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CNS NPT Workshop: Getting the Process Right for the 2007 PrepCom

Workshop Report
Preparing for 2010: Getting the Process Right

L'Impérial Palace Hotel
Annecy, France
16 and 17 March 2007

The Carnegie Corporation and the Ploughshares Fund, as well as the governments of France, Germany, Japan, Norway, and the Republic of Korea provided financial support for the workshop


Updated: May 3, 2007
[Workshop: participants | agenda ]


Continuing its longstanding and well established practice, the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), with the support of the Carnegie Corporation and the Ploughshares Fund, as well as the governments of France, Germany, Japan, Norway, and the Republic of Korea, hosted on 16 and 17 March 2007 in Annecy, France, a well attended and timely diplomatic workshop, entitled "Preparing for 2010: Getting the Process Right." The workshop held in preparation for the 2007 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, and attended by 70 participants, was widely regarded as one of the most useful of its kind as it resulted in-depth, yet informal discussions on several of the most pressing procedural and substantive issues facing the 2007 PrepCom and the NPT in general.

As was the case with previous CNS workshops of this kind, the 2007 event provided informal opportunities to consider and promote ways to preserve and strengthen the NPT, as well as to enhance the capacity of participants in the NPT strengthened review process. It also allowed interaction between leading governmental and nongovernmental experts in the field and exposure to alternative policy options.

The workshop was held under "Chatham House rules." This report, prepared by Jean du Preez, Director of the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program at CNS, provides an overview of the issues discussed at the workshop and the flavor of those discussions. The author of the report bears sole responsibility for its contents. The workshop agenda and list of participants are attached to this report.

The organizers wish to thank the sponsors, the speakers and moderators, as well as all workshop participants for their support and efforts in making the workshop successful.

The Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies is the only organization in the world dedicated exclusively to graduate education, executive training and research in the field of nonproliferation and disarmament. The unifying principle underlying the CNS approach is to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by training the next generation of policy experts and nonproliferation specialists and by disseminating timely information and analysis in this field. One of the Center's highest priorities at the moment is to actively promote common ground in support of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, in particular the NPT, with a view to prevent yet another failed Review Conference in 2010. The Center's International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program (IONP) is primarily tasked to develop practical policy options for the full implementation of the NPT and to disseminate timely policy analysis and information on the activities of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regimes. Key to this task is the promotion of substantive dialogue between governmental and non-governmental sectors on nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament and arms control through informal diplomatic workshops.

Executive Summary and General Observations

Given the current proliferation predicament and the potential impact of another "failed" Review Conference in 2010, the workshop took stock of current developments that will confront the 2007 PrepCom session with a view of identifying any potential common ground. The workshop also allowed in-depth discussions on ways to ensure that the strengthened review process consider principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the treaty so as to allow the PrepCom to make substantive recommendations for the 2010 Review Conference. As such the workshop was designed to assist the PrepCom Chairman-elect, Ambassador Yukiya Amano from Japan in his consultations with key Ambassadors and other senior representatives form NPT state parties, as well as with senior staff from the United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Organization. Also participating were several representatives from selected non-governmental organizations and think-tanks, as well as Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala (former United Nations Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs and President of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference) who delivered the workshop key-note speech.

The workshop agenda comprised six sessions which addressed both procedural and substantive issues related to the strengthened review process and prospects for the 2010 Review Conference. Each session began with a panel of speakers who presented their own perspectives on the given topic, followed by a moderated discussion open to workshop participants. During the first session, two members of the Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group provided perspectives on progress made since 2005 based on the perspectives of the Group. Other sessions addressed the strengths and weaknesses of the strengthened review process; the procedural deficit; available mechanisms for creating political momentum in support of the review process; possible strategies that might be used to ensure success in 2010. The final session allowed the 2007 PrepCom Chairman-elect to brief participants on his consultations in preparation for the PrepCom and to solicit inputs in this regard.

Selected papers presented and circulated by the panelists at the workshop are available on the CNS website:

In no means reflective of all views expressed during the workshop, the following general observations and findings were identified by the author of this report.

