James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction with training & analysis

March 19, 2002, 10:15 a.m.
Room 415, Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, and guests:

I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you this morning to discuss a topic that while, extensively discussed, deserves a new look from a different perspective.[1] In the wake of events following September 11th, it is vital that we examine certain assumptions regarding the acquisition and use of chemical and biological weapons. It has become crucial that we go beyond traditional thinking and take a close look at capabilities and motivations, not only of state actors but also sub-national and terrorist organizations.

Overview of the CBW Threat: A Traditional Review

Since the end of the Cold War, the acquisition and potential use of chemical and biological technologies and materials by state and sub-state actors have become increasingly real threats. The recent trend towards chemical and biological weapons (CBW) terrorism -- most notably the 1995 sarin nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subway and the actual use of anthrax against individuals in the United States, coupled with the state-level proliferation of offensive CBW programs, have created a security environment in which defending against chemical and biological attacks by states as well as sub-national groups must be the top priority.

The anthrax letter attacks that occurred last fall only hint at the potential for casualties and widespread panic associated with a BW event. The 9-11 terrorists were able to plot and train secretly over several years to massacre thousands of people and die in the effort. It is conceivable that terrorists with similar dedication could deliberately obtain, weaponize, and disseminate a contagious pathogen such as smallpox or plague, and the results could make September 11th pale in comparison. In an era where people can literally move anywhere around the world within 36 hours -- far less than the incubation period of many diseases of concern -- all nations could be affected. In addition, advances in biotechnology, and the proliferation of BW know-how and dual-use equipment, might make it possible for terrorists to engineer highly virulent, antibiotic-resistant "designer" pathogens to suit their needs.

Given the destructive possibility of CBW, it is worth quickly reviewing the "state of play." The rest of this section will be devoted to examining state-level CBW capabilities and sub-national groups' interest in and use of CB agents.

CBW Proliferation: State Level

Although the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) impose restrictions on the acquisition and use of these weapons, many states continue to pursue clandestine and offensive CBW capabilities. Roughly 13 states are believed to be actively seeking biological weapons and nearly 20 may be pursuing chemical warfare capabilities. Proliferant states of particular concern include China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Russia, Sudan, and Syria (for more information on state programs please see our website at http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/possess.htm). The analysis here is divided into two categories: 1) unique state threats and 2) other state actors.

Unique State Threats:

North Korea

An analysis of open sources indicates that North Korea has operated an extensive CW program for many years. It is probable that adamsite, mustard, hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, phosgene, sarin, soman, tabun, and VX are among the agents in its chemical weapons arsenal. In the biological sphere, North Korea has reportedly pursued BW capabilities since the 1960s, and continues research with possible production of anthrax, plague, yellow fever, typhoid, cholera, tuberculosis, typhus, smallpox, and botulinum toxin. North Korea is not party to the CWC but has acceded to the BWC.[2]

North Korea's CW capabilities tell us something about how they might use these weapons. Reflecting Soviet military doctrine, North Korea has traditionally viewed chemical weapons as an integral part of any military offensive. There are no indications that this view has altered since the end of the Cold War. The most obvious tactical use of chemical weapons by North Korea would be to terrorize South Korean civilians. Seoul lies within easy striking distance of North Korea's artillery and rocket systems and, today, the South Korean civilian population has no protection against CW attack.[3]

In terms of more traditional conflicts, the rugged terrain of the northern region of the de-militarized zone affords two main routes for North Korea to capture, or at least lay siege to Seoul, while attempting to deny US forces from landing at strategic ports. It is highly likely that chemical weapons would be used against hard military targets in the South, such as airfields and ports, not only spreading death and injury to a large number of South Korean personnel, but contaminating these installations with persistent blister and/or nerve agents for area denial. Finally, because much of the North's success relies on preventing US assets in the region coming to the aid of the South, especially those forces deployed in Okinawa and Guam. Okinawa could be targeted by Nodong-1, Nodong-2 and Taep'odong missiles, possibly armed with chemical warheads, while Guam could be reached by Taep'odongs.

It is unclear how the use of BW agents could play in North Korean military planning. While a number of delivery systems mentioned above could be employed to use BW agents against South Korean and US forces, is unknown what validated weapons systems are currently in the North Korean arsenal. As part of an overall offensive, Northern infiltrators in the South could conduct sabotage operations using BW agents, as well as biological assaults from North Korean specialized units. Whether by sophisticated aerosolized agents (anthrax) or crude contamination of food or beverages, such operations may be set into motion if the North decides to conduct full scale military operations against South Korea.

Former Soviet Union/Russia

Probably an even more problematic and troubling situation exists in some of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) because of the scale of its CBW programs, which had developed large quantities of chemical and biological agent for use in a variety of weapons and military scenarios. Insuring the safety and security of these materials while they await destruction presents a significant challenge, but it is not the only legacy of these programs that requires attention.

Western security experts and policy-makers must take seriously the dangers posed by the scope, history, and enduring capabilities of the Soviet offensive BW program. First, the US government, among others, fears that President B. Yeltsin's 1992 decree ordering the dismantlement of FSU's BW program is being disobeyed and that secret, BW-related activities contravening the BWC continue in the Russian Federation. The three military biological laboratories at Kirov, Sergei Posad, and Sverdlovsk, which remain closed to foreigners, are especially worrisome in this regard.

