Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

2003 NPT Preparatory Committee: Progress towards 2005 or business as usual?

Jean du Preez


Introduction

The Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was held from 28 April to 9 May 2003 in Geneva, under the chairmanship of Ambassador László Molnár of Hungary. The PrepCom was the second of three sessions that will be held prior to the 2005 RevCon and represented the end of the first phase of the "new" strengthened review process (as decided at the 2000 RevCon). Under the new process, the first two sessions (2002 and 2003) considered "principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality." The third PrepCom session will need to make recommendations to the 2005 RevCon, taking into account the deliberations and results of the two previous sessions.

One hundred and six States parties as well as representatives from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) participated in the PrepCom, while representatives from the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the European Commission, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference attended as observers. Representatives from 37 non-governmental organizations attended the plenary meetings of the PrepCom.

The 2003 PrepCom was held amid fears about the nuclear nonproliferation regime at large, in particular given the lack of commitment by some State parties - nuclear weapons States (NWS) and non-nuclear weapons States (NNWS) alike - to their respective Treaty obligations. Despite Cuba's long-awaited accession to the Treaty in November 2002, the State parties were confronted with several challenges to the NPT, most notably the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK's) decision to withdraw from the NPT and restart its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. The U.S. National Security Strategy (which established the doctrine of pre-emptive strikes as official U.S. policy), the invasion into Iraq to rid it of weapons of mass destruction, allegations that Iran is developing a nuclear weapons program, and the apparent lack of commitment by the NWS to implement their nuclear disarmament obligations, also served to focus attention at the meeting on the test of political will regarding nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, and the role that the NPT will take in leading these efforts.

The second PrepCom session, similar to the first session, concluded relatively successfully. Despite some speculation that North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT on 10 April 2003 (the first State party to do so) would lead to a procedural, and potentially divisive debate at the start of meeting over North Korea's status, the Chairman, in a display of diplomatic skills and political resolve, announced that he would take custody of the DPRK's nameplate and that it would not be displayed among those of the States parties, but that it would remain in the conference room. Although this ensured a "smooth" start of the meeting, the States parties' acceptance of this "soft" reaction to one of the most significant challenges to the Treaty seems to be indicative of a "business as usual" kind of approach by many State parties to the present day challenges to the Treaty. In comparison to the lack of interaction between delegations at the first PrepCom session, innovative efforts by the Chairman resulted in more active and substantive interaction. But many delegations, including some NWS, stayed notably quiet, both in engaging others and responding to others' attempts to engage them. Although several issues were highlighted, such as security assurances, non-strategic nuclear weapons, and nonproliferation and disarmament education, with working papers offering concrete and constructive proposals as food for thought, it is questionable whether much progress was made towards agreeing on substantive recommendations at the next PrepCom.

As was the case at the first PrepCom (held in New York in April 2002), the second PrepCom did not attempt to produce any negotiated report. The Chairman, following the approach of the Chairman of the first PrepCom, prepared a Chairman's factual summary of the Committee's consideration of the issues that was annexed to the 2003 PrepCom report. This document captured the Chairman's factual distillation of the views expressed by States parties on a number of substantive matters, including North Korea's withdrawal from the Treaty, concerns over Iranian non-compliance, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, safeguards, export controls, nuclear-weapon-free zones, regional issues, strengthened physical protection of nuclear material, etc.

Although based on the factual summary of the 2002 PrepCom, Chairman Molnar's summary is widely considered as an improvement on that document. Since the summary was prepared by the Chairman, his objective was to reflect as closely as possible his own assessment of the discussions at the meeting while trying to accommodate the views of delegations on some of the most controversial paragraphs, such as those on Iran and the DPRK. His initiative to invite delegations to offer specific text proposals, although risky, provided him with a good basis to formulate language that accommodated most views. Ambassador Molnar furthermore consulted with various key delegations on specific paragraphs of his summary with the result that it was to some extent negotiated; this ensured that key delegations did not object to its attachment to the PrepCom's official report as the factual summary of the meeting. However, as a consequence of these negotiations, those paragraphs addressing some of the most pressing challenges to the NPT were substantially amended and/or watered down.

Most State parties, in their closing statements at the PrepCom, reacted positively to the Chairman's summary, bearing in mind of course that it represents the views of the Chairman and not those of the States parties. Although no State party raised any strong objections to the Chairman's summary, a number of States, in particular the NWS, highlighted some concerns regarding some paragraphs. This general positive approach to the Chairman's summary should, however, not be misinterpreted to mean that agreement exists on any part of the text. The following analysis of the Chairman's factual summary attempts to provide an insight into the developments concerning the most challenging issues at the PrepCom.

North Korea's Withdrawal and Non-compliance

North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT on January 10, 2003, stating then that its withdrawal "will come into force automatically and immediately" on the next day. North Korea stated that it had suspended its 1994 withdrawal from the Treaty on the last day of the required three-month notice period and thus did not need to give further notice to other NPT parties and Security Council as required under Article X. Although the NPT State parties have not formally addressed this matter, the generally held view is that North Korea's withdrawal came into effect on 10 April 2003 when its three-month notice of withdrawal expired.

It is of particular concern that the PrepCom, the first meeting of NPT State parties since the DPRK's withdrawal, did not comment on this important and potentially harmful development. Despite being the most significant challenge to date to the Treaty, the North Korean issue is addressed only in paragraph 28 of the factual summary, following paragraphs on regional issues such as the Middle East and South East Asia and the need for universal adherence to the Treaty. Although many national delegations raised strong concerns over the DPRK's withdrawal, the Chairman's factual summary provided a relatively weak reflection of the collective view by the States parties on this important issue. He clearly tried to satisfy the concerns expressed by States such as Japan, South Korea, and China and to a lesser extent Russia, which objected to stronger language on North Korea's withdrawal.

Phrases such as "a wide range of concerns was expressed on the recent developments" and "States parties expressed concern about or deplored the DPRK's nuclear weapons programme" are indicative of the lack of political resolve by several States parties to directly confront the North Korean issue in the strongest possible terms. Although the summary refers to calls made for North Korea to "dismantle its nuclear weapons programme in a prompt, verifiable and irreversible way ... and to comply with all safeguards obligations pursuant to the Treaty" and for the crisis to be "resolved peacefully, through diplomatic means," it does not reflect a satisfactory response by NPT State parties to the DPRK's withdrawal. The fact that the State parties "noted" the Chairman's statement at the opening of the PrepCom regarding the DPRK's status does not address the question whether the DPRK is still considered to be a State party or not. In this regard, the Chairman's statement did not address North Korea's continued membership in the Treaty per se, but only served to avoid a potential procedural debate over whether there should a nameplate for North Korea in the conference room. Paragraph 28 clearly states that the States parties "believed that this issue should continue to be dealt with multilaterally, with the participation of the concerned countries." However, the question still remains how to deal with the North Korean case and who should be involved.

