### General views on NPT

- **(Page 2, recommendation 1):** To emphasize that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the key international instrument aimed at halting the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, achieving nuclear disarmament and promoting international cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- **(Page 2, recommendation 2):** To reaffirm that the balanced implementation of the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a non-discriminatory manner, remains essential for the effectiveness of the Treaty in realizing its objectives.
- **(Page 2, recommendation 3):** To reiterate that the continued existence of nuclear weapons represents a significant threat to humanity and that the full and effective implementation of all Treaty obligations, including in particular by nuclear-weapon States, plays a crucial role in promoting international peace and security.
- **(Page 2, recommendation 5):** To reaffirm that each article of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is binding on States parties without distinction, and that States parties are required to comply strictly with their obligations under the Treaty as well as with those agreed by consensus at the review conferences of the Treaty, including, in particular, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference.
- **(Page 8, recommendation 39):** To recognize the rights of all States parties under the provisions of the preamble and the articles of the NPT and ensuring that no State party is limited in exercising its rights in conformity with the Treaty.

### Institutional issues

#### Strengthen review process

- **(Page 11, recommendation 58):** To establish a standing committee by the Review Conference to monitor and verify nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement.
- **(Page 13, recommendation 69):** To recommend the establishment of a standing committee composed of members of the Bureau of the 2010 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally on the implementation of the recommendations concerning the Middle East and to report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committees.

#### Universality

- **(Page 10, recommendation 51):** To call on States that are not party to the NPT to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, with a view to achieving its universality at the earliest possible time.
- **(Page 10, recommendation 52):** To call on all States parties to exert all possible efforts to promote universal adherence to the NPT and not to undertake any actions that could negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.

#### Reporting

- **(Page 13, recommendation 68):** To recommend that States parties to the
<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Treaty</strong></th>
<th>Treaty, in particular the three Treaty depositories and sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, should report on steps they have taken to promote the undelayed establishment of a Middle East NWFZ and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| **Subsidiary bodies in Main Committees** | • (Page 1, para 3) ... the Group ... calls for an agreement to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the 2010 Review Conference to deliberate on 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons; to consider and recommend proposal on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.  
• (Page 11, recommendation 60) To establish, as a matter of priority, a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament, in Main Committee I, mandated to focus on the issue of fulfillment of the obligations under article VI and further practical measures required to achieve progress in that regard.  
• (Page 12, recommendation 64) To seek the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to be undertaken to consider legally binding security assurances by NWS to the NNWS parties to the NPT to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.  
• (Page 13, recommendation 70) To recommend the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2010 Review Conference to consider and recommend proposals on concrete practical steps to promote the earliest implementation of the resolution on the Middle East. |
| **General views on nuclear disarmament** | • (Page 4, recommendation 14) To reaffirm that the only way to rid the world of the threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination.  
• (Page 4, recommendation 19) To reaffirm that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee that there will be no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that NNWS should be effectively assured by NWS that there will be no use or threat of use of such weapons.  
• (Page 4, recommendation 13): To agree that...the lack of significant progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies undermine disarmament commitments and work counter to the letter and spirit of the Treaty.  
• (Page 10, recommendation 54) To call for the full implementation by the NWS of their disarmament commitments under the NPT, including those agreed by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.  
• (Page 11, recommendation 55) To accelerate the process of negotiations that should be undertaken, in accordance with article VI, as well as implementing the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT, without further delay, in order to advance towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.  
• (Page 4, recommendation 15) ...to stop the development of nuclear weapons, in the direction of total elimination of nuclear weapons. |
| **Role of NWS** | • (Page 2, recommendation 4): To reaffirm the commitment of nuclear-weapon States to their undertakings on nuclear disarmament, including the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  
• (Page 3, recommendation 6): To note with deep concern security doctrines of nuclear-weapon States, including the “NATO Alliance Strategic Concept”, which not only set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military |
alliances and nuclear deterrence policies.

