Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

CTBT Endgame in South Asia?

Gaurav Kampani: CNS Research Associate, January 2000

After conducting nuclear tests in May 1998, governments in India and Pakistan have finally initiated steps to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Moves to convert their informal adherence to the treaty’s objectives into a formal acceptance of its legal provisions have come at the end of a protracted nuclear dialogue with the United States. The conditions New Delhi and Islamabad have placed on their willingness to accept the test ban, however, are different. New Delhi has linked its acceptance of the CTBT to the outcome of its nuclear dialogue with the United States, easing of all sanctions imposed in the wake of the nuclear tests, and the ratification decisions of other nuclear weapon states. Pakistan, on the other hand, has pegged its participation in the test ban to India’s decision. Recent developments suggest that conditions have become favorable for the two countries to sign the treaty in the near future, but their willingness to ratify the CTBT will likely be deferred for some time.

The Debate in New Delhi

In 1996, India rejected the CTBT on four grounds. First, the CTBT was not linked to time-bound nuclear disarmament. New Delhi argued that far from fostering global nuclear disarmament, the treaty’s focus had shifted to nonproliferation. Second, Indian diplomats also made a case that the CTBT was not a zero-yield treaty. Its scope permitted hydronuclear or sub-critical tests. These, when combined with computer simulations would permit nuclear weapon states to refine older nuclear warheads and design new systems with confidence. Third, India invoked national security concerns for not signing the treaty.(1) Finally, India strongly objected to Article XIV, the Entry-into-Force clause, which required forty-four nuclear-capable states (including India) to ratify the treaty before it could come into force. India claimed that Article XIV violated its sovereignty.(2)

All these factors led to a national consensus in India against the CTBT. The Indian government feared that the CTBT would freeze India’s nuclear weapons capability at an unacceptably low-level.(3) India had conducted only one nuclear test in 1974, the results of which were disputed.(4) India’s nuclear establishment, which had resumed nuclear weapons-related research during the 1980s, made a case for field tests to validate its more sophisticated weapon designs.(5) In addition, the scientists also wanted to collect test-data in order to simulate nuclear explosions on computers and conduct hydronuclear experiments to ensure the safety and reliability of India’s nuclear arsenal under any future test ban.(6)

In 1995, the Congress government considered a radical program of nuclear tests. Under this plan, India would conduct a series of tests after the French example and then join the CTBT as a nuclear weapon state.(7) Former Prime Minister Narasimha Rao authorized test preparations in the winter of 1995. However, US intelligence detected Indian preparations in the Rajasthan desert and the news was leaked to the New York Times. Subsequently, the Rao government postponed the test series in response to US pressure.(8)

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) considered conducting the nuclear tests when it came to power for two weeks in March 1996. However it failed to win a parliamentary majority and refrained from taking a course of action that would have embarrassed the succeeding government.(9) As a consequence, however, the successor United Front government vetoed the CTBT to safeguard India’s nuclear option.

The BJP returned to power in March 1998 and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee authorized the long-pending test series. The tests were conducted in two phases. According to Indian government sources, during the first phase on 11 May 1998, India tested a thermonuclear device, a fission device, and a low-yield device. Two additional sub-kiloton tests were conducted during the second phase on 13 May 1998.(10) Following the completion of the test series, the Indian government declared the tests successful and announced a test moratorium.(11)

The May 1998 tests reopened the question of India’s signature of the CTBT and thus triggered a second round of debate. Since then, the CTBT-debate has become part of a much larger debate on India’s nuclear posture, global nuclear disarmament, and the US-led nonproliferation regime. In the wake of this debate, two schools of thought are now clearly discernible:

The Nuclear Moderates: The moderates favor India’s signature of the CTBT as part of a nuclear rapprochement with the United States. They link India’s 1996 veto of the CTBT to the absence of follow-on nuclear tests after the single 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion. Before May 1998, additional nuclear tests were considered necessary to ensure the credibility of India’s minimum deterrent. Because Indian nuclear scientists have validated older weapon designs and tested newer ones, and collected sufficient data to conduct sub-critical tests and computer simulations, the moderates now favor India’s participation in the global test ban.(12)