In its closing statement, the United States argued that the factual summary did not address the North Korean issue in strong enough terms (though the United States itself had given much less emphasis to DPRK than to Iran during the PrepCom) and that much more should have been said about the DPRK, which for the United States "there was only one acceptable objective - the verifiable dismantlement of its nuclear program and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula." It is of concern that only a few others States parties such as Australia, the United Kingdom, and France emphasized the relatively weak references to North Korea's withdrawal. China in contrast stated that this was a "sensitive issue," but it reiterated its support for the Korean peninsula to be nuclear-weapon free while calling for North Korea's "legitimate security concerns" to be addressed. South Korea expressed the hope that the emphasis placed on the DPRK crisis would create "favourable grounds for a peaceful resolution" of the crisis.

Allegations of Iranian Non-compliance

The scope and sophistication of the nuclear program in Iran gave rise to questions and concerns by several States regarding Iran's compliance with its NPT obligations. The U.S delegation, for instance, focused most of its attention during the PrepCom on Iran. It used its opening debate statement to start this campaign, accusing Iran of "conducting an alarming, clandestine program to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities that we believe make sense only as part of a nuclear weapons program." The United States, and a number of other States, most notably European Union members, repeatedly questioned the economic justification for Iran's advanced nuclear program - which includes pursuit of the entire nuclear fuel cycle. They called on Iran to demonstrate its peaceful intentions through increased co-operation with the IAEA, including the signing and bringing into force of an Additional Protocol, which would allow for more comprehensive verification measures.

The Iranian delegation on the other hand, responded to these allegations in a very cunning and rather unexpected way, thereby, at least in the view of many, turning the focus of the debate on the United States. It implicated that the United States itself is in non-compliance, with both its Article I (nonproliferation) and Article VI (nuclear disarmament) obligations. In this regard, Iran confronted the United States with a series of questions referring for example to the use of nuclear weapons in conventional conflicts and development of new types of nuclear weapons, and to the United States' rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The Iranian delegation also issued a strongly worded and apparently unequivocal condemnation of the development of nuclear weapons. As such it stated, "unlike some others, we consider the acquiring, development and use of nuclear weapons inhuman, immoral, illegal and against our basic principles."  Iran also objected to being prejudged before the IAEA report on its nuclear program (requested at the March 2003 IAEA Board of Governors' meeting and due on 16 June 2003), and argued that its nuclear program should be "viewed on its own merit without political burden of US-Iran bilateral relations."

It is interesting that the Iranian vice-President, Mr. Reza Aghazadeh, in a well-timed statement to the IAEA on the extent and scope of the Iranian nuclear program, made only a few days before the closure of the PrepCom, stated that his "country has no difficulty accepting this (Additional) protocol and, as a matter of fact, it is approaching it positively. At the same time, it doesn't intend to ratify and enforce the provisions of this protocol without any conditions." The Iranian delegation later clarified that these "conditions" implied that Iran's adherence to the protocol would be conditional on the removal of restrictive measures against Iran imposed by the United States and others.

The standoff between the United States (which clearly insisted that the Chairman should name Iran specifically in his summary), supported by about 40 other States (mostly the European Union and Australia) and Iran (who opposed such reference) headed towards a potential deadlock over the status of the Chairman's summary as an attachment to the official PrepCom report. The Chairman, as a result of last minute intense consultations with the United States and Iranian delegations, presented a carefully worded paragraph (paragraph 34) linking the Iranian issue with the need for all States parties, particularly those with advanced nuclear programs, "to conclude, bring into force and implement an Additional Protocol to their comprehensive safeguards agreement at the earliest opportunity, which enhances the confidence of States parties and helps eliminate concerns regarding their nuclear programmes." In a clear attempt to reflect U.S. concerns, this paragraph also calls on Iran "to sign an Additional Protocol and to ensure full and forthcoming cooperation with the IAEA, whose Secretariat is expected to provide a comprehensive report at the June 2003 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors." The Chairman also included a reference to Iranian explanations regarding their program, by referring to the Iranian Vice-President's statement and the "inalienable right of all States parties in full compliance with the Treaty to develop the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as well as the inviolability of nuclear facilities." This paragraph ensured agreement that the factual summary could be attached to the PrepCom report.

While not objecting to paragraph 34, the United States, in its closing statement, made its discontent with the Chairman's approach clear by stating that "the PrepCom had done more than call for Iran to sign the IAEA's Additional Protocol," arguing that the United States had "called on Iran to make full, truly transparent disclosure and compliance on all its NPT obligations." The United States also argued that there should have been more weight given to the concerns and accusations it and several other States had voiced about Iran. The United Kingdom also complained that the language on Iran was weak, reiterating its concern regarding the "scale, scope and lack of transparency" of Iran's program, "as stressed by some 40 states parties." Iran in turn stated that paragraph 34 prejudged the outcome of the June IAEA report on Iran and emphasized Iran's "desire and effort to become economically strong and be able to distribute prosperity, where we are not dependent only on the revenue from the sale of oil as a raw material."

Nuclear Disarmament and the 13 "Practical Steps"

Stressing that compliance also applies to nuclear disarmament obligations, most NNWS expressed frustration with the lack of progress toward this goal, recalling the unequivocal undertaking given by the NWS to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, as agreed at the 2000 RevCon. This frustration was particularly targeted at the faltering commitment demonstrated by the NWS to the 13 practical steps to nuclear disarmament, agreed upon in the 2000 Final Document. The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) - a group of likeminded States (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden), in its opening statement made by New Zealand, noted that there had been some positive developments (such as Cuba's accession and progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in Central Asia. However, with regard to nuclear disarmament, progress had been "dismal."

The NWS on the other hand argued that they have taken significant steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals consistent with their Article VI obligations. Seeking recognition for steps taken to reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal, the United States emphasized that it had already dismantled 13,000 nuclear weapons and had eliminated more than a dozen different types of warheads. The Russian Federation declared that it had reduced its strategic warheads to "5,518 units" and lowered it deployed strategic delivery systems to "1,136 units." The United Kingdom drew attention to the work it has done on verification for nuclear disarmament and stated that its stockpile of operationally available nuclear warheads had been reduced to fewer than 200, "which represents a reduction of more than 70 percent in the potential explosive power of our deterrent since the end of the Cold War." France indicated that it was pursuing dismantlement of its fissile material installations and had dismantled its nuclear weapons testing site. China presented a working paper outlining its basic positions on nuclear disarmament.

