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The 2005 Review Conference:
Understanding the Challenges and Devising Responses

Workshop on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
30 October 2004
New York

Rapporteur's Report

Summary of Recommendations

The following list reflects the recommendations offered by the speakers and participants regarding a number of topics discussed during the workshop. They are not attributable, and do not necessarily reflect the viewpoint of all workshop participants.

Strengthening the review process

• Convene annual conferences to replace the PrepCom sessions.
• Establish a standing-bureau consisting of the president of the Review Conference and a number of regionally representative vice-chairs to serve throughout the period between one Review Conference and the next.
• The existing preparatory process should be transformed into a series of one-week annual conferences of States parties that would consider the status of the treaty. The final annual meeting could be extended by one week.
• The current PrepCom bureau should be reconfigured into a standing five-member bureau that would have tenure throughout the preparatory meetings leading up to the Review Conference.
• An extraordinary session of the General Conference of States parties should be held in the event of a notification to withdraw.

Preparing for the 2005 Review Conference

• The difficult issues should not be avoided.
• The General Assembly should be offered an opportunity to discuss Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and there should be complementary work done by the Assembly and the Security Council on this issue.
• A couple of issues should be addressed with a very clear focus.

Reaching success at the 2005 Review Conference

• The NPT and the IAEA system of safeguards should be strengthened.
• The three pillars of the Treaty should be re-examined: Are they all equally important?
• The events of the last five years should be taken into consideration prior to the 2005 Review Conference.
• In the absence of a consensus document, there should be strong political support for the elements of the NPT.
• States should address the issues that are linked, i.e., disarmament and nonproliferation.
• The final document should address the strengthened IAEA safeguards with a view to ensure compliance by States parties.

Strengthening Article IV

• Maintain the Additional Protocol.
• Develop a more intelligence-based safeguards system.
• Strengthen export controls.
• Create a mechanism that would curtail the right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology for those member States found in violation of Article IV.
• Increase discussion of the political motivations behind acquisition of nuclear weapons.
• Discuss an international system that does not rely on the existence of nuclear weapons.
• If a State is found to be in violation of its Treaty obligations, it should lose the right to peaceful nuclear energy.
• States parties should explicitly declare that the misuse of nuclear technology would result in a suspension of their right to withdraw from the Treaty under Article X.
• There should be a multilateral, rather than unilateral, approach to the situation in order to avoid new sets of discrimination.

Nuclear Disarmament

• State parties need to be realistic in their expectations, especially when it comes to time tables for nuclear disarmament.
• Patience is needed for disarmament to achieve progress.
• Openness and honesty in dialogue are needed to confront concrete challenges.

The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)

• FMCT negotiations should move forward as a confidence-building measure in the Conference on Disarmament (CD).
• The IAEA safeguards system should be considered proof that a verifiable treaty on FMCT dealing with both current stockpiles and future production is possible.
• A legally binding instrument would build confidence that NWS are prepared to move forward, while a non-verifiable treaty would not.

Introduction

The Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), and the Permanent Mission of Indonesia to the United Nations jointly sponsored a workshop on 30 October 2004 in preparation for the 2005 Review Conference of the States party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Close to seventy participants, including the chairpersons of the three Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) sessions and the president-elect of the Review Conference, evaluated the outcome of the preparatory phase for the Review Conference, and considered ways to effectively deal with the most pressing challenges facing the Treaty today.

The meeting began with opening remarks by Ambassador Rezlan Jenie, Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations, and Professor William Potter, Director of the Centre for Nonproliferation Studies. The following sessions consisted of an overview of progress made in the PrepCom phase, a consideration of ways to strengthen Article IV, and an analysis of nuclear disarmament. The workshop concluded with a discussion on what would constitute a successful outcome of the Review Conference during which Ambassador Sergio Duarte, the president-elect of the Review Conference, reflected on his consultations in preparation for the Conference. The workshop agenda and a final list of participants are annexed to this report.