- (Page 3, recommendation 8): To stress the importance of reaffirmation by NWS of their obligations, and full implementation of article I, and refrain from nuclear weapon-sharing with other States under any kind of security arrangements, including military alliances.
- (Page 3, recommendation 11): To reaffirm the importance of the application of the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility by nuclear-weapon States in all measures relating to nuclear disarmament
- (Page 10, recommendation 54) To call for the full implementation by the NWS of their disarmament commitments under the NPT, including those agreed by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.
- (Page 11, recommendation 59) To reaffirm commitment by NWS to end the production of new types of nuclear weapons and the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons

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<tr>
<th>Fissile material / FMCT</th>
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<tr>
<td>(Page 3, recommendation 10): To reconfirm that negotiations on a fissile material treaty should be conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorses both at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Page 11, recommendation 57) To agree on a programme of work for the CD that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations of a verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, with a view to its conclusion within five years.</td>
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<tr>
<th>NWC (Time bound total elimination)</th>
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<tr>
<td>(Page 11, recommendation 56) To agree on an action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, without delay.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Outer space</th>
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<tr>
<td>(Page 3, recommendation 12): To voice concern about the potential for an arms race in outer space, in which the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race and further nuclear proliferation.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Humanitarian approach to disarmament</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Page 2, recommendation 3): To reiterate that the continued existence of nuclear weapons represents a significant threat to humanity and that the full and effective implementation of all Treaty obligations, including in particular by nuclear-weapon States, plays a crucial role in promoting international peace and security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Page 9, recommendation 45) To reaffirm the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities — operational or under construction — poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and regulations of IAEA.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Nuclear Testing</th>
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<tr>
<td>(Page 4, recommendation 15) To support the objective of the CTBT, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all forms of nuclear tests without exception, and to stop the development of nuclear weapons, in the direction of total elimination of nuclear weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Page 4, recommendation 16) To realize the objective of the CTBT, the commitment to nuclear disarmament of all States signatories, especially the five NWS, is essential. The five NWS have a special responsibility to take the lead in making the test ban a reality.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### CTBT

- (Page 4, recommendation 14) …the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and, therefore, cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

- (Page 4, recommendation 15) To support the objective of the CTBT, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all forms of nuclear tests without exception, and to stop the development of nuclear weapons, in the direction of total elimination of nuclear weapons.

- (Page 4, recommendation 16) To realize the objective of the CTBT, the commitment to nuclear disarmament of all States signatories, especially the five NWS, is essential. The five NWS have a special responsibility to take the lead in making the test ban a reality.

- (Page 4, recommendation 17) To support the objective of the CTBT, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all forms of nuclear tests without exception, and to stop the development of nuclear weapons, in the direction of total elimination of nuclear weapons.

- (Page 4, recommendation 18) To reiterate that the improvement in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the existing nuclear doctrines of some NWS, including the nuclear posture reviews of certain States, contravene the security assurances provided by NWS…

- (Page 4, recommendation 19) To reaffirm that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee that there will be no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that NNWS should be effectively assured by NWS that there will be no use or threat of use of such weapons...

- (Page 4, recommendation 20) To recall that at the 2000 Review Conference, States parties to the NPT had agreed, by consensus, that legally binding security assurances by the five NWS to the NNWS parties to the Treaty strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

### Security Assurance

#### General views on security assurances

- (Page 4, recommendation 17) To recall that at the 2000 Review Conference, States parties to the NPT had agreed, by consensus, that legally binding security assurances by the five NWS to the NNWS parties to the Treaty strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

- (Page 4, recommendation 18) To reiterate that the improvement in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the existing nuclear doctrines of some NWS, including the nuclear posture reviews of certain States, contravene the security assurances provided by NWS…

- (Page 12, recommendation 63) Pending the realization of the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons, legally binding security assurances within the context of the NPT remain essential and should be materialized without further delay.

#### Legally binding security assurances

- (Page 4, recommendation 17) To recall that at the 2000 Review Conference, States parties to the NPT had agreed, by consensus, that legally binding security assurances by the five NWS to the NNWS parties to the Treaty strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

- (Page 4, recommendation 19) Efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to NNWS should be pursued as a matter of priority.

- (Page 12, recommendation 63) To call for the negotiation of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the realization of the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons, legally binding security assurances within the context...
of the NPT remain essential and should be materialized without further delay.

