CNS Reports
Combating Terrorism:
Assessing Threats, Risk Management, and Establishing Priorities
By John Parachini
Testimony before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs,
and International Relations
July 26, 2000
Statement of
John V. Parachini
Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
Before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs,
and International Relations
Combating Terrorism:
Assessing Threats, Risk Management, and Establishing Priorities
July 26, 2000
Mr. Chairman,
I want to thank you, other committee members, and your staff for
inviting me to share my views on how the United States assesses the threat
posed by terrorism and allocates its resources to meet it. The United
States government has moved rapidly to address the dangers posed by new
trends in terrorism that emerged in the last decade. With local responder
training ongoing in many cities around the nations, the establishment of
the Joint Task Force, and a number of important R&D program underway,
now is an appropriate time to review national efforts and make
improvements where necessary.
While I believe the United States has made great strides in recent years
to enhance federal, state and local capabilities to combat terrorism,
particularly terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), I am
concerned that many of the efforts launched in the mid-1990s need to be
reconsidered. I particularly fear that our national anxiousness to address
the so-called “New Terrorism” may be inadvertently adding to the
danger. As a result, we are spending big, but not spending smart (See
Figure 1). There clearly are new trends in terrorist behavior. But we must
make sure that we are drawing accurate lessons from the past and guarding
against future developments that are credibly in the realm of possibility
and not merely reflections of our wildest nightmares.
Figure 1:
Federal Funding to Combat Terrorism
($ in Millions)
In addition to the committee’s important oversight function, I
strongly urge the committee and its staff to engage in a regular dialogue
with the executive branch on this issue. As a nation, we are more likely
to be most effective in combating the threat of terrorism if a variety of
government and private institutions are working on this problem. There are
no silver bullets, no special individuals and no single institution for
defeating terrorism. To check the threat posed by domestic and
international terrorism will require sustained effort by many different
entities.
I. Terrorism Threat Assessments and Risk Management Strategies
The United States currently lacks a comprehensive and integrated
intelligence assessment to inform policymaker thinking on how to
prioritize spending decisions to support the government’s programs to
combat terrorism. The General Accounting Office (GAO) has indicated
repeatedly that part of the problem with the current executive branch
approach to terrorism is the lack of "threat and risk assessments
that would suggest priorities and appropriate countermeasures."[1]
The GAO’s observation is extremely important and should be addressed
in a serious manner. The importance of the GAO view is that we lack a
reasoned basis for making a case that we are spending too little, too much
or just enough to combat terrorism. How much is enough remains an open
question. As one renowned scholar succinctly noted, “without a firm
understanding of the threat based on rigorous, ongoing reviews of evolving
or changing terrorist behavior and capabilities, continued efforts to
address this problem may prove as ineffective as they are misplaced.”[2]
The last formal National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on terrorist
threats occurred three years ago. While this estimate was broad in scope,
it was not intended to serve as a national assessment to assist
policymakers in calibrating government efforts and spending decisions.
Currently there is no single person who serves as a National Intelligence
Officer (NIO) for terrorism. In a de facto fashion, the Director of Center
Intelligence’s (DCI) Counterterrorist Center generally serves this
role. Given the jurisdictional restraints on the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Counterterrorist Center cannot assemble an assessment that
combines information on both domestic and international terrorism.
With a security threat as fluid and elusive as terrorism, the challenge
of crafting effective short and long term measures is very difficult.
Intelligence on terrorist threats is significantly different than
intelligence on military threats from nation-states. Intelligence on the
military programs of nation-states is comparatively more static and large
enough to be covered by a variety of intelligence means. Numerous
intelligence assessments on the threat posed by ballistic missiles have
been conducted in recent years.[3] Similarly, a number of special
commissions have also sought to provide the Congress, the President and
the American people with their view of the threat.[4] These assessments
have contributed to the national debate on the threat posed by ballistic
missiles and the measures that may be required to address the threat. The
short and long-term measures addressing the proliferation of ballistic
missiles bear significant financial implications for the country.
While the threat posed by terrorism is much more difficult to gauge,
analysis of the threat certainly deserves as thorough a review. Several
special commissions have contributed to our collective understanding of
the threat posed by emerging trends in terrorism, but their mandates have
not specifically focused on assessing the threat. What is missing from our
national discussion on how to best combat terrorism is a regular,
comprehensive threat assessment that integrates assessment of both
domestic and international terrorist threats.