This report is intended as an aide memoire for participants in the workshop, and is meant to give an indication of the range of issues discussed, and the nature of those discussions. As per the established tradition, the workshop was held under Chatham House rules in which statements and comments made during each session have are not attributed to specific individuals or to the organizations that they represent. The report reflects the views of the meeting's rapporteur, Ms. Risa Mongiello,[1] and the workshop organizer, Mr. Jean du Preez from CNS, who bear sole responsibility for its contents.

Session I: The Road to 2005: Where Are We?

• The introductory session of the workshop sought to identify the current challenges, the areas of convergence and divergence at the 2004 PrepCom meeting, and possible ways to reconcile some of the major disagreements.

The opening speaker noted that all State parties should recognize the seriousness of the problems the nuclear non-proliferation regime is currently facing. He identified Articles IV and VI, security assurances, the lack of consensus on compliance issues, and non-state actors acquiring nuclear weapons as some of the major issues facing the Treaty. He emphasized that time was not on the side of the international community, and the luxury of postponing the debate no longer exists. He called for possible new approaches to reconciling some of the principal disagreements that were evident in the preceding PrepCom, and for the identification of issues where the views of most States parties converged.

The second speaker identified two areas that needed to be dealt with prior to the 2005 Review Conference: procedural and substantive issues. He also noted that, although a provisional agenda should have provided for the compilation of background documentation for the Review Conference, no such documentation will be prepared due to disagreement over the agenda. Regarding the substantive challenges, he identified several recommendations that were put forth on the strengthened review process including:

• Convening annual conferences to replace the PrepCom sessions.
• Establishing a standing-bureau consisting of the president of the Review Conference and a number of regionally representative vice-chairs to serve throughout the period between one Review Conference and the next.
• Establishing a framework for strengthening and implementing the Treaty.
• Verifying the articles of the Treaty.

The speaker also offered recommendations on potential ways to measure success in 2005:

• Progress towards the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
• Commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT).
• Progress towards internationally and legally binding negative security assurances (NSAs).
• Establishing a comprehensive approach to allegations of non-compliance.
• Ensuring the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
• Adherence to IAEA safeguards and the Additional Protocol.

In regard to safeguards/Additional Protocol issue, he noted that near consensus exists among State parties to ensure the non-diversion of nuclear material in the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. This is one area in which the views of States parties converged.

The final speaker during this session discussed the areas of agreement and disagreement regarding the upcoming Review Conference. She noted that there was general agreement that the 2005 Review Conference would be very difficult due to unrealistic expectations by many NPT delegations. She identified three areas currently challenging the Review Conference: disagreement over the agenda, disagreement over related background documents, and the role of the Review Conference within the regime. With respect to the third issue, she referred to a recent British study that concluded that the documentation produced by the Review Conference could potentially be used to interpret the provisions of the Treaty. She also addressed the issue of how to work constructively to prevent the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons. She noted four major problem areas that need to be addressed at the Conference:

• The erosion of confidence in the regime's ability to meet a number of States' interests including: security (i.e., North Korea and Iran), technical and security aspects of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and regional and global interests.
• The Review process has not been able to deliver credible pressure on implementation of the Treaty.
• NPT parties continue to be denied effective mechanisms by which they can assert their collective will on non-compliance; specifically, the Security Council is not able to deal with the micro-management of non-compliance issues while the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) only ensures compliance with safeguards agreements but not the Treaty itself. Serious proliferation challenges fall into the gap between the Security Council and the IAEA, and are consequently dealt with through piecemeal procedures by some States using regulatory mechanisms to deal with the challenges to the regime.
• The nuclear weapons States (NWS) continue to treat their disarmament obligations as second-class priorities that may be addressed only when it is convenient for them.

She concluded by noting that the biggest challenge was implementation, and asked whether the States parties could develop and agree on the kinds of tools needed to seriously implement the Treaty.

