Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Ratification of CTBT in U.S. National Security Interest

by Tariq Rauf


Introduction

The rejection by the U.S. Senate of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by a vote of 51 to 48, on Wednesday, 13 October 1999, has sent a chilling message of seeming disregard for multilaterally negotiated nuclear arms control agreements and strikes a note of isolationism in an increasingly globalized world. Following the vote, President Bill Clinton pledged that his administration would continue to champion the cause of the CTBT, would maintain the US moratorium on further nuclear testing, and would strengthen efforts to bring about the early entry into force of the Treaty.

Ending nuclear explosive testing has been on the global arms control agenda for over forty years and was history's longest sought and hardest fought arms control treaty. Virtually all post-World War II US Presidents have grappled with this issue and President Dwight Eisenhower described the failure to achieve a permanent ban on nuclear testing as the greatest disappointment of any administration-of any decade-of any time and of any party.

On 24 September 1996, the United States-which had conducted in excess of 1,000 nuclear tests, the largest number of any nation-demonstrated its global leadership in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by being the first country to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty. Since then, 156 other countries-including China, Russia, South Africa, Japan, all NATO partners and European Union members-have also signed this Treaty.

The CTBT will enter into force once 44 nations operating nuclear reactors have ratified. Thus far 26 of the 44 have already done so, including France and the United Kingdom. US ratification would encourage such action by the Russian Duma and the Chinese People's Congress, as well as sending a clear signal regarding US leadership in preventing nuclear proliferation and reducing the nuclear danger. It would add credibility to Washington's effort to halt nuclear weapon proliferation in South Asia, Northeast Asia and the Middle East.

Background

Negotiations on a CTBT were conducted in three phases not directly related to one another. During 1957-1963, tripartite-US, UK, and USSR-discussions took place but fell apart due to differences over verification, with the Soviets holding out for a minimal inspection regime. From 1977 to 1980, another attempt was made at tripartite talks on a CTBT and limited progress was achieved on a set of principles, but differences continued over verification.

Further progress toward a total ban on all nuclear explosions continued to be stymied by the politics of the Cold War and the requirements of strategic modernization. It was not until the fall of 1992, following the collapse of the USSR, that the US Congress mandated the administration to impose a moratorium on further testing and to complete a CTBT by the fall of 1996. In July 1993, President Clinton suspended US nuclear testing, provided that other nuclear weapon states also maintained testing moratoria, and called for renewed negotiations banning all nuclear-weapon testing. After three years of bitter and intense negotiation, a CTBT finally opened for signature in New York in September 1996.

Why the CTBT is in the US National Security Interest

A CTBT is unquestionably in the US national interest for a number of key reasons: 1) it will preserve the US' immense lead in nuclear weapon designs; 2) it will prevent China and Russia from modernizing their nuclear arsenals and catching up with the US; 3) it will greatly add to Washington's diplomatic clout in fighting proliferation; and 4) it will create an international legal regime to investigate suspicious events in other countries.

Preserving the US Lead in Nuclear Weapons

The United States has traditionally conducted nuclear tests for at least six reasons: 1) to achieve and demonstrate a weapons capability; 2) to develop, certify, and modernize warheads; 3) to maintain stockpile reliability; 4) to determine and evaluate weapons effects; 5) to enhance safety of existing designs; and 6) to retain the technological infrastructure for nuclear armaments. According to leading US nuclear weapon scientists, for at least a decade, nuclear testing has not been considered necessary to maintain US stockpile reliability or to improve safety features. As President Bush cancelled new weapon acquisition programs, there is no need for testing new designs or evaluating weapons effects. Safety and reliability, as well as infrastructure retention, is already being accomplished through a vast state-of-the-art "science based stockpile stewardship" program. The US ability to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile is grounded in the experience of more than 1,000 nuclear explosive tests, of 150 nuclear tests with modern weapon types, and approximately 15,000 (non-nuclear explosive) surveillance tests. Each weapon in the enduring stockpile has been thoroughly tested.

In July 1995, an eminent group of US nuclear scientists produced a report for the Energy Secretary on options for preserving safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in a no-test regime. This report, JSR-95-320, called JASON, concluded that if the US did not develop any new warhead designs, it could assure the safety and reliability of its existing nuclear stockpile by: a) ensuring close surveillance; b) developing new experimental and computational capabilities for stockpile management; c) maintaining a strong industrial and scientific infrastructure; d) improving the performance margins of its weapons, for example, by increasing the in-fill of tritium; and e) rebuilding or remanufacturing warheads of proven and certified designs, of which the US has five, if and when necessary.

