(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 11) A Treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation provided that such a treaty is non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable, thus constituting a part of the comprehensive efforts to ban nuclear weapons and lead to their destruction. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 6) In this context, the Conference calls upon States parties to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 1) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was conceived as an instrument to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As part of this endeavor, States Parties which are Nuclear-Weapon States undertook “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” and, at the same time, to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 2) During the negotiations of the NPT, the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWSs), particularly the developing countries, sought a fair balance in the Treaty between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the NWSs and NNWSs which could successfully serve the interests of all States Parties. This position was endorsed by resolution 2028 (XX) of the UN General Assembly. However, this was not fully realized at the time. Today, more than two decades later, the imbalances between the obligations and responsibilities have grown. There is a stalemate in negotiations aimed at redressing those imbalances, including negotiations in the NPT Review Conferences as well as the Conference on Disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 5) The cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament as a whole, continue to be the main objectives of the Treaty. The NWSs should reaffirm their commitment to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 6) A time-bound framework and a target date for the total elimination and the efforts by the NWSs to carry forward the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons will create a strong political thrust towards international efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. A statement by the Russian Federation and the United States indicating the bilateral measures they will take in the future in order to reduce their nuclear arsenals beyond the levels envisaged in the START I and II agreements, would also be a welcome initiative, together with an indication of the steps that China, France and the United Kingdom would be willing to take in light of the reductions referred to above. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 8) Furthermore, deployment of nuclear weapons by NWSs on foreign territories, particularly in NNWSs territories, should be prohibited as it negates the objectives of a nuclear-weapons-free zones. All States that have deployed nuclear weapons outside their boundaries should withdraw all those weapons back to their own territories. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/15, Para 2) In contrast to the treaties mentioned above which are of a permanent nature, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the only multilateral instrument of its kind, entered into force in March 1970 for an initial period of 25 years. The transitional nature of the NPT makes it unique among disarmament treaties. It reflects the intention of the parties to ensure the fulfilment of the purposes set out in the preamble and the effective implementation of its provisions, especially those contained in article VI. To achieve this, the NPT provides not only for the possibility of periodic review conferences (art. VIII (3)) but, more importantly, for a conference to be convened 25 years after its entry into force “to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties” (art. X (2)). 

(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 2) Such an exercise calls for a careful examination and realistic assessment of the obligations and responsibilities undertaken by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The extent to which these objectives have been met constitutes an essential element for a decision on the length of the extension. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 4) As has been consistently demanded by the Movement of Non-aligned States and also stipulated in the document for the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13) submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the group of non-aligned and other States, the following measures are essential to the strengthening as well as to the full realization and effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) An immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones; (h) Full and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all the States parties without discrimination; (i) Application of comprehensive and strengthened IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities and facilities; (j) All efforts must be made for ensuring the universality of the Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 1) The Conference reviews the implementation of each aspect of article VI, and of the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs and stresses the need to intensify the effort to achieve, at the earliest possible date, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament; it urges the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 2) The Conference notes with regret that the provisions of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been completely fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. In this regard, the Conference stresses the need for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at the earliest possible date and to take effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament. The Conference urges the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 3) The Conference recalls that under the provisions of article VI each of the parties undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith: (a) On effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament; (b) On a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 7) The Conference notes that a number of significant changes have occurred since the 1990 Review Conference and that a process of gradual transformation of military structures is now under way. The Conference expresses the hope that these developments will lead to an effective halt of the nuclear arms race between the two major nuclear Powers in quantitative terms and that this trend will encourage further efforts in nuclear disarmament negotiations towards the achievement of the objectives of article VI. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 9) The Conference recalls the annual appeals made in United Nations General Assembly resolutions since 1981 calling for a moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In this respect, the Conference notes the moratorium assumed by the four nuclear-weapon States and urges all the nuclear-weapon States to observe it. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 13) The Conference examines the existing situation in the light of the undertaking assumed by the parties in article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. The Conference is pleased to note that during the last few years there have been encouraging developments, namely, that the United States of America and the Russian Federation have concluded the Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), which eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, and the Treaties on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I and START II Treaties), which will further reduce a significant number of the nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles which they have excessively accumulated during the cold war period. