Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East

Israel's Nuclear Posture Review

CNS Issue Brief on WMD in the Middle East

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"Everything is on the table. We will examine changes in the geopolitical environment, changes in our own abilities and other key factors to make sure our strategy is up to date."[1]

Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai, July 1998

Prompted by nuclear weapons tests in South Asia in May 1998 and subsequent international developments, the Israeli government and defense establishment are engaged in a reevaluation of the country's ambiguous or "opaque" nuclear weapon status. Although widely recognized as possessing a sophisticated nuclear arsenal, Israel has never openly tested nuclear weapons, and until July 1998, no senior Israeli official had ever made an unequivocal public declaration that the country possesses nuclear arms.

At a 13 July 1998 press conference in Jordan, former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres publicly admitted for the first time that Israel possessed nuclear weapon capabilities. Peres stated that Israel "built a nuclear option not in order to have a Hiroshima but an Oslo."[2] Public discussion of the issue intensified in July 1998, when Iran tested the Shahab-3, a ballistic missile that may have the potential range to strike Israel.

Because the economic and political costs to India and Pakistan for conducting nuclear tests were quite limited, some analysts fear that such countries in the Middle East as Iran and Iraq may be emboldened to develop nuclear weapons. If other states in the Middle East acquire nuclear weapons, Israel might alter its long-standing policy of nuclear ambiguity and openly brandish its nuclear weapons capabilities. Such a shift might in turn motivate increasing efforts by Arab states and Iran to acquire or to expand their chemical and biological weapons capabilities.[3]

Nuclear Policy Review

Israeli government sources and parliamentarians confirmed in late June 1998 that Israel was formally reviewing its policy of nuclear ambiguity, with several agencies – including the defense and foreign ministries and the office of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – participating in the review.[4] David Ivry, a former commander in the Israeli Air Force and director-general of the Ministry of Defense, is heading the review, which will include an analysis of political, operational, and budgetary issues associated with Israel's nuclear deterrent strategy.[5] In a 1995 public interview, Ivry said that Israel needs a strategic deterrent force based on a "second strike capability." Ivry also alluded to the Cold War-era US nuclear doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) "as a model for Israel."[6]

Commenting on Israel's nuclear policy review, Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai told Defense News, "Everything is on the table. We will examine changes in the geopolitical environment, changes in our own abilities and other key factors to make sure our strategy is up to date." But Mordechai said that he does not support radical change in Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity. In his view, Israel’s policy of not being the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East "has served us well, and at least for the time being, should remain in place."[7]

However, Major General Yitzhak Ben-Yisrael, head of the Armaments Research and Development Administration of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, said that although Israel’s nuclear deterrent policy remained important in the country’s defense doctrine, developing a preemptive strike capability is also necessary. "As a small country," Ben-Israel said, "we cannot go into battle for lengthy periods of time and the option of a preemptive strike is in line with this." Ben-Yisrael also noted that Israel is in a "paradoxical situation" because "you can't deter anyone except by showing him your capability," yet Israel is not interested in publicizing its nuclear capabilities.[8]

The Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Knesset plans to hold a series of closed hearings on Israel's nuclear policy.[9] Committee chairman Gideon Ezra said, "I don't think there is a need for a change in our current position." According to Ezra, "what they [Israel's enemies] don't know is more threatening than what they do know."[10] However, Ephraim Sneh, chairman of the Knesset subcommittee on defense, asserted on 5 August 1998 that "deterrence created by traditional ambiguity doesn’t work anymore." Sneh, who wrote the portion of the Israeli Labor Party platform that would obligate Israel "not to tolerate nuclear weapons in the hands of hostile states," argued that given the likelihood that Iran will develop nuclear weapons in the near future, Israel must invest several billion dollars in developing an assured second-strike or preemptive strike capacity. Sneh said, "We have to think about what we need to do in order to deter or prevent or to pre-empt a nuclear strike on Israel."[11]