In addition, we know that FSU's BW program developed a number of pathogens and toxins for use as biological weapons. While we may not know all the program's accomplishments, it is reasonable to believe that some would be state-of-the-art, possibly posing threats to the West that it is unprepared to meet. A Russian BW program, if it exists, can be expected to build on past accomplishments. It is therefore disturbing to read that Russian military scientists developed new anthrax and plague bacterial strains resistant to antibiotics. For these reasons, a continuing Russian BW program would pose much greater security threats to the West than would the suppressed program of Iraq, or the incipient programs of other proliferant nations, who for the most part are believed to depend on classical agents and technologies developed during and just after World War II.

Turning to the former Soviet Union's CW program, Russia has been in technical noncompliance with the CWC almost since the treaty entered into force. Dealing with catastrophic economic, political, and social problems has left Moscow unable to fulfill its obligations under the CWC. The primary reason for Russian noncompliance has been its inability to destroy its stockpiles in a timely manner. This failure has more to do with lack of funding and the capacity of existing destruction facilities than any real desire by Russia to violate the CWC. However, it has been alleged that Russia purposefully lied in its declarations to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to hide the actual size of its arsenal. In addition, Russia may have secretly destroyed CW in an effort to help with this obfuscation as well as providing false information several years prior. In March 1994, Valerii Menshikov, a consultant to the Russian National Security Council, said that the Soviet Union had indeed lied in its declarations under the 1989 Memorandum of Understanding with the United States.[4]

Even more disturbing than the possibility of false declarations and secret efforts to hide arsenal size is the suspicion that Russia has developed, and may be continuing to develop, a next-generation type of chemical agent.[5] The program, nicknamed 'Novichok' or 'new guy,' might include agents that are outside the current CWC list of prohibited agents. The first compliance question here is determining the existence of the Novichok program. The main problem lies in the fact that even if the program exists, the agents may not be covered by the CWC. It remains then either to make sure that the CWC covers Novichok, or that there is some way to address this possible noncompliance that may not violate the letter of the treaty, but certainly violates its spirit.

Other State Actors:

China

Even though it is a member state of the both CWC and BWC, it is possible that China is pursuing, or has pursued, chemical and biological weapons programs. China claims to have destroyed three production facilities in keeping with its obligations under the CWC.[6] When looking at evidence of its commitment to the CWC, China appears not to have any CW stockpiles or current production capabilities. However, US intelligence sources maintain that China retains a "moderate" stockpile of CW and has "not acknowledged the full extent of its chemical weapons program," even though it ratified the CWC in 1997.[7] Moreover, China has a large civilian chemical and pharmaceutical production infrastructure that could quickly be redirected toward the production of chemical and biological agents.[8] These uncertainties about China's current activities are compounded by the fact that it has not revealed the scope and nature of its past programs. This lack of transparency, although occurring within the context of technical compliance and diplomatic commitment to the regime, nonetheless fails to provide sufficient confidence-building. In China's case, the infrastructure for weapons development might exist, but the state may have indeed destroyed its stockpile. Simply put, without more information, China's true capabilities remain a mystery and its intent is clouded.

Egypt

The first Arab country to develop, produce, stockpile, deploy, and use chemical weapons (Yemen Civil War), Egypt has pursued a chemical weapons program since the early 1960s. In its chemical weapons arsenal, it is probable that Egypt possesses mustard, phosgene, sarin, and VX. In the biological sphere, it is believed that Egypt has been pursuing a BW program since the early 1970s, and likely maintains an offensive program. Egypt is not a party to either the CWC or the BWC.[9]

Iran

Even though Iran is a party to both the CWC and the BWC, it appears to have continued to pursue offensive CBW capabilities. Iran is believed to have initiated both its chemical and biological weapons programs in the mid-1980s. In its chemical weapons arsenal, Iran has manufactured and stockpiled mustard, sarin, hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, and phosgene. In regards to BW, Iran has conducted research on anthrax, foot and mouth disease, botulinum toxin, and mycotoxins. It is likely that Iran maintains an offensive BW program. [10]

Iraq

While the current status of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs remains unknown due to continuous refusals to allow inspectors from the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) into the country, it is widely believed that Iraq is continuing to pursue offensive chemical and biological weapons programs. Prior to the expulsion of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors in 1998, it was ascertained that Iraq had mustard, sarin, tabun, VX, and Agent 15 in its chemical weapons arsenal, along with a sizeable stockpile of chemical munitions. Iraq weaponized the biological agents anthrax, botulinum toxin, ricin, aflatoxin, and wheat cover smut, and conducted BW-related research on brucellosis, hemorrhagic conjunctivitis virus (Enterovirus 70), rotavirus, camel pox, gas gangrene toxin, and possibly plague.[11] Iraq is not a member of the CWC, but acceded to the BWC as a condition of the Gulf War ceasefire agreement.

