Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East

Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities in the Middle East¹

Go to the Regional Map.

	Nuclear	Biological	Chemical
Algeria	Research[2]	Research[3]	Development?[4]
Egypt	Research[5]	Development?[6]	Stockpiled[7] Used in 1963-67[8]
Iran	Development[9]	Development[10]	Deployed[11] Used in 1984-88
Iraq	Weaponization[12]	Stockpiled?[13]	Stockpiled?[14] Used in 1983,1987-88[15]
Israel	Deployed[16]	Production capability[17]	Production capability[18]
Libya	Research[19]	Development?[20]	Deployed[21] Used in 1987[22]
Saudi Arabia	None?[23]	None[24]	None?[25]
Sudan	None[26]	None[27]	None?[28]
Syria	Research[29]	Development?[30]	Deployed[31]
Turkey	Research[32]	None[33]	None[34]
United States[35]	Deployed[36]	Terminated[37]	Dismantling[38]
Yemen	None[39]	None[40]	None?[41]

 

Notes:

1. This chart summarizes data available from public sources. Precise estimation of states’ capabilities is difficult, because most weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs remain secret and cannot be verified independently. Based on open-source information, this chart uses the following terms to categorize states' capabilities:

   Deployed – Nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons integrated in military forces and ready for use in the event of conflict.

   Stockpiled – Produced significant quantity of NBC weapons, but these are not stored in close proximity to military units that would employ them.

   Weaponization – In the process of integrating nuclear explosives or chemical/biological (CB) agents with delivery systems, such as aerial bombs, missile warheads, etc.

   Production capability – Able to produce significant quantity of fissile nuclear material or CB agents, but not known to have done so.

   Development – Engaged in laboratory- or pilot-scale activities to develop production capability for fissile material or CB agents.

   Research – Engaged in dual-use research with peaceful civilian applications, but that can also be used to build technical capacity and/or infrastructure necessary for NBC development and production.

   Dismantling – Removing NBC weapons from deployment to storage areas and destroying agents and munitions.

   Terminated – Produced NBC weapons, but subsequently ended and dismantled program.

   None – No confirmed open-source evidence of capability.

   Where published assessments are uncertain or conflicting reports raise questions about a state's capabilities, the term used is followed by "?", and differences in accounts are summarized in the following notes. For descriptions of steps involved in the development, production, and deployment of NBC weapons, see: Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), US Congress, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 12/93), pp. 19-20, 83-84, 130.

2. Leonard Spector, "Nuclear Proliferation," Non-Conventional Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East, Efraim Karsh, Martin S. Navias, and Philip Sabin, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 147-151. Anthony H. Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: National Efforts, War Fighting Capabilities, Weapons Lethality, Terrorism, and Arms Control Implications" (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2/98), p. 13. "Algeria," Federation of American Scientists, 9/12/96, [Online] http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/algeria.htm.

   A recent US congressional task force report alleges that during 1991-92, "approximately 27.5 pounds of 93% U-235 which had been originally supplied to Iraq by France for use in the French-built Osirak research reactor" was shipped to Algeria via Sudan for storage at the "Algerian reactor at Ain-Oussera." The report was said to be based on unidentified European and Israeli intelligence sources, and asserts that the material remains in Algeria. Yossef Bodansky, "The Iraqi WMD Challenge: Myths and Reality," (Washington, DC: US House of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, 2/10/98). Jim Wolf, Reuters, 2/15/98, "Iraq Hid Deadly Weapons Abroad-Congress Report."

   A White House official said on 2/16/98 that the United States has "no credible evidence" to support the allegations. European intelligence sources likewise said they had no evidence to support the charges, which were rejected by Algeria as a "fantasy." "White House Says No Sign Iraq Exported Arms," Reuters, 2/16/98. Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 3/26/98, "Authorities Claim US ‘Disinformation Attempt’ Over Iraq;" in FBIS-WEU-98-085, 3/26/98. Agence France Presse, 2/15/98; "Ambassador Denies Report Iraqi Uranium Is Stockpiled In Algeria;" in Dialog, 2/15/98, [Online] http://dialog.carl.org.