The United States and the Russian Federation also emphasized the Moscow Treaty as a significant development in the fulfillment of their Article VI commitments. While the signing of the Treaty was welcomed by some NNWS (most notably the EU and NATO States), many other States parties cautioned that the importance of the principles of irreversibility and transparency should not be disregarded. The NAC questioned the treaty's contribution to nuclear disarmament as it "does not contain verification procedures and it ignores non-operational warheads."

Throughout the PrepCom, the United States emphasized that the core purpose of the NPT regime was to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, thereby relegating the nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy components of the NPT bargain to subsidiary positions. Although the United States and some other NWS (United Kingdom and Russia) presented working papers to emphasize their commitment to Article VI, the United States again reiterated its position that "it no longer supports all the practical steps" agreed to at the 2000 RevCon (referring to its objections to the CTBT and its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty). In sharp contrast to this position, the NAC pointed to the lack of "constructive implementation of the 13 steps - the blueprint for achieving nuclear disarmament, not lip service to them." Most NNWS expressed concerns that the NWS are systematically rolling back undertakings given and agreements reached at the 2000 RevCon and that they are faltering in their commitment to Article VI.

Another example of how some of the NWS are rolling back the 2000 RevCon undertakings was the French delegation's continued dismissal of the de-linkage - as agreed to at the 2000 RevCon - between nuclear disarmament, as embodied in the "unequivocal undertaking" by the NWS to the eliminate their nuclear arsenals, and the need for general and complete disarmament. Also, the United Kingdom - which took the lead among the NWS to achieve the agreements reached in 2000 - seemed to share this view. The United Kingdom stated that it would not engage in multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations until the number of nuclear weapons was reduced considerably globally, thereby trying to shift the focus away from those who possess nuclear weapons to progress on compliance and verification. In this regard, it referred to the need to first address the challenge presented by the DPRK; to further strengthen safeguards and fund them properly; to resolve concerns about the Iranian program; and to address the risk of nuclear and radiological terrorism. Of even more concern, the EU's position - as stated in both in its opening and closing statements - also linked nuclear disarmament to general and complete disarmament. Significantly, the EU statements were made on behalf of two NAC members (Ireland and Sweden), sharply contradicting the New Agenda's longstanding position that the implied linkage in Article VI between nuclear disarmament and "general and complete disarmament," had been removed by the "unequivocal undertaking" by the NWS to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

Although mostly based on the 2002 PrepCom factual summary, Chairman Molnar further expanded the paragraphs dealing with nuclear disarmament and the 13 practical steps (paragraphs 9 to 21), but he clearly tried to balance the concerns expressed by the NNWS over the lack of progress toward implementing the 13 practical steps with extensive references to initiatives taken by the NWS to implement their Article VI obligations. In this regard, the summary reflects the concerns ("disappointment") expressed about the progress made in implementing the practical steps. It expresses concern and uncertainty about existing nuclear arsenals, new approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons, as well as the possible development of new generations of nuclear weapons. While expressing the sentiment that "several States parties welcomed the Moscow Treaty as a significant step toward nuclear disarmament and strategic stability," the summary also states that "reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons." The summary also includes specific references to reductions in nuclear arsenals, the disposal of fissile materials, cooperative threat reduction, and the G-8 initiative.

Despite strong pressure from the United States not to do so, the Chairman used language taken from the 2002 PrepCom summary stating that the States parties "remained committed to implementing Article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on 'Principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament' and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in particular the unequivocal undertaking and the thirteen practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement nuclear disarmament that were agreed to" (paragraph 11). In paragraph 14, he stated that strong support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was expressed and that States parties "urged" the remaining 13 States whose ratification was necessary, and in particular those two remaining NWS (United States and China) whose ratification was a prerequisite for its entry-into-force, to ratify without delay. Likewise, the Chairman (in paragraph 15) "noted" the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and its decision on the development of missile defense systems and expressed "certain" concerns that the withdrawal has brought an "additional element of uncertainty to international security, has impacted negatively on strategic stability, and will have negative consequences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation" and that this could lead to a "new arms race on earth and in outer space."

The U.S. delegation, in its response to the Chairman's summary took particular exception to these references, stating that the United States had "made clear this year and last year that it does not support all the 13 steps." It also objected to the references to the ABM Treaty and the CTBT, noting that it had exercised its right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and was now "continuing our legal development of missile defenses" and that contrary to the views of many, missile defenses were "stabilizing and enhanced deterrence." Furthermore, "the US does not support the CTBT and does not intend to proceed with ratification" but, reiterated that it is not pursuing further tests.

The Chairman's summary also expanded on the issue of a fissile material ban. In this regard, he emphasized in paragraph 17 that the "commencement of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the Shannon report and the mandate contained therein, was the next logical step in the process of nuclear disarmament." The reference to the Shannon report suggests that the Chairman tried to capture the emphasis placed on the importance of both the nonproliferation and disarmament aspects of fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations. Paragraph 17 (like the 2002 Chairman's summary), also calls for States that have not yet done so, to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In their reaction to the summary, the Chinese delegation objected to calls for an "undefined and unverifiable moratorium" on fissile materials production, saying it preferred a "properly negotiated FMCT," while the U.K. delegation argued that the paragraph failed to mention that four of the five NWS had declared moratoria on fissile material production.

The Chairman' s summary (also in paragraph 17) continued to call for an agreement on a program of work in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and noted the need for the CD to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. This paragraph also encouraged the CD to "overcome the impasse so that it may resume its substantive work." In this regard, it "took note of a cross-group effort" - referring to the joint proposal made by five CD Ambassadors (all former CD presidents) from Algeria, Belgium, Colombia, Sweden, and Chile. In expressing her dismay over the weak reference to the initiative by the former CD presidents, Ambassador Mary Whelan of Ireland (who held the CD presidency during the PrepCom), stated that the paragraph did not sufficiently acknowledge this initiative "which many of us believe offers a way forward."

