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Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East

IRAQ

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Capabilities and Programs[1]

Current WMD Middle East Information

Please note this section is no longer being updated. For the latest Middle East WMD information, please visit these links:

Country Profiles
Information on nuclear, biological & chemical weapons and missile programs, with details on capabilities, facilities, chronologies, and imports/exports.

CNS maintains these Country Profile databases for the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI).

Go to Iraq Special Collections.
Go to Iraq's Biological Weapons Program.

Updated: April 2006

Nuclear[2]
  • Acquired nuclear material for small civilian nuclear program during the Atoms for Peace program in the mid-1950s.
  • Nuclear weapons program began in mid 1970s as a response to a perceived Israeli nuclear weapons program.
  • 1976, a $300 million deal completed between the French and the Iraqis for two nuclear reactors: a 40MW(th) reactor that the French dubbed "Osirak," and an 800kW(th) reactor called Isis. The Iraqis called the reactors Tammuz-1 and Tammuz-2.
  • Osirak (Tammuz-1) was destroyed by an Israeli aerial bombing campaign in June, 1981.
  • In 1990, Iraq launched a crash program to divert reactor fuel under IAEA safeguards to produce nuclear weapons.
  • Iraq considered two delivery options for nuclear weapons: either using unmodified al-Hussein ballistic missile with 300km range, or producing Al-Hussein derivative with 650km range.
  • Until 1991, Iraq had a nuclear weapon development program that involved 10,000 personnel, and had a multi-year budget totaling approximately $10 billion.
  • After the Gulf War of 1991, the Iraqi nuclear weapons program progressively decayed due to Coalition bombing and UNSCOM disarmament efforts.
  • April 1991, UNSC Resolution 687 adopted enabling the IAEA to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities and carry out a plan for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of prohibited items.
  • August 1991, UNSC Resolution 707 adopted demanding Iraq "halt all nuclear activities of any kind, except for use of isotopes for medical, agricultural, or industrial purposes."
  • Saddam retained intellectual capital (scientists) for the possibility for restarting a nuclear program post 1991.
  • No evidence found to prove intent toward reconstituting a nuclear program, the primary intent post 1991 was to end sanctions.
  • November 15th, 1991, the first removal of highly enriched uranium from Iraq. An IAEA cargo flight carrying 42 fresh fuel elements from the IRT-5000 5 megawatt light water research reactor at Al Tuwaitha, and 6.6 kilograms of uranium-235 left Baghdad for Moscow.
  • Iraq Survey Group's (ISG) inquiry found Iraq concealed elements of its nuclear program from inspectors after 1991, including the hiding of documents, technology, and attempting to maintain the brain trust of scientists who had earlier worked on the nuclear program; this conclusion echoes the statements made by Hussein Kamel upon his defection in 1995.
  • In 2004 Jafar Dhia Jafar, former head of Iraq's nuclear agency, announces all weapons programs had been destroyed after 1991, at which point they had been 2-3 years away from producing a nuclear weapon.
  • January 2005, Charles Duelfer, chief inspector of the ISG, officially brought the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq to a halt. Mr. Duelfer stands by his September 2004 report in which he reported no findings of a nuclear weapons program post-1991.
Biological[3]
  • Signed the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention in 1972. The Convention prohibited development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons.
  • The Iraqi Ministry of Defense published a manual in 1987 entitled Principles of Using Chemical and Biological Agents in Warfare, including a section on military use of biological agents with instruction for small attacks and sabotage operations before a general offensive begins.
  • The timing of the publications suggests the use of such tactics in the Iran-Iraq war.
  • Iraq authorized use of BW against Israel, Saudi Arabia and US forces prior to the 1991 Gulf war, should the need arise.
  • Post 1991, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 687, authorizing UNSCOM and the IAEA to implement on-site inspections of the facilities in Iraq believed to be related to WMD production.
  • Resolution 687 required Iraq to declare and destroy all holdings of biological weapons.
  • Upon commencement of the inspections, Iraq declared despite a biological weapons research and design program for defense purposes, no offensive biological weapons (BW) program existed.
  • Ratified the BTWC on 4/18/91, as required by the Gulf War cease-fire agreement.
  • 1995, Saddam's son-in-law and advisor General Hussein Kamel defected and admitted to destroying all weapons programs, including biological, though research and design elements were preserved.
  • Iraq acknowledged open-air testing of biological agents between March 1988 and January 1991 including Bacillus anthracis, Bacillus subtilis, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and ricin at facilities such as al-Muhammadiyat, Khan Bani Saad, Jurf al-Sakr Firing Range, and the Abu Obeydi Airfield.
  • Conducted research on BW dissemination using unmanned aerial vehicles.
  • Due to a poor economy in 1995 and a desire to lift sanctions, ISG reported Iraq gave up the BW program, specifically destroying the al-Hakam facility.
Chemical[4]
  • Established Chemical Corps in the mid-1960s, foundation of the future CW program. The Corps were tasked with the nuclear, biological and chemical protection of Iraqi troops and civilians.
  • Mid 1970s, the Corps developed a laboratory-scale facility which later synthesized chemical warfare agents and evaluated their properties.
  • Repeatedly used CW against Iraqi Kurds in 1988 and against Iran in 1983-1988 during the Iran-Iraq war.
