Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

The 2005 NPT Review Conference: Challenges and Prospects Ahead

by Jean du Preez
Director, International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program


What are the challenges?

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is facing some of its most difficult challenges since it entered into force almost 35 years ago. Whilst the NPT has in the past contributed significantly to enhance global security, it has yet to achieve most of its objectives. In fact, some argue that the Treaty has no place in today's new security environment, that it is outdated and that it actually leads to the spread of nuclear weapons and not the prevention thereof. Indeed, obituaries of the NPT are already being written by some, but - as Mark Twain famously commented upon reading his own obituary - reports of the Treaty's demise "are greatly exaggerated." Equally though, its successes and values are also greatly exaggerated."[1]

If measured against the predictions by President Kennedy more than 40 years ago that 15 - 20 countries may end up with nuclear weapons by 1975, then the treaty has been remarkable successful. However, it did not prevent the technology from spreading to more than the original five. Today more and more countries have nuclear weapons, are devising plans to increase their numbers and effectiveness or are actively pursuing a nuclear weapons option. At least eight countries already have them, while North Korea is considered to have either developed a weapons program already or is close to doing so. In addition, a wide range of other countries have in the past experimented with the idea to developed nuclear weapons and one country, South Africa, produced six nuclear devices and then decided to destroy the program and join the NPT. Increasing concerns also exist that subnational terrorist groups, are suspected of working to acquire them.

Next to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998, the treaty has faced its most severe setbacks since the much heralded 2000 Review Conference presenting unprecedented challenges to the State parties at the 2005 Review Conference. Not only did North Korea announced its withdrawal from the treaty more than a year ago, but State parties have so far been unable and or unwilling to collectively express themselves in reaction to this challenge. To outside observers this appears to be a tacit acceptance of yet another nuclear armed State outside the Treaty. In addition, it seems that the international community ran out of options on how to deal with the fact that the only three states outside the treaty are armed with nuclear weapons. Regardless of its undertakings to allow increased IAEA inspections in accordance with its Additional Protocol agreement with the Agency, concerns continue to exist over Iran's past failures and breeches of its obligations to comply with its NPT nonproliferation agreements. It was recently confirmed that Libya too was cheating and had aspirations to develop a nuclear program within the next decade or so despite obligations under the treaty not to do so, while. We have also witnessed the declaration of war against another State party, based partly on suspicion of its clandestine nuclear weapons capability. We have also witnessed an increased proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies, including the discovery of a network of clandestine nuclear smuggling activities from a non-party with nuclear weapons despite ever increasing efforts by suppliers states to control these technologies. Despite the main objectives of the NPT - to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons leading towards the elimination of these weapons - more than 30,000 nuclear weapons, most of them in an active state, continue to exist. Increasing concerns exist that the NPT nuclear weapons States (NWS) are no longer fully committed to their legal Article VI (nuclear disarmament) obligations, or to the "unequivocal undertaking" given at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to eliminate their nuclear arsenals as part of "13 practical steps" towards nuclear disarmament. Given evidence of vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons by some of the NWS, this undertaking seems to be long forgotten, or in some cases unequivocally denied.

It has been almost ten years after the decision to indefinitely extend the life of the Treaty. The decision to do so was, however, not taken in isolation, but as part of on integral package of decisions, that included a program of action on nuclear disarmament and a commitment to work towards a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. The circumstances under which this decision was taken seem to be long forgotten. Most State parties, in particular those from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), were concerned that by extending the Treaty indefinitely, the leverage built into the Treaty - albeit weak -- to achieve nuclear disarmament (Article VI) through the notion that States parties would have options to extend the Treaty's life or not (Article X.2) would be lost. The 1995 package of decisions therefore provided a way for all State parties to support the indefinite decision while providing for both the means in which, and the means through which progress toward achieving nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation could be achieved. The successful adoption of a 2000 Review Conference Final Declaration, primarily as a result of agreement on the "13 practical steps" further solidified the 1995 package of decisions. Considering that some NWS no longer consider themselves bound to all the steps leading to systematic and progressive efforts toward nuclear disarmament, many NNWS may very well question the validity of the decisions reached in 1995 and 2000.