The view of the pro-CTBT school is that India must get over its hostility to the nonproliferation regime and normalize political relations with the United States, the world’s sole superpower. The moderates have also made the case that India abandon its historic and absolutist ideological positions on global nuclear disarmament in favor of more practical arms control measures in the short- and medium-term, as a better way to achieve to make progress toward the former goal.(13) More significantly, they argue that India must overcome its current obsession with nuclear weapons. Whereas nuclear weapons are necessary to guarantee India’s strategic autonomy, access to cheap foreign capital and technology are vital for India’s development and emergence as a great power in the international system. Such access will only be possible if India agrees to participate in global arms control regimes.(14)

The Hardliners: The hardliners oppose India’s signature and ratification of the CTBT. They have several concerns. First, they doubt that all tests conducted in May 1998 were successful.(15) Using seismological data published by US scientists, the hardliners argue that Indian scientists probably overstated the yield of the tests. Worse, the thermonuclear device probably failed. Similarly, the second round of tests conducted on 13 May 1998 did not generate the telltale seismological signatures. Therefore, India must conduct additional tests to clear doubts surrounding the credibility of its nuclear capability. Others argue that additional tests are necessary to refine the thermonuclear warhead design, which India might wish to deploy on delivery systems in the future.(16) Third, the skeptics take the view that six tests are barely sufficient to generate data for hydronuclear experiments or computer simulations. Pointing to the examples of the United States and the former Soviet Union, the critics argue that both countries conducted more than a thousand nuclear tests before they could undertake lab testing with confidence.(17) At a minimum, the hardliners would like the government to set up an independent committee to examine the data from the May 1998 tests to determine and verify that no further nuclear tests are necessary.(18)

The critics also take exception to programs such as the US Stockpile Stewardship Program, which are permitted under the nuclear test ban. This, they fear, will permit the nuclear weapon states to make refinements in their nuclear weapon designs. On the other hand, countries such as India, with relatively limited experience in nuclear testing, would find themselves locked into a position of nuclear inferiority. Linked to this point are suspicions that the nuclear weapon states have signed secret protocols among themselves permitting a range of nuclear weapon-related activities that would violate the spirit if not text of the CTBT.(19)

Other concerns center around the CTBT’s verification provisions, which the hardliners fear could be used by hostile states to gain access to India’s unsafeguarded nuclear weapons-related infrastructure.(20) Finally, the hardliners argue India should use the CTBT as a bargaining chip to secure de jure recognition from the United States and the other nuclear weapon states of its nuclear status.(21)

Unless these objectives are achieved, the hardliners argue, India should remain a nuclear holdout state.

The Vajpayee Government’s Attempts to Forge a National Consensus

The Indian government’s position on the CTBT is closer to the moderates’ stance. Since May 1998, Vajpayee and the BJP have adopted measures to prepare the ground for India’s eventual acceptance of the CTBT. Immediately after the completion of the test series, Vajpayee declared a moratorium on further testing. India’s foreign minister Jaswant Singh later explained that the moratorium amounted to India’s de facto acceptance of the CTBT.(22) All that remained was its formal signature. Prime Minister Vajpayee reiterated this assurance when he addressed the United Nations General Assembly in September 1998.(23)

In the course of its nuclear dialogue with the United States, India laid down three conditions in order to convert its de facto adherence to the CTBT into a de jure acceptance. First, the United States would have to lift all economic and technological sanctions imposed under the Symington, and Glenn amendments. Second, India alone would determine its security requirements and retain the right to build and deploy a minimum deterrent. Third, there would have to be some understanding on the part of the United States of India’s security concerns and a tacit acceptance of its de facto nuclear status.(24)