   The available evidence corroborates the Algerian response. The Ain Oussera facility is under IAEA safeguards, and the fissile material referred to in the task force report was physically removed from Iraq in 11/91 by the IAEA with the assistance of UNSCOM. UN Security Council Resolution 687 required Iraq to place all nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control of the IAEA. The 12.6kg of highly enriched research reactor fuel stored at Al Tuiwaitha was airlifted from Iraq between 11/15/91 and 11/17/91. It was transformed in Russia through isotopic dilution for resale as 20%-enriched reactor fuel. "IAEA Inspections and Iraq's Nuclear Capabilities," IAEA, 4/92, [Online] http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/inforesource/other/iraq/iraqindex.html. "Fifth report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), on the activities of the Special Commission," UNSCOM, 5/21/93, [Online] http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/s25977.htm. "UNSCOM Activities," SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press/Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1994), pp. 755-56.

3. Cordesman (p. 13) states that Algeria has conducted "early research activity" on biological weapons but that there is no evidence of production capability.

4. Cordesman (p. 13) states that Algeria may have developed chemical weapons but that there is no evidence that it has deployed munitions.

5. Public sources do not indicate that Egypt has a nuclear weapons program. E.g., Cordesman, p. 17. Ian O. Lesser and Ashley J. Tellis, Strategic Exposure: Proliferation around the Mediterranean (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996) p. 61. [Study prepared for the United States Army].

6. Jonathan B. Tucker, "Motivations for Biological Weapons Proliferation: Examining Proliferators and Nonproliferators in North Africa and the Middle East," in Biological Weapons and Defense, R.A. Zilinskas, ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming 1999), manuscript pp. 16-17. Dany Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt," The Nonproliferation Review, 5(3): 7-9. JPRS-TND-93-007, "Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service Report: A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," (hereafter cited as Russian Federation) 3/5/93, p. 24. Cordesman, p. 17. Lesser and Tellis, p. 61. A 1996 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency annual report said that Egypt developed biological warfare agents in 1972 and that there is "no evidence" that the program has been terminated. Cited in Barbara Starr, "Egypt and Syria Are BW Capable, Says Agency," Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8/21/96, p. 15.

7. Tucker, p. 16. Russian Federation, p. 24. Shoham, pp. 1-6. E.J. Hogendoorn, "A Chemical Weapons Atlas," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (9-10/97), p. 37. "Arms Sanctions for Six African States," Africa Confidential, 1/10/92, p. 8; in Proliferation Issues, 2/14/92, p. 1. "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," Arms Control Today, 10/92, pp. 44-45. Steve Rodan, "Bitter Choices: Israel's Chemical Dilemma," Jerusalem Post, 8/18/97, [Online] http://www.jpost.co.il. Douglas Davis, "Egypt to Netanyahu: Don't Come Empty-Handed," Jerusalem Post, 12/19/97, [Online] http://www.jpost.com/. Priest, p. 1.

8. Shoham, p. 1-2. "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," Arms Control Today (hereafter cited as ACT), May 1991, p. 27. Lesser and Tellis, p. 62.

9. Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, "Iran's Nuclear Facilities: A Profile." (Monterey, California: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1998), [Online] http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/iran.htm. Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, "Iran's Nuclear Procurement Program: How Close to the Bomb?" The Nonproliferation Review 1997, 5(1): 123-35. Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996), pp. 9-25. "Iran: Objectives, Strategies and Resources," Proliferation: Threat and Response, Office of the Secretary of Defense, (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 1997) pp. 3-4. [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/. Cordesman, p. 25. "Iran Special Weapons Facilities," Federation of American Scientists, 10/10/97, [Online] http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/facility/iran_map.htm.

   The Jerusalem Post recently reported that Iran purchased two-to-four nuclear weapons from Kazakstan in 1992, but the US Departments of Defense and State said they had no evidence to support the allegation. Steve Rodan, "Iran Has Up to 4 Nuclear Bombs," Jerusalem Post, 4/9/98. Steve Rodan, "MK Elul Says Israel, US Have Known of Iranian Nukes for Years," Jerusalem Post, 4/12/98, [Online] http://www.jpost.co.il.

10. Russian Federation, p. 29. Cordesman, p. 24. Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 5. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements, 8/96 (Washington, DC. US Government Printing Office, 8/96), p. 68. Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS), "Devil’s Brew Briefings: Iran," [Online] http://www.cdiss.org/cbwnb1.htm.

