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Comprehensive Test Ban TreatyStatements by Ratifiers and Signatories to the CTBTGermanySpeech by Joschka Fischer Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs For years it seemed the nuclear threat had been curbed at any rate, if not altogether banished. Disarmament treaties stipulated reductions in stocks of nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction built up during the Cold War, missiles were demolished, war-heads dismantled, whole arsenals destroyed. Currently, however, there is a danger of the disarmament process coming to a standstill - and given the dramatically changed situation stagnation is tantamount to a setback,
and that means new and heightened dangers for international - security. The international community's efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons have reached a
critical juncture: - In South Asia there is a risk the recent nuclear tests and unresolved conflicts may trigger a nuclear arms race - Uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear technology and know-how undermines the stability of whole regions - By the same token, the rapid development and proliferation of long range ballistic missile systems entails incalculable risks for both regional and global security and
stability - The Geneva Disarmament Conference, where in past years significant progress was accomplished in the field of multilateral disarmament, is currently deadlocked. It is high time the public and the politicians were alerted to the dangers inherent in the present situation. We are standing on thin ice. We must prevent this crisis developing into a threat to the entire non-proliferation regime and the successes of nuclear disarmament. It remains our goal to achieve a world-wide ban on all. weapons of mass destruction. - The Chemical Weapons Convention was a significant milestone along this road. - We have also agreed to ban biological weapons. What is still needed, however, is a convincing verification regime. Together with a number of partners Germany will shortly be tabling a new initiative on this issue at the ongoing negotiations - The elimination of nuclear weapons is defined as a goal of the nonproliferation Treaty. Obviously this cannot be achieved at one stroke, but that is no reason to abandon the idea from the very beginning. What is needed is stamina, for the long haul coupled with a practical step-by-step approach. One step of enormous practical and. political significance is the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. This Treaty could be a means to inject fresh dynamism into the non-proliferation regime: under the Treaty non-nuclear-weapon states are prevented from developing military viable Weapons and nuclear-weapon states are prevented by the ban on nuclear tests from constantly developing new nuclear weapons. No new tests spells no new weapons in effect. Priority is to be given instead to non-proliferation and disarmament. It is of the utmost urgency therefore that the Treaty enters into force as soon as possible. It has been ratified by 48 countries, including Germany in August last year. Above all
those states whose instruments of ratification must under Article IV be deposited prior to the Treaty's entry into force are now called upon to do so. I appeal to India and
Pakistan to sign the Treaty and honour the commitments they made to the UN General Assembly, and I call on North Korea to do likewise. I also appeal to the
nuclear-weapon states Russia,, China and the United States. to live up to the special responsibility they bear for the non-proliferation regime and to ratify the Treaty forthwith. At their Washington summit in April NATO Heads, of State and Government called for the early ratification of the Test-Ban Treaty. I therefore welcome the -US Senate decision to vote on ratification in the next few days. Ratification in Washington would. send a strong message in support of the Treaty to match the signal we hope to send from Vienna. .The issue is not just the pros and cons of the Test Ban Treaty itself. What is at stake is the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty - a cornerstone of nuclear disarmament - and the future of multilateral arms control. Right now we must focus on the Non-Proliferation-Treaty review conference to be held next spring. The entry into force of the Test Ban Treaty can be a milestone in ensuring a successful NPT conference 2000. Should it fail to enter into force, however, that would have dramatic consequences, undo many years of hard work and also jeopardize other parts of the nuclear disarmament acquis. The security gains achieved in decades of hard work since the Non-Proliferation-Treaty must not be set at risk by allowing one of the cornerstones of that security to collapse. Ladies and gentlemen, Germany strongly supports the talks between the United States and Russia on further deep cuts in their strategic nuclear arsenals in the framework of a START III treaty. We welcome the unilateral reductions in the French and British nuclear arsenals as well as the United Kingdom's introduction of important measures to enhance transparency- and its decision to maintain its nuclear forces at reduced readiness. France's decision to give up for good its nuclear testing-site is also a step in the right direction. We for our part have urged. that NATO's spring summit should mandate a study within the Alliance of options to be developed in the field of confidence and security building measures, verification, nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament. The key, however, to the success of our efforts to curb proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a comprehensive, global approach. We must and we will get multilateral disarmament moving once more; through the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and the opening in the near future of negotiations in Geneva on a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons (the so-called "cut-off treaty"). This is the only way we can strengthen also the universal validity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The elimination of weapons of mass destruction is a protracted, expensive and politically complex process. . Yet the recent tensions in South Asia send a message that is loud
and clear: nuclear weapons do not mean automatic gains in security. They frequently have a destabilizing impact, they consume enormous resources and are difficult to
control. Countries that have hitherto not acceded to the Treaty ought to realize that development and possession of nuclear weapons, far from enhancing their security, raises
the grim spectre of escalation that threatens not only themselves but also the entire region. Their security and the sustainable development of their societies would be better
served by acceding to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and subsequently the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Disarmament and arms control must provide answers to new -questions. Given the rapid proliferation of missile technology, how can we achieve greater transparency and
also a clearer demarcation between civilian and military uses? How can ballistic missile defence systems 'evolved in response to the risks of proliferation be made compatible
with existing agreements, so the development of such systems does not itself- generate new risks or a new arms race? Is there. any basis for new regional nonproliferation
regimes, also in Asia or the Middle East? However, the crux of successful disarmament is the firm political will of all -concerned not to resort to military force in order to
settle political differences. Concerted and successful diplomacy in the field of regional conflict management can also provide further scope for disarmament. Ladies and gentlemen, |
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