  1. While the 2005 Review Conference is widely considered as a failure having not adopted a final document, this "failure" does not translate into a lack of common ground, or call into question the validity of the NPT. It was rather the result of differences in emphasis placed on the treaty's "three pillars," and on ways to deal with key nuclear proliferation challenges. Moreover, there was a lack of political will among key state parties -- nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states alike -- to bridge these differences.
  2. The indefinite extension of the NPT was contingent on the other two decisions (the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and the Strengthened Review Process) and the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. These documents were central to the successful outcome of that conference despite its "failure" to adopt a final document. Given the clear linkage between the outcomes of the 1995 conference and the 2000 Review Conference, there should be unambiguous acceptance of these results as benchmarks for the forthcoming review process.
  3. In light of the unprecedented challenges facing the treaty today, renewed and increased efforts are needed to achieve an outcome at the 2010 Review Conference that would reflect and strengthen all state parties' continued confidence in the NPT as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, and more generally in multilateralism as the best way to maintain international security. This would require a strategy based on a combination of process, action and political will.
  4. To achieve an understanding on how to re-establish common ground lost since the 1995 and 2000 conferences, state parties need to acknowledge that the NPT is at risk of eroding, and that the maintenance of the integrity and authority of the treaty regime would only be possible through joint efforts and the re-establishment of the credibility of the pact. They should also recognize that the NPT provides an indispensable normative basis for all nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, and respect the interdependence between non-proliferation and disarmament.
  5. Although positive political will would be essential for any successful outcome in 2010, different opinions exist on the precise meaning of that phrase. Political will would require a common objective for constructive positive outcome(s) of the forthcoming review cycle, while recognizing that a range of interests and different priorities exist among state parties. As such, state parties should endeavor to accommodate those priorities and to achieve positive results in the process of reviewing the treaty with a view to strengthening it as they move forward.
  6. A number of initiatives could be taken to create political momentum in support of the 2010 Review Conference and overall implementation of the treaty including a NPT heads of state summit on the margins of the General Assembly session prior to the Review Conference, and a joint NWS statement that recognizes the range of interests and different priorities among state parties.
  7. All state parties should re-affirm their joint vision of a nuclear weapon free world through acceptance of realistic goals and the principle of reciprocity, and adopt a balanced approach reflecting the fundamental bargains underpinning the NPT. A way to forge renewed confidence in the treaty could be to formulate and adopt at the 2010 Review Conference a balanced plan of action based on new set of principles for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. These principles and the action plan should build on the treaty's own obligations and represent a balanced package deal on ways to deal with the most pressing challenges facing the treaty today.
  8. With respect to the perceived weak review process and the treaty's so-called procedural deficit, these deficiencies are not only the due to the formulation of the strengthened review process, nor are they related to the lack of institutional arrangements, but instead relate to a lack of political will to implement the treaty's obligations in a balanced manner. Nuanced differences exist among those who recognize the need for strengthening the procedural aspects of the review process, and those who doubt that the PrepCom could serve this role.
  9. While the role of consensus in the context of the strengthened review process continues to be crucial to ensure adherence to agreements reached at a multilateral conference, there seems to be a different emphasis on the value of the consensus rule under all circumstances. Over emphasizing the need for consensus might obscure the existence of deviating, but potentially important views. However, for recommendations on specific action to have effect, consensus would be required.
  10. A way to reflect the work of the PrepCom that may avoid a deadlock at the end of the PrepCom process would be for each PrepCom Chair to prepare a compendium of all substantive proposals made during a particular session, to be attached to a brief chairman's summary and passed on to the following session(s). Together with this "rolling compendium," early and continuing coordination among the PrepCom chairs, and if possible the presumed President of the Review Conference could provide the basis for a successful outcome of the conference.

Taking stock after 2005: Understanding the challenges and finding common ground

The workshop started by taking stock of the current nuclear nonproliferation situation in light of the disappointing outcome of the 2005 Review Conference with the aim of understanding the challenges and identifying potential common ground. Two members of the Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group presented papers in which they attempted to identify potential common ground, and practical disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives that may be feasible in the short-term.

One panellist argued that to strengthen or re-establish common ground, a number of "acknowledgements" would be required:

  • the NPT is in a state of crisis and it faces the risk of erosion - the risk being two-fold: violations of the non-proliferation obligation; and a perception of a "renaissance" of nuclear weapons;
  • the maintenance of the integrity and authority of the NPT can only be achieved through joint efforts and the re-establishment of the credibility of the pact:
  • the NPT provides for the indispensable normative basis for all nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts;
  • the interdependence between non-proliferation and disarmament;
  • the need for a joint vision of a nuclear weapon free world through acceptance of realistic goals and the principle of reciprocity; agreement on the role and purpose of review conferences and their outcome; and adopting a balanced approach reflecting the fundamental bargains underpinning the NPT.