The areas of disagreement at the 2004 PrepCom were commonly identified among most speakers as:

• progress, or the lack thereof on nuclear disarmament,
• legally binding security assurances,
• nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear technology,
• balance between safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear technology,
• procedural issues, i.e., background documentation and inclusion of the 2000 and/or 1995 background documents,
• substantive issues, i.e., the DPRK, verification and compliance,
• NGO participation, and
• non-state actor acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Discussion:

Following the speakers' presentations, several issues were raised regarding ways in which to approach the 2005 Review Conference. It was noted that a modest approach to the Conference would be more beneficial than overly ambitious expectations. It was emphasized that the regime should reflect on the original simplicity of what the Review Conference was supposed to be. However, issues such as terrorism, ways to respond to the North Korean challenge, and how to deal with the discovery of other clandestine nuclear programs need to be reincorporated into the review process. It was also stressed that States parties should be pragmatic in their approach, and that balance was the only way to find common ground. It was also stated that responsibility is the basic principle of dealing with any international agreement, and that the outcome of the Review Conference will depend heavily on procedural issues.

The "gap" between the responsibility of the Security Council and the IAEA to ensure compliance with the Treaty was also addressed. It was stated that the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was focused on that gap, and that it was either going to be a model for strengthening the current norm, or an effort to work outside of the norm to address compliance. The question of how an enforcement mechanism could be reintegrated into the NPT was also raised.

It was noted that States parties should be careful be ambitious when it comes to implementing and upholding agreements to support the regime. The need for a commonality of purpose in the review process was also emphasized in order to achieve consensus on what the NPT is and what it seeks to accomplish.

The establishment of an implementation and verification body for the NPT was identified as a mechanism that would be a positive step forward.

Four succinct recommendations were offered:

• A better atmosphere should be created between now and May 2005.
• The difficult issues should not be avoided. In this regard reference was made to the fundamental balance between the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.
• The General Assembly should be offered an opportunity to discuss Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), and there should be complementary work done by the Assembly and the Security Council on this issue.
• Rather than judging ambition or modesty, an alternative approach would be to only address a couple of issues with a very clear focus, such as clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapons or compliance, as not all of the issues need to be solved simultaneously.

Session II. Strengthening Article IV: Plugging The Fuel Cycle Loophole

The second session of the workshop addressed the following questions:

• What can be done to strengthen the link between the inalienable right to nuclear technology for peaceful uses and safeguards and nonproliferation obligations?
• Is there a need to revisit this right?
• What measures can be taken to limit the proliferation dangers of the most sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle?
• What is the IAEA's role in this?
• Are safeguards enough?
• Can limits on the development of fuel cycle technologies be accompanied by demonstrable and significant progress on disarmament?

The first speaker presented a paper entitled "Ways to Strengthen Article IV and Safeguards" in which he addressed how to deal with the nuclear fuel cycle consistent with nonproliferation objectives in the current environment. He also identified some of the major challenges regarding the fuel cycle, particularly with respect to Article IV of the Treaty, including:

• Illicit sources of supply and the threat of terrorist acquisition.
• Increased motivations to acquire nuclear weapons by both State and non-state actors.
• Increased access to the knowledge, know-how, and resources needed to build a nuclear capability.
• Increased diversified sources of technology and equipment.

He recommended two primary approaches - de jure and de facto - to address these challenges.

• De jure: Amending the NPT (a nearly impossible process with a very problematic outcome) or negotiating and bringing into force new politically or legally binding obligations.
• De facto: Focus on assurance of nuclear supply through:
  1. Measures to reinforce the existing global enrichment market.
  2. The establishment of consortia of nuclear fuel suppliers.
  3. The instituting of a nuclear fuel bank or banks of low enriched uranium.

The speaker pointed out that the de facto approaches contain two major advantages:

• They address most of the concerns that could arise with respect to assurance of supply.
• They put States that are reluctant to forego national sensitive fuel cycle activity in the position of having to provide a politically credible reason to other States for why they have to pursue a full national nuclear fuel cycle.

Two questions were put to the workshop for discussion:

• Are States' needs for a nuclear fuel cycle a question of security, national pride, power, or deterrence?
• What are the motivating factors and the incentives necessary to reinforce the nonproliferation treaty regime?