Without a regular, comprehensive and integrated threat assessment of the
security challenge posed by terrorism, policymakers draw conclusions on
raw and finished intelligence information that comes across their desks.
Policymakers prioritize spending and programming emphasis via a variety of
tools, but intelligence is an essential one. The view of the intelligence
community should serve as a critical baseline for the decisions of
policymakers.
Policymakers should not assemble the intelligence assessment in a
piecemeal and episodic fashion. Rather, policymakers should have the
benefit of a regular, comprehensive and integrated terrorism threat
assessment that informs both short-term and long-term policy decisions.
Moreover, given the transnational and increasingly loose networks of
individuals conducting terrorist acts, policymakers must have a picture of
both domestic and international terrorist threats. Examining one set of
threats in isolation from the other may hinder early identification of key
warning signs.
A regular, comprehensive, and integrated threat assessment will help
ensure that intelligence information that withstands the scrutiny of the
entire intelligence community informs program and spending decisions.
While policymakers can call upon portions of the intelligence community at
any given time for information, a regular, comprehensive and integrated
community-wide assessment would provide a process and a document that they
take into account when making program and spending decisions.
The Congress should consult with the President about modalities for
generating a comprehensive and integrated terrorism threat assessment on a
regular basis. One option, and the best in my opinion, is to have the
Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism conduct a comprehensive
and integrated assessment every year or two. Another option is to
establish a National Intelligence Officer for terrorism. In order to
ensure that the assessment integrated information on foreign terrorism
with domestic terrorism, it is worth considering an equivalent officer in
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Given the constitutional
restrictions, the FBI’s Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and
Warning Unit may be the proper office to charge with stitching together
the assessments of foreign and domestic terrorist threats. And finally, a
third option and in my opinion the least desirable option, is for the
National Security Council to generate an assessment based on the
information it reviews from existing intelligence assessments. In a de
facto fashion, this is what currently occurs. The only difference is that
a formal NSC assessment might accompany the Office of Management and
Budget’s Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism.
A regular terrorism threat assessment will lessen the possibility that
long-term investment and program decisions are made according to
vicissitudes of raw intelligence and ensure that at least on a regular
basis there is a community benchmark calibrating the threat. Finally, and
importantly, assembling this report on a periodic basis requires
appropriate resources to meet the increased tasking on the intelligence
community. Too often the intelligence and law enforcement communities are
given new responsibilities without the resources to carry them out and
they end up pulling resources from other existing duties and stretching
personnel beyond desirable limits.
Creating a national strategy to address a threat for which there is not
a clear consensus on the magnitude of the threat leaves the task of
crafting a strategy without context. In recent years, United States policy
to combat the threat of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction has
been driven by perceptions of vulnerability to such attacks rather than
the likelihood. A comprehensive threat assessment would presumably factor
in capabilities and motivations in addition to vulnerabilities. The
inordinate focus of our antiterrorism policy on vulnerabilities and
worst-case planning may skew precious federal resources to less critical
aspects of the terrorism problem.
The recent scare over the vulnerability of the national monuments is
just the most recent example of how the lack of a comprehensive assessment
of threat that takes into account the likelihood of an attack can be
exploited by government bodies seeking to call attention to their
budgetary needs.[5] News reporting on a study conducted by a private
contractor for the National Park Services just prior to the our national
Independence Day, as hundreds of thousands of Americans planned to visit
our national monuments, was a case of threat manipulation for budgetary
benefit in the extreme. [6] The release of information from this report
just prior to this national holiday and prior to the conclusion of the
congressional budget process seems hardly a coincidence. As two private
experts pointed out in the news reporting, the National Park Police are
not alone in our nation’s Capitol when it comes to protecting the
city from terrorist attacks, nor is it possible to completely eliminate
all vulnerability. Addressing the communications or overtime needs of the
National Park Service should be possible without scaring citizens away
from visiting national monuments on Independence Day or unnecessarily
drawing attention to vulnerabilities that might be exploited by
individuals or groups with malicious designs.
Basing threat perception on vulnerabilities and gearing much of our
terrorism response capabilities according to worst-case scenarios is
skewing our approach to terrorism. A number of problems stem from a focus
on vulnerabilities and worst-case response planning. First, the historical
record on terrorism and the intelligence community both suggest that
conventional explosives continue to be the weapon of choice for
terrorists.[7] Low consequence attacks with multiple-use chemicals and
non-contagious biological agents trails behind conventional explosives as
the likely weapon of choice. There is a low probability of high
consequence attacks that may involve the full range of unconventional
weapons materials.