Given the magnitude of these challenges, the question that State parties should be asking themselves is what - if compared to the reasons why the Treaty was conceived in the first place - would it take to serve as another wake-up call for concrete action towards the full achievement of the treaty's objectives? How many more defections would be necessary before they acknowledge that for a growing number of states the NPT may no longer be seen as a significant guarantor of their security? Has any progress been possible after the euphoria that existed upon concluding the 2000 Review Conference? What nonproliferation transgressions must transpire before the international community is prepared to find states in non-compliance with their NPT obligations? How many of the 13 practical steps must be disavowed by states parties before they are called to account for their failure to honor prior commitments?

The State parties will have to face these and other challenges in their preparations for the 2005 Review Conference. Not only do the parties need to reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty and the decisions taken in 1995 and 2000, but for the Treaty to remain viable as the "cornerstone" of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime, the adequacy of the NPT and its associated nonproliferation regime in dealing with the current multitude of urgent proliferation challenges must be addressed. If, however, judged by the discussions at past NPT Review Conferences and the PrepCom sessions during the past two years, the State parties seem to be divorced from the most pressing contemporary disarmament and proliferation challenges. Failure to focus on and resolve these tough issues, although they may make a "smooth outcome" of conferences more difficult, also runs the risk of making the NPT irrelevant. What would be most dangerous for the continued relevance of the NPT strengthened review process, and indeed for the Treaty itself, would be to seek a successful outcome of the 2005 Review Conference at all cost. If success is to be measured by the adoption of a Review Conference Final Declaration, then the State parties should be cautious not to brush over the serious cracks in the regime's armor for sake of a consensus language.

Where to go from here?

While it is true that the period since 1995 and 2000 has seen developments having a negative impact on the goal of nuclear weapons non-proliferation, it continues to be fair to say that the overwhelming majority of NNWS to the NPT have, and are continuing to, demonstrate their full commitment to, and compliance with, their obligations. However, the continuing lack of balance in the emphasis that is placed on different purposes and provisions of the Treaty by different States parties exacerbate these problems and are likely to provide the major stumbling blocks to successful outcomes that will be experienced at both the forthcoming PrepCom and the 2005 Review Conference. A failure to recognize that all of the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are not only dependant upon one-another but that they are also inter-linked will continue be the single most important problem faced by the States Parties when they come together at the Review Conference.

The perception of a lack of balance -- normally based on the political or security persuasion that a particular States party comes from -- has been a perennial source of complaint in the NPT. This problem together with the selective emphasis on preferred aspects of the NPT have been exacerbated in the recent past by the sole emphasis that is being placed on non-proliferation - whether it is on the part of so-called "rogue" States, terrorists or the traffickers of nuclear weapons technology. These issues are of undoubted importance and need the collective consideration of the States parties. They do, however, not provide a rationale for failing to address the other key elements of the Treaty. Care should also be taken not to exacerbate the tensions within the NPT and not to promote "quick-fix" solutions that may provide the foundation for greater problems in the future. A recent proposal in this regard appear to ignore the core bargain of the NPT as issues surrounding nuclear-fuel are approached exclusively as a problem in non-proliferation, without any recognition of the importance of such controls in shaping the future of disarmament. The effect of expanding the current have/have-not regime for nuclear weapons to the capacity to produce nuclear fuel will further increase the discriminatory nature of the regime. This could have a damaging, if not vital impact on key NPT goals, such as the call of the States parties for the negotiation of a treaty banning fissile material production for military purposes (FM(C)T). The impact of a new reliance on the UN Security Council and cooperation of a "coalition of the willing" such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) should also be considered. Care should be taken not to diminish the role of the NPT and the IAEA to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons leading to their elimination. New approaches to proliferation seem to attempt to restrict the need to address proliferation concerns to "coalitions of the willing" rather than recognizing that it is a global challenge requiring cooperation at the global level. In this regard it is evident that there will in the future be an exclusive reliance on outside initiatives such as the PSI and the role of the export controls. Since the current draft Security Council resolution on nonproliferation contains no reference to disarmament or arms control, it would further widen the imbalances with potential negative consequences for both the NPT and the Security Council, itself.