The second speaker during this session identified several challenges regarding Article IV and offered a number of recommendations. He categorized the challenges as:

• The existence of a black market in nuclear technology.
• The lack of a legal interpretation within the NPT of Article IV.
• The inherent imbalance in the NPT: NWS can have weapons while NNWS only have access to peaceful nuclear technology.
• NWS continually place restrictions on supply to NNWS corroding the relationship between the two.
• Grandfather effect: how to deal with facilities that already exist.

His recommendations included:

• Maintenance of the Additional Protocol, which provides access for the IAEA's inspectors.
• A more intelligence-based safeguards system.
• Strengthening of export controls.
• Possible creation of a mechanism that would curtail the right to peaceful uses for those member States found in violation of Article IV.
• Increased discussion of the political motivations behind acquisition of nuclear weapons.
• Discussion of an international system that does not rely on the existence of nuclear weapons.

Discussion:

During the discussion that followed the presentations, emphasis was placed on the interpretation of Article IV, and the possible future use of "nuclear fuel banks." In this context the relationship between Articles IV, I, and II was highlighted. It was noted that the NPT clearly states that countries who have signed the Treaty have agreed that their peaceful use rights can only be exercised in conformity with Articles I and II. It was also emphasized that "when a country makes clear to us that it does not have peaceful purposes, or lies to the international community for years about its program, it demonstrates to all of us that it does not have peaceful uses in mind." In this regard, it was pointed out that the Review Conference might need to consider the continued validity of Article IV regarding the inalienable right to produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the source of that right. The question was raised whether or not it was time to establish a qualitative difference between reprocessing and enrichment. It was also noted that although reprocessing has fewer civilian implications than enrichment, that long-term storage implications need to be addressed.

A substantive discussion was held on how to approach Article IV issues at the Review Conference. The following recommendations were offered:

• The right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy depends on whether States have earned that right; however, if a State is found to be in violation of its Treaty obligations, it should lose that right.
• States parties should explicitly declare that the misuse of nuclear technology would result in a suspension of their right to withdraw from the Treaty under Article X.
• There should be a multilateral, rather than unilateral, approach to the situation in order to avoid new discrimination against certain States.

It was also emphasized that altering Article IV in any way would a have negative impact because it would discourage countries outside the NPT from joining. In this context, the distinction between obligatory and voluntary measures was noted. For example, Iran implemented voluntary measures with respect to the Additional Protocol and the nuclear fuel cycle. A question was raised whether developing countries "really have the right to peacefully develop technology under full-scope safeguards?" It was noted that if countries that have spent millions to construct power plants were denied the right to develop nuclear energy, they would remain dependent on power from the outside.

The question was also raised whether States parties that do not possess nuclear technology, but that are seeking to obtain it, should be automatically considered as violators of the NPT, and therefore not be permitted access to nuclear technology. In this regard it was noted that the NPT should be a framework that member States can rely on year after year, and that the interpretations of the scope of Article IV should be carefully considered.

Discussions were also held on the proposals by IAEA Director-General Dr. Mohammed ElBaradei regarding multilateral or regional nuclear fuel centers. Along this line, the concept of a nuclear fuel bank under the control of the IAEA was also discussed. In this context the following issues were identified:

• The establishment of a commission responsible for a nuclear fuel bank would require the endorsement of members of the IAEA.
• What authority should the bank have over NPT States parties who do not wish to "deal with" the bank?
• A system of economic apartheid in the security sector will develop if countries with no nuclear facilities are forced to deal with the nuclear fuel bank, while more developed countries with already established fuel cycles can avoid doing so.

It was mentioned that the idea of a fuel bank was not to interfere with existing capabilities or the market place. It was explained that if a country could not find what it needed in the market, then the bank could provide it to avoid interruption of peaceful nuclear energy activities. The question of access to nuclear technology was also addressed by emphasizing that the supply of nuclear fuel exceeds demand at this point, and that there should therefore be no market reason for new fuel cycle capacities to come on line. The concept of a nuclear fuel bank under a multilateral system would make any participating member State a co-owner. It was noted that such ownership could potentially limit the areas where this dangerous technology might be located.