After nine rounds of negotiations between Jaswant Singh and US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, some progress has been achieved. In November 1998, US President Bill Clinton used the partial sanctions waiver authority granted by Congress to waive the bulk of economic sanctions on India for a year.(25) Acknowledging the progress in the Indo-US nuclear negotiations, the waiver was extended for a second year in October 1999. Although the bulk of the economic sanctions have been removed, restrictions on lending by multilateral institutions remain in force.(26) In December 1999, the Clinton administration also removed 51 Indian companies from the original list of 200 companies that were blacklisted under the commerce department’s entities list.(27) Reacting to pressure exerted by the US Congress and the Indian government, the administration promised that depending on progress in Indo-US talks, the entities list could be trimmed further and exports of goods and technologies in the future only be denied to those companies that directly contribute to India’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program.(28)

More significantly, the Clinton administration has abandoned its earlier policy of attempting to freeze, cap, and roll back nuclear proliferation in South Asia. There is also clear recognition in Washington that nuclear proliferation in the region is now an inescapable fact, and that the United States lacks the leverage to reverse it in the short-term. As a consequence, the administration’s focus has shifted toward institutionalizing nuclear stability in South Asia at the lowest possible level of weaponization. The new approach is best encapsulated by the phrase “strategic restraint.” Although, the United States continues to maintain publicly that it cannot recognize India’s nuclear status even by implication, in private, the Clinton administration has acknowledged that India alone can determine its national security requirements. Similarly, earlier attempts to persuade India to quantify its proposed minimum deterrent have been dropped.(29)

Acknowledging the advances in the Indo-US nuclear dialogue, in December 1999, Prime Minister Vajpayee initiated a series of high-level meetings with leaders of major opposition parties to build a national consensus on the CTBT.(30) Explaining the importance of achieving a national consensus, India’s national security advisor Brajesh Mishra said that the government did not want a situation to arise whereby one government signed the treaty, while another failed to secure its ratification.(31)

In its parleys with the opposition parties, the BJP has made a case for the CTBT on three grounds. First, India’s national security has been safeguarded. The May 1998 tests have ensured that India will be able to field a credible deterrent. Indian scientists have also collected sufficient data to conduct computer simulations and hydronuclear experiments to ensure the safety and reliability of India’s nuclear warheads under a test ban.(32) Second, India must sign the CTBT to end its diplomatic and political isolation and reassure the international community of its peaceful intent. Third, movement on the CTBT is vital to improve Indo-US relations and ensure that economic and technological sanctions are lifted. India has remained economically resilient to the sanctions so far. However, long-term economic and technological sanctions are likely to have an adverse impact on the Indian economy.(33)

So far, India’s main opposition parties have refused to endorse the government’s position. The Congress, which is the main opposition party, has harked back to the 1986 Rajiv Gandhi plan on nuclear disarmament and hinted that a CTBT should be linked to a time-bound program of phased nuclear disarmament.(34) Similarly, the left parties such as the Communist Party of India-Marxist - are also opposed to the CTBT in its present form. They too would like a test ban to be linked with time-bound nuclear disarmament. However, in lieu of India signing the CTBT in its present form, the left parties have proposed that the Indian parliament pass an act committing India to no further nuclear tests.(35) On the other hand, the Samta Party led by former defense minister Mulayam Singh Yadav has conveyed to the prime minister that it cannot support the CTBT in its present form.(36)

In the national debate on the CTBT, the BJP has stood its ground. It has also vetoed a request from the nuclear establishment to conduct hydronuclear tests. High-level Indian officials have hinted that the government cannot formally convert its informal adherence into a formal acceptance of the CTBT, unless the United States acknowledges Indian security concerns. However, what India means by security concerns has not been explained publicly so far. But members of the Indian national security council’s advisory board have suggested that India would seek recognition from the United States of its role as a strategic balancer in Asia.(37) Further, in order for India to sign the CTBT, the United States would have to explicitly acknowledge India’s nuclear-related security concerns.

From all indications, the Vajpayee government is clearing the decks to sign the CTBT. A breakthrough could be announced during the 10th round of Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott talks in January 2000. India might sign the CTBT during President Clinton’s visit to South Asia in February or March 2000. However, India, following the example of other nuclear weapon states, is likely to disaggregate the process of signing, ratifying, and depositing the treaty articles.(38) Although India may sign the treaty in the first quarter of 2000, a ratification decision will likely be pegged to the ratification decisions in Washington, Beijing, and Moscow.