11. Tucker, p. 19. Russian Federation, p. 29. ACT, pp. 26-27. Eisenstadt, pp. 26-27. E.J. Hogendoorn, "A Chemical Weapons Atlas," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (9-10/97), p. 37. Gregory F. Giles, "Iranian Approaches To Chemical Warfare," manuscript prepared for publication in Thinking the Unthinkable, Peter Lavoy, Scott Sagan, and James Wirtz, eds., (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, forthcoming 1998), p. 7. Seth W. Carus, "Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications and Responses," Middle East Review of International Affairs, 1998, 2(1): 1-14. Stimson Center, "CWC Status: States of Chemical Weapons Proliferation Concern," 5/27/98, [Online] http://www.stimson.org/cwc/status.htm. Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 5. Cordesman, pp. 22-24. CDISS, "Devil’s Brew Briefings: Iran."

12. Although the physical infrastructure of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was destroyed during the 1990-1991 Gulf War and subsequent implementation of UN Security Council resolutions by UNSCOM, Iraq retains human resources, components, and data that could serve as the basis for a nuclear weapons program in the future. David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, estimates that Iraq "has already learned enough to be able to build a nuclear weapon in less than a year," if it were able to acquire sufficient fissile material on the black market. Barbara Crossette, "Clean Bill for Iraqis on A-Arms? Experts Upset." New York Times, 4/19/98, p. A13.

    See also: David Albright, "Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Past, Present, and Future Challenges," Policywatch #301, 2/18/98. Michael Eisenstadt, "Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Unresolved Issues," Policywatch #304, 2/27/98, [Online] http://www.washingtoninstitute.org. Steven Dolley, "Iraq and the Bomb: The Nuclear Threat Continues" (Washington, DC: Nuclear Control Institute, 2/19/98), [Online] http://www.nci.org/nci/ib21998.htm. National Security Council (NSC), "Iraq’s Program of Mass Destruction: Threatening the Security of the International Community,"11/14/97, p. 3, [Online] http://www.usia.gov/regional/nea/gulfsec/nsc1119.htm. US Government White Paper, "Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," 2/13/98, [Online] http://www.usia.gov/regional/nea/iraq/whitepap.htm. Robin Cook, "The Iraqi Threat and the Work of UNSCOM," Britain in the USA, 2/4/98 [Online] http://www.britain-info.org/bis/fordom/middlee/4Feb98-2.stm. CDISS, "Iraq’s Remaining WMD Capabilities: An Overview," [Online] http://www.cdiss.org/98feb4.htm. Cordesman, pp. 35-36. David Albright, "A Special Case: Iraq," Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1997), pp. 309-50.

13. Barbara Starr, "UNSCOM Inspectors Still Doubt Iraq’s Arms Claims," Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2/25/98, p. 18. NSC, US Government White Paper. Cook, "The Iraqi Threat and the Work of UNSCOM." CDISS, "Iraq’s Remaining WMD Capabilities: An Overview." Cordesman, pp. 31-35, 42.

14. Tucker, p. 13. Starr, p. 18. NSC, US Government White Paper. Cook, "The Iraqi Threat and the Work of UNSCOM." CDISS, "Iraq’s Remaining WMD Capabilities: An Overview." Cordesman, pp. 28-31, 40-41.

15. Iraq used chemical weapons against Kurdish cities in Iraq in 1983, and against Iran during 1987-1988. US Government White Paper. ACT, p. 26. Physicians for Human Rights, "Winds of Death: Iraq's Use of Poison Gas Against its Kurdish Population," (Boston, Massachusetts: Physicians for Human Rights, 2/89), pp. 1-2.

16. Because Israel and Egypt are close allies of the United States, US government sources (e.g., Office of the Secretary of Defense, Lesser and Tellis) tend to ignore the WMD capabilities of Israel, and sometimes those of Egypt, in analyses of proliferation in the Middle East. Dana Priest, "In U.S. Weapons Crusade, Allies Get Scant Mention." Washington Post, 4/14/98, p. 1.