Section III: Nuclear Disarmament

The third section of the workshop addressed the following major questions:

• What are the prospects for implementing the 13 Practical Steps agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference?
• Should a multilateral verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons be the next step?
• If so, how can it be achieved?
• What would be the mandate for a CD subsidiary on nuclear disarmament?
• How can further reductions on non-strategic nuclear weapons occur?
• Can the three States not party to the NPT be incorporated into disarmament efforts?

The first speaker (a representative from a nuclear weapon State) opened his presentation by making three distinct points:

• While the goals of the NPT have not changed since 1968, disarmament is not an end in itself; achieving security is also important.
• Security is precisely the objective of the NPT as seen in the 1995 and 2000 agreements.
• International peace and security and halting the spread of nuclear weapons are all goals of the NPT.

He continued by noting that the challenges to global peace and security have changed since the Treaty's inception. Issues such as terrorism and parties outside the Treaty are different from the challenges the regime faced during the Cold War. While nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation are equally important, he emphasized that the present challenges need to be reflected in the regime's priorities. He also noted that there has been progress in recent years as the NPT has helped to decrease the nuclear arsenals of the NWS. In this regard, he referred to the reduction of the operational stockpile of one NWS to 200 warheads. He concluded by offering four recommendations:

• State parties need to be realistic in their expectations, especially when it comes to time tables for nuclear disarmament.
• FMCT negotiations should move forward as a confidence-building measure in the CD.
• Patience is needed for disarmament to achieve progress.
• Openness and honesty in dialogue are needed to confront concrete challenges.

The second speaker focused on the prospects for implementing the 13 Practical Steps. He made the following points

• Interpretation of the steps on "nuclear disarmament" and "general and complete disarmament" presents a challenge to the continued validity of the 13 Practical Steps.
• An obligation of results (implementation) and conduct (effort) exist within Article VI. The 13 Steps are therefore a reflection of a norm in Article VI - the rule of law with regards to arms control - and should be respected as such.

The speaker also offered the following three recommendations

• Recognition of the legitimacy of the call for nuclear disarmament given that the NWS continue to argue that nuclear weapons have a deterrence value.
• Amending the NPT is not realistic, but expanding the scope of obligations is feasible.
• NNWS should maintain their leverage regarding the scope of all obligations under the Treaty.

The third speaker made six main points regarding nuclear disarmament:

• The goals and obligations of the NPT have not changed. The NWS and NNWS remain parties for the same reasons, and therefore States parties should confirm all their obligations and not be selective.
• Disarmament is not an end in itself. It should been seen against the backdrop of the overall process of international security. The way to move forward is through a step-by-step process, i.e., security, stability, and verifiability.
• Progress can be achieved through transparency.
• Challenges have changed since the end of the Cold War, including: a) the possible re-integration of nuclear weapons in security policies; b) the need for NWS to lead by example; c) the critical importance of an FMCT, especially given the existence of about 370,000 tons of loose nuclear material and no comprehensive mechanism designed to deal with it; and d) the NPT's erosion as States outside the regime feel ignored.
• Confidence building is required in the fields of nonproliferation and disarmament. Instilling momentum into the process of disarmament would demonstrate the political will to promote implementation of the Treaty. One way to build on the 13 Practical Steps would be to agree that they exist.
• Honest dialogue on both nonproliferation and disarmament issues related to the NPT is needed. States parties should not shy away from discussing some issues that may, for some parties, be uncomfortable.

Discussion:

Emphasis was placed on the issue of security, and it was noted that it was difficult to understand how tenable the situation can be with only some States having the privilege of security through the possession of nuclear weapons. It was stressed that progress in nonproliferation needed to be matched by progress in disarmament. It was also noted that disarmament needed to be matched by compliance with nonproliferation obligations. It was further emphasized that, with respect to the relation between nonproliferation and disarmament, NWS were not advancing arguments to convince advocates of disarmament that nonproliferation was really working toward disarmament efforts.