The View from Islamabad

As the BJP government in New Delhi attempts to build a national consensus in favor of the CTBT, there are signs of stirring in Islamabad in well. This is largely because Pakistan has formally tied its position on the CTBT to India’s course of action.

Unlike India, Pakistan did not oppose the CTBT at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In 1996, Pakistan voted in favor of the treaty after it was brought before the United Nations to bypass the Indian veto. However, Pakistan feared that India harbored plans to conduct additional nuclear tests. Since an Indian test program would have forced Islamabad to follow suit, Pakistan declined to accede to the CTBT unless India did the same.(39)

The Sharif Government’s Position

After testing nuclear weapons in May 1998, the civilian Nawaz Sharif government came under enormous pressure from the United States and the international community to accept the CTBT. US economic sanctions hurt investor confidence, curtailed multilateral lending, and brought Pakistan’s economy to the verge of bankruptcy. As a result, the Sharif government formally delinked signature and ratification of the CTBT from New Delhi’s course of action.(40) In September 1998, it also agreed in principle to sign the CTBT.(41) However Sharif insisted that Pakistan would not sign the CTBT unless the United States eased the coercive environment – read economic and technological sanctions.(42)

The Clinton administration granted partial sanctions relief to Pakistan in November 1998 under the Brownback amendment.(43) The bulk of economic sanctions were waived. This paved the way for the resumption of multilateral institutional lending, a move that was disallowed in India’s case. Nevertheless, between May 1998 and October 1999, the United States failed to persuade Pakistan to sign the CTBT.

There were several reasons for this failure. Although the Sharif government had formally delinked its course of action from India’s, at an informal level the linkage remained.(44) After the BJP government lost its majority in parliament (April 1999) and declared its inability to sign the CTBT pending a fresh mandate, Pakistan too deferred its decision. Second, the Nawaz Sharif government did not make any concerted attempt to build a national consensus in favor of the CTBT. Right-wing Islamic parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami opposed Pakistan’s signature.(45) There is also some evidence of divisions within Pakistan’s nuclear establishment over the CTBT. Although influential scientists like A.Q. Khan came out in support of the treaty, others like Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, chief designer of the Khushab nuclear plant in Punjab, resigned in protest against the Sharif government’s moves to sign the treaty.(46) Mahmood and other nuclear scientists such as Muhammad Nasim have since alleged that the CTBT will slow down Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development program.(47)

Third, Pakistan’s humiliating withdrawal from the Kargil heights under US pressure in July 1999, made Sharif’s domestic position untenable. The Islamic right-wing parties in Pakistan, and the electorate in general, portrayed the withdrawal as a national betrayal.(48) This further narrowed the civilian government’s room for maneuver on the CTBT. Finally, the US Senate’s rejection of the CTBT in September 1999 put a question mark on the treaty’s future and allowed Pakistan to defer its decision.

The Post-Coup Scenario

On 12 October 1999, the Pakistan army led by General Pervez Musharraf ousted the civilian government in a coup. Immediately after seizing power, Pakistan’s coup leader and now Chief Executive, General Musharraf, reiterated that Pakistan was aware of the concerns of the international community on nonproliferation and disarmament issues.(49) Musharraf also reassured the Japanese ambassador in Islamabad that Pakistan was considering the CTBT positively and was willing to fulfill its international obligations.

However, the overthrow of a legitimately constituted civilian government in Pakistan worsened relations with the United States. In response to the coup, the Clinton administration imposed fresh sanctions mandated under Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act.(50) The administration also expressed its displeasure by meting out differential treatment to India and Pakistan on the sanctions waiver issue. Whereas it extended prompt sanctions relief to India, in the case of Pakistan, the majority of sanctions remained in force.(51)

The consequence of these actions was a visible hardening in the military regime’s position on the CTBT. Pakistan’s new foreign minister, Abdul Sattar, took exception to this discriminatory stance and reiterated his government’s position that a coercion-free atmosphere was indispensable to building a domestic consensus in favor of the CTBT in Pakistan.(52) Addressing the issue of the CTBT during his maiden press conference as Chief Executive on 1 November 1999, Musharraf declared that the CTBT was not his immediate priority. He added that before Pakistan could sign the CTBT, there was a need for a national debate and consensus.(53)