Prospects for 2005:

The purpose of the 2005 Review Conference is to both evaluate the implementation of the Treaty, the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament" adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and progress made towards implementing agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference, including the "13 practical steps" towards nuclear disarmament. It has also been given the specific mandate to deal with the issue of security assurances to NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The second session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 Review Conference represented the end of the first phase of the PrepCom's work in terms of the 2000 Review Conference decision on "Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the NPT" which determined that the first two PrepCom sessions should consider "principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality." Many consider that the second PrepCom had been successful given the "smooth" way in which it concluded its work and the fact that the chairman, Ambassador Laszlo Molnar (Hungary), was able to summarize the discussions in such a way that allowed his factual summary to be attached to the official PrepCom report. Chairman Molnar's summary reflected as closely as possible his own assessment of the discussions at the meeting while trying to accommodate the views of delegations on some of the most controversial issues, such as those on Iran and North Korea's withdrawal. His initiative to invite delegations to offer specific text proposals, although risky, provided him with a good basis to formulate language that accommodated most views. Ambassador Molnar furthermore consulted with various key delegations on specific paragraphs of his summary with the result that at least some parts of the text reflected agreed language between delegations most effected by those issues. This approach ensured that delegations did not object to its attachment to the PrepCom's official report as a factual summary of the meeting.

Looking forward to the forthcoming PrepCom, both in terms of the provisions of the 2000 "improved" strengthened review process and the agreement contained in the 2000 Final Declaration to make recommendations on the issue of security assurances, the PrepCom is expected to deliver certain results or products, distinctly different from the outcome that was required from the first two sessions in 2002 and 2003. These products are as follows:

  1. A consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference taking into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions. Although the 2000 Review Conference decision suggests that the PrepCom "should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference" it is not clear whether the recommendations should be of substantive nature and whether they should be agreed by consensus;
  2. The finalized procedural arrangements for the Review Conference. This task will include the endorsement of a candidate for the presidency of the Review Conference, agreement on the Rules of Procedure and recommendations on the program of work for the Review Conference, including on the establishment of subsidiary bodies; and
  3. Recommendations on legally binding security assurances to the Review Conference. The 2000 Final Declaration under the section entitled "Article VII and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States", states clearly that "(t)he Conference agrees that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Conference calls upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue."

Given the products required from the 2004 PrepCom, the recommendations to be developed by the PrepCom will by necessity fall into three broad categories:

  1. Substantive issues taking into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions.
  2. Non-substantive issues, e.g. recommendations on reporting, the strengthened review process as well as on the establishment of subsidiary bodies to Main Committees to deal with such issues as nuclear disarmament, the 1995 Middle East Resolution, security assurances, etc.
  3. Procedural arrangements for the Review Conference (e.g. dates, rules of procedure, background documentation, etc).

For the 2004 PrepCom to be measured as a success it will be important for the States parties to, inter alia, focus on the three identified products required from the PrepCom and on the need to produce a consensus report. Failure to do this will only ensure that issues arise again at -- or in the immediate run-up -- to the Review Conference. The delayed resolution of such issues may in turn cloud the start of the Review Conference and have a negative impact on its potential for a successful outcome. In preparing such recommendations caution should, however, be demonstrated not to endanger the agreements reached in 1995 and in 2000 as this would place in jeopardy the validity of all those agreements, if not the Treaty itself.