    Most public estimates of Israel's nuclear capability range between 100-200 weapons (e.g., Amy Dockser Marcus, "Growing Dangers: U.S. Drive to Curb Doomsday Weapons In Mideast Is Faltering," Wall Street Journal, 9/6/96, p. A1), but one analyst concludes that "the Israeli nuclear arsenal contains as many as 400 deliverable nuclear and thermonuclear weapons." Harold Hough, "Could Israel’s Nuclear Assets Survive a First Strike?" Jane’s Intelligence Review, 9/97, p. 410. Israel’s nuclear capability is by most accounts quite sophisticated, and may include "intercontinental-range, fractional-orbit-delivered thermonuclear weapons; thermonuclear or boosted nuclear-armed, two-stage, solid-fuel, intermediate-range ballistic missiles with a range of 3,000km; older, less accurate, nuclear-armed, theatre-range, solid-fuel ballistic missiles; air-deliverable, variable-yield, boosted nuclear bombs; artillery-delivered, enhanced-radiation, tactical weapons; and small nuclear demolition charges." Kenneth S. Brower, "A Propensity for Conflict: Potential Scenarios and Outcomes of War in the Middle East," Jane's Intelligence Review Special Report No. 14, p. 15. See also: Cordesman, p. 19. "Nuclear Forces Guide," Federation of American Scientists, 10/10/97, [Online] http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/facility/index.html.

17. Extensive research reportedly conducted at Israel's Biological Research Institute in Ness Ziona, but no publicly confirmed evidence of production. Tucker, p. 3. Russian Federation, p. 25. Cordesman, p. 19. "Chemical and Biological Weapons Facilities," Federation of American Scientists, 10/10/97, [Online] http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/facility/cbw.htm. P.R. Kumaraswamy, "Marcus Klingberg and Israel’s ‘Biological Option," Middle East International, 8/16/96, pp. 21-22. Zafir Rinat, "Nerve Gas Antidote in Works," Ha'aretz, 12/12/97, [Online] http://www3.haaretz.co.il/eng. Edna Homa Hunt, "Israel’s Biological and Chemical Research and Development – Potential Menace at Home and Abroad," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 4/98, pp. 84, 93. Liat Collins, "Bio Institute to Come Under Close Inspection," Jerusalem Post, 2/19/97, [Online] http://www.jpost.com. P.R. Kumaraswamy, "Has Israel Kept its BW Options Open?" Jane's Intelligence Review, 3/98, p. 22.

18. Priest, p. 1. Cordesman, pp. 18-19. Steve Rodan, "Bitter Choices: Israel’s Chemical Dilemma," Jerusalem Post, 8/18/97, [Online] http://www.jpost.co.il. David Makovsky, "Israel Must Ratify Chemical Treaty," Ha’aretz, 1/8/98, [Online] http://www3.haaretz.co.il/eng. Russian Federation, p. 25. ACT, p. 27. "Chemical and Biological Weapons Facilities," Federation of American Scientists, 10/10/97, [Online] http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/facility/cbw.htm.

19. Joshua Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1997, pp. 97-98. Office of the Secretary of Defense, pp. 34-35. Cordesman, p. 15.

    A US congressional task force report recently alleged that Iraq transferred specialists and materials from its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs to Libya in the 1990s. The report asserts in particular that Iraq sent a "limited quantity of semi-enriched nuclear fuel" by ship to Libya, and that by the end of 1995 Iraqi specialists "began enriching the Iraqi nuclear material having successfully installed the small and medium-sized kilns/furnaces there" in Libya. The report was said to be based on unidentified European and Israeli intelligence sources. Yossef Bodansky, "The Iraqi WMD Challenge: Myths and Reality," (Washington, DC: US House of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, 2/10/98). Jim Wolf, Reuters, 2/15/98, "Iraq Hid Deadly Weapons Abroad- Congress Report."

    A White House official said on 2/16/98 that the United States has "no credible evidence" to support the allegations. European intelligence sources likewise said they had no evidence to support the charges. "White House Says No Sign Iraq Exported Arms," Reuters, 2/16/98. Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 3/26/98, "Authorities Claim US ‘Disinformation Attempt’ Over Iraq;" in FBIS-WEU-98-085, 3/26/98.

    Although there are several technical processes by which uranium can be enriched, none of these involve "kilns/furnaces." Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, "Appendix 4-B: Enrichment Technologies," in Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 12/93), pp. 176-80.