- (Page 12, recommendation 64) To seek the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to be undertaken to consider legally binding security assurances by NWS to the NNWS parties to the NPT to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Legally binding security assurances within the context of the Treaty would provide an essential benefit to the States parties and to the credibility of the Treaty regime.

### Nuclear weapons free zones

#### General views on NWFZ

- (Page 5, recommendation 20) To welcome the efforts aimed at establishing NWFZ in all regions of the world.
- (Page 5, recommendation 21) To welcome the ongoing consultations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and NWS on the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty and urge NWS to become parties to the Protocol to that Treaty as soon as possible.
- (Page 5, recommendation 22) To welcome the entry into force of the treaties establishing NWFZ in Africa and Central Asia and to stress the importance of the signature and ratification of the Rarotonga Treaty, the Pelindaba Treaty, and the Semipalatinsk Treaty, as well as Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, by all States in their respective regions and by all concerned States, as well as signature and ratification by NWS and other relevant States that have not yet done so of the relevant protocols to those treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, as envisaged in article VII of the Treaty.
- (Page 5, recommendation 23) To welcome the talks by Mongolia with its two neighbors to conclude the required legal instrument institutionalizing Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status.
- (Page 12, recommendation 65) To confirm that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the Tlatelolco Treaty and the Treaties of Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk, as well as Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, represents a positive step and an important measure towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
- (Page 12, recommendation 67) To highlight the importance of holding the second Conference of States parties and Signatories to the Treaties that Establish NWFZ and Mongolia and its contribution to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

#### NWFZ and security assurances

- (Page 12, recommendation 66) To urge NWS that, having signed or ratified some of the relevant protocols to a treaty establishing a NWFZ, have done so with reservations or unilateral interpretations that affect the denuclearization status of that zone to modify or withdraw such reservations or unilateral interpretations.

#### NWFZ in Middle East

- (Page 5, recommendation 23) To reiterate the crucial need for practical steps aimed at achieving speedy establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East without any further delay.
- (Page 13, recommendation 68) To focus the activities of the 2010 Review Conference substantially on the Middle East including, in particular, the establishment of a NWFZ in that region in accordance with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East...

### Regional issue: Middle East

#### General views on NWFZ in Middle East

- (Page 5, recommendation 25) To intensify the efforts aimed at establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East and call for cooperation and consultation among States parties in order to identify and adopt necessary practical steps to achieve that goal in implementing the resolution on the

- (Page 5, recommendation 26) To stress that the adoption of resolution GC(53)/RES/16 on application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the Middle East and resolution GC(53)/RES/17 on Israeli nuclear capabilities by the IAEA General Conference are another manifestation of the threat posed by such capabilities to regional and international peace and security, and remain the main obstacles to the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East.

- (Page 6, recommendation 28) To reaffirm the 1995 resolution on the Middle East (as well as the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (part I)), which “calls upon all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards”.

- (Page 13, recommendation 68) To focus the activities of the 2010 Review Conference substantially on the Middle East including, in particular, the establishment of a NWFZ in that region in accordance with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East…

Israel

- (Page 6, recommendation 27) To express concern that Israel continues to refrain from acceding to the NPT despite the accession of all other States in the region.

- (Page 6, recommendation 28) To reaffirm the 1995 resolution on the Middle East…which “calls upon all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards”.

- (Page 6, recommendation 30) To reaffirm the 2000 Review Conference Final Document, which underscored the importance of Israel’s accession to the NPT and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the NPT in the Middle East.

- (Page 6, recommendation 31) To stress that the outcomes of the 2010 Review Conference should contain concrete and practical recommendations concerning the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, including a commitment by each State party to the NPT to strictly prohibit the transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance to and cooperation with Israel in the nuclear fields, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. States parties to the Treaty should also undertake to disclose all information available to them on the nature and scope of Israeli nuclear capabilities, including information pertaining to previous nuclear transfers to Israel.

- (Page 13, recommendation 71) To call upon States parties to the NPT to provide appropriate support in order to facilitate the implementation of IAEA General Conference resolutions GC(53)/RES/16 on application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East and GC(53)/RES/17 on Israeli nuclear capabilities.

