Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Statements by Non-Signatory States

Pakistan

Statement by Ambassador Shaukat Umer

Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Pakistan in Vienna

Mr. President,

It gives me great pleasure to congratulate you on your election to the Presidency of this Conference. Your unanimous endorsement for this high office testifies to the significant role Japan has played in promoting the global disarmament agenda. We are confident that your consummate diplomatic skills and wide experience would lead this Conference to a successful conclusion.

2. We welcome the opportunity to address this important conference.

3. Pakistan has always supported the objectives of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We supported the CTBT1s endorsement in the Conference on Disarmament and voted in favour of the Treaty at the General Assembly of the United Nations. In contrast, our neighbour prevented the consensus in the CD and voted against the Treaty in the UN, declaring that it will never sign or ratify the CTBT.

4. Today, when this Conference is engaged in an endeavour to safeguard the future of the Treaty, it is necessary to identify the real challenges to its objectives and purposes and indeed to the broader goal of promoting disarmament and non-proliferation. It would also be pertinent to highlight the consequences of the actions and intentions of some of the states whose adherence to the CTBT is essential for its entry into force.

5. The failure of major powers to confront India's real designs in rejecting the CTBT emboldened its government to take the fateful decision to conduct its nuclear tests in May 1998 and to declare itself a nuclear weapon state. Thus an ominous new dimension to the nuclear scene in South Asia was introduced. The Indian nuclear tests, driven by an insatiable quest for great power status, recast the terms of the debate on CTBT. Pakistan faced a grave challenge aggravated by hostile statements emanating from the Indian leadership. It was asserted that Pakistan should be dealt with forcefully in the new environment of a transformed strategic balance in the region. Questions were also raised about Pakistan's nuclear capability. It was proclaimed that by exploding its devices, India had called "Pakistan's bluff"., This was a dangerous assumption as it could have easily lead to serious miscalculations.

6. The weak, if not solicitous, response of the world community to India's tests and threats, conveyed the unambiguous message that Pakistan should not count on any international assistance in the preservation of its independence and territorial integrity. It was brought home to us that we alone were responsible for safeguarding our security. Pakistan was thus obliged to restore the strategic balance in the interest of its own security as well as regional stability.

7. Our failure to respond to the Indian tests would have eroded the delicate and de facto nuclear deterrence which had existed in South Asia for more than a decade.

8. There is a fundamental and qualitative difference between the tests conducted by India and those conducted by Pakistan. The Indian tests were meant to herald that country's great power status. They had also destabilized the security balance in South Asia. Pakistan's tests were purely in self defence and served the cause of peace and stability by reestablishing mutual deterrence in South Asia.

9. At the same time, Pakistan acted with a great sense of responsibility. We emphasized the need to prevent a nuclear and missile arms race. We declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. We expressed our desire for mutual restraint in the operational deployment of nuclear weapons. We sought to evolve a risk reduction mechanism and to maintain deterrence at the minimum level.

10. The announcement of the Indian nuclear doctrine reconfirms that country's goal of acquiring a massive nuclear war-fighting capability - a "triad" of up to 400 operationally deployed ground, air and sea based nuclear weapons. This doctrine has added a new dimension to Pakistan's security concerns. The international community must call on India to give unequivocal assurances against the implementation of the proposed doctrine which threatens to unleash a massive nuclear arms race in South Asia and will crate a hair-trigger security environment. It should also endorse the concept of strategic restraint in South Asia proposed by Pakistan.

11. If the Indian nuclear doctrine remains unchallenged and is not explicitly disavowed, Pakistan would be required to take appropriate action to preserve the credibility of its nuclear deterrence and the capability for conventional self defence. In such circumstances, we may need to re-evaluate the impact of arms control on our security. The CTBT could be subverted if India decides to conduct further tests to fulfil its ambitious nuclear plans.

Mr. President,

12. Article XIV of the CTBT which requires compulsory adherence by the 44 States listed in the Annex to the Treaty, is based on the fundamental assumption of collective and reciprocal restraint by all the States concerned. A nuclear weapon test by any of these States could subvert the CTBT. Furthermore, the goal of bringing the Treaty into force could also unravel if one or more of the nuclear weapon States reject the ratification of the CTBT. This would signal that nuclear testing could be resumed in future.

13. India's absence from this Conference is mystifying. We earnestly hope that the ominous message which this decision conveys, in the backdrop of its nuclear doctrine, would not, yet again, be lost on the international community.

14. Rejection of the CTBT would further add to the tensions which have arisen over arms control issues between the major powers specially on the issue of preserving the ABM Treaty. If such plans are implemented the nuclear arms race may well be revived between the nuclear weapon states. The CTBT would fall by the wayside and the goals of nonproliferation and disarmament dealt a crippling blow. Thus, while South Asia has received considerable attention since the nuclear tests of May last year, we hope that the nuclear weapon states will also act responsibly at this juncture.

15. We remain committed to adhering to the CTBT in an atmosphere free of coercion. Such coercion has not been removed, despite some progress and temporary relief. We hope that as a result of the intense dialogue held by Pakistan, the coercive atmosphere would be fully removed at the earliest point in time.

16. In conclusion, Mr. President, let me thank you once again for giving us an opportunity to present our viewpoint on a subject of vital importance to the international community.


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