On the basis of these five "safeguards" recommended by JASON as well as other conservative scientific advice, President Clinton with the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, national weapons laboratories, and the intelligence agencies concluded that it was in the US national security interest to join the CTBT. In reaching this decision a number of "safeguards" were adopted-these included non-explosive testing, super computer simulations, a ($1.7 billion) National Ignition Facility (NIF) to be built at the Livermore National Laboratories, increased funding for all three nuclear weapons labs-Livermore, Los Alamos and Sandia-to preserve the scientific-technological infrastructure; and maintaining the operational readiness of the Nevada Test Site. The stockpile stewardship programme of the Department of Energy is being funded at a level of $4.5 billion annually, compared to the average support level of $3.7 billion annually for nuclear weapons during the cold war.

Currently, the US does not intend to rebuild warheads on a regular basis upon expiry of projected lifetimes of the weapons, but will use nuclear simulation to determine rebuilding necessity if flaws appear in existing designs-thus far, the very few flaws that existed on older warhead designs were all discovered through non-nuclear-explosive technologies. Three types of experiments can be used for purposes of determining safety and reliability of nuclear warheads: hydrodynamic experiments, that simulate the working of a warhead, from the point of triggering to the initiation of a nuclear chain reaction; inertial-confinement fusion (ICF), which is the heating and compression of beads of deuterium and tritium with the use of high-intensity lasers to observe fusion or thermonuclear characteristics; and hydronuclear experiments, that use conventional high explosives with kilogram yields, rather than kilotons, to test for warhead reliability. The US is utilizing the first two of these technologies, in addition to simulations with networked supercomputers and a super-sophisticated NIF, as well as materials evaluation and stockpile surveillance to ensure warhead reliability, safety and applied weapons research under a true zero-yield CTBT regime.

In order to safeguard safety and reliability over the short_term, the US has undertaken to conduct at least six sub-critical experiments--of which four have already been carried out, the latest (Oboe-1) on 30 September 1999--with nearly complete nuclear warheads except for the fissile pit which was replaced by a mechanically equivalent hollow sphere made out of depleted uranium together with a small quantity of fertile fissile material--the fissile material content is kept low enough to ensure the absence of a self-sustaining chain reaction and thus of a nuclear explosive yield--i.e. a "true-zero yield".

However, such tests remain controversial due to their inherent lack of verifiability and transparency, as well as uncertainty regarding the complete absence of nuclear ignition. In order to resolve some of these concerns particularly on the Russian side which uses inferior technology, Energy Secretary Richardson and Russian Minatom Minister Adamov have agreed to advance notification and transparency measures regarding sub-critical tests.

The CTBT is Verifiable Using Current Technologies

Verification of a complete prohibition of nuclear explosive testing in all environments though a challenging task is technically feasible using currently available technologies. Four discrete but inter-linked technologies are being employed to verify a CTBT: a) seismic; b) hydroacoustic; c) infra-sound; and d) atmospheric (radionuclide) sampling. It is well proven that seismic technologies alone can characterize, identify and locate underground nuclear detonations of very low yields, at teleseismic (or intercontinental) distances. Hydro-acoustic detectors can locate nuclear explosions below one kiloton under-water or low altitude atmospheric tests, at distances of thousands of kilometres; and infrasound stations can detect a one kiloton nuclear explosion in the atmosphere and in the ocean or near its surface, within an area of several thousand square kilometres. And, atmospheric or radionuclide sampling can detect the minute quantities of "noble" gases, fission products, released by underground nuclear explosions, no matter how well such explosions have been 'contained' or shielded, as well as radioactive particulates released by atmospheric tests.

The CTBT's international monitoring (verification) system (IMS) will involve 321 monitoring stations worldwide supported by 16 radionuclide laboratories, using the four technologies, and it will be able to produce real-time or near-real-time depictions of "suspect" events. Such events could be further investigated using additional methods and by on-site inspections. In addition, US national technical means will supplement the CTBTO data to provide Washington with additional confidence against any cheating.

The locations and geophysical characteristics of the testing sites of states which have previously conducted nuclear tests are well known and documented. The IMS can reliably detect nuclear explosions of a yield of one kiloton, and has a proven capability of detecting smaller explosions under many circumstances. For example, in August 1977, it was believed that Russia conducted a nuclear explosion at Novaya Zemlya. The combined data from the prototype International Data Centre (IDC) and scientific stations was able to provide clarification and determine that an earthquake of 3.5 magnitude (equivalent to a yield of less than 1 kiloton) had occurred some 80 kilometres away from Novaya Zemlya. In August 1998, the provisional technical secretariat of the CTBT participated in a calibration exercise with a chemical explosion (dynamite) at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstanthe former Soviet test site. This explosion with a yield of 0.1 kiloton was detected by nine IMS seismic stations in Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe and North America. Another calibration test was conducted at Semipalatinsk on 25 September 1999, involving an explosion with a yield equal to 100 metric tons of granulated high explosive (TNT) that was used to calibrate seismic equipment that distinguishes earthquakes from nuclear tests. Yet another calibration test is scheduled for the year 2000. More than 60 IMS stations, located across the Pacific and as far away as Africa, reported reliable data on India and Pakistans nuclear tests in May 1998.

