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Go to the Libya's Chemical Weapons Program.

Updated: April 2006

Sources:

1. This chart summarizes data available from public sources. Precise assessment of a state's capabilities is difficult because most weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs remain secret and cannot be verified independently.
2. Joshua Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," The Nonproliferation Review, 1997 (4)3: 97-98. "Libya: Objectives, Strategies and Resources," Proliferation: Threat and Response, Office of the Secretary of Defense, (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 1997), pp. 34-35, [Online] http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/. Anthony H. Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: National Efforts, War Fighting Capabilities, Weapons Lethality, Terrorism and Arms Control Implications" (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2/98), p. 15. A US congressional task force report recently alleged that Iraq transferred specialists and materials from its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs to Libya in the 1990s. The report asserts in particular that Iraq sent a "limited quantity of semi-enriched nuclear fuel" by ship to Libya, and that by the end of 1995, Iraqi specialists "began enriching the Iraqi nuclear material having successfully installed the small and medium-sized kilns/furnaces there" in Libya. The report was said to be based on unidentified European and Israeli intelligence sources. Yossef Bodansky, "The Iraqi WMD Challenge: Myths and Reality," (Washington, DC: US House of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, 2/10/98). Jim Wolf, Reuters, 2/15/98, "Iraq Hid Deadly Weapons Abroad- Congress Report." A White House official said on 2/16/98 that the United States has "no credible evidence" to support the allegations. European intelligence sources likewise said they had no evidence to support the charges. "White House Says No Sign Iraq Exported Arms," Reuters, 2/16/98. Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 3/26/98, "Authorities Claim US 'Disinformation Attempt' Over Iraq;" in FBIS-WEU-98-085, 3/26/98. Although there are several technical processes by which uranium can be enriched, none of these involve "kilns/furnaces." Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, "Appendix 4-B: Enrichment Technologies," in Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 12/93), pp. 176-80. Libya Country Profile, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, January 6, 2004, http://ctbto.org. Sharon A. Squassoni & Andrew Feickert, Congressional Research Service, Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2004 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2004). Staff Report, "IAEA Verification of Libya's Nuclear Program, Board Adopts Resolution, Libya Signs Additional Protocol," International Atomic Energy Agency, 10 March 2004, http://iaea.org.
3. Robert Waller, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence Case Study 2: Libya, (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998), p. 5. W. Andrew Terrill, "Libya and the Quest for Chemical Weapons," 1994, Conflict Quarterly 14(1): 47-59. Thomas C. Wiegele, The Clandestine Building of Libya's Chemical Weapons Factory (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992). Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, "How Libya's Secret CW Plant Was Detected," Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 12/93), pp. 42-44. Office of the Secretary of Defense, pp. 35-36. Cordesman, p. 14. Sinai, pp. 93-94. "Devil's Brew Briefings: Libya," Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS), [Online] http://www.cdiss.org/cbwnb4.htm. Sammy Salama, "Was Libya WMD Disarmament a Significant Success for Nonproliferation?," NTI Issue Brief, September 2004, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/was-libyan-wmd-disarmament-success/. "Membership of the OPCW, Status of Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention," March 20, 2006, http://opcw.org/html/db/members_ratifyer.html.
4. Cordesman, p. 15. Sinai, p. 96. CDISS. Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 37. Waller (pp. 6-7) asserts that Libya may have the capacity to produce limited quantities of such agents as anthrax and botulinum toxin, but that its current technical constraints preclude weaponization or effective military use of biological weapons. One source reports that up to several dozen Iraqi microbiologists were sent from Iraq in anticipation of a US attack on suspected biological weapons facilities. Michael Theodoulou, "Saddam Sends Scientists to Libya for Safety," London Times 2/13/98, p. 1. "Libyan Biological Warfare," Global Security, March 20, 2006, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/libya.bw.htm.
5. "Missile and Space Launch Capabilities of Selected Countries," The Nonproliferation Review, forthcoming 1998. Duncan Lennox, ed., "Iltisslat or Al Fatah," and "Country Inventory – In Service," Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems Issue 24, 5/97. Cordesman, p. 14. Waller, pp. 8-9. "National Briefings: Libya," Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, [Online] http://www.cdiss.org/libya_b.htm. "Libya," Federation of American Scientists, 9/12/96, [Online] http://www.fas.org/irp/missile/libya.htm. Terrill, p. 56. Sharon A. Squassoni & Andrew Feickert, Congressional Research Service, Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2004 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2004). Sammy Salama, "Was Libya WMD Disarmament a Significant Success for Nonproliferation?," NTI Issue Brief, September 2004, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_56a.html.
6. Lennox. Cordesman, p. 14. Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 37.
7. The Military Balance 1997/98 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), p. 134. Cordesman, p. 14. Terrill, pp. 56-57. Waller, pp. 7-8. Office of the Secretary of Defense, p. 37.