20. Tucker, pp. 20-21. ACDA, p. 68. Russian Federation, p. 31. Cordesman, p. 15. Sinai, p. 96. "Devil’s Brew Briefings: Libya," CDISS, [Online] http://www.cdiss.org/cbwnb4.htm. Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 37. One analyst asserts that Libya may have the capacity to produce limited quantities of such agents as anthrax and botulinum toxin, but that its current technical constraints preclude weaponization or effective military use of biological weapons. Robert Waller, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence Case Study 2: Libya, (Alexandria, Virginia: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998), pp. 6-7. Another source reports that up to several dozen Iraqi microbiologists were sent from Iraq to Libya in anticipation of a US attack on suspected biological weapons facilities. Michael Theodoulou, "Saddam Sends Scientists to Libya for Safety," The Times (London) 2/13/98, p. 1.

21. Waller, p. 5. W. Andrew Terrill, "Libya and the Quest for Chemical Weapons," 1994, Conflict Quarterly 14(1): 47-59. Thomas C. Wiegele, The Clandestine Building of Libya’s Chemical Weapons Factory (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992). Office of Technology Assessment, US Congress, "How Libya’s Secret CW Plant Was Detected," Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 12/93), pp. 42-44. Office of the Secretary of Defense, pp. 35-36. CDISS, "Devil’s Brew Briefings: Libya." Cordesman, p. 14. Sinai, pp. 93-94. Tucker, p. 20. Lesser and Tellis, p. 53. ACT, p. 27. Sinai, pp. 93-94.

22. Lesser and Tellis, p. 68. Sinai, p. 92. Terrill, p. 55.

23. Studies of nuclear proliferation do not identify Saudi Arabia as a country of concern. E.g., Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), US Congress, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 12/93), p. 239. However, news media reports appeared in 1994 of a Saudi effort to acquire nuclear weapons from Iraq. The reports were based on allegations and documents provided by a former Saudi diplomat, Mohammed Khilewi, who sought asylum in the United States. Khilewi alleged that Saudi Arabia provided $5 billion in funding for Iraq’s nuclear program during the 1980s in exchange for a nuclear weapon, and that Saudi Arabia had two undeclared nuclear research reactors. The allegation was not confirmed by any other source, and US officials said they had no evidence of Saudi assistance to Iraqi nuclear development. Marie Colvin, "How an Insider Lifted the Veil on Saudi Plot for an ‘Islamic Bomb," Sunday Times, 7/24/94. Steve Coll and John Mintz, "Saudi Aid to Iraqi A-Bomb Effort Alleged," Washington Post, 7/25/94. Paul Lewis, "Defector Says Saudis Sought Nuclear Arms," New York Times, 8/7/94. "Saudis Said To Have Aided Iraq’s Nuclear Program," Christian Science Monitor, 7/25/94. An earlier report, which likewise remains unsubstantiated, alleged that Saudi Arabia may have received nuclear warheads from China in 1990 for its CSS-2 missiles. Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, "Do Saudis Have Nuclear Weapons?" Washington Post, 12/12/90, p. G15.

    Because the CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles that Saudi Arabia purchased from China are not accurate enough to be used effectively against point targets with conventional munitions, analysts speculated that Saudi Arabia might seek nuclear warheads for the missiles. However, Saudi Arabia reportedly pledged in writing to the United States that it would not acquire unconventional warheads for the missiles. The Saudi decision to join the NPT sought to underscore this assurance. President George Bush certified in 5/89 that the United States had "no credible intelligence reporting indicating that Saudi Arabia possesses nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons," and noted Saudi commitment that the missiles would not carry nuclear or chemical warheads. "Saudi Arabia," Federation of American Scientists, 9/12/96, [Online] http://www.fas.org.irp/threat/missile/saudi.htm. "Saudi Arabia Decided to Sign the NPT," Nuclear News, 6/88, p. 90. "White House Statement on Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia," [Online] http://csdl.tamu.edu/bushlibrary/papers/#search.

24. Studies of biological weapons proliferation do not identify Saudi Arabia as a country of concern. E.g., OTA, p. 239. Graham S. Pearson, "The Threat of Deliberate Disease in the Twenty First Century," Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for Concern, Courses of Action (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1/98) Report No. 24, p. 26.