The forthcoming PrepCom and the 2005 Review Conference will have to face the questions of how to effectively address cases of non-compliance and potential withdrawals from the NPT as well as how to prevent any rollbacks from undertakings given and agreements reached in the context of the strengthened review process. The State parties and indeed the PrepCom chair are faced with the daunting, and perhaps impossible task, to reach agreement within a time span of two weeks on not only some of the most difficult issues facing the Treaty in its 30 plus year history, but also on all the procedural matters related to the Review Conference. If taken into account that the program of work for the third session should allow time for general debate, presentations by non-governmental organizations and the IAEA, agreement on procedural preparations for the Review Conference, including on the establishment of subsidiary bodies as well as sufficient time for the specific cluster debates, then the State parties will have at most a week to identify, negotiate and reach agreement on substantive recommendations. If measured against the failure of the 1999 third PrepCom session for the 2000 Review Conference to agree on any substantive recommendations - bearing in mind that the Treaty is in a far worse shape today than it was in 1999 - it is unlikely that agreement will be reached at the PrepCom on recommendations dealing with the full range of substantive issues that would need to be addressed at the Review Conference. Traditional rules of negotiation -- such as, 'nothing is agreed until everything is agreed' and the intention of key delegations to make concessions only at the time when they are needed (i.e. at the Review Conference) -- will militate against this. A more cautious -- but possibly more successful -- approach would be to work towards three sets of recommendations:

  1. Procedural arrangements for the Review Conference (e.g. dates, rules of procedure, documentation, etc).
  2. Recommendations on non-substantive -- as opposed to procedural -- issues taking into account the deliberations and results of previous sessions (e.g. recommendations on reporting, the strengthened review process as well as on the establishment of subsidiary bodies to Main Committees to deal with such issues as nuclear disarmament, the 1995 Middle East Resolution, security assurances, etc). The substantive content of such issues (especially with regard to subsidiary bodies) are normally only dealt with at the Review Conference itself and the proposed approach would consequently not prejudge the issues, leaving them open for actual deliberation at the Review Conference. In the case of subsidiary bodies, this approach would furthermore be consistent with provisions of the 2000 decision on "Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the NPT", and would be based on the clear precedents of the establishment of such bodies at the 2000 Review Conference to deal with nuclear disarmament and the Resolution on the Middle East and at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, where such a body (chaired by Australia) was in fact established to consider the security assurances issue.
  3. A set of recommendations by the PrepCom Chairman to the President of the Review Conference and the Chairs of the Main Committees at the Review Conference, which takes into account the deliberations and results of the previous sessions, for their consideration and possible use. These recommendations should not attempt to duplicate a Final Document but rather to highlight the issues.

Issues to be confronted at the 2005 Review Conference:

So what should then be included in the Chairman's recommendations? A close examination of the second PrepCom's chairman's factual summary may prove useful to identify which issues concerning the implementation of the NPT enjoy a wide range of agreement and which issues still need to be further deliberated towards agreement at the 2005 Review Conference. It could be useful to the State parties, and indeed to the chairman of the third PrepCom to break down the language in the second PrepCom's chairman's factual summary and identify those issues which should be addressed and which could be used as basis for consensus at the 2005 Review Conference. In formulating such recommendations, the PrepCom should attempt to follow the approach of the second session where representations of the differing views of States Parties on specific issues were only used where more consensual language could not be found in the time available. To this end, the role of the Chairman in consulting delegations with opposing views with a view to formulate consensus style language will determine how useful his recommendations will be to the President of the Review Conference and the Chairs of the Main Committees. In this regard, the PrepCom should turn the spotlight on the following issues each of which has different levels of agreement by States parties:

Basic principles:

Reaffirming the basic principles of the Treaty: the three fundamental pillars of the NPT and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament; the commitment to the effective implementation of the all objectives of the Treaty; that each article of the Treaty is binding on the respective States parties at all times and in all circumstances; the decisions and the resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; and the importance of multilateralism as a core principle in addressing issues of international peace and security.