Second, by focusing on the low probability, high consequence events we
may tend to categorize too many of them involving unconventional weapons
materials as federal events when state and/or local resources may be more
appropriate.[8] Given the potential for demands on federal assets to meet
American interest abroad as well as at home, they should be saved for when
they are appropriately required.
Third, frequent discussion about our vulnerabilities draws attention to
them. Most of the WMD cases the FBI investigated in recent years were
anthrax hoaxes. Our public communication about the terrorist threat is
inadvertently eliciting threats that distract our resources from real
attacks by determined terrorists.[9]
Fourth, we must guard against inflating the potential of this threat to
such a large degree that we create conflicts between funding for
antiterrorism measures at home and important missions for our military
abroad. Inordinate concern about catastrophic domestic terrorism may lead
policymakers to call upon the military to perform missions at home that
should be the domain of non-military service government organizations.
Mission dilution of our military is something that constantly warrants the
attention of the President and the Congress. We should keep the military’s
missions few and well defined such that it can perform at the highest
level of effectiveness.
An open society such as ours cannot eliminate completely danger from all
aspects of life. Prudent risk assessments will help us reduce the danger
and improve our ability to respond in the unlikely event of an attack. We
accept risk in many other areas of American society that result in the
tragic loss of life. We want to guard against any terrorist attack that
not only threatens the lives of our citizens, but also calls into question
the authority of our government. This balance can be achieved at
acceptable cost bearing in mind some risk.
Both executive and legislative branches of government seek to address
the threat posed by catastrophic terrorist attacks. Senior officials say
that they will accept criticism for being over-prepared and
over-compensating for the threat.[10] Some congressional staff suggest
that the political danger of being parsimonious with spending to combat
terrorism is too great to do anything but prepare for the worse-case
scenario. While some hedge against the unpredictability of the future is
commendable, we must not confuse prudent measures with efforts to avoid
political blame for failure to take necessary precautions. Government has
a responsibility to prepare for unlikely events that could produce
catastrophic consequences. However, a balance must be struck between
responsible preparedness and mere political hedging.
A comprehensive terrorism threat assessment will presumably be informed
by a thorough analysis of past terrorist incidents with unconventional
weapons. Far too many policymakers and researchers rendering assessments
about terrorist use of unconventional weapons focus on what they imagine
terrorists could do, not on what they have done in the past, which leads
them to substitute their thinking for that of the terrorists.
Acknowledging that history is not a perfect guide to the future and that
government has a responsibility to take precautions against even unlikely
eventualities, there must be some baseline, some historical context in
order to consider potential eventualities.
II. Comprehensive Terrorism Threat Assessment and a National
Strategy for Combating Terrorism
A comprehensive terrorism threat assessment is an essential component
for crafting a national strategy for combating terrorism. A national
strategy should guide the creation of programs and allocations of
resources to implement the strategy. The report submitted by the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) pursuant to section 1051 of
the Fiscal Year 1998 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law
105-85) entitled “Director of the Office of Management and Budget’s
Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism” (hereafter “the
OMB Annual Report”) provides a useful basis for congressional and
public review of the executive branch’s policies and programs.[11]
The year 2000 version of this report does describe a sound budget review
process.[12] The document as a whole is a considerable improvement over
previous versions of the report.
The OMB Annual Report notes that the Clinton administration’s
terrorism policy is outlined in Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 39,
62 and 63 and specific agency guidance such as the Attorney General’s
“Five-Year Interagency Counter-Terrorism Plan.” These documents,
issued over the course of the last several years, form a basis for a
national strategy. The current budget review process described in the OMB
annual report is not a substitute for a comprehensive threat assessment.
Both a comprehensive threat assessment and a sound budget review process
are needed. However, they do not amount to a national strategy. PDD-39 was
issued in 1995 shortly after the sarin attack on the Tokyo subway and the
bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. PDD-62 and PDD-63
were issued in 1999. Each document was prepared at a different time, in
reaction to terrorist events or developing circumstances, or designed to
address specific policy gaps and meet new circumstances confronting the
United States. A collection of policy documents is simply not equivalent
to a national strategy like that recommended by the Gilmore
commission.[13] If this national security threat is as important as the
President and many of his advisors suggest, then a comprehensive strategy
is an important roadmap to guide programmatic and budgetary aspects of
governmental activities.