The Chairman's summary also placed emphasis on developments regarding arrangements by the NWS to place fissile material, designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes, under IAEA or other relevant international verification. In this regard, it noted that the first phase of the Trilateral Initiative - involving the IAEA, the Russian Federation, and the United States - for placing excess nuclear materials from dismantled weapons under international safeguards was successfully completed by September 2002. It also referred to the agreed model legal framework now available to be used in new verification agreements between the three parties. The summary noted that several hundred tons of fissile material had been removed from military stockpiles and would be disposed of so that it is no longer usable in nuclear weapons. It also highlighted the G-8 Global Partnership announcement in June 2002 "as a positive contribution toward cooperation in reducing threats from all weapons of mass destruction through practical initiatives." In addition, it referred to the important role that the IAEA could play in verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.

Although not as clear as in the 2000 RevCon Final Document, the Chairman's summary continued to make a distinction between nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. In paragraph 11 of his summary, the Chairman referred to the "unequivocal undertaking and the thirteen practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement nuclear disarmament," while he stated in paragraph 20 that "the view was held that the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free world should be accompanied by the pursuit of other effective arms control agreements at the global and also particularly at the regional level, in line with the goal of general and complete disarmament."

While welcoming the references to its own initiatives related to nuclear disarmament, the United States said in its closing remarks that it would have liked to see a more positive report on such progress as "these achievements are truly remarkable and the factual summary should have reflected this better." Addressing the Chairman's approach with regard to the relationship between nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, France stated that general and complete disarmament did "not have its due place (in the summary) as part of article VI." Greece, on behalf of the EU, also implied that that there should have been a clearer linkage by referring to the "common goals of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament." By contrast, the NAC stated that it would be redoubling its efforts at future meetings, especially with regard to the implementation of the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, referring to this undertaking as "a goal in itself, as well as being on the way towards complete and general disarmament."

Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons

A discussion on the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons logically belongs under the nuclear disarmament section of this report (given its placement as part of the "13 practical steps"), but the increased emphasis on this issue at the PrepCom merits a separate reference.

Although non-strategic nuclear weapons have traditionally been overlooked in the formal arms reduction process, the 2000 Final Document mandated that the PrepCom should make recommendations on this issue to the 2005 Review Conference. The issue has since gained increased importance. September 11th provoked greater awareness and fear of the threat of nuclear terrorism, and the January 2002 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review advocated research into modified and new generations of low-yield nuclear weapons to combat the increasing threat of hardened and deeply buried targets. Germany submitted a detailed working paper at the first PrepCom session, advocating a gradual approach on this issue. The NAC also submitted a working paper at the last PrepCom, later expanded in an October 2002 UN General Assembly resolution (57/58). These papers proposed, inter alia, codification and reporting on the implementation of the 1991-92 Unilateral U.S. and Russian Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, further reductions and elimination of these weapons, as well as further confidence-building and transparency measures.

Building on these past proposals, the NAC, as part of its working paper on nuclear disarmament, made substantive proposals at the 2003 PrepCom, while Austria, Mexico, and Sweden presented a separate working paper entitled "Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons." The substantive proposals contained in these working papers enjoyed wide support indicating that some progress might be possible at the 2005 RevCon on this issue.

Of concern, however, was the position taken by some NATO members, such as the Netherlands who stated that although it is in favor of further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, "these weapons support NATO's nuclear posture." The Dutch delegation's statement that "a limited number of TNW deployed in Europe are politically and physically well protected and there is no possibility that those weapons will be transferred to other NNWS" smacks of the kind of language normally associated with a NWS. The Netherlands also implied that if the United States were to reduce its non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, there would be a great imbalance in numbers of these weapons between NATO and Russia.

The Russian Federation expressed some support for addressing the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the context of reductions of other kinds of nuclear armaments, taking into consideration the maintenance of strategic stability. The United States on the other hand stated that after reviewing the potential for further arms control instruments on non-strategic nuclear weapons, "we concluded that such an approach is not possible. The nature of the remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems makes it far more difficult to have confidence in treaty implementation than is the case for strategic systems."

The importance of further reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons, "based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process," is addressed in paragraph 16 of the Chairman's summary. It included a call for "formalization and increased transparency" in the implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 between the Russian Federation and the United States. While recognizing that substantial reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons had taken place through unilateral actions, and that the dismantling of these weapons under the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiative had been partly concluded, the summary also reflected the view "by some States parties" (probably referring to those States that made specific proposal in this regard) that non-strategic weapons "must be further reduced in a transparent, accountable, verifiable and irreversible manner, and that negotiations should begin on further reductions of those weapons as soon as possible." Making the linkage with the threat of terrorism, the Chairman emphasized the need to enhance security of transport and storage of these weapons. In an attempt to reflect Russian concerns over the issue, the summary also commented: "the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons is of a comprehensive nature and is linked to other aspects of strategic stability and therefore cannot be considered separately from other types of weapons."

In its response to the Chairman's summary, the Russian delegation reiterated its position as stated several times during the PrepCom and disassociated itself with how this issue had been characterized in paragraph 16. Russia quoted from the 13 practical steps and underlined that the step on non-strategic nuclear weapons "should be implemented in a way that strengthens international stability and undiminished security" and that de-linking these kind of weapons from other "weapons and security considerations does not reflect this step properly." France also complained that references to international stability and undiminished security had been omitted.

Security Assurances

Given that little progress has been made towards nuclear disarmament, and that new security doctrines include the potential use of nuclear weapons against NNWS, the issue of negative security assurances (NSAs) gained renewed attention during this PrepCom. Many States parties stressed that NNWS party to the NPT have the right to unconditional and legally-binding NSAs as a transitional measure until the goal of nuclear disarmament has been fully achieved. In comparing the reluctance by States parties, in particular the NWS to deal with negative security assurances to "an ostrich that buries its head in the sand," South Africa recalled the 2000 RevCon decision that the PrepCom has to make recommendations on the issue to the 2005 RevCon. In this context, it mentioned that, "security assurances rightfully belong to those who have given up the nuclear weapon option as opposed to those that are still keeping their options open." It was also noted that NNWS party to the Treaty are in a "less enviable" position than that of non-States. Comments were also made that if security assurances are being considered for North Korea to bring it back into the Treaty, this would imply that States which have been in compliance with their NPT obligations are not able to rely on the NPT to achieve legally binding security assurances. The impression is that the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation leads to such assurances being granted.

The NAC submitted a working paper, detailing provisions on scope, format, and other aspects involved with security assurances. It also submitted a draft legal instrument that could take the form either of a protocol or an agreement. The proposed draft instrument included both positive and negative security assurances, but allowed for the cessation of security assurances in the event that a NWS was attacked by a NNWS in association or alliance with a NWS.

