Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East

Syria's Scuds and Chemical Weapons

CNS Issue Brief on WMD in the Middle East

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Overview

Syrian chemical weapons development has been largely spurred by its disastrous conventional military defeats by Israel in 1967, 1973, and 1982. Syrian President Hafez al-Assad was Minister of Defense during the 1967 Six-Day War, during which the Golan Heights were captured by Israeli forces. After seizing power and assuming the presidency in 1971, Assad sought to bolster Syria's strategic capabilities by pursuing the development of chemical weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems. After Syria's air force was routed by Israeli jet fighters in 1982, losing 86 planes in one engagement over the Bekaa valley in Lebanon, Syria apparently decided that surface-to-surface missiles could counter Israel’s air superiority. From a strategic perspective, long-range missiles such as the Scud could offer a means to deliver chemical weapons in response to Israel’s nuclear threat.[1]

Syrian efforts to acquire chemical weapons may date as early as 1972. By 1986, Syria reportedly possessed a large arsenal of both blister and nerve agents.[2] By the 1990s, the Syrian chemical weapons arsenal included hundreds of tons of chemical agents. Weaponized agents include blister (mustard) and nerve (sarin, VX), and can be delivered in aerial munitions, artillery and rocket shells. Some Western analysts believe that by the late 1980s Syria had armed many of its modern missiles, including Scuds, with chemical warheads.[3] Currently, Syria's strategic chemical weapons stockpile is primarily composed of the nerve agent sarin. However, recent reports indicate that Syria has successfully produced the much more persistent nerve agent VX,[4] and that it has tested missile warheads armed with VX.[5]

Precursor Chemical Procurement and Production

Syria is capable of producing precursor chemicals used for its production of mustard, and probably sarin as well. A facility near Homs is the likely source of petrochemical derivatives for ethylene, a mustard precursor, as well as alcohols, which are used to produce nerve agents.[6] In the past, Syria obtained precursors for chemical warfare agent production from India and countries in Western Europe. Syria’s very limited chemical industry is dependent on foreign pesticides.[7] However, the country is naturally endowed with phosphates, producing about one fifth of the phosphate rock mined in the Middle East.[8] Phosphorus is an important element for use in nerve agent production, but it remains uncertain whether some portion of locally-mined phosphate is allocated to chemical weapons manufacture by Syria.

A civilian research center located near Damascus, the Syrian Center for Scientific Studies and Research (Centre d' Etudes et de Recherche Scientifique–CERS) apparently directs the procurement of dual-use technologies for chemical weapons research. A network of nationalized pharmaceutical and petrochemical firms are also involved in production. According to Western reports, hundreds of agent tons - including nerve and mustard agents - are produced by facilities near Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo.[9]

It is also difficult to determine to what extent Syria currently relies on foreign expertise for CW development. Syria received technical advice from the former Soviet Union and Russia.[10] Its efforts to develop more advanced chemical warheads were also based on assistance from North Korea and Western European countries, but according to Israeli defense sources Syria is now able to produce advanced warheads indigenously.[11] In 1997, Major General Moshe Ya’alon, former intelligence chief of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), asserted that "Syria itself manufactures Scud B’s, Scud C’s, and chemical warheads of various types."[12]

Tactical and Strategic Potential of Syrian Chemical Weapons

By using a combination of volatile (i.e., sarin) and more persistent agents (i.e., mustard, VX), Syria has the capability of utilizing CW in very different tactical scenarios. Sarin is extremely deadly, but it evaporates about as rapidly as water. An attack using this agent could inflict high casualties near a battlefront, but because it dissipates quickly it could permit an attacking force to seize territory without major risk to its own troops. A Syrian attack to retake the Golan Heights might include the use of sarin munitions (although it should be noted that Israeli troops deployed in the area are equipped with chemical defense equipment suitable for such an environment.) Compared to VX nerve agent, sarin is also relatively easy to disseminate. Due to its viscous nature, VX requires some sort of aerosolization. However, VX could be most effective in attacking an adversary's rear areas, including military installations and logistical networks such as airports and train stations. Most people whose skin comes into contact with as little as one drop of VX will die, unless they receive very swift medical intervention.[13] Furthermore, this nerve agent would remain hazardous for at least several days, requiring labor-intensive and time-consuming decontamination procedures.

Western and Israeli analysts seem to agree that Syria’s Scud-C missiles, which were originally purchased from North Korea, are being armed for long-range chemical weapons delivery. In 1997, Jane’s Defence Weekly reported that Syria was in the process of developing cluster bomblets designed for loading nerve agents in the 884mm Scud-C warheads.[14] Two Scud-C brigades, each equipped with 18 missile launchers, are reportedly deployed approximately 25km east of Hama. Some 200 Syrian Scud-B missiles reportedly could be armed with conventional ordinance or with chemical warfare agent payloads, including VX.

While the 985kg payload of the Scud-B missile is nearly double the 500kg payload of the Scud-C, the Scud-B has a much shorter range of only 300km, compared to the 500km range of the Scud-C. Furthermore, because Scud-B missiles are more accurate, they may be better suited for direct attacks on Israeli military targets.[15] Because of the low accuracy but long range of the Scud-C system, Syria may adopt the strategy of using Scud-C missiles to deliver chemical warheads on broader areas where Israeli reserve military forces would gather in the event of a national emergency.[16] Depending on where Scud-Cs are deployed within Syria, the comparatively long range of the missile entails that they could be used to strike most if not all significant military and civilian targets in Israel.

