Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Non-Proliferation and the Test Ban Treaty

Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr.
Hon. Lawrence Scheinman

There is an urgent need for the Senate to approve U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a treaty that verifiably and permanently ends the practice of conducting nuclear explosive tests. Otherwise, the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, which is linked to the CTBT, is likely to unravel.

The link between the test ban and the NPT regime is an explicit one. The Preamble of the NPT expresses the desire of the states parties, now 186 nations, to see the completion of a comprehensive test ban. When the indefinite extension of the NPT was negotiated in 1995, an historic diplomatic achievement, an associated consensus agreement called the Statement of Principles and Objectives specifically called for the completion of the test ban by the end of 1996. This was the only objective that was given a specific timeline for achievement and, while the CTBT was opened for signature in 1996, failure to ratify it will be seen by significant non-nuclear weapon states as a violation of this commitment.

Failure to ratify the CTBT would seriously undermine United States and international security in the 21st Century. It would materially compromise our ability to promote our arms control and nonproliferation agendas in multilateral forums. Political leaders in the major industrialized nations, international organizations, and elsewhere have stated that the spread of nuclear weapon is and will continue for the foreseeable future to be the most significant threat to international peace and stability. Just as the United States demonstrated leadership by successfully pushing to make the NPT permanent in 1995, the United States must lead today in order to avoid a world in which many states possess nuclear weapons with every conflict carrying the potential to go nuclear. Ratifying the CTBT and working to secure its entry into force is an important step toward ensuring that such a dangerous scenario never becomes reality.

CTBT negotiations were completed in September 1996 after more than forty years of work initiated by President Eisenhower, a Republican, who later noted that his greatest disappointment as President was his failure to complete the test ban before leaving office. President Clinton realized this long-held U.S. foreign policy objective and was the first national leader to sign the CTBT. While the Treaty has since been signed by more than 150 nations and ratified by more than 50, it cannot enter into force until ratified by the United States and other designated states.

A negative vote in the U.S. Senate, or even delay in considering the CTBT could have disastrous implications. Either of these actions would be tantamount to stating to potential proliferators that although we have not tested in seven years and have no intention of testing in the foreseeable future, you have the green light. If the U.S. fails to commit to the Treaty, it is likely that India and Pakistan will conduct further nuclear tests or that nations such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and/or Syria eventually would test nuclear weapons. Should any of these states test nuclear weapons, it is all but certain that many other states such as Japan, South Korea, and others would reconsider their status as non-nuclear weapon states. The NPT regime could very easily unravel unless the United States takes a leadership role in bringing the CTBT into force and the strongest sign of this leadership would be for the United States to itself ratify the Treaty.

The benefits of the CTBT ratification to U.S. national security and to international peace and security are enormous, and the consequences of failure to ratify are severe. As Paul Nitze recently noted in a letter to senators on this issue, "The Senate is soon to be faced with a critical choice between approving a treaty that would bolster international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons on the one hand and condoning the continuation of nuclear proliferation and the weakening of the non-proliferation regime on the other." To us, the choice is clear.


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