The same panellist emphasized that a successful forthcoming review cycle would require setting the right signals through rapid agreement on procedural arrangements; unambiguous acceptance of the results of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences as benchmarks for the forthcoming review process; moving on from ideological posturing to openness and constructive engagement; and for the NWS to make a joint statement in particular on their commitment to nuclear disarmament, security assurances and universality. With regard to the substantive challenges facing the review process, he argued that to achieve a successful outcome would require a comprehensive and realistic "double track" approach. Such approach should reflect the fundamental bargains underpinning the NPT and thus be geared towards, on the one hand, strengthening the non-proliferation commitment of the NPT and, on the other hand, instilling a new momentum in the process of nuclear disarmament. He offered a number of tasks and objectives to this end.

The second panellist argued that opportunities to advance the treaty's goals in the run-up to the 2010 conference remain, but taking advantage of them would require visionary leadership, strong political will at the highest levels, and above all innovative and constructive cooperation among all key players to strengthen the core bargains that the treaty was founded on. He also emphasized that initiatives to address the challenges confronting the treaty must focus on the achievable, be balanced and should not to reinterpret, negate or diminish existing obligations, commitments, and undertakings. In this regard he argued that instead of singular approaches focusing only on the nonproliferation side of the NPT bargain, or through linkages aimed at stalling progress on nonproliferation, or by attempting to force equal treatment on issues such as nuclear disarmament or the situation in the Middle East, bridges need to be built between opposing views on ways to strengthen the treaty's core bargains. This, he suggested, would require a strategy based on a combination of process, action and political will.

The same panelist also proposed that a "new set of principles" should be developed around a balanced plan of action for adoption at the 2010 Conference. He argued that as opposed to a divisive debate on how to reflect the Treaty's implementation during the preceding review cycle, these principles and action plan should build on the Treaty's own obligations and represent a balanced package deal on ways to deal with the most pressing challenges facing the Treaty today. His suggested the following 10 principles:

  • universal application of the nonproliferation norm;
  • preventing NPT break-outs;
  • strengthening existing nonproliferation obligations;
  • peaceful use of nuclear energy;
  • countering nuclear terrorism;
  • achievable nuclear disarmament;
  • regional approaches and nuclear--weapon-free zones;
  • recognizing the need for negative security assurances;
  • accountability; and
  • the role of civil society, education, training and outreach

He also suggested a number of initiatives that could be taken to create political momentum in support of the 2010 Review Conference and overall implementation of the Treaty including a NPT heads of state summit to be convened on the margins of the 2009 General Assembly session and a joint NWS P-5 statement prior to the 2010 Review Conference.

During the subsequent discussions, wide support was expressed for the approaches suggested by both panelists. There was also strong support for the unambiguous acceptance of the results of 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. A general view was held that while the 2005 Review Conference failed to adopt a final document, this does not mean that there is an absence of common ground. Moreover, the "failure" of that conference, does not call into question the validity of the NPT, but was the result of deep differences in emphasis placed on the treaty's "three pillars" (nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy). Likewise are the differences on how to deal with key challenges facing the treaty. Although it was stressed that it would not be appropriate to characterize the NPT as being in "crisis," there was strong emphasis placed on the importance of avoiding, during the next review cycle, the kind of complacency exhibited at 2005 Review Conference.

The strengthened review process: Going back to the future

Three panelists offered their perspectives on the core issues underlying the outcome documents of 1995 Review and Extension Conference; the relationship between the resolution on the Middle East and the three decisions adopted at the 1995 Conference and the extent to which these agreements have been implemented; as well as the impact of the 2000 "improved" strengthened review process. The panelists and interveners pointed out that success in 1995 was the consequence of a package deal. The legally binding decision on indefinite extension of the NPT was therefore contingent on decisions on Principles and Objectives, a strengthened review process and a resolution on the Middle East. These documents were neither subordinate nor collateral, but rather central to the outcome. It was also pointed out that while from a treaty review perspective the 1995 conference could not adopt a final document, the conference did not fail since highly constructive discussions were held.

While prospects for a comparably positive outcome for the 2000 Review Conference looked rather dim as that conference approached, in particular given the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, and the failure of the United States to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), it was emphasized that the role of the New Agenda Coalition in forging consensus made the difference. However, the momentum did not carry over to the 2005 Review Conference which was held in the context of an even more dramatically changed security environment, marked by 9/11 in particular, the demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the end of the START process and the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT, coupled with diminishing confidence of some in multinational - as distinguished from national approaches - to pursuing and fulfilling policy objectives. What seemed to suffer most in 2005 was sustained political will and commitment to build a consensus that had characterized the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. This was manifested in the almost exclusive emphasis given by some to compliance with nonproliferation and by others in progress in implementing steps toward disarmament, especially as inscribed in the 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference.

