Strait Talk: Avoiding a Nuclear War between the United States and China over Taiwan

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The Solution

Contrary to prior stated policies by all three actors (America, China and Taiwan) the United States should play an active role in resolving the Taiwan Strait issue. While the United States is viewed as a potential adversary by some elements within China, it is clear that over the past two decades both sides have gradually increased mutual trust. For the first time individuals within China and Taiwan have suggested that although the Taiwan Strait Issue is a matter to be resolved by the Chinese themselves, the international environment has changed to the point that it may now be useful for senior U.S. officials to offer good offices to help resolve the issue. The conclusion of this web book is that the policy of all three actors should be one of active status quo because the most significant factors which prevent resolution of the problem are changing in a direction that will allow a solution after 25 to 30 years.

To avoid military action and potentially a nuclear war, all three actors must explicitly announce a status quo policy that will avoid any actions, such as a name-changing referendum in Taiwan or a PRC missile attack to influence Taiwan's politics. Even better, all three sides should sign a communiqu&eacut; that commits to an active status quo policy for at least twenty-five years (See idealized sample communiqu&eacut; at Appendix 152). The analysis in this book clearly indicates that the situation is likely to be so different in twenty-five years because of economic interaction and China's gradual movement toward a democracy and rule of law acceptable to Taiwan, that the critical obstacles to a confederation solution will be significantly reduced.

The current military standoff can be mitigated by increased confidence building measures by all three sides. China can withdraw missiles targeted on Taiwan and reduce the rhetoric about the use of force. Taiwan can reduce arms purchases and efforts to place themselves into a broader defense structure and can renounce the ultimate goal of complete independence. The United States can continue to make clear that American policy will not support Taiwan independence and will intervene if either side uses force to solve the problem. U.S. intervention should have the explicit goal of returning the situation to status quo ante. It should not be to help Taiwan win a victory or create a situation in which Taiwan can gain by declaring independence.

Immediate discussions can begin to create a better and less threatening environment in which negotiations for Taiwan's degree of autonomy can be carried out. Negotiations between China and Taiwan should distinguish process from outcome. China should recognize that compromises will have to be made about the negotiations process and Taiwan should recognize that they will have to engage in some talks about the ultimate degree of autonomy for Taiwan. There doesn't have to be immediate agreement on these different topics, but both sides should enter into sincere discussions to resolve the issues. Special groups made up of serious scholars should be established to rewrite political philosophy, to study the theoretical concepts of unified versus federated states in history, and to design a new "Basic Law" for Taiwan that can be used as a basis for negotiations. All of these efforts will take time.

Many senior Chinese and Taiwanese leaders still carry grievances that are the result of historical circumstances. Their judgment is colored by emotion even though both sides have become more pragmatic over the years. Even if both sides were completely sensible and logical in their thinking, it would still be very difficult to agree to the detailed terms of unification. Differences based on local versus central interests will still emerge. Even in China today differences between the national government and provincial governments require a great deal of give and take.

A successful unification, assuming that independence is not an option, will require a period of about twenty-five to thirty years for current leaders to retire and for future leaders to find a formula for unification that protects the interests of Taiwan's citizens. Taiwan has to believe that any settlement will become a matter of law that cannot be changed by political whim. There will have to be, as Taiwan's Guidelines to National Unification point out, periods of increased contact and cooperation. It will have to be introduced in phases of increasingly complex interaction. New rules will have to be developed.

It will be necessary to build a foundation for unification that brings both sides together willingly. China may not have to become a liberal democracy and Taiwan may not have to be considered an equal. Solutions based on acceptable and well researched data rather than forced compromise will have to occur. That process is likely to take twenty-five to thirty years and that argues for China, Taiwan and the United States to adopt explicit policies that promote the status quo for that length of time. An explicit status quo policy for all three sides will change and improve many of the current policies of interaction.

It may be possible for China to compromise by accepting Taiwan as a de facto state for the purpose of negotiation only if Taiwan compromises by explicitly stating that it will not seek de jure independence and acknowledges that the final status of Taiwan will be as part of one China. The problem is that if China were to compromise and agree that Taiwan is a de facto state now, it could open the door for Taiwan to seek an end solution in which Taiwan maintains its independent status and that is not acceptable to China. On the other hand, discussing these possible compromises could move the process forward and allow both sides to compromise on the issue of degree of autonomy after unification. All of this must be mitigated by an understanding of the declining relevance of the concept of nation state sovereignty and the increasing consequence of global interdependence.

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