New START and the Maintenance and Modernization of US Nuclear Weapons

Faced with senators who are skeptical of and even openly hostile to his nonproliferation and disarmament agenda, President Barack Obama went to unprecedented lengths to try and secure Republican support for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). Although the price was steep, the administration's sustained efforts over many months were a major factor in the Senate's decision to ratify New START.

Among the fundamental concerns of many Republicans, two issues received particularly close attention from the administration: the future of strategic delivery systems (ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable bombers, or the triad), and the upkeep and modernization of US nuclear warheads and the complex that maintains them. Republicans, led by Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ), made clear early on that a vote to ratify the treaty would depend to a large degree on whether sufficient funding was provided to sustain strategic missile and aircraft, the warheads they carry, and the complex maintaining those warheads well into the future.

When the administration submitted New START to the Senate for ratification on May 13, 2010, it also submitted a classified report requested by Congress under Section 1251 of last year's defense authorization bill. The language in Section 1251 (drafted by Sen. Kyl), required "a comprehensive plan" to "(1) maintain delivery platforms; (2) sustain a safe, secure, and reliable U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile; and (3) modernize the nuclear weapons complex." In its one page unclassified summary of that report, the administration declared that the United States "will invest well over $100 billion in nuclear delivery systems to sustain existing capabilities and modernize some strategic systems" along with an intention "to invest $80 billion in the next decade to sustain and modernize the nuclear weapons complex," beginning with a $7 billion request for fiscal year (FY) 2011 (which began on October 1), a 10 percent increase over FY 2010. Among the projects supported by this $80 billion commitment are the design and construction of new plutonium and uranium processing facilities, programs to increase surveillance of existing warheads (to check for potential defects and certify reliability), and life extension programs to ensure the continuing viability of all operational warhead types well into the 21st century.

"Show Me the Money"

Over the summer, as hearings on the treaty got underway, Sen. Kyl, Sen. Bob Corker (R-TN) and others complained that this extraordinary "down payment" was insufficient because most of the money for the weapons complex ($70 billion by their account) was for previously planned projects, not new initiatives, and that in any case the funding for the weapons complex was not guaranteed. (As a practical and constitutional matter, Congress cannot require this or future administrations to lock in funding for future years; for example, neither the executive branch nor congressional appropriators would permit funding levels to be set a decade or two into the future, especially not when there is so much economic and programmatic uncertainty.) Kyl argued for "a more precise and higher degree of commitment so that we know that this program is not going to go for a while and peter out," while Corker, whose state is slated to receive a large new uranium processing facility, insisted that any reduction of nuclear weapons "must go hand-in-hand with ensuring the nuclear force we have is fully operational."

To address these concerns, in September Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, offered an amended resolution of ratification for the treaty that declared the administration's budget numbers to be a floor on spending, and required the president, among other things, to report to Congress within 60 days if congressional appropriations fall below these "minimum" levels or if a requirement for additional resources is identified. (Making the president responsible for identifying and rectifying any spending shortfalls—even those created by Congress itself—is another way of trying to secure the future funding guarantee sought by Kyl and Corker.)

As the federal budget cycle progressed, and as it became clear that Kyl and Corker were still dissatisfied with the amount of money offered by the administration, an update to the Section 1251 report was submitted to Congress in mid-November, demonstrating an intention to request $7.6 billion for the nuclear weapons complex in FY 2012, an increase of more than $600 million over the previous plan submitted in May. Between FY 2012-2016, total funding would increase at least another $4.1 billion. In a December 1 letter to Senator John Kerry (D-MA), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Lugar, the directors of the three national nuclear weapons laboratories wrote that they were "very pleased" with the updated report "because it clearly responds to many of the concerns that we and others have voiced in the past about potential future-year funding shortfalls, and it substantially reduces risks to the overall program." Writing in a December 13, 2010, op-ed in the Washington Times, Thomas D'Agostino, head of the National Nuclear Security Administration, praised the president's approach as "the most robust, sustained commitment to modernization our nuclear deterrent since the end of the Cold War."