During the debate, most of the NWS referred to their assurances given in April 1995 (Security Council resolution 984), stating that their respective policies on this issue remained unchanged. China reiterated its unilateral no-first-use and negative security assurance policy, and urged the other NWS to confirm their commitments in a legally binding form. Russia supported the application of legally-binding NSAs through protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs), but also noted the possibility of establishing an ad hoc committee within the CD to negotiate a universal and legally-binding agreement on security assurances. The Republic of Korea also encouraged the pursuit of NSAs through the establishment of NWFZs, stating that this approach was the "most realistic." The NAM made the linkage between security assurances and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and severely criticized this and similar policies by other NWS for setting out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons. The NAM stated that "the possible development of new weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermines disarmament commitments."

It was particularly notable that the NWS, in particular the United States, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom, in deep contrast to their reaffirmation of previously given security assurances, failed to address widely held concerns about the development and possible use of new types of nuclear weapons against NNWS. In this regard, the United States failed to address concerns over its new doctrine of pre-emptive attack and threatened use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries that use chemical or biological weapons. Many States consider this doctrine to be in contravention of both politically and legally binding NSAs already given by the United States. It is ironic that only a few weeks after the PrepCom, the U.S Senate voted down an amendment to the Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Authorization bill that would have preserved the ban (the 1993 Spratt-Furse law) against pursuing research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons by the United States. It is also disconcerting that Russian President Vladimir Putin in a speech to the Duma after the PrepCom stated that "work to create new types of Russian weapons, weapons of the new generation, including those regarded by specialists as strategic weapons, is in the practical implementation stage." Moreover, British Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon had stated before the Parliamentary Defence Select Committee only a month before the start of the PrepCom that the United Kingdom "would retain the right to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state."

The Chairman's summary contained a detailed paragraph (29) reflecting to some extent the proposals made on NSAs. The Chairman indicated that many States parties reaffirmed that NNWS should be effectively assured by NWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Reaffirmations of commitments under Security Council resolution 984 (1995) were also expressed. The summary also reflected the call by many States parties (as mandated by the 2000 RevCon Final Document) that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to NNWS should be pursued as a matter of priority, and that this could take the form of an agreement or protocol to the Treaty, without prejudice to the legally binding security assurances already given by the five NWS in the framework of the treaties regarding NWFZs. The summary included an expression of concern that recent developments (referring to the implications of the possible use of new kinds of nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive manner) "might undermine commitments taken under the respective Security Council resolutions." It is interesting that the Chairman included a new element with respect to security assurances, i.e., that the granting of security assurances should be linked to the fulfillment of NPT obligations. This seems to imply that legally binding assurances will only be available to NNWS that are in compliance with the Treaty. The summary also acknowledged that several States parties, including China, had emphasized the importance of a no-first use policy, and it included a reference to a proposal made by South Africa that a further subsidiary body be established to Main Committee I at the 2005 RevCon to address the issue of security assurances. Notably, a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament established at the 2000 RevCon led to the adoption of the "13 practical steps" toward nuclear disarmament.

In its response to the Chairman's summary, the United Kingdom argued that the paragraph was not balanced as it made "small mention" of the NWS' security assurances provided through a Security Council resolution. France followed the same line by stating that the references to negative security assurances had not adequately reflected the reassertions of the 1995 assurances that had been made by four of the nuclear powers, including France.

The Middle East

Since many of the burning issues confronting the NPT at this PrepCom related to the Middle East, Chairman Molnar approached these issues with great caution. In doing so he clearly employed a lot of diplomatic tact to avoid a situation where the PrepCom was driven to fail on these issues as was the case during the 1998 PrepCom. In addition to naming Iran in paragraph 34 (see above), he continued to specifically call on Israel (as was the case in the 2000 RevCon Final Document) "to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards." He also reaffirmed the support given by all State parties at the 2000 RevCon for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction (see paragraph 24).

In trying to acknowledge the initiatives by the United States, the United Nations, the European Union, and the Russian Federation to promote a peaceful resolution to the Palestinian crisis, the Chairman mentioned in paragraph 25 that "some States parties noted the road map." He, however, implied that this initiative, and not Israel's accession to the Treaty, would lead to a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. He stated that "a view was expressed that the road map could be an important step" in the direction of the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.

It is also interesting that the Chairman avoided any justification of the war against Iraq, while leaving the impression that questions remain about the true reasons for that war. He included a specific paragraph (26) in which he stated that the States parties "recalled that there remained unresolved questions regarding Iraq's programmes of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and noted the importance of clarifying those outstanding issues." As in the case with the reference to the "road-map" to resolve the Palestinian crisis, he linked the justification by the United States and the United Kingdom for the war in Iraq, i.e., disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction capabilities, with the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. His statement that only "some States parties took note of the IAEA's readiness to resume its verification activities in Iraq" (a phrase that the United States reportedly insisted on) furthermore gives an incorrect impression that the majority of States believed that the Agency no longer had a role to play in Iraq.

In its response to the Chairman's summary, the Russian delegation objected to part of paragraph 26, which referred to remaining "unsolved questions regarding Iraq's programmes of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery." The Russian delegation also stated that instead of merely taking note of the IAEA's readiness to resume its verification activities in Iraq "a more accurate point would have reflected that some states parties welcomed the IAEA's readiness to resume its inspection activities in Iraq." The Egyptian delegation, referring to the inclusion of a reference to the "road map" and clearly representing the views of the Arab States parties, stated that "the importance of a nuclear weapon free zone and a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, should not be underestimated or tied to specific kinds of regional or political developments." Syria also objected to the reference to the road-map saying that "fulfillment of the NPT must not be conditional on anything else."

Utilizing the Strengthened Review Process through Regular Reporting

Building upon the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, Step 12 of the thirteen practical steps agreed upon in 2000, mandated regular reports by all States on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament."

Canada submitted a working paper to this session of the PrepCom, expanding upon its proposal at last year's session and outlining the feedback received during its informal consultations over the past year on the issue of regular reporting. While the paper does not make specific recommendations, it highlighted issues in further need of consideration, such as the format, scope, and timing of the reporting requirement. In support of the Canadian approach, many States parties emphasized that reporting can serve as a tool for increasing transparency and accountability, and can increase confidence with regard to compliance of States parties.