The issue of verifiability regarding nuclear disarmament was also emphasized. It was stated that the principles of transparency, accountability, and verifiability are key to the principle of nuclear disarmament. Referring to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is generally considered illegal, it was noted that the applicable law holds that verifiability is essential to the efforts of disarmament. The participants identified the following questions to be considered in preparation for the Review Conference:

• What are the criteria for judging whether or not a NWS is meeting its obligations under Article VI?
• If nuclear weapons are never to be used, then isn't disarmament the next step?
• Can we achieve security without disarmament?
• Can proliferation be countered by supply-side denial of nuclear technology?
• Does focusing only on nonproliferation actually narrow our ability to deal with post-9/11 threats?

With regard to the FMCT, the following recommendations were made:

• The IAEA safeguards system should be considered proof that a verifiable treaty on FMCT dealing with both current stockpiles and future production is possible.
• The abundance of fissile material makes a verifiable treaty even more important.
• A legally binding instrument would build confidence that NWS are prepared to move forward, while a non-verifiable treaty would not.

It was also suggested that an FMCT would help turn a corner with the NWS psychologically as it would reinforce with a legally binding instrument a common goal between the NWS and the NNWS that fissile material will not be produced. In this context, it was noted that a non-verifiable FMCT could at least push the negotiations forward. It was further suggested that the security of NWS also needed to be taken into consideration during the course of the reduction of nuclear weapons. The notion that pragmatism, realism, and responsibility are needed when dealing with nuclear disarmament was asserted. When making nuclear disarmament verifiable, care must be taken given the new threats and challenges of terrorism. However, it was also suggested that a non-verifiable FMCT would pre-empt disarmament measures, and that a non-verifiable treaty would be contradictory to other obligations under the NPT.

Participants also emphasized that States parties need to live up to their agreements in the international security field, whether they are legally binding or not. To enhance security through arms control, verifiability and confidence building are necessary. The question was raised whether disarmament goals could really be achieved through nonproliferation?

Section IV: The 2005 Review Conference: Agreement At Any Cost?

The final session addressed the following six major questions:

• What outstanding issues should be addressed prior to the 2005 Review Conference, and how will this be accomplished?
• Is there a need for the Review Conference to reaffirm recommendations made during the 2000 and 1995 Conferences?
• How should a Review Conference's success be measured?
• What would be the consequences of a "failed" conference?
• Would changes in review process procedures enhance State parties' ability to forge agreement?

The first speaker during this session focused primarily on the question of, "How should a successful Review Conference be measured?" He presented several concrete components for success:

• States parties should participate in collective action through agreed and substantive results.
• Results should comprise practical measures and augmented standards of oversight and commitment by adoption of the Additional Protocol as the embodiment of new nonproliferation standards.
• There should be tangible progress on previously agreed to obligations under Article VI concerning nuclear disarmament.
• NWS should demonstrate their commitment to Article VI in a tangible way.
• Entry into force of the CTBT and FMCT should remain two key priorities.
• One of the best contributions that could be made is putting the CD back to work and agreeing on a program of work.
• A review of the controls over certain elements of the nuclear fuel cycle should be completed.

With regard to institutional mechanism to strengthen the review process, he proposed that:

• The existing preparatory process should be transformed into a series of one-week annual conferences of States parties that would consider the status of the Treaty. The final annual meeting could be extended one week.
• The current PrepCom bureau should be reconfigured into a standing five-member bureau that would have tenure throughout the preparatory meetings leading up to the Review Conference.
• An extraordinary session of the General Conference of States parties should be held in the event of a notification to withdraw.
• State parties should be more active in debates and should not be "passive observers."