The Musharraf regime also formally pegged Islamabad’s acceptance of the CTBT to New Delhi’s signature.(54) Musharraf clarified that there would be two components to the CTBT decision. The first would be political; the second, scientific. For the latter, the views of the nuclear scientists would be ascertained to determine whether the CTBT would retard Pakistan’s nuclear capability.(55)

By mid-November, US-Pakistani relations began to improve. Although the United States continued to insist that there would be no “business as usual” with the military regime, it was prepared to do some business nevertheless. The new thinking in Washington was guided by the realization that the United States had very little direct leverage with the Pakistani army. Pakistan was already heavily sanctioned under US nonproliferation laws, and sanctions had begun to yield diminishing returns. Further sanctions could produce an economic meltdown and jeopardize Pakistani cooperation on export controls of sensitive nuclear technologies. Sanctions-induced economic and political instability could also have dangerous consequences for nuclear command and control and the safe custody of nuclear weapons. Further, there were pressing items on the US nonproliferation, arms control, drug control, and international terrorism agendas, the resolution of which required the attention of the Pakistani government.(56)

Acknowledging the shift in US policy, on 20 December 1999, the Pakistani government called a meeting of the Foreign Policy Advisory Group to advise the foreign ministry on the CTBT.(57) This was followed by a joint meeting of the federal cabinet and the national security council on 23 December 1999. During this meeting, the federal cabinet reportedly concurred that the CTBT was not discriminatory. The cabinet also held the view that if India decided to conduct additional nuclear tests before the CTBT came into force, nothing within or outside the treaty could prevent Pakistan from following suit. And finally, the CTBT would not affect Pakistan’s nuclear capability or fissile material production. (58)

Observers have interpreted this as a positive signal. They believe that Pakistan may now be preparing to sign the CTBT. Pakistan’s foreign minister Abdul Sattar has reportedly advised General Musharraf that India is likely to announce the signing of the CTBT towards the end of January 2000. Hence it might be in Pakistan’s interests to pre-empt India to secure concessions from the United States as well as to improve the military regime’s public image.(59) To prepare the grounds for Pakistan’s formal acceptance, Sattar has also held meetings with leaders of the right-wing Islamic parties that are opposed to the CTBT.(60)

Although Pakistan may sign the CTBT soon, like India, it will most probably disaggregate the process of signing, ratifying, and depositing the treaty articles with the United Nations.


Sources:

(1) India cited two national security reasons: First, countries around India (read China and Pakistan) continued with their nuclear weapon programs that posed a threat to India. Second, the CTBT permitted sub-critical tests and computer simulations, which would allow nuclear weapon states to make qualitative improvements to their nuclear weapons, a matter of security concern for India. See statement by Ms. Arundhati Ghose, Ambassador/Permanent Representative of India to UN/in the Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, on 20 June 1996, Embassy of India, http://www.indianembassy.org.

(2) Dinshaw Mistry, “India and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” Acdis Research Reports, Program in Arms Control and Disarmament, Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, September 1998.

(3) Interview: Jaswant Singh, Hindu, 29 November 1999, http://www.the-hindu.com.

(4) George Perkovich, “The Bombs that Roared,” in India’s Nuclear Bomb, (California: University of California Press, 1999), pp.426-428.

(5) P.K. Iyengar, “Twenty Years after Pokharan,” Indian Express, 18 May 1994.

(6) George Perkovich, “India’s Nuclear Weapons Debate: Unlocking the Door to the CTBT,” Arms Control Today, vol.26, no.4, May/June 1996, pp.11-16.

(7) Raj Chengappa, “Testing Times,” India Today, vol.20, no.24, 31 December 1995, pp.49-50.

(8) Tim Weiner, “India Suspected of Preparing for A-Bomb Test,” New York Times, 15 December 1995, p.A6.

(9) T.V.R Shenoy, “The BJP was ready for tests as far as May 1996,” Rediff on the Net, 14 May 1998, http://www.rediff.com.