Israel

The roots of Israel's biological and chemical weapons programs can be traced back to 1948, and the mid-1950s, respectively. Even though little information on the highly secretive programs exists in open sources, it is widely believed that Israel has a large chemical weapons defensive program and is capable of producing and stockpiling various chemical agents. In the biological sphere, Israel is conducting a wide array of biological weapons related research, with a possible production of numerous types of agents. The current CBW program is located at the Israeli Institute of Biological Research (IIBR) at Ness Ziona. Israel is not a party to either the CWC or the BWC.[12]

Libya

Since the 1980s, Libya has produced more than 100 metric tons of nerve and blister agents at the Rabta facility, employed chemical weapons against Chadian troops in 1987, and has attempted to build an underground production facility at a site called Tarhunah. Chemical agents believed to be in Libya's arsenal include mustard, sarin, tabun, lewisite, and phosgene. Libya has conducted research on biological and toxin agents, although the extent of the program is unknown. It is possible, however, that Libya could produce small quantities of BW agents. Libya is not a member of the CWC, but has acceded to the BWC.[13]

Sudan

Although a party to the CWC, evidence in the public domain suggests that it is likely that Sudan has been developing a chemical weapons capability since the 1980s. Sudan is heavily dependent upon foreign assistance for its program, and has traditionally sought foreign assistance from a number of countries that have CW programs, including Iraq. It is possible that Sudan is pursuing a biological weapons program, but there are no reports in the open source to confirm this. Sudan is not a party to the BWC.[14]

Syria

With an estimated CW stockpile in the hundreds of tons, it is likely that Syria has one of the largest and most advanced chemical weapons stockpiles in the Middle East. Even though it is dependent upon foreign sources for precursor chemicals, materials and equipment, it is likely that Syria is capable of producing and delivering mustard, sarin, and VX. It is likely that Syria conducts biological weapons research on anthrax, botulinum toxin, and ricin, with possible production of such agents. Syria is not a party of the CWC or the BWC.[15]

The Non-State Threat: A Fusion of Factors

Alone, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, should be a wake-up call to action. When added together with the emergence of state-sponsored and transnational forms of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies and materials in the post-Cold War period, it is clear that we are living in a new security era in which the possibility that terrorists could acquire and use WMD, including chemical and biological weapons, must be seen as real. The anthrax letter attacks, although limited in the scope of their lethality, suggest that future terrorists might well cross the weapons of mass destruction threshold.

It is well known that several terrorist organizations have expressed an interest in or already obtained chemical or biological agents. Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese doomsday cult, showed its ability to make and use sarin gas in the subway system in Tokyo, albeit not as effectively as it had hoped or planned. The unknown assailant(s) that have plagued the United States with anthrax-tainted letters have shown that manufacturing and dispersement of lethal anthrax is possible. Beyond these well known cases, there are extensive examples of terrorists groups using, or attempting to use chem-bio agents. Other organizations with known interest in chemical and/or biological weapons include: al-Qa'ida, believed to have obtained chemical weapons from Sudan and Iraq and biological agents from the Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia; the Kurdistan Worker's Party, believed to have the precursors needed to produce a sarin bomb; and the Rajneeshees, a religious cult located in The Dalles, Oregon, actually used Salmonella Typhimurium to contaminate food in local restaurants in order to make voters ill before an upcoming election.[16]

Related to this sense of an increased threat is the reality that we are all more vulnerable. Today's global community is the result of several developments, including the diffusion of and increased reliance on technology; increased access to information, technology, and materials; ease of communication and transportation; and the openness of more societies. This certainly enhances economic advancement, but also creates more avenues of access for adversaries. Coupled with this increased access to potential targets is the reality that most countries or sub-national groups cannot defeat the United States in a direct confrontation. These adversaries then look for ways to exploit their access and our vulnerabilities. So, what is new is the vulnerability of modern, open society to terrorists with such an open-ended agenda. While we have moved away from the threat of global annihilation, we may have moved closer to the actual use of mass destruction weapons in situations where the United States may have little influence or be the target. In short, Americans may not be worried about a Russian nuclear attack, but now must fear a more random set of events producing some catastrophe in their local environment, without any notice or early indicators.

Moreover, it now has become apparent that certain thresholds have been passed -- until September 11th, no more than 1,000 Americans had died in terrorist incidents at home or abroad since 1968. Our speculation on whether terrorists would and could kill thousands of people has been answered. The problem is that this should not have surprised those of us in the field because, at least since the first World Trade Center bombing, it has been clear that there existed a network of terrorists, loosely tied by extreme Islamic teachings, willing to try to cause harm to large numbers of people. Ramzi Yousef, the perpetrator of that incident was quite clear in his intent in 1993 to kill 50,000 or more Americans. He and others planned a variety of terrorist acts that if successful would have caused large numbers of deaths and casualties.

Several factors have come together to increase the likelihood of CBW acquisition and use by sub-national groups. First, terrorists may see CBW as giving them a new advantage. They know we are incredibly worried about such a possibility and may believe such an attack will not only kill many Americans, but also could psychologically "freeze" the United States.

Second, chem-bio materials are available and there is clear evidence of terrorists being interested in obtaining these materials. This supply-demand dynamic could easily be played out at biological research institutions in the FSU. If security is poor or lacking (as many suspect) at these institutions, they would be vulnerable to theft of pathogens, toxins, and other material of potential use by criminals, other countries, or terrorists. Most important, after theft, it would be easy for the perpetrator to hide and transport seed cultures of organisms that could be directly used in biological weapons or to produce toxins.

Third, some terrorists groups exist that are clearly capable of organizing and operationalizing the type of complex long-term effort that would be needed to develop and effectively deliver CBW agents. The planning effort behind the September 11th events was both long term and complex, and it surprised many that terrorists could sustain such an effort. It clearly signaled a level of commitment and operational thoroughness thought to be beyond most terrorist groups.