According to the London newsletter Foreign Report, the Israeli Defense Ministry is reportedly pressuring government officials to authorize a policy that would allow Israel to retaliate with nuclear weapons, in the event that it suffers a nuclear first-strike attack. The newsletter also reported that the Israeli government is "coming to terms" with the possibility that Israel’s nuclear deterrent will be inadequate, because an Iranian nuclear first strike could disable or destroy Israel’s capability to retaliate in kind. Foreign Report stated that Israel could develop a sea-based, assured second-strike capability using three Dolphin-class diesel-electric submarines that Germany recently provided to Israel. The submarines, which are to be deployed in 1999, could provide the basis for a submarine-launched nuclear cruise missile force. Defense analysts expect that once Israel has mastered the requisite technologies, it will have the capacity to produce long-range cruise missiles in a short period of time, which could serve as the basis for a second-strike nuclear capability.[12] In December 1990, Major General Avraham Botzer, former commander of Israel's navy, told Israeli television that Israel needed the Dolphin-class submarines "as platforms for weapons systems to deter against an attack by weapons of mass destruction." Botzer said the submarines "are a way of guaranteeing that the enemy will not be tempted to strike pre-emptively with non-conventional weapons and get away scot-free."[13]

Public Debate

Although military censorship prevents analysis of Israel's current nuclear capabilities, Israeli newspapers and journals are permitted to publish information based on foreign sources as well as general policy discussions.[14] Defense analyst Yo'el Marcus wrote in June 1998 that the nuclear tests in South Asia have not altered Israel's political-military situation in any significant way. Marcus notes that Iran will not be able to produce an operational nuclear device for at least another five years, and that even after it did so it is unlikely to use nuclear weapons. Marcus said that if Arab countries were to develop nuclear weapons, Israel would still retain a superior nuclear capability.[15] However, Reuven Pedatzur, who teaches military strategy at Tel Aviv University, commented that "if Iran declares [it has nuclear weapons], then it's almost inevitable that Israel will have to declare."[16]

Shai Feldman, director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS) at Tel Aviv University, noted that if Israel conducted a nuclear test, the United States would be legally obligated to immediately terminate its provision of military aid and close defense ties with Israel. Given that prospect, Israel is unlikely to follow the Indian and Pakistan example and carry out a nuclear test.[17] Israeli defense analyst Ze'ev Schiff likewise cautioned against changing Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity, stating that it could lead to a conflict between Israel and the US Congress.[18]

Israeli defense analysts are also debating how Israel should respond to a chemical or biological weapons attack. At a conference on "Challenges to Global and Middle East Security" in Herziliya, sponsored by Tel Aviv and Harvard universities, Feldman said that Israel should be prepared to use any weapon – including nuclear weapons – if attacked with chemical or biological weapons. However, other conference participants said that the United States and the international community would not understand the use of nuclear weapons in response to such an attack. Zeev Bonen, a researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University, argued that "you can't respond to a single chemical warhead on Tel Aviv with a nuclear attack."[19]

In a September 1998 article in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, Dan Margalit said Israel would gain nothing if it altered its policy of nuclear ambiguity. Margalit argued that Israel must consider the implications of a policy change, asking, "why should Israel reveal the secret of its strength, or relative weakness, to a hostile environment? Why should Israel supply invaluable intelligence data, without receiving anything in return?" However, Margalit noted that Israel's nuclear ambiguity does not preclude public debate of the issue. He said that there is enough information in Israel and abroad to debate whether Israel should join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or develop a second-strike nuclear capability.[20]

In a 1998 public survey by the National Security and Public Opinion Project at JCSS, 92 percent of Israelis surveyed supported the statement that Israel should develop nuclear weapons, up from 78 percent in 1987. Two-thirds of those surveyed agreed that Israel should keep its nuclear weapons secret, "if they existed," a decrease from 71 percent in 1993 and 78 percent in 1987. Furthermore, 80 percent said they would support Israel's use of nuclear weapons under certain conditions, an increase from 36 percent in 1986. Of those respondents who said they would support Israel's use of nuclear weapons, 99 percent believe that Israel would be justified in using nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack, while 86 percent support their use in response to a chemical or biological weapon attack. Forty-five percent of those who support Israel's use of nuclear weapons believe their use would be justified in order to avoid defeat in a conventional war, 21 percent believe their use would be justified if the Golan Heights were taken, and 12 percent supported their use instead of using Israel's regular army. The survey also indicated the non-politicized character of the nuclear weapon issue in Israel, as 70 percent of all ideological groups in Israel were willing to justify the use of nuclear weapons.[21]