25. Office of Technology Assessment, p. 239. Saudi Arabia’s CW preparations are reportedly limited to defensive equipment, including personal protective equipment, decontamination units, and chemical detectors. Shlomo Gazit and Zeev Eytan, eds. The Middle East Military Balance 1993-1994 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 419. However, as noted above, there have been unconfirmed reports that chemical warheads were developed for Saudi Arabia’s CSS-2 ballistic missiles. Duncan Lennox, ed., "CSS-2 (DF-3)," Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 24, 5/97. Priest, p. 1.

26. Public sources do not indicate that Sudan has a nuclear weapons program. There have been reports that nuclear materials were shipped via Sudan from Germany to Libya and Pakistan, and from Iraq to Algeria, but these remain unconfirmed. "Former Officer Reveals Black Market Uranium Sales," Al-Mustaqbal (Paris), 11/21/87, p. 13; in Nuclear Developments, 2/25/88, pp. 30-31. Horst Bieber, "Illegal Movement of Weapons-Grade Uranium Seen Still Possible," Die Zeit (Hamburg), 1/22/88, pp. 11-14; in Nuclear Developments, 3/14/88, pp. 32-39. "Minister Denies Iraqis Storing Nuclear Material," MENA (Cairo), 7/25/91; in Proliferation Issues, 8/8/91, p. 25. Mark Hibbs, "Interpol Investigating Report of Uranium Market in Mozambique," Nuclear Fuel, 8/5/91, p. 5. Indrani Banerjee, "Details of Nuclear Weapons Program Revealed," Sunday (Calcutta), 4/24/93, pp. 34-38; in Proliferation Issues, 5/18/93, p. 12.

27. Reports on biological weapons proliferation do not identify Sudan as a country of concern. E.g., Pearson, p. 26. OTA, p. 239. However, a recent US congressional task force report alleges that beginning in 1997, Iraq transferred equipment and materials for chemical and biological weapons production facilities that it built in Sudan. The report says that that "Sudan needs WMD in order to hit the Black rebels in the south and deter Western intervention against the Islamist terrorism empire." The report also states that Iraq transferred chemical weapons to Sudan and Yemen during 1991-1992, and that "in 1993, Iraq sent additional chemical weapons to Sudan, this time through Iran." It also asserts that in mid-1991, "about 400" Scud missiles were transferred from Iraq to Sudan, that in late 1995, "some 50 'advanced Scud launchers' and a similar number of Al Hussein missiles" were shipped from Iraq to Sudan. The report was said to be based on unidentified European and Israeli intelligence sources. Yossef Bodansky, "The Iraqi WMD Challenge: Myths and Reality," (Washington, DC: US House of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, 2/10/98). Jim Wolf, Reuters, 2/15/98, "Iraq Hid Deadly Weapons Abroad--Congress Report."

    A White House official said on 2/16/98 that the United States has "no credible evidence" to support the allegations. European intelligence sources likewise said they had no evidence to support the charges. "White House Says No Sign Iraq Exported Arms," Reuters, 2/16/98. Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 3/26/98, "Authorities Claim US ‘Disinformation Attempt’ Over Iraq;" in FBIS-WEU-98-085, 3/26/98. The allegations regarding chemical weapons appear to be based on statements by Ugandan security officials and members of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), who assert that Sudan produced chemical weapons with Iraqi assistance and employed them against forces of the SPLA. Emmy Allio, "Sudan Has Poison Gas Plant Near Uganda," Nando Times, 11/21/97, [Online] http://www.africanews.org. These claims have not been confirmed by other sources.

    The allegation that Iraq transferred hundreds of ballistic missiles from Sudan is wildly at variance with recent public estimates by other sources, which estimate that Iraq may retain two to a maximum of a few dozen Scud missiles. E.g., NSC. US Government White Paper. Cordesman, p. 31. Michael Eisenstadt, "Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Unresolved Issues," Policywatch #304, 2/27/98, [Online] http://www.washingtoninstitute.org.

28. With the exception of Bodansky noted above, studies of chemical weapons proliferation do not identify Sudan as a country of concern. E.g., OTA, p. 239.

29. Public sources do not indicate that Syria has a nuclear weapons program. E.g., Michael Eisenstadt, "Syria's Strategic Weapons," Jane's Intelligence Review 5/93, p. 169. Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 18. Cordesman, p. 22.

30. Tucker, p. 18. ACDA, p. 68. Lesser and Tellis, pp. 70-71. Dockser Marcus, p. A1. Eisenstadt, p. 170. Office of the Secretary of Defense, pp. 19-20. Cordesman p. 22. Ahmed S. Hashim, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence Case Study 1: Syria (The Deterrence Series, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998), p. 10.