It is worth noting that even when adjusted for inflation, these funding levels will greatly exceed recent appropriations. Moreover, they are substantially higher than the average annual expenditure for such activities during the Cold War ($5.1 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars). For example, in FY 1989—when there were 22,217 nuclear weapons in the US stockpile and production and underground testing of these weapons was still underway—Congress appropriated $6.1 billion for these programs. Twenty years later, in 2009, the stockpile had been reduced by 77 percent—to 5,133 weapons—and yet spending had increased to $6.6 billion. And under New START, further reductions will take place, even as the budget for maintaining them soars to a projected $9.8 billion by FY 2020.

Regarding delivery systems, the updated report noted that the Navy "will maintain continuous at-sea deployments" of ballistic missile submarines in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, as well as the capability "to surge additional submarines in a crisis." A decision on what will replace Trident submarines as they start retiring in FY 2027 is expected by the end of this year. On ICBMs, the Air Force intends "to sustain the Minuteman III through 2030," with plans to select a follow-on replacement around FY 2014. And for aircraft, the military "plans to sustain a heavy bomber leg of the strategic Triad for the indefinite future, and is committed to the modernization of the heavy bomber force." A decision on a new bomber is expected around FY 2012, although the B-52 bomber will be retained "through at least 2035." Notwithstanding these commitments, along with the overwhelming support for the treaty by all current senior military leaders (and many former ones), Sen. Kyl argued repeatedly during the ratification debate that "we have to replace all three legs of our Triad," that the Air Force had not expressed an intention to build a new nuclear-capable bomber, that "no funding has been provided" for a Minuteman III replacement, and that the reductions called for in New START would jeopardize US security. Sen. Kerry responded that with an intended duration of just ten years, New START would cease to exist long before any delivery system replacements are required or would become operational, and that an insistence on locking in decisions on replacements let alone funding now was neither necessary nor efficient.

Domestic and International Implications

Even as nearly every other government program faces spending cuts, the Obama administration's deal with Congress will ensure that funding for the strategic triad and the nuclear weapons complex will continue to rise dramatically in future years. Indeed, even as Congress refused to pass an omnibus spending bill for FY 2011—opting instead for a continuing resolution through March 4, 2011 that keeps spending at FY 2010 levels—it authorized a $624 million increase for the weapons complex in conjunction with efforts to ratify New START, the only such increase in the bill. As large new capital-intensive projects get underway in the years ahead, and as the costs of acquiring new buildings and maintaining the existing infrastructure and the weapons increases, the long-term funding commitments extracted by Sen. Kyl (who pointedly refused to vote for ratification), may begin to crowd out other defense and non-defense programs throughout the federal budget, even as the overall size of the nuclear weapons stockpile continues to decline.

From an international perspective, such public, significant, and sustained increases in spending on nuclear weapons are likely to have a mixed impact. On the one hand, they can be expected to reassure NATO allies and others (especially Japan and South Korea) that the US commitment to maintaining its nuclear arsenal is strong. But when juxtaposed with President Obama's lofty rhetoric in favor of eventual global nuclear disarmament (as articulated in his April 2009 speech in Prague), other states, principally those within the Non-Aligned Movement, are likely to question the administration's disarmament credentials and intentions and possibly resist further efforts to support or strengthen existing nonproliferation programs.

Finally, depending on the nature and extent of improvements to both long-range delivery systems and the warheads they carry, US initiatives proposed in large measure to secure ratification of New START could complicate efforts to reach even deeper reductions with Russia (including on tactical nuclear weapons), or interfere with initiatives to discourage China from expanding its small nuclear arsenal and instead join a multilateral effort to lower the levels of nuclear weapons worldwide. Facing budgetary and strategic obsolescence issues of its own, Russia remains wary of how the conjunction of an expanded US missile defense program and enhancements to strategic weapons, including the possible introduction of long-range conventionally-armed precision ballistic missiles, could negatively affect its national security. And improving the effectiveness of existing nuclear weapons could lend support to hardliners in Russia, who favor an increased emphasis on nuclear weapons. Chinese analysts and strategists share similar concerns.