(10) “Planned Series of Nuclear Tests Completed,” Statements on India’s Nuclear Tests, May 11 & 13 1998, Indian Embassy, Washington, D.C., http://www.indianembassy.org; “Joint press statement on India’s nuclear tests by DAE and DRDO, 17 May 1998, Indian Embassy, Washington, D.C., http://www.indianembassy.org.

(11) “Suo Motu Statement by Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Parliament on 27th May 1998,” Indian Embassy, Washington, D.C., http://www.indianembassy.org.

(12) C. Raja Mohan, “Towards a CTBT consensus,” Hindu, 9 November 1999, <http//www.the-hindu.com>; Kanti Bajpai, “Policy on CTBT,” Hindustan Times, 16 December 1999, http://www.hindustantimes.com; Jasjit Singh, “A Negotiating Chip?” Hindustan Times, 25 December 1999, http://www.hindustantimes.com; K. Subrahmanyam, “CTBT Consensus: Work Towards Converting Rejectionists,” Times of India, 27 December 1999, http://www.timeofindia.com.

(13) C. Raja Mohan, “An Unfolding Indo-US Waltz,” Hindu, 23 December 1999,http://www.the-hindu.com.

(14) Kanti Bajpai, “The Great Indian Nuclear Debate,” Hindu, 12 November 1999, http://www.the-hindu.com.

(15) Raj Chengappa, “Is India’s H-Bomb a Dud?” India Today, 12 October 1998, http://www.india-today.com.

(16) Bharat Karnad, “Policy on CTBT,” Hindustan Times, 4 November 1999, http://www.hindustantimes.com; G. Balachandran, “A Consensus or a sell-off?” Hindu, 14 December 1999, http://www.the-hindu.com.

(17) Rajesh Rajagopalan, “The Question of more tests,” Hindu, 17 December 1999, http://www.the-hindu.com.

(18) Rajesh Ramachandran, “A closed-door consensus,” Hindustan Times, 19 December 1999, http://www.hindustantimes.com.

(19) Rajesh Rajagopalan, “The Question of more tests.”

(20) B.Vivekanandan, “Meaning of CTBT,” Hindustan Times, 23 November 1999, http://www.hindustantimes.com.

(21) Brahma Chellaney, “US-friendly policy,” Hindustan Times, 15 December 1999, http://www.hindustantimes.com; Brahma Chellaney, “India’s attitude to current nuclear order ambivalent,” Hindustan Times, 13 December 1999, http://www.hindustantimes.com.

(22) “India’s moratorium is de-facto acceptance of CTBT: Jaswant,” Hindustan Times, 26 November 1999, http://www.hindustantimes.com; Jaswant Singh, “India’s Case for Nukes,” Foreign Policy, September/October 1998, pp.41-52.

(23) “Address of the Prime Minister of India to the 53rd UN General Assembly,” Government of India, 24 September 1998, http://www.meadev.gov.in.

(24) Interview: Jaswant Singh, Hindu, 29 November 1999; “India reserves right to minimum deterrent,” Hindu, 22 December 1999, http://www.the-hindu.com.

(25) Presidential Determination No.99-7, 1 December 1998, The White House, http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov.

(26) Presidential Determination No.2000-04, October 27, 1999, The White House, http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov.

(27) N.C. Menon, “US lifts curbs on 51 Indian entities,” Hindustan Times, 17 December 1999, http://www.hindustantimes.com.

(28) Ibid.

(29) Interview: Strobe Talbott, India Today, 15 February 1999, <http:www.India-today.com>.

(30) Harish Khare, “Govt. talks to Cong on CTBT,” Hindu, 18 December 1999, http://www.the-hindu.com.

(31) “Brajesh: India, US may form panel on counter-terrorism,” Hindustan Times, 25 December 1999, http://www.hindustantimes.com.

(32) “Further nuclear tests unnecessary,” Hindu, 4 February 1999, http://www.the-hindu.com.

(33) “Left against signing CTBT in a hurry,” Hindu, 22 December 1999, http://www.the-hindu.com.