Although the number of reports submitted at this PrepCom exceeded last year's efforts, the content of reports reflected the different views with regard to what aspects of the Treaty should be included in these reports. Some reports covered only implementation of Article VI, others the 13 practical steps while still others reported on each article of the NPT. The United Kingdom included in its report detailed information on the approximate number of warheads and the alert status of its one remaining Trident system, as well as on its ongoing project to seek technological methods of verification for future agreements on nuclear disarmament. The United States and Russia also provided relatively specific accounts of their nuclear arms reductions and the implementation status of their various arms control agreements, but continued to express opposition to attempts to define reporting structure and format, or efforts to make reports obligatory. The United States submitted a fact sheet on its implementation of Article VI, and included aspects of its nuclear policies. To a lesser extent, France also offered general assessments of its nuclear arsenal holdings, although no specific numbers were provided, and outlined its efforts to support the CTBT and to halt fissile material production. China was especially lacking in substance in its oral report, only reiterating its nuclear policies and stating that it has developed only a "minimal level" of nuclear weapons for defense purposes.

Several NNWS, especially South Africa, Sweden, Canada, and Cuba, encouraged the use of reports to enable active interaction among States parties, and used this opportunity to pose questions and comments to the NWS. This introduced a new dimension of interactivity to the strengthened review process. Although the usefulness of this interaction is yet to be fully developed, it has the potential, if fully realized, to allow for more substantive and constructive discussion on the implementation and strengthening of the Treaty.

The Chairman addressed the reporting issue in paragraph 21 of his summary where he stressed that "reporting would promote increased confidence in the overall nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime through transparency." He also stated that "such transparency provides valuable means to address and respond to compliance concerns" and that States parties recognized the value of reports and "used them in substantive deliberation, in line with their wish for enhanced interaction."

Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education

The issue of disarmament and nonproliferation education was for the first time introduced in the context of the NPT at the 2002 PrepCom. The 57th session of the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the recommendations made by the United Nations Secretary-General's expert panel on disarmament and nonproliferation education. The General Assembly (in resolution 57/60) "conveyed" the recommendations for implementation, as appropriate, by Member States, the United Nations and other international organizations, civil society, non-governmental organizations, and the media.

As was the case during the 2002 PrepCom, several State parties, most notably those which were represented on the UN Secretary-General's expert panel (e.g., Sweden, Egypt, Mexico, Peru, Poland, New Zealand, Japan, Hungary, etc), emphasized the importance of education as a tool for strengthening disarmament and nonproliferation education. These delegations also introduced a working paper to this end.

It is encouraging that the Chairman's factual summary further expanded on this issue. Although the Chairman's summary did not reflect agreement on any of the issues addressed therein, it is significant that paragraph 30 dealing with disarmament and nonproliferation education contained the only reference in the entire document that implies that State parties "agreed" on something at the PrepCom. In this regard, the Chairman stated that States parties "agreed that education on disarmament and non-proliferation was important to strengthening disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations." The summary also indicates that the State parties "welcomed recommendations for utilizing education in pursuit of this objective, which were contained in the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation education," submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its 57th session. States parties were also "encouraged" to include in their education and training programs information on the Treaty, including its Review Conferences and the work of States parties to implement the Treaty.

The Role of the IAEA and Its Safeguards System

The experience in Iraq, the withdrawal by North Korea from the Treaty, and concerns over possible nuclear weapons development in Iran, placed renewed emphasis on the role of the IAEA and its safeguards system, in strengthening the Treaty regime. To this end most State parties, in their national statements and during the specific time debate, emphasized the importance of the IAEA for promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and verifying compliance with the Treaty's nonproliferation obligations. Strong emphasis was placed on the need for States parties to have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement (as required in accordance with Article III of the NPT) and an Additional Protocol in place for the Agency to be able to provide assurances of both non-diversion of declared material and the absence of undeclared activities or material.

The relevant paragraphs of the Chairman's factual summary dealing with the IAEA and its safeguards system (paragraphs 31-34) significantly expanded on the importance of the IAEA and the safeguards system. Moreover, the Chairman significantly strengthened the language used in the 2002 PrepCom summary. In this regard, he made a clear attempt to do away with references that "some" or "many" State parties considered issues of importance. It is also evident that the Chairman attempted to strike a balance between safeguards as a mechanism for States to demonstrate their compliance, on the one hand, and the right of State parties in full compliance with the Treaty to develop the research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, on the other.

In addition to recognizing IAEA safeguards as a "fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime" (based on language taken from the 2002 summary), paragraph 31 indicated that States parties reaffirmed their convictions that IAEA safeguards provide assurance that States are complying with their undertakings, and also provide the mechanism for States to demonstrate this compliance. Paragraph 31 also recognized that IAEA safeguards "promote further confidence among States, help to strengthen their collective security and play a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices."

Most notable in the 2003 Chairman's summary is the emphasis placed on the need for State parties to conclude an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. In contrast to the 2002 factual summary, Chairman Molnar implied that there was wide support among the State parties for the need to have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol in place for the IAEA to be able to provide an assurance of both non-diversion of declared material and the absence of undeclared activities or material. He also included a rather bold statement: "States parties called upon those that had not yet signed or ratified the Additional Protocol to do so as soon as possible." Likewise, he made two emphatic statements in paragraph 32: "the importance of the Model Additional Protocol as an essential tool for the efficient and effective functioning of the IAEA safeguards system was underlined" and "attention was drawn to the fact that States parties must have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol in place for the IAEA to be able to provide assurance of both non-diversion of declared material and the absence of undeclared activities or material." He also included a reference that many States voiced their expectation that the strengthened safeguards system (i.e., a comprehensive safeguards agreement coupled with the Additional Protocol) constituted the Treaty's safeguards standard, and suggested that this standard should be recognized at the 2005 RevCon as a requirement for "nuclear supply to NNWS." Another new element in the 2003 Chairman's summary was the comment that "efforts to achieve the universal application of the Model Additional Protocol should not hamper efforts towards achieving universality of comprehensive safeguards agreements." This reference was clearly included to satisfy the concerns by the Arab States, in particular, about Israel's refusal to conclude such arrangement with the IAEA.

Of further significance in the 2003 Chairman's summary was the statement that "support was expressed for a properly funded IAEA safeguards system, and (that) it was noted that the IAEA Director-General has proposed an increase in the 2004-05 budget for safeguards." This reflects the many statements of support, including by the United States, for an increase in the financial capacity of the Agency's safeguards system.