III. US Funding to Combat Terrorism
The OMB Annual Report provides a useful basis for congressional and
public review of the executive branch’s spending on antiterrorism and
counterterrorism.[14] Funding to combat terrorism is difficult to segment
into sub-categories, separating funding that specifically addresses WMD
from other non-WMD related programs. Undoubtedly there is overlap that
requires a judgment call as to which federal dollar spent contributes to a
particular activity. The OMB is to be commended for generating this useful
document.
Each annual version of the Report prepared by the OMB and submitted to
the Congress provides more budgetary detail on US antiterrorism and
counterterrorism activities than the previous year’s version.[15] Not
only does this high degree of budgetary transparency serve as a modest
testament to the strength of the American political system, it creates the
basis for congressional and public review that is vital to sustaining a
consensus on government policy in this important area of national
security.
The 2000 OMB Annual Report states that “information gleaned since
the submission of the FY 2001 budget” and the submission of the
Report indicates the nature of the terrorism threat has increased. Further
explanation of the increased threat in the period -- February 2000 to May
2000 -- is not provided. The OMB Annual Report argues that this augmented
threat is the justification for an amendment to the budget amounting to
$235.5 million submitted in conjunction with the report.[16]
How financial resources are allocated serves as a critical indicator of
actual, as opposed to declared, policy implementation. The OMB Annual
Report is a valuable tool for understanding the direction, scope and
dimensions of USG efforts to combat terrorism. However, in order to ensure
that these reports serve their full potential in the future, the OMB
should strive to be consistent from year to year.
An imperfection in the OMB Annual Reports over the course of the past
three years is that the dollar figures described as enacted in past years
are not consistent from year to year. Presumably the OMB can account for
the discrepancies, by grouping items under the spending category in one
report from that of the following year. For example, in the Report’s
general mission category of Law Enforcement and Investigative Activities,
the 1999 version of the OMB Annual Report indicates that $2.587 billion
was enacted in 1999, there was a supplemental appropriation of $350
million, and that the FY 2000 requested amounted to $2.757.[17] Yet, the
OMB Annual Report for 2000 indicates that $2.687 was enacted in 1999 and
$2.797 was requested.[18] Thus, the 1999 dollar amount for this category
plus the supplemental does not equal the amount the 2000 OMB Annual Report
indicates as “enacted” in 1999, nor are the “requested”
figures equivalent between the two annual reports. The confusions these
apparent discrepancies sow must be rectified in future annual reports to
Congress.
Clearly defining the spending items under each spending category may be
one way to improve the value of these annual reports. Some analysts argue
that the only way to truly understand what has been spent from year to
year is to examine the Treasury accounts per department and agency. By
tracking the spending according to the Treasury accounts the Congress
could determine not only how it agreed with the executive branch on how
funds would be spent, but also would actually see how the executive branch
implemented the spending as directed by annual budget acts.
IV. Important Budget Issues
A constructive dialogue between the President and the Congress on
funding to combat terrorism is critical. At present the dialogue seems
satisfactory, but there is room for improvement. On the part of the
executive branch, the President’s representatives should consult more
regularly and transparently with the Congress. On the part of the
Congress, the process should be streamlined and rationalized. The plethora
of committees with jurisdiction over portions of the budget supporting the
government’s programs to address the terrorist threat makes the
consultation process cumbersome. The National Commission’s
recommendation that the appropriation committees in each house of Congress
assign an individual staff member to track funding for combating terrorism
is a useful suggestion.[19]
1. Shifting Funding Emphasis to Prevention and Preemption
Tremendous improvements have been made in our national preparedness to
respond to mass casualty terrorism incidents, particularly those involving
weapons of mass destruction. More progress is required and training of the
next generation of local responders and officials at all levels of
government will remain an ongoing task. The focused emphasis on improving
capabilities to respond to a WMD attack on American soil followed the
Tokyo subway attack. At the time, there was tremendous fear that Aum
Supreme Truth’s attack marked the start of a new pattern of
sub-national terrorist activity involving unconventional weapons. Since
the Tokyo subway incident much has been learned about the attack and the
cult, which should help recalibrate the magnitude of the danger of
sub-national groups and WMD terrorism.[20]
Putting aside the question of whether the US is allocating too little or
too much funding to combat terrorism, and considering the figure of $9.3
billion requested by the Clinton administration for Fiscal Year 2001, a
shift in programmatic emphasis and funding seems warranted at this stage
in the evolution of American terrorism policy. Increasing emphasis should
be place on the front end of the problem, by preemption and prevention of
attacks, with less emphasis placed on the back end in post-attack
consequence management. The OMB Annual Report notes that from 1998 to 2001
spending for preparing for and responding to terrorist acts increased from
$126 million to $627 million, an increase of 398%.[21] This shift is
particularly relevant for funding relating to WMD terrorism and incident
response (See Figure 2). The increase in funding for preparing for and
responding to WMD terrorist acts increased from $89 million in 1998 to
$566 million three years later, an increase of 536% (See Figure 3).[22] In
contrast, funding for law enforcement and investigative activities has
increased only $6% over the same period. While the President has asked for
significant increases in this area of funding over the last two years, the
end result has been only a modest increase.