The importance of defining political will and whether or not the PrepCom can be used to generate such will generated several views. One way to define political will is a through shared objective of achieving a constructive positive outcome that recognizes that priorities and views will differ while committing to an open discussion and debate that strives to reach accommodation where feasible. In so far as the strengthened review process is concerned there was an open question of what needed to change in order for the strengthened review process to work as intended. It was considered critically important to take reciprocal steps that address the legitimate concerns of all parties as we go forward.

The main conceptual points emerging from this session included the following:

  • the importance of positive political will in support of a successful review conference;
  • deficiencies are not due to the formulation of strengthened review but its implementation;
  • the importance of reviewing the treaty in all of its aspects;
  • political will should be built on the shared objective of a constructive positive outcome recognizing that a range of interests and different priorities exist among state parties; and
  • that this understanding should be the basis for striving to accommodate those priorities and to achieve positive results in the process of reviewing the treaty with a view to strengthening it as one moves forward.

Preparing for 2010: Working within the confines of the existing strengthened review process

While the previous two sessions reflected a general understanding that a positive outcome of the review process required a high degree of consonance on substance and of political will to achieve this, the panelists in this session examined the procedural measures that would be conducive to such an outcome in 2010.

The panelists and interveners together painted a cogent picture of the issues likely to arise during the PrepCom, and of the problems that would have to be dealt with as a result. There was much support for the contention that given the pressure the Treaty was currently under, strong efforts should be made to achieve an outcome that would reflect, and if possible strengthen, the state parties' continued confidence in the NPT as the mainstay of the non-proliferation regime, and more generally in multilateral measures to maintain international security. Some warned in this context that a lowest-common-denominator final document might be of little value. There seemed to be wide agreement that a final document should reflect states' preoccupations with all aspects of the Treaty and should not give undue prominence to some issues at the expense of others. While many speakers referred to "political will" as a sine qua non for a positive outcome of the review cycle, it was noted that there did not seem to be general agreement on the precise meaning of that phrase.

The role of consensus in the context of the strengthened review process was also discussed. Traditionally seen as essential to give meaning to the outcome of a multilateral conference, this emphasis seemed to have somewhat shifted. On the one hand, it was said, overmuch stress on consensus (in the sense of an absence of expressed disagreement) might obscure the existence of deviating, but potentially important views. On the other hand there was support for the view that recommendations on specific action to have effect, consensus would be required.

Among various suggestions for ways of handling proposals during the preparatory process in a way that would avoid a deadlock at the end of the PrepCom process, was that each PrepCom Chair should prepare a compendium of proposals made, to be attached to the Chair's summary and passed on to the following session(s). Much was said about the need for the early adoption of an agenda, preferably, as was suggested, on the basis of the precedent of the 2000 Review Conference. The need (or desirability) of early and continuing coordination among the chairs of the PrepCom and if possible the presumed President of the Review Conference was recognized as were the practical problems of getting this done. To some, this question seemed to be an aspect of an eventual discussion on further institutional aspects of the review process.

There were several references to the possibility of adding a fourth PrepCom session, possibly a brief one just prior to the Conference, but most interveners appeared to discount this as being of dubious value. On the question of having plenary debates in the PrepCom, various pros and cons were advanced. A suggestion that opening statements be limited was not generally supported. The majority of participants saw a plenary debate as virtually unavoidable.

Dealing with the procedural deficit

Several interesting proposals were made by one of the panellists on ways to deal with the Treaty's procedural deficit. Two basic perspectives were identified: (1) There is a procedural deficit, and addressing it would enhance compliance, accountability, effectiveness and trust in the Treaty; and (2) there is no "procedural gap", but instead there exist an "unhealthy fixation" on procedural aspects. The review process is and should remain a forum to discuss and achieve "policy convergence" in addressing challenges to the Treaty.

It was clear from the discussions that nuanced differences exist among those who recognize the need for strengthening the procedural aspects of the review process, such as whether there should be regular or emergency Meetings of State Parties to address important events (such as withdrawals), and those who doubt that the PrepCom could serve this role. It was also pointed out that the way in which the 2007 PrepCom session deals (or not deal) with the North Korean (DPRK) situation would be a "test case" for the Treaty's ability to respond to important challenges/events.