Another interesting change in the 2003 Chairman's summary in comparison to 2002, was the inclusion of a rather convoluted paragraph (33) in which he stated: "States parties reaffirmed that the IAEA is the competent authority" responsible for verifying and assuring compliance with its safeguards agreements "with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." This paragraph also reaffirmed that "nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in this regard" and recalled that States parties "that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by other States parties, should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions, and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its Statute." This paragraph is clearly based on language provided by Iran in an effort to deflect the criticism by primarily the United States over it suspected nuclear weapons program thereby strengthening Iran's argument that the IAEA, and the United States, should be responsible for verifying its compliance. The language was also based on text taken from the 2003 Non-Aligned Summit document. This paragraph should be read in conjunction with paragraph 34, in which a linkage is made between the need for all States parties, "particularly those with advanced nuclear programmes," to conclude, bring into force, and implement an Additional Protocol to their comprehensive safeguards agreement, and the concerns expressed over Iran's nuclear program. In this regard, Iran was called upon to sign an Additional Protocol and to ensure full and forthcoming cooperation with the IAEA, whose Secretariat is expected to provide a comprehensive report at the June 2003 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors.

As mentioned earlier in this report, paragraph 34 represents a balancing act by the Chairman that prevented Iran from outright rejecting the summary. In doing so he included language that reaffirmed "the inalienable right of all States parties in full compliance with the Treaty to develop the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, as well the inviolability of nuclear facilities." He also included references to Iran's statement of 29 April 2003, "solemnly declaring that it does not seek to acquire nuclear weapons and that it is engaged in addressing in a detailed and substantiated manner the questions which have been raised about its nuclear programme" and that of 8 May 2003, "underlining the need to avoid prejudgment about Iran's nuclear program in order to maintain the integrity of the IAEA process."

Nonproliferation Export Controls and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

Many States (most notably NAM States parties) reiterated the inalienable right of all States parties to the Treaty to engage in the research, development, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as stipulated in Article IV of the NPT. They expressed frustration that stringent export controls were preventing the effective implementation of Article IV. Notably, mostly the developed States (EU, Australia, the U.K., Japan, the ROK, Canada, France, and especially the United States) emphasized the link between nonproliferation and peaceful uses, and in this regard, urged the further conclusion of comprehensive safeguard agreements and Additional Protocols, as well as the stringent use of export controls and physical protection measures. The statement by the Republic of Korea that the "benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy cannot be made available to those states that remain outside the Treaty or violate their NPT obligations" seemed to reflect the sentiments of these States. The United States also stated that "the inalienable right to develop nuclear energy is not an entitlement but rather flows from demonstrable and verifiable compliance with Articles I, II and III of the Treaty.... No one could seriously maintain that a country not complying with its NPT non-proliferation obligations should nonetheless have a 'right' to benefit from nuclear cooperation. No such unconditional right exists." The United States used the examples of Iraq, North Korea, and Iran as illustrations of countries that maintained the façade of peaceful programs while working towards building nuclear weapon capacities.

States also praised the IAEA's Technical Cooperation (TC) program, listing a number of projects under the program in which their countries had taken part and from which they had benefited. Many delegations called for States to maintain or increase their funding for the TC program. Some States, such as Brazil and Algeria, emphasized that while funding for the Agency's safeguards activities may need to be increased, the distribution of funding should maintain the balance between the IAEA's three pillars of verification, nuclear safety, and technical cooperation. States also listed the benefits provided through the peaceful application of nuclear technology.

Chairman Molnar addressed the issue of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in paragraph 41 of his summary. As was the case with the 2002 Chairman's summary, this paragraph once again does not reflect a balanced approach between the three pillars of the Treaty, i.e., nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He repeated language used in the 2002 summary indicating that States parties "reiterated their strong support for article IV of the Treaty, which provided a framework for cooperation and confidence for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." In an attempt to address the concerns by developing States, he added in this context, that the "inalienable right of the States parties to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination" was reaffirmed. He also stated: "a call was made to fully ensure free, unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes" and that States parties expressed wide support for the technical cooperation activities of the IAEA "underlining that technical cooperation plays an important role in further developing the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." The importance of aligning technical cooperation programs with the development goals and needs of the country concerned was also emphasized, as well as the need to increase public awareness in this regard. The Chairman stressed the importance of providing the IAEA with "adequate voluntary resources for those activities." He also drew attention to the significance of developing proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies and support was expressed for the work being carried out by the IAEA under the INPRO (International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles) project. In an effort to balance the "inalienable right of the States parties to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination" with compliance provisions of the Treaty, he "noted that full and transparent implementation of strengthened safeguards is necessary to build the confidence which is a prerequisite for international nuclear cooperation." He also stated that "full compliance with all provisions of the Treaty is the basic condition for receiving the benefits of Article IV."

It is significant that the Chairman included a specific paragraph (35) dealing with export controls. Given the extreme sensitivities in this regard, the 2002 Chairman shied away from including an explicit reference to export controls in his summary. The inclusion of a reference to export controls was also not possible in the Final Declaration of the 2000 RevCon, directly as a result of the concerns expressed by in particular NAM State parties. Paragraph 35 is likely to cause great debate at the next PrepCom. It incorrectly stated: "State parties underlined that effective export controls, together with comprehensive safeguards, are central to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which depends on the existence of a climate of confidence about non-proliferation," implying that this sentiment was shared by most State parties. It also stated: "the important role of the international export control framework for nuclear related materials and technologies, namely the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group were noted, in particular their utility in guiding States in setting up their national export control policies" and thus gave undue recognition to the role of these export control regimes. As most State parties, especially those from the NAM, are not members of these regimes, and in fact consider them to be discriminatory in nature, attempts to include specific references to the Zangger Committee and the NSG have so far been unsuccessful in NPT documents. Although the Chairman tried to address these concerns by including language recognizing "the importance of transparency in export controls" and that "nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in keeping with the non-proliferation obligations of Articles I and II of the Treaty," it is unlikely that this approach would satisfy these concerns.

Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Terrorism

Given the increase in the perceived threat of nuclear terrorism, many States parties and the IAEA representatives at the meeting emphasized the importance of safety and security of peaceful nuclear programs to ensure that terrorists do not gain access to nuclear/radioactive materials. In this regard, the Chairman's summary reflects the strong support for the work done by the IAEA to address this issue. Paragraph 36 made a clear reference to the support for the IAEA action plan on protection against nuclear terrorism and the Agency's work in support of States' efforts to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material. The paragraph also included a call for support of the G-8's "Kananaskis principles" to prevent terrorists, and those harboring them, from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and related material.