Figure 2:
Funding to Combat WMD Terrorism - By Mission Area
($ in Millions)
Figure 3:
Preparing for and Responding to WMD Terrorism
($ in Millions)
Comparatively modest increases in law enforcement, intelligence and
diplomatic tools may dollar per dollar contribute more to diminishing the
threat. Using the OMB Annual Report’s language, this means shifting
emphasis from downstream investments to upstream investments. Currently,
82% of the funding goes to these downstream investments and 18% to
upstream investments.[23] Some downstream investment, such as R&D into
pharmaceuticals and improvements in facilities security, may entail huge
costs, while more FBI agents and CIA case officers might be comparatively
less. Thus, the percentage balance in favor of antiterrorism measures as
opposed to counterterrorism measures is understandable. Yet, a
comparatively modest shift in funding emphasis would greatly enhance our
effort to preempt and prevent attacks, while not neglecting defensive
measures.
The law enforcement and intelligence communities perform critical “front
end” missions to combat terrorism. While both communities have
received extra tasking with the increased concern about the dangers of new
terrorist trends, neither has benefited from a sustained increase in
funding support to fundamentally change their impact on the problem.
Intelligence is the front line of defense against terrorism. The more we
know about a security threat from the front line, the more tools we can
assemble to address the challenge.
The State Department deserves special mention as a potential tool in the
government’s effort to combat terrorism. For comparatively modest
amounts of funding the State Department could play a larger role to
prevent terrorist attacks. Collaboration with allies to thwart attacks and
pressure states that aid terrorism could hem in the problem in important
ways. The intelligence community and the Department of Defense can also
play an important role by collaborating with their counterparts in foreign
countries to thwart attacks before they occur and sap the resources that
terrorist group need to wage their attacks. Finally, it may be helpful to
establish a separate line item in the State Department for combating
terrorism. Currently, funding for terrorism is lumped in with the
Department’s Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related
Programs Account (NADR). As a result of the other programs in this
account, sustained support for the Department’s activities is
precarious.
By suggesting a shift in the emphasis of spending, I am not proposing
that domestic preparation to respond to terrorist incidents be diminished
significantly or discontinued. It is my view that a more systematic
approach to assessing the threat and devising programmatic guidelines with
the benefit of a comprehensive and integrated threat assessment will lead
to a recalibration of the threat we face in the short and medium term. It
is important to establish a balance of spending that can be sustained over
time and this balance will, in my opinion, require a shift in funding
emphasis.
In regard to domestic preparation and response mission, the balance
should shift from programs unique to terrorism to be broadened in a way to
that will meet the challenges of a wider range of public disasters. Wise
spending on defensive measures will have a dual-use capability that
benefits American society today and serves as an asset to deter, detect or
respond to a terrorist incident. Funding to improve the health and
agricultural surveillance systems to guard against disease outbreaks is an
example of dual-use benefit spending. Capabilities that benefit society at
the moment of a catastrophic attack may be warranted, but they should be
considered with a clear sense of spending trade-offs.
2. Sustainability of US Terrorism Policy
It is vitally important to forge a consensus on those essential programs
and provide adequate support for them. Sustained support is particularly
important in the areas of law enforcement and intelligence. Critical to
the effectiveness of these mission areas is the development and retention
of good personnel. The law enforcement and intelligence communities must
be directed to make combating terrorism an organizational priority that is
reflected in the value of such work for career advancement. Furthermore,
it is important to enable personnel working terrorism issues to develop
the needed expertise. Frequent rotation or multi-tasking prevent personnel
from building valuable expertise.