Harold Hough, an independent US analyst contracted by the Israeli newspaper Yedi'ot Aharonot to examine commercial satellite imagery of alleged Syrian missile deployment sites deduces that Syrian Scud-C missiles are armed with chemical warheads. Hough's reasoning is largely based on the two following rationales:

1. The Scud-C has an estimated circular error probable (CEP) is about 1.5km,[17] making it unlikely that this missile could successfully hit specific military targets. The most likely role for the Scud C is to deliver a chemical warhead to create mass casualties and havoc.[18]
2. Syrian Scud-C deployments Hama include a relatively high ratio of launchers to missiles, thus enabling Syria to launch most of its ballistic missiles in a few salvos. Most Scuds found worldwide are matched with about one launcher for every 10 missiles, in order to save costs on expensive launching systems. Syria appears to have a 1:2 ratio of launchers to missiles in order to deliver an overwhelming first strike. (In former East Germany, for example, the ratio was 1 launcher for every 5 missiles for each chemical- and nuclear-armed Scud.)[19]

The IDF has recently concluded that Syria has no intention of starting a war in 1999.[20] But if some independent assessments are correct that Israel could destroy much of Syrian conventional forces within 10-14 days,[21] Syria’s chemical weapons give it a strategic option to deter—or preemptively attack—its southern nemesis. Fearing an encirclement by present and future enemies, Syria is very much concerned that Turkey and Israel are now forming a strategic alliance, including the latter’s assistance in the modernization of Turkey’s armed forces. Asad may believe that, after having been handed defeats on three separate occasions on the conventional battlefield, weapons of mass destruction can help even the strategic balance.

Eric Croddy, March 1999.
© Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute for International Studies.

Sources and notes:

1. Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, (New York: Brassey’s, 1991) p144.

2. Ahmed S. Hashim, "Case Study 1: Syria," The Deterrence Series: Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence (Alexandria, Virginia: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998) p7.

3. Ahmed S. Hashim, "Case Study 1: Syria," The Deterrence Series: Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence, 1998, op. Cit. p8. In the early 1990s, it was seriously doubted by some analysts that the SS-21 was mated with chemical warheads in Syria, but this may have changed. Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, (New York: Brassey’s, 1991) pp27-28.

4. Ron Ben-Yishay, "Chief of Staff on Syria, Iran, PA Threats," Yedi'ot Aharonot ‘Atzma’ut supplement), May 11, 1997, pp6-17, translated by FBIS.

5. Michael Evans, "Russians Help Syria to Make Chemical Arms," London Times, January 25, 1999.

6. Harold Hough, "Viewing Syria’s Strategic Missile Infrastructure from Space," Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol.10, No. 4, April 1, 1998, p25.

7. Syria requisitioned $15.4 million for pesticide imports for 1998, and estimated that it used about that much in 1995. "$15 Million Allocated for Pesticides Imports," Tishrin, December 6, 1997, p8; translated by FBIS. 1995 figure based on ‘Imad Nusayrat, "No More Chemical Pesticides!" Tishrin, November 5, 1996, p8.

8. Michael Mew, "Phosphate Rock," Mining Annual Review, December, 1998, p111.

9. "Mordechay Says Russia Helping Syria Develop Nerve Agent," The Sunday Times, (London) November 17, 1996.

10. Harold Hough, "Viewing Syria’s Strategic Missile Infrastructure from Space," Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1998, op. Cit., p25.

11. Ze’ev Schiff, "Interview with Major General Moshe Ya’alon, IDF Intelligence Chief," Ha’aretz, May 11, 1997, translated by FBIS.

12. Ze’ev Schiff, "Interview with Major General Moshe Ya’alon, IDF Intelligence Chief," Ha’aretz, May 11, 1997, translated by FBIS.

13. The median lethal dose for most male adults is about 10 milligrams on the skin.

14. Paul Beaver, "Syria to Make Chemical Bomblets for 'Scud Cs'," Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 3, 1997, Vol. 28, No. 9, p3.

15. Harold Hough, "Syria Preparing Option of Sudden Chemical Attack on Israel’s Cities" Yedi’ot Aharonot (Leshabat supplement, Tel Aviv), September 12, 1997, pp4-7, translated in FBIS.

16. Paul Beaver, "Syria to Make Chemical Bomblets for 'Scud Cs'," Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 3, 1997, op. Cit., p3.

17. Harold Hough, "Syria Preparing Option of Sudden Chemical Attack on Israel’s Cities" Yedi’ot Aharonot (Leshabat supplement, Tel Aviv), September 12, 1997, pp4-7, translated in FBIS.

18. Syria's Scuds Move South," Jane's Information Group, Foreign Report, No. 2495, May 14, 1998.

19. Harold Hough, "Syria Preparing Option of Sudden Chemical Attack on Israel’s Cities" Yedi’ot Aharonot (Leshabat supplement, Tel Aviv), September 12, 1997, p4-7, translated in FBIS.

20. Harold Hough, "Syria Preparing Option of Sudden Chemical Attack on Israel’s Cities" Yedi’ot Aharonot (Leshabat supplement, Tel Aviv), September 12, 1997, p4-7, translated in FBIS.

21. Arieh O’Sullivan, "IDF: Syria Not Expected to Wage War," Jerusalem Post, February 7, 1999, (http://www.jpost.com/News/Article-6.html).

22. Kenneth S. Brower, "A Propensity for Conflict: Potential Scenarios and Outcomes of War in the Middle East," Jane's Intelligence Review Special Report No. 14, 1997, p5.

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