  • Due to CW success in the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam viewed this type of warfare as efficient and necessary in defensive and offensive strategy.
  • Saddam considered his chemical weapons program to be a deterrent to Coalition forces moving toward Baghdad in 1991.
  • ISG found all CW holdings had been destroyed in 1991 after the Gulf War as a result of Saddam's desire to have sanctions lifted.
  • Throughout the 1990s, Iraq maintained a trust of scientists that had worked on the previous CW program.
  • Chemical programs were reinstituted in the mid-1990s due to a brief period of economic recovery.
  • ISG found no evidence prior to the 2003 invasion that proves Iraq had revitalized a chemical weapons program.
  • Evidence shows most chemical research done in 1995 and 1996 was conducted in the realm of infrastructure improvement.
  • An extensive CW arsenal–including 38,537 munitions, 690 tons of CW agents, and over 3,000 tons of CW precursor chemicals–was destroyed by UNSCOM prior to the inspectors' withdrawal in 1998.
  • Not a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention as of February 23 2006, however the new Iraqi government has declared its intention to accede to the Convention.
Ballistic missiles[5]
  • Began development of missile program in early 1970s.
  • 1991 Gulf War, UN weapons inspections, UN resolutions and sanctions brought missile production to a halt in the early 1990s.
  • Signed contracts with the Soviet Union in 1972 involving the acquisition of 819 Scud-B missiles and 11 MAZ-543 transporter-erector-launchers.
  • Launched 331 Scud-B missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, and 189 al-Hussein missiles at Iranian cities during the 1988 "War of the Cities."
  • 1995 Hussein Kamel declared Iraq had destroyed hidden Scud-variant missiles and related materials in response to inspections and sanctions, an account that is later found to be accurate by the ISG.
  • ISG found no evidence of remaining Scud missiles post-1991.
  • After Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, ISG discovered Iraq had plans and designs for three long-range ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000 km and a 1,000-km-range cruise missile. None of these systems had progressed to production.
  • UNSC Resolution 687 passed in 1991, forbidding Iraq from developing delivery systems exceeding 150 km, verified by periodic weapons inspections.
  • In 2002, Iraq developed the liquid-propellant al-Samud II with the help of Russian technicians and engineers, and the solid propellant al-Fat'h and continued pursuing a program of small UAV systems.
  • Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, ISG reports Iraq imported 380 SA-2/Volga liquid-propellant engines from Poland and possibly Russia or Belarus. Iraq claimed these engines were for the al-Samud II project.
  • After UNSC Resolution 1441, Iraq presented the Currently Accurate, Full, and Complete Declaration (CAFCD) to the UN in December of 2002 providing details on the al-Samud II and al-Fat'h programs and facilities.
  • February 2003, UN ordered the destruction of the al-Samud, which began in March.
  • ISG head inspector Charles Duelfer assessed that while Iraq may have had plans for long-range missile programs, none had been brought to fruition prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom.
  • ISG final conclusions indicate Iraq was in the process of destroying holdings of ballistic missiles at the time Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced.
Cruise missiles[6]
  • C-601/Nisa 28 and HY-2 Silkworm with 95km range and 513kg payload.
  • SS-N-2c Styx with 80km range and 513kg payload.
  • Exocet AM-39 with 50km range and 165kg payload.
  • YJ-1/C-801 with 40km range and 165kg payload.
  • After UNSCOM inspections in 1998, Iraq continued to develop the al-Faw 150/200 HY-2 anti-ship cruise missile program extending the range from 100 to 150 km.
  • Tested a land attack cruise missile (LACM) in August of 1999 in Basra.
  • In the late 1990s, Minister of Military Industrialization, 'Abd-al-Tawab Huwaysh, created the Special Projects Office (SPO), which headed a secret project to extend the range of the HY-2 cruise missile to 150 km using cannibalized components from their inventory of surplus C601 and C611 anti-ship cruise missiles and changes to the propulsion system.
  • ISG found it doubtful that the engine replacements were successful.
  • The Jinin research and design program, a turbojet-powered cruise missile intended to carry a High Explosives warhead of up to 500 kg, began in 2001 and had a projected range of 1,000 km. The design work was destroyed in February 2003.
  • Operation Iraqi Freedom prevented completion of the Jinin cruise missile.
  • Extended range HY-2 successfully flew to at least 150 km.
  • Primary goal of HY-2 program was to provide a greater defense capability against attacking ships; research relates to the Jinin project as well.
Other delivery systems[7]
  • Reportedly converted L-29 jet trainers to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for delivery of BW or CW.
  • May have possessed spraying equipment for BW dissemination by helicopter.
  • Experimented with MIG-21 as unmanned delivery vehicle UAV for BW.
  • Began development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the late 1980s.
  • Attempted to convert MiG-21 fighter aircrafts to Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) in 1990 for the purpose of delivering CBW. Program was unsuccessful.
  • Started Yamamah research and design program in 1991 for the development of small indigenous UAVs.
  • Between 1994 and 1995 resumed efforts on RPV program converting Czech L-29 trainer aircraft.
  • Fighter and ground attack forces total 300 fixed-wing aircraft, including Su-25, Su-24MK, Su-20, Su-7, MiG-29, MiG-25, MiG-23BN, MiG-21, Mirage F1EQ5, and F-7.
  • Ground systems include artillery and rocket launchers, notably 500+ FROG-7 artillery rockets and 12-15 launchers, with 70km range and 450kg payload.