Universality:

Since India, Pakistan and Israel are not likely to give up their nuclear weapons and given the treaty's definition of a NWS, the world will have to accept that there might forever be three states with nuclear weapons outside the Treaty. For the short term it would seem highly improbable that any of these three states would join the NPT. The recent discovery of Pakistan's nuclear "Wall-mart" and nuclear smuggling activities emphasize the urgency to make every effort to reach an agreement with a country such as Pakistan to effectively stop any further proliferation. To reduce the appeal for States within the NPT to pursue the nuclear option, the States parties must reaffirm that States with nuclear weapons outside the Treaty can not derive any privileges or a special status on the international stage.

North Korean withdrawal:

The DPRK's announced withdrawal highlighted the question of the legality of a withdrawal from the treaty, in particular in case of a state that developed nuclear weapons while still a member of the treaty. It is unfortunately not likely that the State parties will at the forthcoming PrepCom, or at the Review Conference collectively express themselves on North Korea's withdrawal. Given the precedent set by the Chairman of the second PrepCom by keeping the DPRK's nameplate in his custody in order to avoid a disruptive debate over the status of the DPRK, it is likely, and probably wise, to continue with this practice at the forthcoming PrepCom. At the very least, the States parties should call upon the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in a prompt, verifiable and irreversible way. The DPRK should also be urged to reconsider its course of action and to comply with all safeguards obligations pursuant to the Treaty. The second PrepCom's Chairman's summary contained another important notion in so far that it emphasized the need to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue peacefully, through diplomatic means, and that it "urged the DPRK to take the necessary action to de-escalate and improve the situation and to engage in talks with countries concerned in a responsible, forthcoming and constructive manner."

Several proposals have been made to avoid a repetition of this experience in the future. One proposal would be for the States parties to declare at the 2005 Review Conference that the misuse of a State party's "inalienable right" to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as cover to develop a nuclear weapons capability cannot be considered as an "extraordinary event" leading to the State's sovereign right to withdraw from the treaty. Another, and perhaps more practical and political viable option, would be to build into the 90 days notice period before a withdrawal takes effect, a mechanism for consultations involving all State parties, such as convening an extraordinary meeting of State parties to consider the "extraordinary events" that led to the said State's decision to withdraw. The State parties would have a number of options available including referring the issue the UN Security Council. This approach relates to other proposals about annual meetings of State parties with plenipotentiary powers.

Compliance with nonproliferation obligations:

Two cases of clear non-compliance and evidence that another State party have not been in full compliance highlight the complicated duality of allowing NPT member States under Article IV of the Treaty to legitimately develop an entire nuclear fuel cycle without having a sufficient mechanism to objectively gauge nuclear intentions. Although Article IV explicitly states that this "inalienable right" is only applicable to States that are in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations (Articles I and II), the Treaty's mechanisms to verify that this right is not misused is very weak. It is useful to recall the approach by Ambassador Molnar in his factual summary in this regard: "While recognizing and supporting the legitimate right of all States to utilize the atom for peaceful purposes, ownership of the capability that could be utilized to develop nuclear weapons places a special responsibility on the States concerned to build confidence with the international community that would remove any concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation. Such States need to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency is able to verify that these capabilities are being used for peaceful purposes only, including through the mechanisms available under the Additional Protocol for strengthened safeguards."

Recent proposals to internationalize and control access to nuclear fuel cycles also need to be carefully considered, bearing in mind that these proposals could create further imbalances in how the Treaty's provisions are implemented. These proposals, if implemented, would in effect introduce a new bargain into the NPT deal. As such, it would disallow the sales of enrichment and reprocessing equipment or technologies to states that do not now possess full-scale enrichment capabilities with a promise to supply fuel to states that renounce enrichment and reprocessing.

Given the concerns by many NNWS that some NWS are equally guilty of not being in full compliance with their Article VI - and in some cases their Article I obligations - it would be important to affirm, as the Molnar factual summary did, that the best way to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime would be through full compliance by all States parties with all of the provisions of the Treaty.