The second speaker also discussed possible measures to achieve success at the 2005 Review Conference. He noted that a successful conference will be a function of how the States parties prepare in the months to come. He cautioned that if expectations are too high, the potential for failure will also be high. In addition, he emphasized that the States parties should not aim too low. He also emphasized that success will be measured by whether or not procedural issues can be resolved prior to the Conferences. He offered the following recommendations:

• Leave the NPT in at least as good of shape as it was when it was created, if not better.
• The NPT and the IAEA system of safeguards should be strengthened in order for success to be achieved.
• The implementation side of the Treaty should be much more effective.
• The three pillars of the Treaty should be re-examined: Are they all equally important?
• The events of the last five years should be taken into consideration prior to the 2005 Review Conference.
• In the absence of a consensus document, there should be strong political support for the elements of the NPT.

The speaker concluded by noting that if there is failure in the area of nonproliferation, it is likely that the NPT will fall apart much faster. He, however, admitted that consensus will not be easy to achieve.

Discussion:

It was noted that States parties should expect that the most important issues would be resolved at the last minute, and delegations should be prepared to cooperate to allow the Review Conference to start. It was also stated that the management of the conference would be one of the most critical elements. It was recalled that the joint P-5 statement issued just prior to the 2000 Review Conference, which purposefully omitted any reference to PAROS, contributed to the success of the Conference. It was also emphasized that the focus in 2005 should be on how to prevent nuclear weapons and nuclear material from being acquired or used by non-state actors. In this regard, it was pointed out that implementing Security Council Resolution 1540 was critical. Another view, however, maintained that reporting on the States' obligations under the NPT was as important as non-state actors and Resolution 1540 since reporting relates to accountability. In this regard, a call was made for more quantifiable and transparent reporting.

In response to a comment by one of the speakers regarding the three pillars of the NPT, it was stated that all three pillars should be considered of equal importance. Another participant noted that although all three pillars are important, at this point in time, nonproliferation needs to be attended to more than the others. Another view pointed out that all three pillars should be dealt with equally or the "three legged stool" will become very unstable.

With regard to the issue of possible future withdrawal from the Treaty, questions were raised whether the States parties should obtain a legal opinion on the position of the DPRK with respect to Article X. The question was raised as to what effect withdrawal stipulations, such as the restitution of nuclear equipment and facilities obtained under Article IV, the requirement to consult with States parties prior to withdrawal, or the denial of withdrawal to States that are under investigation for non-compliance, would have had on North Korea had they been in place. The question of under what legal authority the international community is raising the issue of withdrawal was also raised. In response to these questions, it was stated that the NPT does not provide for any legal advice on how to deal with withdrawal.

A number of other suggestion were offered on what should be addressed in order for the conference to be successful. These included:

• The 2005 Review Conference should be regarded as part of a process to enhance nonproliferation efforts. It was also stated that States parties should respect one another's positions and proposals as everyone agrees that the NPT should contribute to collective security for all.
• Future PrepComs should become a more coherent process with a broader text being circulated as a basis for discussions. It was also noted that States should address the issues that are linked, i.e., disarmament and nonproliferation.
• The final document should address the strengthened IAEA safeguards with a view to ensure compliance by States parties. In this context, reference was made to possible new enforcement mechanisms for the NPT regime.
• Nuclear disarmament, the CTBT, and nonproliferation efforts were all of great importance

Two related questions were considered central to the success of the conference:

• Can the Treaty's relevancy survive the challenge of the production of new nuclear weapons?
• Can the entry into force of the CTBT and a verifiable FMCT counter-balance the first challenge?

Conclusion

Mr. Jean du Preez from CNS closed the workshop by stating that the States parties have strong leadership to guide them towards success at the Review Conference, but that time is running out to reach agreement on some of the important issues that need to be resolved beforehand. He emphasized that the Treaty remains important for all, stating that if the Conference is to be successful, it should operate in a better atmosphere than the PrepCom. He concluded by suggesting that States parties should carefully consider the consequences of success at all costs, especially in the context of creating a final document.

[1] Ms. Risa Mongiello is a former Monterey Institute intern at the Department of Disarmament Affairs in New York.

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