua de renmin jundui (Towards a Modernized People's Army), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2007), p. 294; Gao Chaoting and Li Bin, eds., He junkong yu caijun (Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament), (2005), p. 135; Qian Shaojun, ed., Hewuqi zhuangbei (Nuclear Weapons Equipment), (Beijing: Zong zhuangbeibu dianzi xinxi jichubu, Yuanzineng chubanshe, Hangkong gongye chubanshe Bingqi gongye chubanshe, 2003), pp. 166–67; Xia Liping, Yatai diqu junbei kongzhi yu anquan (Arms Control and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region), (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2002), pp. 593–94, 597; Liu, 2000, p. 3.
[6] Israel did not receive mention by these Chinese analysts.