Coastal States parties (e.g., Argentina, Chile, New Zealand, South Africa, and Turkey) highlighted the issue of transport, particularly maritime transport, of nuclear and radioactive materials, and stressed the need for strict international regulation of such transport to protect those who might be adversely affected by an incident associated with the transportation of nuclear materials. The Chairman addressed these concerns in paragraph 39, where he emphasized that "all transport of nuclear and radioactive material, including maritime transport, should be carried out in a safe and secure manner in strict conformity with international standards established by the relevant international organizations, such as the IAEA and the International Maritime Organization." He balanced the call by primarily the coastal States for "effective liability arrangements, prior notification and consultation" with a reference to statements by States carrying out international transport "that those transports are carried out in a safe and secure manner and in strict conformity with all relevant international standards."

Many States parties (e.g., New Zealand, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Russia, Japan, and the United States) also supported the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and urged other States to accede to the Convention. In this regard, the Chairman stated in paragraph 37: "States parties urged the strengthening of the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities as an element of the nonproliferation regime that should be emphasized particularly in the light of the heightened risk of nuclear terrorism." He also referred to the conclusion of the work to prepare a well-defined draft amendment to the CPPNM and called for early action with respect to the strengthening of CPPNM. He noted: "States parties recommended the early convening of a diplomatic conference to amend the CPPNM" and that "Many States parties called upon States that had not yet done so to accede to the CPPNM."

The importance of strengthening nuclear safety, radiation protection, safety of radioactive waste management, and the safe transport of radioactive materials is addressed in paragraph 38 of the Chairman's summary. The Chairman emphasized the need for "maintaining the highest standards of safety at civilian nuclear installations through national measures and international cooperation" and indicated that the efforts of the IAEA in the promotion of safety in all its aspects were welcomed. The summary included an important call on States parties that had not yet acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, as well as the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, to do so.

Strengthening of the Review Process and Enforcement of the NPT

Of further interest at the PrepCom was a proposal by South Africa to again review the strengthened review process at the 2005 RevCon based on the outcome of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) 2001/2002 Review Conference decision following the demise of the Ad hoc group negotiations. The South African proposal suggested that the BWC approach to undertake substantive work on an annual basis would provide the means to undertake substantive consideration of what can be done to achieve further progress in the future and to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty. The South African delegation, however, indicated that delegations should consider the content of their proposal "on the basis that our next PrepCom meeting in 2004 may consider recommendations on the issue to the Review Conference."

In a similar vein, and building on a proposal made during the 2000 RevCon, the Irish delegation again suggested that consideration be given to establishing "annual General Conferences of States parties to the NPT to take place in years other than those in which Review Conference are held." Ireland also recalled its former proposal that a "small Secretariat be established within the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs to distribute information received from the States parties and (to) prepare an annual report to the proposed general Conference." Ireland noted that an advantage of this proposal would be that it would provide a forum "in which an NPT party could react to issues affecting the implementation of the Treaty which require an early response."

The German delegation also submitted proposals as "food for thought" on how to strengthen the "enforcement of the NPT." Drawing on lessons learned from the North Korean experience, Germany suggested that a Heads of State level UN Security Council meeting be convened, modeled on the 1992 meeting at which the Council declared the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction a threat to international peace and security. The German delegation argued that the overall goal of such a Security Council meeting should be "the establishment of a new strategic consensus on how to deal with serious cases of non-compliance effectively and by making use of the possibilities provided for in the UN Charter." Germany furthermore proposed that "special conferences of NPT State parties" could be convened in cases of serious violations of Treaty obligations. With regard to withdrawals from the Treaty, Germany suggested that a State party contemplating withdrawal "would be called upon to conduct prior consultations with NPT State parties before exercising its right in accordance with Article X. Such consultations could take place in the context of a special conference of the NPT to be convened immediately." Such consultations would provide an opportunity "for exploring ways and means to prevent a withdrawal."

Although no in-depth discussions were held on these proposals, several delegations indicated that these ideas merit further consideration. The Chairman stated in his summary: "States parties took note of proposals for the further strengthening of the Treaty's review process." Referring to the need for more interactive debates in the future, he stated that the "importance of interactivity was emphasized and broader participation of States parties was encouraged."

Progress Towards 2005?

If judged by the "smooth" way in which the PrepCom concluded its work, the relative interactivity among delegations and the fact that the Chairman's factual summary was partially negotiated and attached to the official PrepCom report, then the PrepCom could be considered successful. If, however, measured against the true purposes of the PrepCom (as agreed to at the 2000 RevCon) to "consider principles, objectives and ways in order to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality," then progress remains questionable. Real progress and prospects for agreement at the 2005 RevCon should not be judged by the "smooth" conclusion of meetings or by the number of interactions between delegations, but should be measured by the level of agreement on progress made towards the full implementation of all aspects of the Treaty.

This PrepCom, at which the factual summary by the Chair again took the place of a negotiated text, was the last opportunity before the 2005 RevCon in which to engage in a discussion on substance rather than text. Although the initiatives and diplomatic skills by both chairmen of the first two PrepCom sessions are to be commended, the successful achievement of two Chairmen's factual summaries is not indicative of any agreement among NPT States parties on the implementation of the Treaty's provisions. It is indeed questionable whether these summaries will be used as a basis for recommendations to the 2005 RevCon when the States parties meet again at the third PrepCom. A lot of work lies ahead for the States parties, both in preparing for the next PrepCom and at the PrepCom itself, to formulate and agree on specific recommendations to the RevCon. Given the rather dismal track record set by the preparatory process for the 2000 RevCon (it could not agree on any substantive recommendations to that Conference), the Chairman of the third PrepCom (who has not yet been nominated by the NAM) indeed has the odds stacked against him.

In view of the decision taken at the 2000 RevCon on "Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty" that recommendations to the 2005 RevCon should only be considered at the third PrepCom, the States parties will have to face tough questions at the next PrepCom on how to effectively address cases of non-compliance and potential withdrawals from the NPT as well as how to prevent any rollbacks from undertakings given and agreements reached in the context of the strengthened review process. The continued validity of the strengthened review process, as an integral part of the package that led to the decision to indefinitely extend the life of the Treaty, and the decision taken at the 2000 RevCon to "further improve" this process will be called into question if the next PrepCom again fails to make concrete recommendations to the next RevCon. Only strong political will by all States parties - NWS and NNWS alike - will determine whether the next RevCon will be successful or not.


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