Sources:

[1] This chart summarizes data available from public sources. Precise assessment of Iraq's capabilities is difficult because most weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs remained secret and cannot be verified independently. Although inspections by UNSCOM and the IAEA's Iraq Action Team provided detailed information about past Iraqi programs, assessing Iraq's capabilities prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 was difficult due to its policies of denial and deception, and the departure of UNSCOM inspectors in November 1998. Since Operation Iraqi Freedom and the subsequent departure of the Ba'ath Party from Iraq, such discrepancies have been elucidated through the investigation of the Iraq Survey Group, which since consolidated all findings related to WMD in Iraq in the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence in Iraq's WMD.
On Iraq's deception and denial policies, see: Khidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam's Bombmaker (New York: Scribner, 2000). David Albright, "Masters of Deception," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54:3 (May/June 1998). Barton Gellman, "A Futile Game of Hide and Seek," Washington Post, 10/11/98. Barton Gellman, "Arms Inspectors 'Shake the Tree," Washington Post, 10/12/98.
On UNSCOM's efforts to disarm Iraq of WMD, see Robert Einhorn, Robert Gallucci, Dimitri Perricos, Jere Nichols, Gary Dillon, Ephraim Asculai, and Michael Eisenstadt, 6/14-15/01, transcripts from a conference, "Understanding the Lessons of Nuclear Inspections and Monitoring in Iraq: A Ten-Year Review," Washington, DC. Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iraq/index.html>. Richard Butler, The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Growing Crisis in Global Security, (New York: Public Affairs, 2000). Tim Trevan, Saddam's Secrets-The Hunt for Iraq's Hidden Weapons, (New York: Harper Collins, 1999).
[2] IAEA Action Team on Iraq, 7/13/01, "Fact Sheet: Iraq's Nuclear Weapon Programme," International Atomic Energy Agency, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/nwp2.html>. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001). Kelly Motz, undated [accessed 9/12/01] "What Has Iraq Been Doing Since Inspectors Left? What Is On Its Shopping List?" Iraq Watch, <http://www.iraqwatch.org/updates/update.asp?id=wpn200107231601>. William J. Broad, "Document Reveals 1987 Bomb Test by Iraq," New York Times, 4/29/01, p. 16. David Albright, "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: Past, Present, and Future Challenges," PolicyWatch #301, 2/18/98, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/Policywatch/policywatch1998/301.htm>. U.S. Government White Paper, "Iraq Weapons Of Mass Destruction Programs," 2/13/98, <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/iraq_white_paper.html>. Steven Dolley, 5/12/98, "Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program: Unresolved Issues," Nuclear Control Institute, <http://www.nci.org/iraq/iraq511.htm>. Steven Dolley, 2/19/98, "Iraq and the Bomb: The Nuclear Threat Continues," Nuclear Control Institute, <http://www.nci.org/i/ib21998.htm>. Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2001, <http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/me_wmd_mideast.pdf>, pp. 85-86. David Albright, "A Special Case: Iraq," Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1997), pp. 309-50, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Profiles: Iraq: Nuclear Overview, 3/08/06, <http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iraq/nuclear/>. Central Intelligence Agency, Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004), September 12, 2004. International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Capabilities of Iraq, 4/18/06, <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Iraq/event.html>. Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 20 1999 <http://www.iraqwatch.org/perspectives/csis-WMDIraq.pdf>. "Iraq 'Ended Nuclear Aims in 1991,'" BBC News, August 11, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3556714.stm>.