Prospects for Policy Continuity

Gerald M. Steinberg, director of the Center for Conflict Resolution at Bar Ilan University, believes that Israel is unlikely to openly acknowledge its nuclear capability by conducting nuclear tests. He noted that since the 1960s, Israeli governments comprised of very diverse political parties and ideologies and facing very different strategic environments have consistently honored Israel's commitments to the US government, in which Israel promised not to test nuclear weapons or otherwise openly declare its nuclear capability. Furthermore, Steinberg notes that the "vast majority" of the Israeli public and elite support Israel's current policy of nuclear ambiguity. Unlike in South Asia, "nuclear status and policy does not play a role in Israeli domestic politics, and there is no 'nuclear' lobby pressing for tests," said Steinberg. He concludes that "Israel has nothing to gain and much to lose by following India and becoming an overt nuclear power," but notes that in the long term, the South Asian tests may prompt Israel to develop second-strike systems, and increase its efforts to develop defenses against regional ballistic missile threats.[22]

Analyst Emily Landau points out that since the 1990-91 Gulf War, public debate over Israel's nuclear posture has taken place in the context of changes in Israel's strategic environment, international demands that Israel begin to address directly its perceived nuclear capability, and Israel's increasing willingness to join regional and global arms control negotiations and initiatives. Israel signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in January 1993 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, although it has not ratified either accord. However, upon signing the CTBT, Israeli representatives at the United Nations noted that "Israel's support for the treaty did not reflect any change in its policy on the nuclear issue."[23]

On 11 August 1998, Israel agreed to allow the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva to form a negotiating committee for a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Israel had previously been the only country of the 61-member CD that had not consented to negotiations.[24] However, in a press release, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel still has "fundamental problems" with a FMCT, and that Israeli support for the committee "does not indicate we are taking a position on the treaty and its contents."[25] Prospects for Israeli participation in such accord, if it were successfully negotiated and opened for signature, appear unlikely at best.

In the recent landmark book Israel and the Bomb, scholar Avner Cohen observes that Israel's nuclear policy has been an enduring success for Israel, because it has enabled the country to maintain a nuclear monopoly in the Middle East while avoiding the political liabilities associated with overt possession of nuclear weapons.[26] According to former Prime Minister Shimon Peres, Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity has "managed to create sufficient suspicion for there to be a deterrent without having gotten to a status of clarity which would behoove sanctions against us."[27] Hence, despite the South Asian nuclear tests and concerns about the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by other states in the Middle East, the current nuclear posture review is unlikely to lead to major change in Israel's posture of nuclear ambiguity.

Michael Barletta and Christina Ellington. December 1998.
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Sources and Notes:

1. Barbara Opal-Rome, "Israel Officials Hint at Cracks in Nuclear Code of Silence," Defense News, 14-20 September 1998, p. 6.

2. "Peres Admits to Israeli Nuclear Capability," Israel Wire, July 14, 1998, (http://www.israelwire.com).

3. For a table summarizing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon capabilities in the Middle East, see Michael Barletta and Erik Jorgensen, "Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities in the Middle East," CNS Fact Sheet Series on WMD in the Middle East, May 1998, (http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/capable.htm#1).

4. Steve Rodan, "Israel Mulls Stance Amid New Threats," Defense News, 29 June-5 July 1998, p. 3.

5. Barbara Opal-Rome, " Israel Officials Hint at Cracks In Nuclear Code of Silence," Defense News, 14-20 September 1998, p. 6.

6. Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt, and Andrew J. Bacevitch, "Jewish State Studies Atomic Arms Option After Founding," Washington Times, 12 August 1998.

7. Barbara Opal-Rome, "Israel Officials Hint at Cracks in Nuclear Code of Silence," Defense News, 14-20 September 1998, p. 6.

8. Amnon Barzilai, "Military Reviews Nuclear Policy, as Israel Called 'Vulnerable' to Missile Attack," Ha’aretz, 25 August 1998, (http://www.haaretz.co.il/eng).

9. Barbara Opal-Rome, "Israel Officials Hint at Cracks in Nuclear Code of Silence," Defense News, 14-20 September 1998, p. 6.

10. Steve Rodan, "Israel Mulls Nuke Stance Amid New Threats," Defense News, 29 June-5 July 1998, p. 3.

11. Barbara Opal-Rome, "Israel Officials Hint at Cracks in Nuclear Code of Silence," Defense News, 14-20 September 1998, p. 6.

12. Douglas Davis, "Defense Officials Said Urging Nuclear Second-Strike Capability," Jerusalem Post, 6 August 1998, p. 3.

13. Martin Sieff, "Israel Buying 3 Submarines to Carry Nuclear Missiles," Washington Times, 1 July 1998, p. 1.

14. "Knowledge and the Nuclear Program," Ha'aretz, 6 September 1998, (http://www3.haaretz.co.il/eng/).

15. Yo'el Marcus, Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), 5 June 1998; in FBIS-TAC-98-156, 5 June 1998, "Conventional, Not Nuclear Weapons 'Real Danger' to Israel."

16. Serge Schmemann, "Israel Clings to its 'Nuclear Ambiguity'," New York Times, 21 June 1998, p. 6.

17. Shai Feldman, "The Nuclear Test in South Asia: Implications for the Middle East," Strategic Assessment 1 (July 1998), (http://www.tau.ac.il/~jcssjb/v1n2p2.html).

18. Ze'ev Schiff, "No Change in the Nuclear Policy," Ha'aretz, 11 September 1998, (http://www.haaretz.co.il/eng).

19. Steve Rodan, "Israel Mulls Nuke Stance Amid New Threats," Defense News, 29 June-5 July 1998, p. 36.

20. Dan Margalit, "Ambiguity is Preferable," Ha'aretz, 10 September 1998, (http://www.haaretz.co.il/eng).

21. Asher Arian, "Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons," Strategic Assessment 1 (October 1998), (http://www.tau.ac.il/~jcssjb/vinep3.html).

22. Gerald M. Steinberg, "Assessing the Impact of the Indian and Pakistan Nuclear Tests on the Middle East," Jerusalem Letter/ Viewpoints, 15 July 1998, (http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~steing/arms/jspa.htm).

23. Emily Landau, "Change in Israeli Nuclear Policy?" Strategic Assessment 1 (March 1998), (http://www.tau.ac.il/~jcssjb/v1p3.html).

24. Liat Collins, "UN Nuclear Parley Begins After Israel Drops Veto," Jerusalem Post, 12 August 1998, (http://www.jpost.co.il).

25. Israel Government Press Office, "PM Netanyahu's Remarks Regarding Media Reports Concerning Israel's Nuclear Policy," 11 August 1998, (http://www.pmo.gov.il/english/gpo/press-releases/110898/110898-2.html).

26. Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, (New York: Columbia University Press, October 1998), p. 343. Information regarding this book and declassified documents used in its research are available at http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/israel/. Earlier studies of Israel's nuclear programs and policies include Shai Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East, (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1997); Shlomo Aronson, The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: Opacity, Theory, and Reality, 1960-1991, (New York: State University Press of New York, 1992); and Seymour M. Hersch, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy, (New York: Random House, 1991). The seminal analysis of Israel's "opaque" nuclear posture is Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, eds., Opaque Nuclear Proliferation: Methodological and Policy Implications, (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1990).

27. Serge Schmemann, "Israel Clings to Its 'Nuclear Ambiguity'," New York Times, 21 June 1998, p. 6.

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