31. Eisenstadt, p. 170. Office of the Secretary of Defense, pp. 18-19. Cordesman, p. 21. Hashim, p. 5. CDISS, "Devil's Brews Briefings: Syria," [Online] http://www.cdiss.org/cbwnb5.htm. Uzi Mahnaimi, "Syria Builds Nerve Gas Arsenal," Sunday Times, 11/17/96, [Online] http://personal.the-times.co.uk:80. Paul Beaver, "Syria To Make Chemical Bomblets For 'Scud Cs," Jane's Defence Weekly, 9/3/97, p. 3

32. Reports on nuclear proliferation do not identity Turkey as a country of concern. E.g., OTA, p. 239. For detailed information regarding Turkey's nuclear development, see Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey's Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power," The Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1997), pp. 33-44.

33. Reports on biological weapons proliferation do not identify Turkey as a country of concern. E.g., OTA, p. 239. Pearson, p. 26.

34. Reports on chemical weapons proliferation do not identity Turkey as a country of concern. E.g., OTA, p. 239. According to the Sussex/Harvard Information Bank on Chemical and Biological Warfare Armament and Arms Limitation, Turkey was the only country possessing chemical weapons during the First World War that did not use them. However, the Sussex/Harvard Information Bank notes that Turkey was reported to have used chemical weapons against Kurdish separatists in 1988. Cited by Julian Perry Robinson, "Chemical-Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East," in Non-Conventional-Weapons Proliferation In The Middle East, Efraim Karsh, Martin S. Navias, and Philip Sabin, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 90, 76.

35. The United States is included on this chart because in addition to its nuclear capabilities and deployments, US Department of Defense policy during recent years has been to maintain a "near-continuous presence" in the Persian Gulf. It has deployed a combination of aircraft carriers, Marine amphibious assault task forces, army battalions, and air force strike aircraft in the region under the direction of CENTCOM (US Central Command). The US "standard presence" in the Gulf has included an aircraft carrier for a minimum of nine months annually, and one Marine Amphibious Ready Group for a minimum of six months annually. The US Navy's Fifth Fleet, which includes 20 ships, 103 strike aircraft, and 19,000 sailors and marines, is headquartered in Manama, Bahrain. Military personnel deployed in the countries and waters of the region have ranged from 19,000 to the recent peak of 44,000. Although US military deployments in the Middle East region are lower than in other regions, such as Europe and East Asia, they have grown since the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Robert S. Greenberger and Thomas E. Ricks, "Clinton and Pentagon Plan Less Obsessive Stance Toward Iraq, with Big Troop and Ship Pullback," Wall Street Journal, 5/13/97, p. 24. Kenneth H. Bacon, "DoD News Briefing," 4/16/98, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, [Online] http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1998/04. Dana Priest, "Military Reduces Presence in Gulf," Washington Post, 5/27/98, p. 1. US Navy, "United States Naval Forces in 5th Fleet - The Arabian Gulf," 2/25/98, [Online] http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/news/in-gulf2.html. F. Gregory Gause, III, "Arms Supplies and Military Spending in the Gulf," Middle East Report, 7-9/97, p. 14. On US military deployments and cooperation with countries in the region, see: Anthony H. Cordesman, "USCENTCOM and its Area of Operations," (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5/98).

    Ongoing US cruise missile and nuclear-capable strike aircraft deployments in the region may be augmented rapidly. During the 1/98 - 2/98 confrontation with Iraq, for example, the United States deployed seven surface ships armed with a total of 575 Tomahawk cruise missiles to the Middle East, as well as two attack submarines carrying 24 cruise missiles each. US aircraft were deployed in Bahrain, Kuwait, Diego Garcia, and Saudi Arabia. Priest, p. 1. Robert S. Greenberger, "Under the Gun," Wall Street Journal, 2/17/98, p. A8. "News From the Gulf: United States Naval Forces in Fifth Fleet-The Arabian Gulf," United States Navy, 2/25/98, http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/. Terence Nelan, "Allied Forces in the Gulf," ABC News, 2/19/98, http://www.abcnews.com. Bacon, "DoD News Briefing."