[3] United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), Report: Disarmament, 1/25/99, United Nations, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/ucreport/index.htm>. Motz undated. Steve Bowman, "Iraqi Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Capabilities," (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2/17/98), pp. 1-5. Barbara Starr, "UNSCOM Inspectors Still Doubt Iraq's Arms Claims," Jane's Defence Weekly, 2/25/98, p. 18. U.S. Government White Paper 1998. Cordesman 2001, pp. 81-84. Gellman 1998. Jonathan Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Program," Arms Control Today, 1993, 14(3): 229-71. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Profiles: Iraq: Biological Overview, 3/08/06, <http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iraq/biological/>. Central Intelligence Agency, Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004), September 12, 2004.
[4]U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000," 9/7/01, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_sep_2001.htm>. Motz undated. Javed Ali, Spring 2001, "Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance," Nonproliferation Review 8(1): 43-58. UNSCOM 1/25/99. Bowman 1998, pp. 1-5. U.S. Government White Paper 1998. Starr 1998, p. 18. Cordesman 2001, pp. 75-79. United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), "UNSCOM Main Achievements," 5/98, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/achievement.htm>. Physicians for Human Rights, "Winds of Death: Iraq's Use of Poison Gas Against its Kurdish Population," (Boston, MA: Physicians for Human Rights, 2/89), pp. 1-2. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Profiles: Iraq: Chemical Overview, 3/08/06, <http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iraq/chemical/>. Central Intelligence Agency, Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004), September 12, 2004. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Non-Signatory States, 4/18/06, <http://www.opcw.org/>.
[5] CIA 9/7/01. Cordesman 2001, pp.71-75. "German Assessment: Iraqi Missiles Will Reach Europe by 2005," Deutsche Presse Agentur (Berlin), 2/23/00, <http://www.BerlinOnline.de>. Jane's Online, "Country Inventory – In Service," and "Offensive Weapons, Iraq," Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems 36, 7/24/01, <http://online.janes.com>. National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015, 9/99, <http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/foreign_missle_developments.htm>. Carnegie Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project, undated [accessed 8/14/01], "World Missile Chart, <http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/ballisticmissilechart.htm>. Motz undated. UNSCOM 1/25/99. Federation of American Scientists, undated, "Iraq," <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/missile/>. Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS), undated, "National Briefings: Iraq," "Ballistic Missile Capabilities by Country," and "Iraqi Ballistic Missile Capabilities," <http://www.cdiss.org/>. U.S. Government White Paper 1998. Starr, p. 18. Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (London: Grafton Books, 1989). Interview with Tim McCarthy, Senior Missile Analyst, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 4/30/98. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Profiles: Iraq: Missile Overview, 3/08/06, <http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iraq/delivery-systems/>. Central Intelligence Agency, Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004), September 12, 2004.
[6] National Defense Industrial Association, Feasibility of Third World Advanced Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat: Volume 2, Emerging Cruise Missile Threat, 8/99, <http://www.ndia.org/committees/slaad/ECMTVol2.pdf>, pp. 138-145. CDISS, undated, "Emerging Cruise Missile Capabilities," <http://www.cdiss.org/images/tabled.htm>. Central Intelligence Agency, Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004), September 12, 2004.
[7] CIA 9/7/01. Motz undated. Jane's Online 7/24/01. The Military Balance 2000/2001 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000), p. 141. Central Intelligence Agency, Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2004), September 12, 2004.


September 2001 update by Michael Barletta and Jeffrey Fields.
November 1998 original by Michael Barletta and Erik Jorgensen.
Updated by Sammy Salama and Alexis Zeiger, April 2006.

© Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. April 2006


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