Public reports indicate that Turkey may be a significant transshipment route for nuclear smuggling from the former Soviet Union (FSU). Eighteen nuclear trafficking incidents involving Turkey were reported between 1993 and 1999. These cases include nuclear material seized in Turkey, nuclear material interdicted en route to Turkey, and seizure of nuclear material smuggled by Turkish nationals. These cases vary in significance from outright frauds involving osmium and "red mercury," to some that reportedly involved small quantities of weapons-usable material. However, to date none of these cases have been authoritatively confirmed to involve highly enriched uranium or plutonium.

Turkish officials have denied publicly that any plutonium or highly enriched uranium has been seized in the country. According to unconfirmed open-source reports, however, Turkish authorities seized several grams of plutonium in Bursa, Turkey in 1998, which had been smuggled from either Kazakhstan or Russia. In another reported incident, police confiscated 12g of highly enriched uranium in Zurich, Switzerland on 22 January 1996, and arrested a Turkish national who was a member of a nuclear smuggling group based in Turkey. The suspect said the material was destined for Libya. Four days later, Turkish police arrested the remaining members of this alleged smuggling ring in Yalova with 1.2kg of uranium (enrichment level not reported) in their possession. Furthermore, Turkish, Russian, and international wire services reported that Turkish police seized 750g of weapons-grade uranium, which had originated in Azerbaijan, in Istanbul in 1994. Initial press reports of seizures of "weapons-usable material" often turn out to be inaccurate, however, and none of these reported cases have been confirmed. Nuclear materials confiscated in Turkey were in most instances taken to the Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center in Istanbul for analysis.

Some preliminary observations can be made about these cases. First, public reports indicate that all nuclear material smuggled via Turkey originated in countries of the FSU. As the materials were seized, their ultimate destination cannot be determined with confidence; however, three cases reportedly involved material being sought by or shipped to Iran or Libya. In no case was the reported destination the government or any other entity in Turkey itself. Second, a number of these incidents apparently involved "amateurs" who acquired nuclear materials before identifying potential buyers, and who sought to peddle material of little or no utility for fabricating nuclear weapons. Third, the sheer number of cases indicates that Turkey may be a significant transshipment route for clandestine efforts to buy or sell nuclear material originating in the FSU. Turkeys geographic setting could make it an attractive route for such transactions. Several countries of proliferation concern Iran, Iraq, and Syria share borders with Turkey. Three countries of the FSU Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia likewise have borders with Turkey. In addition, ongoing commercial exchange between Turkey and Central Asian countries may provide opportunities for smuggling. However, the concentration and types of incidents reported in Istanbul, and the lack of reported incidents on Turkey's borders with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, are somewhat surprising. The former offer grounds to speculate that scam artists may seek buyers in the "international bazaar" of Istanbul; the latter could indicate that materials are not shipped across those international borders.

Public reports indicate that Turkish and other international authorities thwarted each of the nuclear smuggling schemes recounted in this study. However, other more sophisticated attempts may have escaped detection. The possibility that proliferation-relevant nuclear materials may be smuggled via Turkey continues to merit international attention.
 
 

* For sources and further details, see Sandi Arnold, "Factsheet on Reported Nuclear Trafficking Incidents Involving Turkey, 1993-1999," July 1999, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Sources and Notes:

The authors sought to eliminate contradictions and clearly false information, but cannot confirm the veracity of the reports from which these summaries are drawn.  Case selection was based upon the following three criteria: (1) nuclear material seized in Turkey; (2) nuclear material en-route to Turkey; or, (3) nuclear material seized involving a Turkish national.

This chart is based on Turkish-, Russian-, and English-language open-source reports and information in the International Nuclear Proliferation Database and the Newly Independent States Nuclear Trafficking Database of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.  Access to these is only available by subscription. For subscription information click here.

Sandi Arnold and Michael Barletta, July 1999.
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
 Monterey Institute of International Studies

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