Fourth, cooperation between groups and with states possessing CBW capabilities may be growing. An example of such cooperation is reflected in Iran's relationship with three terrorist groups, Hamas, Hizbollah, and Islamic Jihad. In April 2001, Iran reiterated its unflinching support for those terrorist groups working against Israel by hosting the International Conference on the Palestinian Intifada in Tehran, which was convened by the Iranian parliament. Those invited included leaders from Hamas, Hizbollah, and Islamic Jihad, presumably to encourage greater cooperation between these groups in their campaigns against Israel. At the conference, Iran's religious leader Ayatollah Khamenei repeated his description of Israel as a "cancerous tumor" ripe for removal.[17]

Finally, the technical workforce needed to develop effective CBW is available and "cheap." This concern about workforce availability deserves more attention. As is well known by now, the Soviet Union established a powerful, well-funded secret program to acquire biological weapons. In 1992, President B. Yeltsin acknowledged the BW program's existence and decreed that it be discontinued and dismantled in Russia. The decree's effect, when combined with the general decrease in public support by the Russian government for science, led to drastic funding cuts for the BW program. Although we do not know the full consequences of these measures, some dedicated BW facilities (such as Stepnogorsk) were closed down and many others down-sized (including Obolensk and Vektor). Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of scientists, engineers, and technicians were fired or had their wages cut.

In general, the Western governments have viewed the condition of the FSU weapons research institutions with apprehension. Whether the mission of a weapons research institution lies in the biological, chemical, or nuclear area, the problem is similar: What will happen to the expertise inherent in these institutions as some dissolve and others are down-sized? Two concerns of Western governments include: Might institutions on the verge of extinction be contracted by foreign governments or sub-national groups to develop weapons? And could scientific workers that they employ be induced to relocate to proliferant countries by offers of high salaries and bonuses?

Due to the difficult conditions under which science operates in the FSU, and in consideration of the dissolving or diminishing weapons research institutions, these countries are likely have a substantial number of disgruntled and frustrated scientists and engineers with expertise in the biological weapons area. Some may be enticed by high salaries and other inducements to work for foreign governments, sub-national groups, and criminals to develop biological weapons. It is known that especially Iran has made strenuous attempts to recruit weapons scientists to work in that country by offering them high salaries (in excess of $6,000 per month).

But the concern about the clandestine recruitment of scientists from dismantled CBW programs should also include South Africa and the former Yugoslavia. CBW-related activities first started in South Africa under British rule in the 1930s and continued during the Second World War with the production of mustard gas. But it was not until 1981 that the official South African program, code-named Project Coast, began operations. Ostensibly to provide the South African Defence Force with detection and protection capabilities, Project Coast became a highly secretive program that engaged in offensive research. With an annual budget of 10 million dollars a year, and with an estimated staff of 200, Project Coast employed a number of scientists, physicians, and technicians to work on both chemical and biological weapons research, development, and production (exact numbers of scientists and other employees of the program have not been published by the South African Government).[18]

When Project Coast was terminated in 1993, it left a number of weapons scientists and technicians suddenly out of work, therefore raising the possibility that a number of these specialists may have been induced to work for foreign governments and sub-national organizations. Further compounding this threat is the knowledge that in the early 1990s, after the termination of the CBW program, Dr. Wouter Basson, the former head of the CBW program, made frequent trips overseas. Of particular concern were a series of visits made to Libya between 1992 and 1995 as a representative of a South African industrial conglomerate Transnet, to promote its transportation and hospital equipment interests. His lack of expertise in this field and his special experience in CBW programs, combined with the efforts of the Libyan government to develop an indigenous CBW capability, led to concern that he was selling his CBW knowledge.[19]

Yugoslavia provides another example. Prior to its breakup in 1991, the Yugoslav National Army had a chemical weapons program consisting of four weapons facilities, three in Serbia and one in Bosnia. Chemical agents in the Yugoslavian arsenal included sarin, mustard, and CS.[20] It should be noted, however, that there is limited information in the open source literature to determine accurately where many of the former scientists currently reside. The possibility exists that former Yugoslavian weapons scientists could have been recruited by foreign state and sub-state actors interested in developing a chemical weapons capability.

A CBW Threat Reality Check

Having outlined the recognized state and terrorist threats, it is worth looking at these threats from an additional dimension (see Appendix A). Too often we comfortably reiterate the same threat mantra without examining more closely certain underlying assumptions. Discussed below are several traditionally accepted statements often found in threat assessments that deserve to be challenged.

Assumption: Terrorists don't have physical locations to make/store materials.

It is often argued that terrorists may have safe havens, but will still lack a physical infrastructure to develop CBW. Also, it has been assumed that it will be virtually impossible to detect terrorists hunkering down in caves and basements and working on CB agents. However, an often overlooked point is that terrorist groups can and have actually possessed recognizable (and targetable) CBW facilities. While this possibility is not a new concern, the extent of it occurring and its implications may not be fully recognized.

The US government has viewed the subject of terrorist facilities with concern, but little public discussion has developed about terrorists having CBW facilities within their safe havens as well as within established western states. An early, but well publicized, example was the Clinton administration's controversial cruise missile attack on the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan on August 20, 1998. It argued that the plant was linked to Bin Laden and that it was not a pharmaceutical plant, but a chemical weapons manufacturing complex that was engaged in the production of the nerve agent VX.