Funding for improving the protection of our embassies abroad is one area
where our inability to provide adequate funding over a sustained period of
time is particularly disturbing.[24] Funding for embassy security always
seems to go up the year after American embassy has been bombed and then
the funding tapers off each year thereafter until another bombing occurs.
The OMB Report notes that since military installations abroad have become
tough targets for terrorists, there is some evidence that American
embassies are preferred targets.[25] Both the Congress and the President
should strive to sustain funding in this area.
3. Funding in the Medical Response Area
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has received the most
significant increases in funding in the shortest period of time (See
Figure 4). The research agenda for many HHS programs is especially
challenging. It is a Department that critically needs the grounding of a
comprehensive threat assessment and the guidance of a national terrorism
strategy. For example, the intelligence community has not always agreed
upon the list of biological agents the US is most likely to confront.
Thus, the priority list of biological agents for which vaccines and
antibiotics should be developed changed repeatedly. The implications of
these changes is that it is very difficult to know what vaccines and
antidotes should be developed if there is not a solid consensus on the
most likely agents we may face. The research and development for these
prevention and response tools could take many years, if not decades. Thus,
these spending decisions require considerable care and scrutiny.
Figure 4:
Funding to Combat WMD Terrorism - By Agency
($ in Millions)
At the other end of the task spectrum for HHS is mental health response
to terrorist incidents, both real and threatened, which has not received
the support it should. How to manage the problem of the “worried well”
and the mental trauma American society might experience in the event of a
catastrophic terrorist attack deserves greater priority and financial
support. The Tokyo subway attack and other mass casualty terrorist attacks
suggest that hospitals will need to deal with many multiples more people
with psychosomatic disturbances than physical injuries.
How to manage the onslaught of the psychosomatic and psychologically
injured public must be addressed if the health system has any chance of
treating the physically wounded. Our official communication about the
threat of terrorism, particularly WMD terrorism, has increased rather than
reduced concern. Anthrax hoaxes dramatically increased in the United
States after the initial Nunn-Lugar-Domenici local responders training
sessions began, as Secretary of Defense Cohen held up a bag of sugar at a
news conference to indicate how little anthrax would be needed to kill
thousands in a city, and as a result of the government's poorly handled
detention of Larry Wayne Harris, who had anthrax vaccine in the back of
his car. More sober official communications about the potential danger of
WMD terrorism and our preparations might have limited the tremendous
increase in unconventional weapons threats and hoaxes. The vastly
different strategies in New Jersey and New York for dealing with the West
Nile virus suggest that effective communication with the public about the
nature of an outbreak can mean the difference between creating public
concern and maintaining public order and confidence.[26]
4. R&D Spending
R&D spending poses the greatest long-term policy challenge. The
search for future tools to address the full range of terrorist threats,
particularly those stemming from the use biological weapons, is critical.
But given the time required for new technologies to mature, special care
must be taken to ensure that each yearly research dollar contributes to
future technological advancements.
The R&D spending related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
deserves special attention (See Figure 5). There are significant
differences in how the OMB annual reports depicted R& D spending from
one year to another. The 1999 OMB Annual Report, for example, lists very
different figures for the Department of Energy R&D spending than those
listed in the 2000 OMB Annual Report for the same years.
Figure 5:
R & D for Defense Against WMD Terrorism
($ in Millions)
Finally, the R&D spending category of “Other” has
consistently outpaced all other mission categories. Some means of
characterizing the variety of activities covered by the “Other”
R&D category must be found. Proper oversight of the R&D budget is
difficult without greater detail.
5. Managing Rapid Budget Increases
The President and the Congress responded rapidly to the prospect of an
increase in terrorist activity on American soil and the potential use of
unconventional weapons materials. In several instances, government
departments and agencies received significant budget increases to “stand
up” important programs. The Departments of Health and Human Services
has received enormous increases in budget authority for antiterrorism and
counterterrorism programs in the last few years. Managing such rapid
increases in funding is bound to present formidable challenges.
A thorough review of the three or four government programs that received
the most significant percentage increases is important to the integrity of
the government’s overall effort (See Figures 6 and 7). Challenges
about the propriety of the increases and their effective allocation could
stall important programs at a crucial stage of development. Alternatively,
if fast growing programs have gone off track, it is important to identify
these problems before sunk costs drive spending decisions more than wise
policy.
