Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East

Russian Nuclear and Missile Exports to Iran[1]

CNS Issue Brief on WMD in the Middle East

Nuclear Exports

Russian construction of a light-water power reactor for Iran's nuclear power station at Bushehr, pursuant to an agreement signed in January 1995, has raised significant proliferation concerns despite pledges from both countries that the reactor will be placed under IAEA safeguards.[2] Although the United States raised these concerns through the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and other bilateral channels, Russia remains determined to fulfill its obligations under the $800 million deal, and the Bushehr reactor is scheduled for completion in 2003.  Iran has asked Russia to bid on the construction of three additional power reactors, the price for which could total up to $3 billion.[3]  Negotiations over the sale of a heavy-water research reactor were reported in December 1998, and blueprints for these facilities were reportedly provided to Iran.[15] Plans to construct a gas centrifuge enrichment facility in Iran, however, have been cancelled, and the status of a light-water research reactor and a nuclear-powered desalination plant remains uncertain.
 
In August 1995, Russia entered into a 10-year contract to supply nuclear fuel for the Bushehr plant. Although the January 1995 agreement originally provided for the delivery of 2,000 MT of natural uranium, this aspect of the agreement may also have been cancelled.[4] Some reports, which Moscow has consistently denied, indicate that Russia has also provided assistance in mining and milling technology to Iran, possibly through clandestine channels without official approval.[5] Russia is currently training Iranian physicists and engineers at a leading center for nuclear research in Moscow and a nuclear power station at Novovoronezh.[6]

Nuclear Exports Summary Table

Category	Status	Exports	Manufacturer	Exporter	Recipient
Reactors	ongoing	One VVER-1000 light-water power reactor	Zarubezhatomenergostroy	Minatom	Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant
	under negotiation	Three additional power reactors	Zarubezhatomenergostroy	Minatom	Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, possibly others
	under negotiation	One 30-50 MWt research reactor	Zarubezhatomenergostroy	Minatom	Atomic Energy Agency of Iran
	under negotiation	One 40 MWt heavy-water research reactor	probably Zarubezhatomenergostroy	Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology (NIKIET)	Unknown
	unknown	One APWS-40 desalination plant	Experimental Machine Building Design Bureau (OKBM)	Minatom	Unknown
Enrichment, mining, and milling	under negotiation	Uranium conversion facility	unknown	Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology (NIKIET) and Mendeleev University of Chemical Technology	Unknown
	cancelled	Gas centrifuge plant	unknown	Minatom	Atomic Energy Agency of Iran
	alleged	Assistance to mining & milling operations	unknown	unknown	Alleged facilities in Yazd province
Nuclear materials	planned	LEU fuel rods for VVER-1000 reactor	Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate Plant	Minatom	Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant
	unknown	2,000 tons of natural uranium	unknown	Minatom	Unknown
Training and know-how	ongoing	Training for physicists and technicians	n/a	Kurchatov Institute, Novovoronezh Nuclear Power Plant	Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant

 

Missile Exports

The Russian government insists there has been no significant transfer of missile technology to Tehran, although it admits that Iran has actively tried to acquire Russian technology and that some individual Russian specialists may have worked in the Iranian missile program.  Russian officials have repeatedly insisted that Russia is fulfilling its obligations under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and President Yeltsin has "categorically denied" US allegations of supplying Iran with missile components and technologies.[7] Nevertheless, reports continue to surface in both Russian and Western media (with many Western reports based largely on leaked Israeli and US intelligence assessments) suggesting the Russian government has either turned a blind eye to the activities of Russian defense firms in this area, or has actually assisted their efforts.  Available information does not resolve whether transferring missile technology to Iran is an official policy, or merely an activity carried out by individual companies, possibly in collusion with corrupt officials.  However, together with recent revelations about a 1995 sale of Russian missile guidance components to Iraq and the deleterious effects of Russia's continuing economic crisis in the defense sector, reports of the transfer of missile technology raise concerns over the possibility of Russian government involvement at some level as well as lax enforcement of export controls.[8]

It should be noted that many reports of Russian transfers of missile technology or materials often quote unnamed US or Israeli intelligence sources. While this should not lead one to discount the reports automatically, the possibility that reports relying on such sources may be politically motivated should be kept in mind. In any event, no legal exports of missile components or related equipment from Russia to Iran have been officially acknowledged. The more serious allegations of unlicensed exports involve guidance and engine components, high-strength steel and special alloys, and manufacturing and test equipment. Additionally, two Russian defense firms are known to have sent specialists to Iran, and reports indicate Iranian students have received training in missile technology at Russian technical institutes. In July 1998, the Russian Government Commission on Export Control launched an investigation of nine companies and institutions suspected of violating Russian export control laws. Under pressure from the US Congress to take action, the Clinton administration penalized seven of these companies with trade sanctions.[9] However, the list of enterprises investigated by the Russian government does not include several large and influential organizations--including the Russian Space Agency; Rosvooruzheniye, the state-owned arms export company; and the Federal Security Service--that Western and Israeli sources have charged with complicity in covert transfers of Russian missile technology to Iran.[10]

Reports and commentary in the Israeli press charged that Russian technology was incorporated into the Shahab-3 missile that Iran tested in July 1998.[11 ]Iranian officials, however, denied that Russia cooperated with Iran in production of the missile.[12] Iran's defense minister further claimed that the Shahab-3 was developed "without help from any foreign country,"[13] but this claim is fallacious; most experts agree that the Shahab-3 is essentially a North Korean Nodong medium-range ballistic missile with few, if any, modifications.[14] Nevertheless, the possibility that Russian technology or know-how may have been used to enhance the performance of the Shahab-3, or to enable Iran to manufacture some components domestically, reinforces the need for Russia to maintain and fully implement its commitment to control the proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