At the other extreme of public exposure are the facilities in the former Yugoslavia. On July 8, 1999, the Italian newspaper Corriere della Serra indicated that members of the World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders, which was founded by Bin Laden, had purchased three chemical and biological agent production facilities in the former Yugoslavia in early May 1998. According to the article, one such facility was erected in the Bosnian village of Zenica. The report also stated that another factory was built near Kandahar, Afghanistan. There was no open investigation or diplomacy, and certainly no cruise missile, directed against these facilities at that time. Allegedly, members of the World Islamic Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders hired Ukrainian scientists to manufacture unspecified poisons and train Bin Laden's activists in the use of these substances as weapons. The activists would be trained to insert the chemical agents and toxins into explosive devices. Bin Laden planned to send the chemically-trained warriors back to their home countries or to cells in Europe.[21]

During the war in Afghanistan, US intelligence officials pinpointed two sites that may have been used by al-Qa'ida to produce chemical weapons. The United States believes cyanide was produced at a crude chemical facility in the small village of Derunta (Darunta), near the city of Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan.[22] The secret laboratory contained bottles of cyanide poison and bomb instruction manuals, and was allegedly run by a man named Abu Khabab.[23] A fertilizer plant in the northern town of Mazar-e-Sharif is also suspected of playing a role in possible chemical weapons production.[24]

Beyond al-Qa'ida there is Aum Shinrikyo, who, through substantial contributions from wealthy members, purchased a wide variety of businesses and facilities including a medical clinic, computer stores, and trading companies. Also, the cult purchased land in Japan, on which they built a compound where they were able to pursue research and development of various dangerous and potentially lethal materials. Using its businesses as a front, the cult could claim some legitimacy for its pursuit of certain chemicals and technology. Although most of the chemicals were obtained from within Japan, Aum purchased some materials from the United States and attempted to buy weapons and technology from Russia. In addition, the cult bought a ranch in a remote area of Australia to carry out testing of nerve agents.

As all these cases demonstrate, terrorists have had access to or possession of facilities. Some of these may even be located outside of safe havens and may appear legitimate, making the task of detecting and identifying them accurately much more difficult.

Assumption: A certain set of CB agents, such as VX, sarin, anthrax, and smallpox, are the most likely CBW agents to be used.

Cyanide is a chemical that has sometimes been overlooked as a weapon in favor of more lethal and "glamorous" chemical agents like sarin and VX. Yet the wide availability of various cyanide-containing compounds, which are widely used in industrial processes, make cyanide (either in the form of hydrogen cyanide gas or as a solid or liquid contaminant) one of the more likely WMD agents that can be used to attack localized targets.

The WMD Terrorism Database of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute records 52 possessions, plots, or uses involving cyanide by terrorists. These cases have so far collectively resulted in only 124 injuries and 13 fatalities, but the danger lies more in the intent of the perpetrators than their results, as sooner or later some group or individual will overcome the technical hurdles associated with conducting an effective cyanide attack (see Appendices B and C).

In addition to consumer products periodically being contaminated with cyanide (the Tylenol and Chilean grape scares in the 1980s are well-known), cyanide has been extensively used by a variety of terrorist groups. The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) have allegedly used cyanide on several occasions against Sri Lankan government troops and in 1999 Kashmiri separatists were found in possession of at least 3 kilograms of cyanide which was to be used to poison water tanks used by the Indian army. Right-wing groups have also shown a particular interest in cyanide. In both 1985[25] and 1998,[26] domestic right-wing terrorist groups plotted to inflict large numbers of casualties by poisoning the water supplies of major American cities with cyanide; in 1993, the AWB, a South African right-wing group, planned a similar action in order to disrupt the country's first multi-racial election; and in 1988, a group calling itself the Confederate Hammerskins formulated a plan to pump cyanide gas into the ventilation system of a synagogue in Dallas, Texas. Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese doomsday cult, tried on three occasions in 1995 to employ binary weapons that were designed to release hydrogen cyanide gas but failed either because they were detected in time or did not operate properly.[27] The arrest in Chicago in early March of a man found to be storing significant amounts of potassium and sodium cyanide in subway tunnels highlights the ease with which even lone individuals can acquire this poison.

Even the United States' current terrorist nemesis, al-Qa'ida, has shown an interest in cyanide as a weapon. Ahmed Ressam, the terrorist convicted of plotting to bomb Los Angeles International Airport during the millennium celebrations, claimed that in 1998, while in an al-Qa'ida camp in Afghanistan, he had been trained how to kill people with cyanide.[28] Mr. Ressam stated that he was trained to poison individuals by smearing an oily mixture of cyanide and other toxic substances on door handles. His terrorist masters also taught him how to introduce cyanide gas into public ventilation systems in order to affect the maximum number of victims, while minimizing the risk to the perpetrator.[29] The February 2002 arrest in Rome of nine Moroccans with potential links to al-Qa'ida for allegedly planning to poison the water supply of the US Embassy using potassium ferrocyanide shows that al-Qa'ida's interest in cyanide is hardly waning.[30]

Assumption: States won't provide terrorists with CBW.

Compounding the threat to US national security is the possibility that states with CBW programs or related dual-use technologies could provide sub-national actors with these deadly tools. The issue of state sponsorship of terrorism has been a problem commonly associated with rogue states in the Middle East. States such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Sudan have been linked to numerous terror organizations, providing them with a wide variety of assistance, including financial support, weapons and other equipment and materials, and even specialized training bases. Even though there has been little evidence to indicate that any of these states have transferred CBW material, technology or know-how to such terrorist organizations, the possibility cannot be ruled out. The more states that proliferate and pursue chemical and biological weapons programs, the greater the possibility that sub-national actors will acquire them, either from direct assistance or through other covert means, including theft.

