James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction with training & analysis

Old Ebbitt Grill
Washington, D.C.

8:30 a.m. EDT
Friday, October 1, 1999

MR. SCHEINMAN: Thank you very much. I was told I could sit, but my former boss (John Holum) stood and I will follow his example, as I've always tried to do. (Scattered laughter.)

It was a Republican American president, Dwight Eisenhower, in 1958, who started the process of trying to negotiate CTBT. That didn't materialize, and if you look in Eisenhower's memoirs, you'll find that he says this is one of the greatest disappointments in his career -- that he had not managed to achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and that an intensified nuclear arms race ensued.

Non-proliferation is a fundamental U.S. security and political objective. The Nonproliferation Treaty, in which we are instrumental leader underscores that interest. The Comprehensive Test Ban (CTBT) is very tightly linked to nonproliferation. The CTBT is explicitly inscribed in the preamble of the Nonproliferation Treaty. It is embedded in the principles of Article VI of the treaty which calls for ending the arms race and moving forward toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

At the 1995 conference on the extension of the NPT, the parties agreed a set of principles and objective as part of a politically binding package that resulted in the indefinite extension of the treaty, a primary objective of the United States. In the section devoted to nuclear disarmament the first principle and objective listed was 'completion of negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996". It was the only objective that was given an explicit timeline for achievement. That Treaty was negotiated, opened for signature, and signed by a very large number of states. The Congress has now been mandated by the administration to complete the treaty through timely action by the Senate.

CTBT has been a perennial issue on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, and it has had exceptionally strong and explicit support from a very wide spectrum of states (allied and non-aligned alike) from the non-nuclear weapons state community, and increasingly, of course, from the weapons states themselves.

Failure to achieve consensus on how to address the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was an underlying reason why two of the four NPT Review conferences in 1980 and 1990 were unable to achieve a consensus final document. It has been the benchmark criterion for judging whether the nuclear weapons states have been fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the NPT. It is a political symbol of the willingness of the nuclear weapons states to move forward toward the eventual disposal of their nuclear weapons stockpiles as international political security conditions permit.

If we cannot achieve entry into force of the CTBT, if we cannot have the United States take the lead from this effort by having the Senate send its advise and consent to confirm this treaty, then what chance, you might ask, do we have to make other progress?

In the period before the 1995 extension conference, some countries sought to link the outcome of the extension conference -- which was so critical for us -- to successful negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. But in the final analysis, we managed to reverse that position, by saying that the conclusion of the CTBT was dependent upon the indefinite extension of the NPT. And that is what we finally achieved.

But that of course established an unambiguous expectation that a CTBT would be concluded once the indefinite extension took place. And -- most importantly -- that once concluded, it would be brought into force, and it that would be implemented.

As John Holum pointed out, it requires 44 parties for CTBT to enter into force. Two of those whose participation is required-- Pakistan and India -- have not signed and with their tests last year have taken steps contrary to the purposes of the CTBT. Whether that can be altered at this time is very problematic, but whether that can be altered in the longer run, should not be. Both states have made declarations to the effect that they would sign the treaty, but both have also given indications that at this time, they would not.

The failure of the United States, which led on this treaty, and to which this Administration has given its strongest support, to ratify, would be very, very contrary to U.S. security and political interests, which are embedded in non-proliferation in general and the NPT in particular -- which as I have said is evaluated in part by how well the treaty contributes toward the goals of eliminating nuclear arsenals.

It would also be a huge disservice to the United States not to bring this treaty into force in our efforts to successfully pursue the agenda that we will take into the 2000 NPT Review Conference next spring. And the objectives that we will pursue when the Conference on Disarmament opens for business next year and takes up the Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty, which as you know is the quantitative counterpart to the qualitative CTBT in moving down the road of progressive delegitimization and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. And it certainly would undermine our claims to be a leader in the world of nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament.

The CTBT has a specific objective, making it one of the building blocks of eventual elimination of nuclear arms. It is not and we have rightly resisted it being the vehicle for nuclear disarmament per se. It's part of the nuclear disarmament process -- a step towards the goal of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. It serves the national interest, not only in substance with the constraints on the development of new nuclear weapons of all states including China and Russia as well as Iran, Iraq and other states regarding whom we have nuclear concerns, but also as a bona fide step in the implementation of Article VI of the NPT, which itself ,as I have said, is the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime which is a core U.S. political and security interest.

I believe that it was well understood in 1995 that failure to achieve a CTBT in 1996 that effectively precluded the development of new generations of nuclear weapons would be regarded as an act of bad faith and could undermine and damage the NPT. It needs to be understood today, on the threshold of the CTBT conference that, as John mentioned, failure of the United States to ratify the treaty to ratify the treaty in whose achievement we played such an important role could have an equally if not more pernicious effect on the nonproliferation regime and on confidence in the United States as a leader in moving the world further away from nuclear weapons.

Thank you.

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