- (Page 13, recommendation 72) To call upon States parties to the NPT to disclose all information available to them on the nature and scope of Israeli nuclear capabilities, including information pertaining to previous nuclear transfers to Israel.

- (Page 13, recommendation 73) To reiterate the commitment of all States parties to the NPT to prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related
equipment, information, material, facilities, resources or devices, and
extension of know-how or any kind of assistance to and cooperation with
Israel in nuclear fields, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and
has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

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<th>1995 Resolution on the ME</th>
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<tr>
<td>(Page 6, recommendation 29) To recall that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis on which the NPT was indefinitely extended, without a vote, in 1995, and reaffirm that the resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Page 13, recommendation 68) To focus the activities of the 2010 Review Conference substantially on the Middle East including, in particular, the establishment of a NWFZ in that region in accordance with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East...</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Page 14, recommendation 74) To support the efforts of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties in the Middle East in pursuing the earliest implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and invite the Conference on Disarmament to closely consider the proposals put forward by States parties of the region in this regard.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Safeguards and verification</th>
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<tr>
<td>(Page 7, recommendation 32) To reaffirm that IAEA is the sole competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfillment of their Treaty obligations, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the global focal point for nuclear technical cooperation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Page 7, recommendation 33) To acknowledge that it is fundamental to make a distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings are not turned into legal safeguard obligations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Page 7, recommendation 34) To confirm that the obligation under article III in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes in accordance with article IV.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Page 7, recommendation 34) ...States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Page 7, recommendation 36) To emphasize that the States parties to the NPT should consult and cooperate in resolving their issues with regard to implementation of Treaty-related safeguards agreements within the IAEA framework.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Page 14, recommendation 76) To request all States that have not yet done so to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as soon as possible with a view to consolidating and enhancing the verification system for the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, through the universalization of comprehensive safeguards.</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Page 14, recommendation 77) To request all NWS and all States not parties to the NPT to place all their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.</td>
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</table>
• (Page 7, recommendation 35) While expressing full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of IAEA, strongly rejects attempts by any State to politicize the work of IAEA, including its technical cooperation programme, in violation of the IAEA statute, and stresses that any undue pressure of interference in IAEA, especially in its verification process, which could jeopardize the efficiency and credibility of IAEA, should be avoided.

• (Page 7, recommendation 36) To emphasize that the States parties to the NPT should consult and cooperate in resolving their issues with regard to implementation of Treaty-related safeguards agreements within the IAEA framework

• (Page 14, recommendation 75) To reiterate that the work of IAEA with regard to safeguards and verification needs to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and full-scope safeguards agreements.

• (Page 14, recommendation 77) To request all NWS and all States not parties to the NPT to place all their nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. This should be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with the Treaty and the IAEA statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of the obligations of NWS…

• (Page 14, recommendation 78) To consider the strengthening of the IAEA system for the protection of confidentiality of safeguard-related information.

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### Peaceful uses

**General views on peaceful uses**

• (Page 7, recommendation 37) To underscore that nothing in the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be interpreted to affect the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty.

• (Page 7, recommendation 38) To stress that nothing in the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the right of States parties to technical cooperation among themselves or with international organizations, keeping in view the needs of the developing States parties.

• (Page 8, recommendation 40) To reaffirm that each country’s choices and decision in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements or its arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

• (Page 8, recommendation 42) To emphasize that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their “sensitivity”, and only stipulates that such equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards.

• (Page 8, recommendation 43) In this context, to reject, in principle, any attempts aimed at discouraging certain peaceful nuclear activities on the grounds of their alleged “sensitivity”; and emphasize that any ideas or proposals pertaining to the non-proliferation of any peaceful nuclear technology that are used as a pretext to prevent the transfer of such technology are inconsistent with the objectives of the NPT.