Many of the same states identified as terrorist sponsors are also those accused of attempting to acquire CBW capabilities. Under certain circumstances the leaders of these countries may decide the only practical utility they can derive from their CBW arsenals is by deploying them covertly, using sub-national actors as means of delivery.

Even if a state may not be willing to transfer CBW-related technologies to a sub-national actor, one cannot discount the possibility of rogue elements within a government -- such as an extremist clique within the Iranian intelligence apparatus -- being prepared to take more risks than the government as a whole. Within national CBW programs, disgruntled or underpaid scientists, or individuals sympathetic to terrorist causes may also be willing to illicitly transfer CBW-related technologies and know-how to terrorist groups. In summary, the threat that a state actor may indirectly or directly transfer CBW-related technologies, equipment and scientific know-how to a sub-national actor is a threat the US government cannot ignore.

Assumption: Terrorists won't use CBW except in extreme cases.

With the exception of the terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo, the long-held assumption has been that sub-national groups and terrorists will not use CBW except as a last resort. Many state players perceive a threshold created by international norms that prevents them from openly using CBW. However, non-state players, especially terrorists, do not act under the same restraints as sovereign states. It is possible that these organizations do not perceive such a threshold. Moreover, their assessment of the costs and benefits of using CBW cannot be measured on the same scale as that of nations. Terrorist organizations and religious fanatical groups are not under the same political restrictions as sovereign states. In fact, if the motivation of an organization is to infuse terror, then use of CBW even on a small scale, might be seen as furthering their cause. Omar Bakri Mohammed, an Islamic cleric with ties to Islamic Jihad (and Hamas), advocated the use of biological weapons against "western" forces, saying "if any Muslims are under occupation by a western force, they can use any weapon to survive and that includes biological weapons."[31]

The disparity between Israeli and Palestinian forces may lead to the use of CBW in an effort to balance the scales. This thought was expressed in the Palestinian weekly "Al-Manar":

While the human-bombs [meaning, suicide bombers] may be followed [and may be stopped by] preventive measures...serious thinking has begun for a while about developing a Palestinian weapon of deterrence. This weapon terrifies the Israeli security apparatuses, from time to time, mainly because obtaining its primary components, whether biological or chemical, is possible without too much effort, let alone the fact that there are hundreds of experts who are capable of handling them and use them as weapons of deterrence, thus creating a balance of horror in the equation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. A few bombs or death-carrying devices will be enough, once they are deployed in secluded areas and directed at the Israeli water resources or the Israeli beaches, let alone the markets and the residential centers. [This will be carried out] without explosions, noise, blood, or pictures that are used to serve the Israeli propaganda. Anyone who is capable, with complete self-control, of turning his body into shrapnel and scattered organs, is also capable of carrying a small device that cannot be traced and throw it in the targeted location.[32]

Thus, an asymmetric conflict, even where the imbalance is not so great, can be used as justification for turning to CBW. It would be folly not to recognize and respond to all the trends pointing to the CBW option as one increasingly attractive to terrorists.

Assumption: US must focus efforts on homeland security and defense.

While this assumption is not wrong, it may lead to neglecting other venues in which US interests or allies are at risk. A good case in point is US Central Command in the Middle East. It is very much at risk given its location in the heart of some of the most anti-American groups. It would be a mistake to pour so much into enhancing US domestic security when equal attention should be given to those Americans mobilized and deployed to protect us. In addition, planning for responding to CBW terrorism must consider providing assistance to allies. What if Italy is the site of a smallpox attack -- we had better have planned some way to have adequate resources available to contain the consequences of such an attack. This means having vaccine available in some international organization or stockpile above and beyond what is needed for the US population.

Recommendations

We have to be prepared to respond to chem-bio events and to do everything we can to prevent them from ever occurring. But, that will require new ways of approaching old, evolving, and emerging perils.

First, what is required is innovative thinking and a re-conceptualization of threats in the 21st century. In past years, when terrorists were unlikely to have the capability to cause or even seek mass casualties, US foreign policy could focus on the more critical and traditional problem of state threats. Even in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent re-making of the world order, it was clear who the enemies were (Iraq, North Korea), and these enemies were defined not only by their antagonism towards the United States and its values, but also by the fact that they were seeking weapons of mass destruction.

Addressing even the "old" threats will require more than just military power. It requires a long term, dedication to a multi-dimensional and multi-faceted approach that seeks to prevent WMD acquisition and use, strengthens anti-proliferation norms, develops adequate defenses here and elsewhere, and prepares for effective consequent mitigation and management in the advent of a WMD attack. Specifically, this means not only putting significant money into US military and intelligence capabilities, but also into international organizations and collaborations. It involves finding ways to bridge gaps within the US government as well as between states, communities, and even tribes. It also means forging new partnerships and helping to build trust and cooperation in areas where these have been scarce commodities.

Second, the United States, while recognizing the ongoing threat from proliferant states, also faces a threat from a new type of terrorist. The US appears to be approaching the problem of mass-casualty transnational terrorism, and the possibility of terrorist use of WMD, in a manner consistent with deeply entrenched Cold War assumptions about warfare and deterrence. The terrorists of today do not, by and large, behave like states, nor are they part of the international "system." Addressing those terrorists who seek and obtain WMD will require much of the same effort that has been expended on states in the past, plus a strategy that addresses the root causes and nature of terrorism. Long-term approaches that go beyond the next election must be incorporated into the national counterterrorism strategy. These approaches include investing in states that are in danger of collapse in order to prevent the spiral into statelessness that creates a haven for terrorism; involving allies and partners in regional confidence-building measures that are designed to validate US policy to the publics of other nations rather than just the governments; and creating an international safety net to ensure that the rule of law and social infrastructures remain intact even through conflict.