Nuclear disarmament:

Despite the increased emphasis on non-compliance by in particular the NWS, the issue of nuclear disarmament will continue to be central to the success of the forthcoming PrepCom and the 2005 Review Conference. Many State parties, not only those from the NAM are concerned that some NWS seem to have completely ignored the program of action on nuclear disarmament agreed to as part of the 1995 package deal, further expanded by the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI, agreed to by all States parties at the 2000 Review Conference. At best, only limited progress has been achieved in implementing the 13 steps on nuclear disarmament. Among these steps was the "unequivocal undertaking" by the NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. Some NWS have walked away from other undertakings such as the early entry into force of the CTBT, negotiating a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons within five years; irreversibility to disarmament, arms control and reduction, and the entry into force of START II and the conclusion of START III while preserving and strengthening the ABM. Of further concern are new emerging approaches to the broader role of nuclear weapons as part of security strategies, including rationalizations for the use, and the possible development, of new types of nuclear weapons. However, as in the case of the second PrepCom's factual summary, any recommendations flowing from the forthcoming PrepCom will have to balance the concerns expressed by the NNWS over the lack of progress toward implementing the 13 practical steps with references to initiatives taken by the NWS to implement their Article VI obligations.

Given the significance of the "13 practical steps" adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, great care should be taken not to undermine this agreement, which is linked to other agreements, in any manner. In this regard, the 2005 Review Conference should review the implementation of the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI and consider their further development. The recommendations should also reflect the number of proposals made on how to deal with non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process. Given the provisions for the establishment of subsidiary bodies, the precedent set in 2000, and the strong position of the NAM and the New Agenda Coalition in this regard, it can be expected that there will be strong pressures for the establishment of a subsidiary body on the nuclear disarmament.

Security assurances:

Both the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference had underscored the importance of security assurances. Several proposals have been made over the years to establish a legally binding mechanism to ensure such assurances, including a proposal by the NAC for a protocol to the Treaty. The 2000 Review Conference called upon the PrepCom to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on security assurances. A proposal was also made that a further subsidiary body should be established to Main Committee I at the 2005 Review Conference to address the issue. The issue of whether or not these assurances should be legally-binding and whether they should be linked to the fulfillment of Treaty obligations need to be resolved. How this issue will be addressed at the 2005 Review Conference remained unclear. What is clear, however, is that the specific recommendations in the 2000 Final Declaration will likely lead to insistence by the NAC and NAM for the establishment of a subsidiary body at the Review Conference to consider how to proceed with the issue.

Nonproliferation and disarmament education:

Although the second PrepCom's Chairman's factual summary did not reflect agreement on any of the issues addressed therein, it is significant that the paragraph dealing with disarmament and nonproliferation education contained the only reference in the entire document that implies that State parties "agreed" on something at the PrepCom. In this regard, the Chairman stated that States parties "agreed that education on disarmament and non-proliferation was important to strengthening disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations." The summary also indicated that the State parties "welcomed recommendations for utilizing education in pursuit of this objective, which were contained in the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation education," submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its 57th session. States parties were also "encouraged" to include in their education and training programs information on the Treaty, including its Review Conferences and the work of States parties to implement the Treaty. Further consideration should be given on how to make the issue of disarmament and non-proliferation education specifically relevant to the various aspects of the Treaty.

Safeguards:

Firstly, the State parties should reaffirm the important role of the IAEA as the competent authority responsible authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with the Treaty's obligations under Article III. The Agency's experiences during the early 1990s in Iraq and North Korea and recently in Iran and Libya proved that the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/153) are insufficient as a stand-alone system. The Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) would provide the Agency with a wider scope and more tools to monitor all material, technology, facilities and sites associated with a State's nuclear program at every stage - from mining to waste storage or disposition. The State parties therefore need to reconsider the safeguards requirement under Article III of the Treaty and could agree to include the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC 540) coupled with the current comprehensive safeguards agreements as the required mechanism to verify compliance. It should, however, be borne in mind that although the Additional Protocol would substantially expand the Agency's ability to check for clandestine nuclear facilities by providing inspectors with authority to visit any facility -- declared or not - it does not guarantee a complete picture of a state's intentions to develop a nuclear weapons capacity, especially in secret societies. Even with its full implementation, it only provides the Agency with more extensive abilities to verify capabilities, but not intentions; thus a State can still legally develop the "break-out" capability under the supervision of the IAEA.