Recently the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed two new methods of detecting nuclear tests. One automatically analyses air samples on-site for radioactive xenon-133 and xenon-135, both products of nuclear explosions-whose half-life is only nine hours. The other automatically detects fission products attached to dust particles, improving sensitivity 100-fold over previous methods. These systems instantaneously transmit data to the CTBT verification centre over regular phone lines.

Thus, the CTBT's IMS when fully operational will have a high threshold of reliably detecting forbidden nuclear explosions-thus contributing to US "national technical means" or intelligence sources for verification. The CTBT verification regime will provide the US with access to additional monitoring stations it otherwise would not have. For example, the IMS will require the installation of 31 monitoring stations in Russia, 11 in China, and 17 in the Middle East. Without a CTBT in place it will not be possible to inspect suspicious events at known national test sites and elsewhere.

Importance of US Leadership

The CTBT, when it enters into force, will become a critical part of the system of interlocking treaties and agreements that help prevent the global spread of nuclear weapons. Unless serious measures are undertaken to promote the early entry-into-force of the CTBT and a legally binding norm against further testing is established, there will be pressures in some countries to resume nuclear testing. Such a resumption of testing would be justified in Russia in terms of certifying existing or developing new sub-strategic and strategic nuclear warhead designs to compensate for declining conventional forces and to respond to US missile defences, and in China as required for nuclear force modernization to respond to deployment of theater- or national-missile defences by the United States. In the absence of US ratification and a CTBT, these pressures are likely to be the strongest in Russia and China. This could make it even more difficult to prevent further testing by India and Pakistan.

Benefits to US Security of a CTBT

A CTBT will guarantee the US' clear superiority in nuclear weapon designs and technologies. This Treaty would help reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international security and bring additional pressure on NPT hold-outs to refrain from weapon development and to join the regime. A CTBT would prevent countries such as India, Israel, and Pakistan from validating theoretical designs and calculations for nuclear warheads, and raise the political costs for so-called "rogue" states in violating global non-proliferation norms. It would also prevent Russia from modernizing its nuclear warhead designs. And a CTBT would stand in the way of China validating or proving reverse engineered warhead designs or technologies that it may have illegally acquired from the US.

A CTBT also would help eliminate a critical element of friction and dissatisfaction concerning the inequality of obligations assumed under the NPT by nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). NNWS parties to the NPT from the Third World constituted by far the overwhelming majority of NPT members-these states regarded a CTBT as a sine qua non for NPT extension-and their support was crucial in securing the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. Many non-nuclear weapon states consider a CTBT as the single most important and visible indicator of the nuclear weapon states' compliance with NPT Article VI (on nuclear disarmament). The US Senate's negative vote unless reversed soon, will have a major detrimental effect on the NPT Review Conference in April 2000.

Vienna Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force

The CTBT includes a provision whereby three years after its opening for signature, a special conference would be convened to consider ways and means of facilitating the Treaty's entry into force. Ninety-two ratifying and signatory states of the CTBT met in Vienna 6-8 October, but the US was not on the front benches occupied by ratifying states, and had to satisfy itself with a back seat. This was an ignominious position to be in for the world's sole surviving superpower and the global leader in preventing proliferation of mass destruction weapons and countering so-called "rogue" states. The ratifying and signatory states issued a call for all other countries to ratify the CTBT and to bring it into force at the earliest possible date, and several Western leaders emphasized the importance of US ratification of the CTBT for achieving the full implementation of the Treaty.

It is time for the US to ratify the CTBT at the earliest opportunity and to send a clear message regarding the crucial importance of this Treaty to national and global security.

As we approach the end of this century, it is important to recall the prescient words of President Kennedy at the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 1961: "Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us . . . The logical place to begin is a treaty assuring the end of nuclear tests of all kinds . . . ."

Monterey: 14 October 1999.

Tariq Rauf is Director of the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He was a member of Canada's Delegation to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty, held in Vienna, 6-8 October 1999. The views expressed here are personal and do not represent the views of any government or organization.


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