What are some of the more specific activities that might need to be pursued? The following six areas of effort emerge as critical if the United States is to be successful in its war on terrorism and WMD proliferation:

1. enhancing global WMD materials protection, control and accounting;
2. supporting displaced WMD scientists and technical experts to keep them employed doing constructive, socially beneficial projects;
3. enhancing intelligence collection, analysis, coordination, and cooperation;
4. strengthening the public health sector within the United States and internationally;
5. renewing international commitment to effective implementation of both the CWC and BWC; and
6. making meaningful investments to address underlying causes of terrorism, such as poverty, illiteracy, and socio-economic inequities.

Enhancing global WMD materials protection, control and accounting (MPC&A)

The United States must continue its support of improved MPC&A procedures in the FSU and expand these activities to include sensitive chem-bio materials and to be international in scope. Although the United States has supported numerous activities within the former Soviet Union to enhance nuclear weapons and nuclear materials protection, control and accounting since the end of the Cold War, these efforts have not really addressed similar problems with chem-bio materials either in the former Soviet Union or elsewhere in the world. Chemicals of concern are controlled to some degree under the CWC and the Australia Group which provide a normative and international framework for national and international regulation. However, nothing similar exists for dangerous biological materials and this gap deserves greater attention.

The BWC does prohibit the transfer of toxins, agents, weapons, equipment, or means of delivery prohibited under the treaty to any other state, group of states, or international organization. However, this prohibition is limited in several ways: it does not address the concern we now face with terrorists, nor is there any implementing mechanism, nor does it directly address the problem of security and safety of materials while being transferred, stored, or used. Consequently, there is a missing link in our efforts to contain the threat from dangerous pathogens, one that must be dealt with on both the national and international levels.

The anthrax incidents of this past fall and the ensuing investigation clearly indicates that the United States does not have good control over the collection of pathogens within US territory. When one looks beyond the United States, the situation is even more disconcerting. While the World Federation for Culture Collections is an association of 472 repositories of living microbial specimens in 61 countries, it lacks any ability to require of its members tight controls on access to these materials, nor can it force compliance on the membership. Also, the WFCC has as members only a small portion (less than 1/3) of the 1500 germ banks worldwide. In evaluating the security and protection globally of these dangerous materials, it is quite apparent that without much trouble terrorists could easily steal or buy them illicitly. Thus, although the United States needs tighter regulations, such an effort will have little meaning unless there is a similar international initiative. The United States and its allies must make it a priority to fill this security gap by pursuing vigorously enhanced national regulations that control and secure deadly pathogens and toxins and by launching the negotiation of a new "Biosecurity Convention" (see Appendix D).

Such a Convention would compliment the BWC by developing a set of specific, concrete regulations and activities that guarantee the control, accounting, safety, and security of dangerous pathogens and toxins. It would include, at a minimum, the following four components: (1) a legal commitment by the contracting parties; (2) agreed principles for developing progressively higher standards with respect to regulation and licensing of microbial culture collections; (3) mechanisms for oversight and their progressive refinement; and (4) compliance and enforcement measures. To initiate this process, the United States should work with Europe, Japan, and other like-minded states to develop the national legislation needed to prevent misuse and unauthorized access to dangerous biological agents and toxins. Using these efforts as models, the United States must lead the effort on an international level and with industry and academia to define international standards of safety and security in the biotechnology sector so that we have more control over where materials of concern are, who has access to them, how they are controlled, and how they are stored and transferred. By engaging the international community in the negotiation of a Biosecurity Convention, the United States will be pursuing an activity that will reduce the access to dangerous pathogens and thus reduce the threat of biological weapons proliferation and terrorism.

Supporting displaced WMD scientists and technical experts to keep them employed and engaged in constructive projects and careers

A critical aspect of any state or terrorist group effort to acquire and use CBW is having sufficient technical expertise to develop an effective weapon. As indicated earlier in this testimony, several states have had CBW programs that no longer exist and the personnel from these programs (perhaps numbering in the thousands) may be without jobs or at least without adequate wages. This workforce issue should not be seen as involving only the FSU, but must address similar concerns that exist for South African and Yugoslavian former bio-weaponeers.

While the United States through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and a few other initiatives has tried to address these "brain drain" concerns in the FSU, the amount of effort directed towards former CBW personnel has been insufficient. A revitalized and focused commitment to working with Russia and the other relevant states of the FSU to provide adequate jobs, wages, and living conditions to these experts must be immediately pursued. In addition, collaborative discussions and programs should be pursued to address conditions in other countries. Finally, ethics courses should be developed and provided to those entering chemistry or biology fields to put their eventual work and careers into a broader societal framework. Without a much greater level of attention being given to workforce component of the threat, we will live in a continued state of fear that these experts may be lured into working for states or sub-national groups with malicious intentions or may find themselves disgruntled enough to act alone using their expertise for disastrous results.

Enhancing intelligence collection, analysis, coordination, and cooperation

The issue of improving the capacity and capabilities of the US intelligence community has been discussed in great detail in other contexts, but two points deserve mention. First, while there have been numerous studies, commission reports, and meetings concluding that the intelligence community needs to integrate much more effectively open source information, in reality this has not been done to the degree needed. In part this is because of a mindset which constrains analysts from seeing the value in non-classified information; in part it is because there are few analysts that have the language and area studies expertise to exploit adequately unique open source materials; and in part it is because there is already too much classified information for most analysts to try to wade through an additional stack of open source materials on a regular basis.