Although not directly related to the overall topic of the session, one of the panellists presented four substantive working papers on U.S. perspectives on nuclear disarmament. While these papers were welcomed, and considered to be a positive contribution to framing the nuclear disarmament debate, it was pointed out that the papers require further study. The rejection in one of the papers of the value of the "grand bargain" or "package deal" arguments and an assertion that Article VI should be seen as no more than a "declaration of intent" stimulated a debate inter alia on the NPT's negotiating history, where some participants recalled the 1967-8 negotiations, while others pointed at the 1995 indefinite extension of the treaty, based on a set of documents agreed to in a post Cold War context.

Another panellist reminded the meeting of the relationship between compliance and universality. It was underlined that the best universalization method would be complete nuclear disarmament. But pending such a development, the issue of universalisation clearly needs to be seriously discussed in the coming review cycle.

Getting the politics right: A recipe for success

This session considered mechanisms available to create political momentum in support of the review process. It also addressed the continued value of caucus groups in the context of the NPT review process and how their roles might be modified. In addition the session considered what would constitute failure or collapse of the NPT and its review process, how success could be defined, and strategies and tactics that might be used to ensure success in 2010.

There were positive expressions on the value of involvement of political leaders and policy makers, and cross-regional groupings, together with inputs from civil society, research institutions and industry representatives. Mixed views were, however, expressed on the value of regional groupings, and it was suggested that such groupings should be confined to information sharing. It was pointed out that these groupings often afford cover to "recalcitrant" States Parties to hide behind the group, preventing the PrepCom chair or Review Conference president from dealing directly with a particular problem.

The following factors were considered to contribute to the success (or conversely the failure) of the NPT and its review process:

  • a lack of further withdrawals;
  • a further expansion of levels of transparency by NWS as an aspect of permanence with accountability;
  • continuing to confine divisions to matters of implementation, modalities and conditionality, rather than giving rise to questions about the relevance and salience of the Treaty;
  • balanced treatment of the three pillars;
  • respecting the status of past, agreed outcomes and decisions;
  • elaboration of benchmarks for implementation (i.e., on nuclear disarmament, universal acceptance of the Additional Protocol, etc);
  • a conducive external environment (e.g. further progress towards ratification of the CTBT, and progress in the Conference on Disarmament, or conversely stultification of the Conference);
  • greater shared recognition of underlying values and responsibilities; and
  • increased attention to the plinth on which the three treaty pillars stand as well as to the three pillars themselves.

Prospects for the 2007 NPT PrepCom: Perspectives of the Chair-elect

This session was designed to allow the 2007 PrepCom Chairman-elect, Yukiya Amano, to brief participants on his consultations in preparation for the PrepCom. He indicated that there is wide support for his proposal to solve the procedural problems at the outset of the meeting so as to allow discussions on all the substantive issues relevant to the NPT. He emphasized that a full exchange of views on substantive issues and good preparation of future meetings at the 2007 PrepCom are crucial to the success of subsequent PrepCom sessions and the Review Conference. He expressed the hope that state parties share the common objective to get the PrepCom off to a good start.

The Chairman-elect emphasized his intention for the PrepCom to adopt the agenda and take note of the indicative timetable at the outset and start the meeting promptly and smoothly. He warned that if this would not be possible, he will be obliged to suspend the meeting at a very early stage so as to avoid getting bogged down with a procedural debate as was the case during the 2005 Review Conference.

He also emphasized the importance of formulating the agenda and indicative timetable in a way in which the three pillars of the NPT can be addressed in a balanced manner. In addition, he mentioned that many state parties wish to specifically discuss nuclear disarmament and security assurance issues while the NWS are eager to explain their endeavors towards this end. Other issues of keen interest to states parties include non-proliferation and regional issues, including a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East, and the implementation of Article X.

He also indicated that the PrepCom need to reach an agreement/understanding on the procedural arrangements for the 2008 and 2009 sessions, but that procedural arrangements for the Review Conference should be finalized at the 2009 PrepCom session. In this regard he expressed the hope that agreements/understandings could be reached on the venue and dates for further meetings. He also indicated that it would be advantageous to identify the names of the countries and persons who will chair future meetings well in advance, in order to help ensure continuity.

He informed participants that he intends to prepare a factual summary under his own responsibility on the outcome of the discussion on substantive issues and preparations for future meetings.


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