Nuclear Weapons Free Zones:

The concept of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States in the regions concerned has been recognized by the NPT State parties and the wider membership of the UN General Assembly. The contribution of such zones to enhancing global and regional peace and security, including the cause of global nuclear non-proliferation, should be emphasized. The importance of the entry into force of all the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties should be stressed and a call should be made on the Central Asian States and the NWS to conclude their consultation with a view to the adoption of a Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.

The Middle East:

The implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East remains a contentious issue, with the potential to wreck any chance of success in 2005. It should be recalled that the 2000 Final Document requested all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States to report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the President of the 2005 Review Conference, as well as the Chairpersons of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference, on the steps that they had taken to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. As in the case with nuclear disarmament and security assurances, the NAM will argue for the establishment of a subsidiary body on the Middle East or alternatively on regional issues.

Peaceful uses:

Although the inalienable right of the States parties to engage in research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination would need to be respected, it should be linked to full and transparent implementation of strengthened safeguards in order to build the confidence as a prerequisite for international nuclear cooperation. A possible way to strengthen the treaty's implementation in this regard would be for the States Parties to agree at the 2005 NPT Review Conference to affirm their interpretation of Article IV and its relationship with Article III (safeguards). While recognizing the inalienable right to use the atom for peaceful purposes, the States Parties should state clearly in the Final Document that ownership of the capability that could be utilized to develop nuclear weapons places a special responsibility on such States to instill confidence in the international community, thus removing concerns about nuclear proliferation. The States Parties could furthermore agree that withdrawal from the treaty would not free a NNWS party from the obligation not to use weapons fissile materials and production facilities (including those of indigenous origin) acquired prior to its withdrawal for weapons. Precedence for interpreting the treaty in light of changed circumstances already exists since the States Parties agreed at the 2000 Review Conference that the provisions of Article V (peaceful uses of nuclear explosions) no longer apply given the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The review of the implementation Article IV of course also relates to the strengthening of physical protection of nuclear materials, the need for safe and secure transport of nuclear materials, and the importance of preventing the dumping of radio-active waste - measures which have become increasing important given the threat of nuclear terrorism. The text of the second PrepCom's Chairman's factual summary provides valuable guidance in this regard.

Export Controls:

The importance of transparency in and the need for export controls in the context of Article III remains a controversial issue. The inclusion of a reference to export controls was not possible in the Final Declaration of the 2000 Review Conference directly as a result of disagreement between the NAM and members states of the NSG. This issue is likely to be the focus of some debate at the PrepCom and the Review Conference. Although the Chairman of the second PrepCom tried to address these concerns by including language recognizing "the importance of transparency in export controls" and that "nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in keeping with the non-proliferation obligations of Articles I and II of the Treaty," it is unlikely that this approach would satisfy the NAM's concerns.

Nuclear Terrorism:

A relatively new, but dangerous threat to the regime that regained prominence since September 11, 2001, is the threat of nuclear terrorism. Since the NPT, as all multilateral treaties, was designed to deal with states, it has very little capacity to deal with the new threat coming from non-state actors using nuclear weapons, or material and technology to develop improvised nuclear explosive devices. While there seems to be clear agreement to combating nuclear terrorism, the role of the IAEA in this endeavor does not enjoy similar support and need to be strengthened.


[1] Quote taken from the statement made by the former UN Under Secretary-General, Jayantha Dhanapala, on the occasion of the second Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

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