The first recommendation is to develop incentives and organizational structures that encourage and facilitate the use of open source materials. The second suggestion is to hire more regional experts and actively encourage the acquisition of such language and area expertise with scholarships and funding for relevant educational programs. Finally, information technology is making great strides in being able to filter, bin, and even prioritize data, but the R&D efforts in this area need to be better coordinated and grounded in reality, i.e., analysts need to be integrated into these efforts at the beginning, middle, and end of the activities so that they are given tools that they are willing to use to become better analysts.

The second point has to do with improved cooperation and coordination. Since September 11th, great strides appear to have been made in inter-agency information sharing and collaboration. But, more is necessary and more agencies have to be drawn into the circle. More importantly, international collaboration must continue to be enhanced and expanded as appropriate. Success in this area requires high-level attention and leadership to overcome institutional practices, mistrusts and rivalries.

Strengthening the public health sector within the United States and internationally

My two recommendations in this area reiterate what others in numerous meetings, hearings, and reports have indicated, namely that we need to strengthen our own public health sector and that we need to work with other international groups and foreign governments to do the same internationally. Last fall's events were unnerving enough to get much-needed political support and funding to strengthen domestic public health preparedness by improving disease surveillance and monitoring, communication networks, training, response capabilities, and laboratory facilities. In addition, the proposed draft legislation of Senators Biden and Helms called "Global Disease Surveillance Act of 2002" reflects the fact that given the speed of international travel, migration patterns, and commercial transportation networks, it will not be enough to shore up American public health capabilities and capacities. We must assist others to develop capabilities for disease monitoring, surveillance, and response or else leave ourselves vulnerable to being affected unnecessarily to dangerous diseases (whether intentional or not) that could be locally contained if detected in a timely way. Having gotten more support today, the challenge now is sustaining these efforts both in the United States and elsewhere. Since these activities have dual benefits -- enhancing national and international security and public health -- it is hoped that their value will be clearly evident and funding will become an integral and ongoing element of our national and public security systems.

Renewing international commitment to effective implementation of both the CWC and BWC

Over the last decade, the United States and the UN Security Council have claimed rhetorically that terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the greatest threats to US and international security. Whether it is the inability of the UN Security Council to address effectively the problems of Iraq's unresolved WMD capabilities, or the unwillingness of Russia and China to make fully transparent their past CBW activities, states in general have not recognized their own need for compliance, nor the need to enforce compliance standards on others. The regime appears threatened by a degradation in effectiveness that may paradoxically lead to what it was developed to prevent -- weapons proliferation, growing security threats, and an increased likelihood of violent, wrenching conflicts. We are at a critical juncture as far as it concerns proliferation-related security threats, a time in history when muddling and making political deals may no longer be sufficient, when difficult choices must be made and sacrifices endured to reach the next level of national as well as international security and stability.

But looking at the record of the last five years does not bode well for the next 10 years. The actions of too many states call into question the long-term commitment to anti-terrorism and nonproliferation goals: the rhetoric appears hollow, the commitment to effective action inadequate to the task. It will require US leadership to move forcefully forward, leadership that involves working within the CWC and BWC contexts to ensure compliance, secure access to sensitive and dangerous materials, and to strengthen the international norms. It will require the United States and others to provide substantial new funding and support to these efforts, to focus on the international benefits rather than national demands involved, and to take a long term rather than short term approach to these problems. What can not happen is "business as usual." While terrorism and proliferation may not be an issue in all parts of the world, it remains a substantial threat in several regions and is capable of acting as a catalyst to other states and sub-national groups who might rethink their own decisions not to acquire or use weapons of mass destruction.

Making meaningful investments to address underlying causes of terrorism, such as poverty, illiteracy, or socio-economic inequities

The United States must realize that problems such as failing states, decades of unresolved, bitter conflict, or poverty and socio-economic inequalities provide the breeding ground for angry, alienated individuals and groups. With little to lose and perhaps much to gain in terms of spiritual or political legacies, these individuals develop values and moral frameworks that justify violence and possibly mass destruction. If we ignore their efforts to address their grievances, we risk always being the target, always being hated, and always failing to move our own community and the international community to greater stability and security. Simply put, this recommendation requires a long-term commitment to making the world a better place for all, which does not mean that we should impose our way of life on others or accept theirs. It does mean that we remain an active, constructive player in multilateral affairs, that we try to improve the quality of life for everyone, that we help in whatever ways possible to resolve ongoing conflicts, and that in all of this we act generously and with humility. While it may not be possible to repeat the success of the Marshall Plan in Europe, it may be worth the effort to try to find a new version appropriate for areas such as Afghanistan, Somalia, or even the Middle East.

Appendix A

Today's Terrorists

Types: Single-issue Millenarian groups Religious cults State-sponsorship Right-wing groups Militias Combinations Motivations: Political Revenge Economic Mass casualties Divine inspiration Beliefs: Apocalyptic prophecy Racist or supremacist ideology Dehumanized victims Mass casualties Divinely sanctioned violence

Appendix B

Number of Politically/Ideologically Motivated Incidents Involving Cyanide, Sarin, and VX (without Hoaxes/Pranks/Threats)

Appendix C

Casualties from Politically/Ideologically Motivated Incidents Involving Cyanide, Sarin, and VX