36. The United States is the only country with nuclear weapons currently stationed outside of its borders. Of approximately 12,000 nuclear weapons in its arsenal, the United States reportedly deploys 15 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs at Inçirlik Air Base in Turkey, as well as 140 additional nuclear weapons in other NATO countries (i.e., in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom). It is not known whether the new earth-penetrating version of this nuclear weapon, the B-61 Mod 11, is or will be deployed in Europe. William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and Joshua Handler, Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments 1998 (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, 3/98) pp. 14, 25, 78-79. Otfried Nassauer, Oliver Meier, Nicola Butler, and Stephen Young, "U.S. Nuclear NATO Arsenals 1996-97," BASIC-BITS Research Note, 2/97, [Online] http://www.basicint.org/usnukeur.htm.

    The United States has threatened that it may use nuclear weapons against states in the Middle East (in particular, against Iraq and Libya) in response to chemical or biological weapons attacks on US military forces or allies. William Arkin, "Calculated Ambiguity: Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf War," Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1996), pp. 3-18. Greg Mello, "New Bomb, No Mission," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (5-6/97), pp. 28-32. James P. Rubin, "Excerpt of U.S. Department of State Press Briefing Iraq Crisis and U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy," 2/5/98, Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, [Online] http://www.clark.net/pub/clw/coalition/rubin205.htm. Stephen I. Schwartz, "Miscalculated Ambiguity: U.S. Policy on the Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons," Disarmament Diplomacy, 3/98, [Online] http://www.brook.edu/FP/PROJECTS/NUCWCOST/THREATS.HTM. See also the 4/26/96 statement by then Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, highlighted in Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 35.

    In accordance with the 1991 decision of President George Bush to withdraw nuclear weapons from US naval ships, the United States withdrew 100 TLAM-N [RGM/UGM-109A] Tomahawk cruise missiles, which carry a 200kt nuclear warhead, from navy vessels in 1993. Although "as a matter of policy" the United States does "not discuss the presence or absence of nuclear weapons aboard specific ships, submarines or aircraft," it is "general US policy not to deploy nuclear weapons aboard surface ships, attack submarines, and naval aircraft." Walter Pincus, Washington Post, April 2, 1998, p. A3. Duncan Lennox, ed., "RGM/UGM-109 Tomahawk," Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems 26, 1998. "Sixth Fleet FAQs," United States Sixth Fleet, [Online] http://www.naples.navy.mil/c6f/.

37. The US biological weapons program was initiated in 1943 and terminated 26 years later. President Richard Nixon announced on 11/25/69 that the United States would "renounce the use of lethal biological agents and weapons...[and]...confine its biological research to defensive measures such as immunization and safety measures." The US stockpile of biological weapons and munitions was subsequently destroyed. William C. Patrick III, "A History of Biological and Toxin Warfare," Director's Series on Proliferation, Kathleeen C. Bailey, ed. (Livermore, California: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 5/23/94), pp. 13-20.

38. In 1985, the US Congress mandated destruction of the US chemical weapons stockpile. The US Army is in the process of incinerating 28,000 tons of blister and nerve agents, which include sarin, VX, and mustard gas. In fulfillment of the Chemical Weapons Convention, US chemical weapons are to be destroyed by the year 2007. Carla Anne Robbins, "Army's Huge Supply of Nerve Gas Poses Some Unnerving Questions," Wall Street Journal, 6/1/98, p. 1. Office of the Secretary of Defense, "U.S. Chemical Weapons Stockpile Information Declassified," News Release, 1/22/96.

39. Public sources do not indicate that Yemen has a nuclear weapons programs, nor that it possesses research or power reactors. E.g., Nuclear Engineering International, 1998 World Nuclear Industry Handbook, (Essex, UK: Wilmington Publishing Ltd., 1998), pp. 36, 118.

40. Reports on biological weapons proliferation do not identify Yemen as a country of concern. E.g., Pearson, p. 26. OTA, p. 239.

41. Cordesman (p. 12) states that Yemen has stockpiled chemical weapons but that these may no longer be usable. However, other sources do not identify Yemen as possessing chemical munitions. E.g., Julian Perry Robinson, "Chemical-Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East," Non-Conventional Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East, Efraim Karsh, Martin S. Navias, and Philip Sabin, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 69-98.

Prepared by Michael Barletta and Erik Jorgensen,
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. May 1998

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