Figure 6:
Funding to Combat Terrorism, Including WMD - By Mission Area
($ in Millions)
Figure 7:
Funding to Combat Terrorism, Including WMD - By Agency
($ in Millions)
6. Funding the Department of Justice’s National Domestic
Preparedness Office
PDD-62 designates the Department of Justice (DOJ) as the lead agency for
handling domestic terrorism crisis. While allocation of financial
resources is not the only way to indicate policy priorities, the lack of
support for DOJ’s terrorism offices is conspicuous by its absence.
The 2000 OMB Annual Report does not discuss the National Domestic
Preparedness Office (NDPO) in any meaningful detail. Appropriately, the
task of local and state responder training will transition from the
military as designated by earlier Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation to the
DOJ’s NDPO. Based on questions regarding the NDPO’s funding and
its operational pace, neither the executive branch nor the Congress seems
to have fully endorsed the mission of this new office. This sends exactly
the wrong signal to State and Local officials at precisely the moment they
look to the Federal government to bring some leadership to this daunting
new challenge.
V. Other Nations’ Approaches to Combat Terrorism
The GAO’s report on other nation’s approaches to combating
terrorism is a valuable contribution to improve the formulation and
implementation of a national terrorism policy.[27] Examining the policies
and practices of other nations, particularly those with experience who
have suffered a greater number of terrorist attacks than the United
States, is valuable. The most important finding of the report that should
inform our national approach to the problem is how other countries view
the terrorism threat in context. The nations survey by the GAO all took
into account the likelihood of an attack and did not focus as intensively
on vulnerabilities. They adapt their intelligence, physical protection
measures, and law enforcement activities to the changing nature of the
threat. Vulnerabilities are taken into account, but the likelihood that
terrorists will exploit vulnerabilities is a significant component of
their preparation.
Given the greater historical experience with terrorism on their national
territory, the publics of the countries surveyed accept periodic
casualties without a significant loss in public confidence of the
government. In the United States, we aim as a society to take whatever
measures deemed appropriate to protect our entire territory, every
citizen, and all public and private facilities from any and all malicious
and intentional attack. Our national desire for protection against
ballistic missiles is another expression of this desire that is not shared
to the same degree by other nations, including many of our key allies.
Furthermore, more Americans die from alcohol related traffic accidents or
food-borne illness than terrorist incidents. Political support has not
surged to ensure that the government take meaningful actions to reduce
these casualty rates.
Taking note of the limitations of such an analysis will help American
policy put this international comparison in perspective. While the GAO
clearly indicates that they did not conduct a comparative study, the value
of their findings lies in the potential for comparison with the United
States. At this moment, the United States stands as the preeminent power
with global influence and responsibilities. The countries considered in
the GAO analysis are regional powers. As the sole global power the United
States attracts admiration, envy and antipathy. Periodically, the US
government, American companies and American citizens may be a terrorist
target for no other reasons than the perception of the country’s
global power.
Second, two of the countries included in the GAO analysis, Israel and
the United Kingdom, struggle with acute terrorism problems stemming from
their presence on disputed territories. American forces stationed abroad
face a somewhat similar threat environment, but it is not nearly as acute
or as constant. The security environments in the Middle East and Northern
Ireland have changed in the last few years due to improvements in the
political dialogues of the parties concerned. The United States does not
face any analogous circumstances that could lead to a significant
lessening of the terrorist threat
Conclusion
A comprehensive threat assessment that integrates information on both
domestic and international terrorist threats is an essential baseline tool
for informing a national strategy on terrorism, which the US currently
lacks. At the moment, far too much of the government’s policy on
terrorism is driven by perceptions of vulnerability and planning for
worst-case scenarios. Inordinate attention to vulnerabilities and
worst-case scenarios may be skewing resources in ways that do not
effectively add to the government’s effort to protect our personnel
and facilities, private businesses, and citizens at home and abroad.
Producing a comprehensive and integrated national threat assessment that
takes into account vulnerabilities to attack as well as the capabilities
and motivations of terrorists will improve our national understanding of
the threat and should inform the President and the Congress as they decide
upon investments in short and long term programs to combat terrorism.
- U.S. General Accounting Office. Combating Terrorism: Observations on
Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism. Statement of Henry L. Hinton,
Jr., Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International
Affairs Division, Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, U.S.
House of Representatives, March 11, 1999, p. 13.
- Bruce Hoffman, The Debate Over Future Terrorist Use of Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons, in Hype or Reality?: The
“New Terrorism” and Mass Casualty Attacks, ed. Brad Roberts,
(Alexandria, VA: The Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute,
2000), p. 220.