• (Page 9, recommendation 49) To underline that concerns related to nuclear weapons proliferation shall not in any way restrict the inalienable right of all States parties to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

### Access to/transfer of equipment, materials

• (Page 8, recommendation 41) To note with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and
and scientific and technological information

- (Page 8, recommendation 42) To emphasize that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their “sensitivity”, and only stipulates that such equipment and material must be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards.
- (Page 8, recommendation 44) …recall the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which has made it clear that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency’s full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- (Page 14, recommendation 79) To stress the commitment of developed countries to facilitate and assist the legitimate development of nuclear energy by the developing countries by allowing them to participate to the fullest extent in the possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes…
- (Page 15, recommendation 81) To reiterate that any undue restrictions or limitations on peaceful uses of nuclear energy that are incompatible with the provisions of the NPT should be removed.

IAEA

- (Page 9, recommendation 46) To emphasize that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA in meeting the needs of its member States for material, equipment and technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall not be subject to any political, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of its statute.
- (Page 9, recommendation 47) To stress that the IAEA technical cooperation programme, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, is formulated in accordance with the IAEA statute and the guiding principles, thereby ensuring that the projects are consistent with all the decisions of IAEA policymaking organs. To reiterate that the current guidelines and criteria for the selection of technical cooperation projects are robust and effective, and that no additional criteria should be imposed for fulfilling the aforementioned objectives.
- (Page 9, recommendation 48) To stress its full support to all efforts aimed at strengthening the role of IAEA in line with the objectives of the IAEA statute. In this context, to emphasize that efforts towards strengthening all statutory activities of IAEA should be balanced.
- (Page 9, recommendation 50) To stress the importance of nuclear safety and security. While nuclear safety and security are national responsibilities, IAEA should play the key role in the development of international safety standards and nuclear security guidance based on best practices.

Assurance of supply / Multilateral approach to nuclear fuel supply

- (Page 8, recommendation 43) To reiterate that the issue of assurances of nuclear fuel supply is a very complex and multidimensional concept with technical, legal, commercial and economic implications. In order to reach a consensual conclusion, it is premature for this issue to be considered before extensive, comprehensive and transparent consultations are held.
- (Page 8, recommendation 44) To reiterate a need for caution while thoroughly addressing the associated technical, legal and economic aspects, as well as the underlying political dimensions of the issue of assurances of nuclear fuel supply, so that any proposal that eventually
emerges in this regard is in full accordance with the NPT and takes into account the respective legal obligations of States parties and the principle of non-discrimination.

- (Page 8, recommendation 44) To underline that any further consideration of the issue of nuclear fuel supply assurances must be based on a coherent and comprehensive conceptual framework that adequately addresses the views and concerns of all States parties.

**Attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities**

- (Page 9, recommendation 45) To reaffirm the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities — operational or under construction — poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and regulations of IAEA. To recognize the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument-prohibiting attacks, or the threat of attacks, on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

**Nuclear safety and security**

- (Page 9, recommendation 50) To stress the importance of nuclear safety and security. While nuclear safety and security are national responsibilities, IAEA should play the key role in the development of international safety standards and nuclear security guidance based on best practices. To emphasize that undue nuclear safety and security concerns should not be used to hamper the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, especially in developing countries.

**Non-proliferation**

**General views on nonproliferation**

- (Page 3, recommendation 7) To reaffirm that every effort should be made to implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty in all its aspects to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty. Emphasize, in this context, the particular importance attached to the strict observance of articles I and II.

- (Page 3, recommendation 8): To stress the importance of reaffirmation by NWS of their obligations, and full implementation of article I, and refrain from nuclear weapon-sharing with other States under any kind of security arrangements, including military alliances.

- (Page 3, recommendation 9): To stress the importance of reaffirmation by NNWS of their commitments to the full implementation of article II and to refrain from nuclear weapon-sharing with NWS, NNWS and States not party to the NPT for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements in times of peace or in times of war, including the framework of military alliances.