Missile Exports Summary Table

Category	Status	Exports	Manufacturer	Exporter	Recipient
Materials and components	intercepted	21 tons of maraging steel	unknown, possibly Inor Production Association	MOSO; Yevropalas 2000	unknown
	intercepted	composite material used for ballistic missile warheads	NII Grafit	unknown	unknown
	cancelled	turbopumps for RD-214 (SS-4) liquid fuel rocket engine	Samara State Scientific and Production Enterprise-NK Engines	Samara State Scientific and Production Enterprise-NK Engines	unknown
	alleged	components of RD-214 (SS-4) liquid fuel rocket engine	NPO Trud, NPO Energomash	unknown	unknown
	alleged	unpecified missile guidance components	Polyus Scientific Research Institute	unknown	unknown
	alleged	620kg of special alloys and foils	Inor Production Association	Rosvooruzheniye	unknown
Manufacturing and testing	alleged	wind tunnel and related facilities	Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI)	Rosvooruzheniye	unknown
	alleged	unspecified missile manufacturing equipment	Inor Production Association	Rosvooruzheniye	unknown
	alleged	measurement equipment used in rocket engine tests	NPO Trud	unknown	unknown
Training and know-how	suspended	training of Iranian students in missile design	n/a	Baltic State Technical University, Moscow Aviation Institute	Sanam Industries Group
	suspended	missile specialists traveled to Iran under false documents	n/a	Komintern Plant, Tikhomirov Institute	unknown
	unknown	training of Iranian students in missile design	n/a	Bauman Moscow State Technical University	unknown
	unkown	suspected transfer of dual-use technology	n/a	Glavkosmos	unknown
	alleged	recruitment of Russian experts to work on Iranian missile projects	n/a	Federal Security Service (FSB)	unknown

Fred Wehling. December 1998.
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies.
 

Sources and Notes:

(click on footnote number to return to text)

[1] Portions of this issue brief are adapted from  Fred Wehling, "Russian Nuclear and Missile Exports to Iran," NIS Nuclear Profiles database, http://cns.miis.edu/db/nis/nis_profiles/russia/exports/rusiran/ff_ruirn.htm (subscriber access only).

[2] "Iran, Russia Agree on $800 Million Nuclear Plant Deal," Washington Post, 9 January 1995.

[3] Andrew Jack and Stephen Fidler, "Iranian Nuclear Reactors: US Reinforces Opposition to Deal," Financial Times, 26 November 1998, p. 2.

[4] "Russian Contract Extended to Fuel," Nuclear News, no. 38, October 1995, p. 47; David Albright et al., Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 353.

[5] R. Jeffrey Smith, "Administration Concerned About Russia's Nuclear Cooperation With Iran," Washington Post, 3 July 1997, p. A7.

[6] ITAR-TASS, 21 March 1996; in Specialists to Train Iranians for Bushehr Nuclear Plant, FBIS-SOV-96-057.

[7] Mikhail Kirillin, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 20 May 1998, p. 7, in "Dual-Purpose Exports to Iran Denied," FBIS-TAC-98-140; "Utverzhdeniya o peredache Rossiyei Iranu raket i raketnykh tekhnologiy ne imeyut dostatochnykh osnovaniy," Voprosy bezopasnosti, no. 14, 30 September 1997; Interfax, 26 September 1997, in "Yeltsin Rejects US Nuclear, Missile Iran Transfer Charge," FBIS-SOV-97-269.

[8] See Yevgeniya Albats, Nash Chelovek v Tegerane, Novaya gazeta, no. 10, 16-22 March 1998; in "Hiring of Missile Experts for Iran Described, FBIS-TAC-98-076.

[9] White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the President Expanding the President's Executive Order on Weapons of Mass Destruction," 28 July 1998.

[10] Bill Gertz, "Russia, China Aid Iran's Missile Program," Washington Times, 10 September 1997, p. A1; Steve Rodan, "Secret Israeli Data Reveals Iran Can Make Missile in Year, Defense News, 6-12 October 1997,  p. 4. For details on the sactions and the companies to which they were applied, see Scott Parrish and Fred Wehling, "Institutions Suspected by the Russian Government of Violating Export Control Legislation," Center for Nonproliferation Studies website, http://cns.miis.edu/research/summit/9firms.htm.

[11] Ze'ev Schiff, "After the Iranian Test," Ha'aretz, 29 July 1998, p. B1; Arieh O'Sullivan and Liat Collins, "Iran Expected to Complete Shahab-3 Prototype Next Year," Jerusalem Post, 29 July 1998.

[12] IRNA (Tehran), 4 August 1998; in "IRGC Commander Reveals Shahab-3 Missile's Size, Capability," FBIS-TAC-98-218.

[13] "Iran Confirms Test-Firing of Missile," Washington Post, 26 July 1988, p. A27.

[14] U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, 23 July 1998, Tim Weiner, Iran Said to Test Missile Able to Hit Israel and Saudis, New York Times, 23 July 1998. Steven Erlanger, Washington Casts Wary Eye at Missile Test, New York Times, 24 July 1998.

[15] Carla Anne Robbins and Andrew Higgins, "Fission for Cash: Money Hungry Russia Finds a Foreign Market for Nuclear Knowledge," Wall Street Journal, 15 December 1998, p. 1.

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