(34) C. Raja Mohan, "Rajiv Gandhi and the CTBT," Hindu, 4 February 1999, http://www.the-hindu.com.

(35) “CPM urges PM not to sign CTBT in present form,” Times of India, 23 December 1999, http://www.timesofindia.com; “PM rejects Left demand for white paper on CTBT,” Hindustan Times, 22 December 1999, http://www.hindustantimes.com.

(36) “Mulayam opposes signing of CTBT,” Hindu, 21 December 1999, http://www.the-hindu.

(37) K. Subrahmanyam, Undue Fears: Pragmatic Approach to Signing the CTBT,” Times of India, 13 December 1999, http://www.timesofindia.com.

(38) Interview: Jaswant Singh, Hindu, 29 November 1999.

(39) Raja Zulfikar, “Pakistan to upgrade N-deterrence: Sattar,” News International, 26 November 1999, http://www.jang.com.pk.

(40) Nasir Malick, “No Giving Up Of N-Capability: Pakistan May Sign CTBT If Curbs Lifted,” Dawn, 26 August 1999, http://www.dawn.com.

(41) Betsy Pisik, “Pakistan Will Sign Nuclear Test Ban, Even If India Doesn’t,” Washington Times, 24 September 1998, p.A-17.

(42) Ibid.

(43) Presidential Determination No.99-7, 1 December 1998.

(44) “Pakistan Said Rethinking CTBT Commitment,” Nation, 7 May 1999, http://www.nation.com.pk.

(45) “Jamaat Plans move against CTBT signing: FP,” Pakistan News Service, 18 August 1999, http://www.paknews.org.

(46) “No Harm in Signing CTBT: Qadeer,” Pakistan Link, 25 September 1998, http://www.pakistanlink.com; “Pakistan Scientist Resigns over CTBT,” BBC, 11 April 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, 11 April 1999, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

(47) Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Muhammad Nasim, “A Technical Assessment,” Nation, 4 January 2000, http://www.nation.com.pk.

(48) Raj Chengappa, Zahid Hussain, and Sujatha Shenoy, “Face-Saving Retreat,” India Today, 19 July 1999, http://www.india-today.com.

(49) “Speech of the Chief Executive of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf,” News International, 17 October 1999, <http://www.jang.com.pk>.

(50) “Testimony by Assistant Secretary Karl F. Inderfurth,” House International Relations Committee, Asia Pacific Subcommittee, 20 October 1999, http://www.usia.gov; Sridhar Krishnaswami, “Will the U.S. go all the way of sanctions?” Hindu, 17 October 1999, http://www.the-hindu.com; Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Remarks on Iraq, Pakistan and India, Foreign Policy Forum, George Washington University, Washington, DC, 6 December 1999.

(51) Presidential Determination No.2000-04, October 27, 1999.

(52) Raja Zulfikar, “Pakistan not to conduct N-Test first: Sattar,” News International, 9 November 1999, http://www.jang.com.pk.

(53) “Highlights of Chief Executive’s Press Conference, 2 November 1999,” Associated Press; in Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Official Website, http://www.pak.gov.pk.

(54) Mahdi Masud, “CTBT: the debate resumes,” Dawn, 27 November 1999, http://www.dawn.com; “Pakistan reiterates stand on CTBT,” Dawn, 9 December 1999, http://www.dawn.com.

(55)“CE denies Afghans’ arrests on US request,” Nation, 21 December 1999, http://www.nation.com.pk.

(56) Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Remarks on Iraq, Pakistan and India.

(57) “Analysts divided over CTBT signing issue,” Nation, 21 December 1999, http://www.nation.com.pk.

(58) “Pakistan keeps right to test if India rejects CTBT,” Nation, 23 December 1999, http://www.nation.com.pk.

(59) Amit Baruah, “No benefits in not signing CTBT: Pak,” Hindu, 5 January 2000, http://www.the-hindu.com; “No US pressure to sign CTBT, says Sattar,” Nation, 5 January 2000, http://www.nation.com.pk.

(60) “JI advises govt. not to sign CTBT,” Dawn, 3 January 2000, http://www.dawn.com.


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