- (Page 4, recommendation 13): To agree that the development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes…

- (Page 10, recommendation 53) To reaffirm also, towards the attainment of these objectives, the commitment of all States parties to prohibit completely the transfer or sharing of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources or devices, or the extension of scientific and technical assistance in the nuclear field, to States not parties to the Treaty…

- (Page 15, recommendation 80) To emphasize that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the NPT as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or
| Export controls | (Page 7, recommendation 34) … States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements. |
| Nonproliferation and peaceful uses | (Page 8, recommendation 41) To note with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes persist. |
| Nonproliferation and peaceful uses | (Page 10, recommendation 53) To reaffirm also, towards the attainment of these objectives, the commitment of all States parties to prohibit completely the transfer or sharing of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material, facilities, resources or devices, or the extension of scientific and technical assistance in the nuclear field, to States not parties to the Treaty… |
| Nonproliferation and peaceful uses | (Page 15, recommendation 80) To emphasize that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the NPT as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. |
| Nonproliferation and peaceful uses | (Page 9, recommendation 49) To underline that concerns related to nuclear weapons proliferation shall not in any way restrict the inalienable right of all States parties to develop all aspects of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination, as stipulated in article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. |
| Nonproliferation and peaceful uses | (Page 8, recommendation 41) To note with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes persist. |

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### Nuclear Disarmament

<p>| General views on disarmament | (Page 1, para 1) The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapon. |
| General views on disarmament | (Page 1, para 2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. |
| General views on disarmament | (Page 2, para 4 b, ii) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development. |
| General views on disarmament | (Page 3, para 5) Full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those agreed at the 2000 Review Conference; acceleration of the negotiation process, in accordance with article VI, and implementation of the 13 practical steps. |
| General views on disarmament | (Page 3, para 9) Formal declaration of the decade 2010-2020 as the “Decade for nuclear disarmament” and realization of its objectives. |
| General views on disarmament | (Page 3, para 10) [During 2015 - 2020] Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance. |</p>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Progressive and balanced reduction of missiles intended for carrying nuclear warheads.</strong></th>
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<td><strong>Recommendation by the 2020 Review Conference to declare 2020 as the “Decade for the total elimination of nuclear weapons”</strong>.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>[During 2020 – 2025] Full implementation of the treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and of its verification regime through the elimination of all nuclear weapons.</strong></td>
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### Role of NWS

- **Page 1** (para 1) ...urgent and concrete actions by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their multilaterally agreed commitments to achieve general and complete disarmament remain essential.
- **Page 1** (para 2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000.
- **Page 1** (para 2) The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention.
- **Page 1** (para 4, c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies.
- **Page 3** (para 4 i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively.
- **Page 3** (para 4 j) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.
- **Page 3** (para 8) Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
- **Page 3** (para 12) Progressive and balanced reduction of missiles intended for carrying nuclear warheads.

### Verification and disarmament

- **Page 1** (para 2) The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility.
- **Page 3** (para 4 i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively.
- **Page 3** (para 11) Preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles.

### NWC (time bound total elimination)

- **Page 1** (para 2) The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention.
- **Page 1-2** (para 3) The Non-Aligned Movement proposes a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame that includes the following concrete steps and measures, as a basis for consideration by the Review Conference.
- **Page 2** (para 4 f) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations...
on and early conclusion of An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention).

| Fissile materials /FMCT | • (Page 2, para 4 a) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference.  
• (Page 3, para 7) Moratorium on the production of fissile materials, pending conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty. |
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<td>Bilateral agreements (START)</td>
<td>• (Page 3, para 6) Conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START).</td>
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<td>Humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament</td>
<td>• (Page 1, para 2) It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.</td>
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| Nuclear testing | • (Page 2, para 4 b, i) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests…  
• (Page 2, para 4 b, i) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites. |
| Security Assurance | • (Page 2, para 4 e) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of a convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.  
• (Page 2, para 4 d) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of a multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. |
| Nuclear weapon free zones | • (Page 2, para 4 g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones.  
• (Page 2, para 4 h) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East… |
| Safeguards/verification | • (Page 3, para 8) Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.  
• (Page 3, para 10) Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance. |
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<tr>
<th>IAEA</th>
<th>(Page 3, para 8) Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.</th>
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<td><strong>General views on peaceful purposes</strong></td>
<td>(Page 4, para 10 c) [During 2015 – 2020] Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to “peaceful purposes”.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Page 4, para 14 b) [During 2020 – 2025] Full implementation of the treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and of its verification regime through the Conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes”.</td>
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