- DCI National Intelligence Estimate President's Summary, "Emerging
Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years", PS/NIE 95-19, November 1995,
(http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/nie9519.htm) (July 24, 2000). “NIE
95-19: Independent Panel Review: Emerging Missile Threats to North America
During the Next Fifteen Years", OCA 96-1908, December 23, 1996,
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/oca961908.htm) (July 24, 2000)
(hereafter referred to as the Gates Panel). Report of the Commission To
Assess The Ballistic Missile Threat To The United States, Pursuant to P.L.
201, 104th Congress, July 15, 1998, (hereafter referred to as the Rumsfeld
Commission.) National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile
Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through
2015, September 1999
- National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of
International Terrorism, June 2000 (Hereafter referred to as “The
National Commission Report”). First Annual Report to the President
and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction,
(hereafter referred to as the Gilmore Commission Report), I. Assessing
the Threat, December 15, 1999.
- National Park Service, Report to Congress pursuant to P.L. 105-391
National Parks Omnibus Management Act 1998, “Law Enforcement Programs
Study: United States Park Police,” March 8, 2000, pp. 13-15.
- Arthur Santana, “Monuments Are Found Vulnerable to Attack,”
Washington Post, July 2, 2000, p. A1.
- For a recent study of the incidents of chemical and biological weapons
terrorism frequently cited in the scholarly literature see, Jonathan B.
Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and
Biological Weapons, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000). For a
recent summary of recent intelligence community rankings of terrorism
threats see, U.S. General Accounting Office. Combating Terrorism: Need
for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological
Attacks, (GAO/NSIAD-99-163), September 1999.
- The Gilmore Commission Report, p. 21.
- A CIA Middle East specialist offer wise commentary on this topic just
prior to the year 2000 celebration: Reuel Marc Gerecht, “Alarm Abets
the Terrorists,” New York Times, December 23, 1999, p A-29.
- Michael Dobbs, “Key Player in U.S. Terror War,” Washington
Post, April 2, 2000, p. A1.
- Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, “Including
Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction/Domestic Preparedness and
Critical Infrastructure Protection,” May 18, 2000 (hereafter “The
2000 OMB Annual Report”).
- The 2000 OMB Annual Report, p. 6.
- The Gilmore Commission Report, pp. 53-55.
- The federal funding information from the report and other federal
documents can be found at the web site of the Monterey Institute’s
Center for Nonproliferation Studies:
(http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/terfund.htm ) (July 24, 2000).
- The two earlier versions of the OMB Annual Report were the following:
The Office of Management and Budget report pursuant to P.L. 105-85,
Government-wide Spending to Combat Terrorism, March 12, 1998 (hereafter ;
and, The Office of Management and Budget report pursuant to P.L. 105-85,
March 3, 1999. (Hereafter these reports will be referred to respectively
as The 1998 OMB Annual Report and the 1999 OMB Annual Report).
- The 2000 OMB Annual Report, p. 3.
- See The 1999 OMB Annual Report, p. 6.
- The 2000 OMB Annual Report, p. 48.
- The National Commission Report, p. 36.
- The Gilmore Commission, pp. 40-50. See also, Milton Leitenberg, “The
Experience of the Japanese Aum Shinryko Group and Biological Weapons,”
in Hype or Reality?: The “New Terrorism” and Mass Casualty
Attacks, ed. Brad Roberts, (Alexandria, VA: The Chemical and
Biological Arms Control Institute, 2000), pp. 159-172.
- The 2000 OMB Annual Report, p. 11.
- The 2000 OMB Annual Report, p. 13.
- The 2000 OMB Annual Report, p. 53.
- Report of the Accountability Review Boards, “Bombings of the US
Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,” August 7,
1999 (http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/accountability_report.html)
(October 18, 1999).
- The 2000 OMB Annual Report, p. 10.
- Matthew Purdy, “Public Health Meets Public Relations in Battle
Against Mosquitoes, New York Times, p. 19.
- “Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to
Combat Terrorism,” U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO/NSIAD-00-85)
(April 2000).
Mr. Parachini recently authored
motivational case studies on the Weather Underground and the World Trade Center bombing that are published by MIT press in an edited volume entitled Toxic Terror.
Author(s): John
Parachini
Related Resources: Chem/Bio,
Reports
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Date Created: 27 July 2000
Date Updated: 2 August 2000 |
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