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 16) The Conference calls for the intensification of negotiations towards further reduction and elimination of all types of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, with the earliest participation of all nuclear-weapon States. The Conference believes that all the nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves to a definite, time-bound programme of action for the continued reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to their total elimination. The Conference calls on the Conference on Disarmament to begin deliberating on the programme of action as soon as possible. The Conference firmly believes that such a programme of action will effectively contribute to the early realization of the objectives of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 17) In reviewing progress towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, the Conference takes note of a number of developments in the areas of chemical weapons, conventional force reductions and confidence and security-building measures. The Conference however regrets the lack of progress towards the realization of the treaty itself. The Conference, therefore, calls for an intensified effort to bring about greater confidence and the reduction of armaments in all areas in pursuit of the objectives set out in the twelfth preambular paragraph and in article VI of the Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 18) With respect to article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, the Conference observes that much remains to be done before the objectives and aspirations of the Treaty are attained. The Conference notes that in some areas there has been progress in the past five years but in other significant areas there has been no progress. The Conference reaffirms the commitment of all parties to the implementation of article VI and calls upon the parties to achieve fully the objectives of the article. The Conference agrees that the achievement of the following measures at an early date is essential to the strengthening as well as the full realization and effective implementation of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) Immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally-binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons leading to the total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 1) The Conference reaffirms that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty and the regime of non-proliferation in all its aspects has a vital role in promoting international peace and security. The Conference therefore welcomes the accession of more parties to the Treaty, especially the remaining nuclear-weapon States, since the last Review Conference, and urges all States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it without delay. The Conference remains convinced that full compliance of all parties and universal adherence to the Treaty are the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 3) The Conference reiterates and reaffirms the convictions expressed in the first to third preambular paragraphs. The Conference welcomes the positive developments in the international situation since the last Review Conference, especially in the East-West context and the relations between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. In this regard, the Conference takes note of the role of the INF and the START process which will result in the reduction in nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States. The Conference urges China, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to join the process. The Conference remains convinced that proliferation of nuclear weapons both horizontally and vertically would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 4) The Conference agrees that the strict observance of the terms of articles I and II remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing under any circumstances further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 5) The Conference takes note of the declarations of nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty that they had fulfilled their obligations under article I. The Conference underlines the need for nuclear-weapon States toremain in compliancewith the letter and the spirit of article I. The Conferencefurther reiterates that prohibition of transfer of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices includes transfers between nuclear-weapon States. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 6) The Conference further takes note of the declarations that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had fulfilled their obligations under article II. However, the Conference remains concerned about the ability of certain States not parties to the Treaty to obtain nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. Such transfers seriously place doubt on those responsible for supplying such material and technology to those non-parties. The Conference underlines the vital need for all parties to the Treaty to comply scrupulously and unreservedly with their obligations. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 1) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was conceived as an instrument to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As part of this endeavor, States Parties which are Nuclear-Weapon States undertook “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” and, at the same time, to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 5) The cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament as a whole, continue to be the main objectives of the Treaty. The NWSs should reaffirm their commitment to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 4) As has been consistently demanded by the Movement of Non-aligned States and also stipulated in the document for the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13) submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the group of non-aligned and other States, the following measures are essential to the strengthening as well as to the full realization and effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) An immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones; (h) Full and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all the States parties without discrimination; (i) Application of comprehensive and strengthened IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities and facilities; (j) All efforts must be made for ensuring the universality of the Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 1) The Conference reviews the implementation of each aspect of article VI, and of the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs and stresses the need to intensify the effort to achieve, at the earliest possible date, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament; it urges the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 2) The Conference notes with regret that the provisions of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been completely fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. In this regard, the Conference stresses the need for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at the earliest possible date and to take effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament. The Conference urges the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 3) The Conference recalls that under the provisions of article VI each of the parties undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith: (a) On effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament; (b) On a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 7) The Conference notes that a number of significant changes have occurred since the 1990 Review Conference and that a process of gradual transformation of military structures is now under way. The Conference expresses the hope that these developments will lead to an effective halt of the nuclear arms race between the two major nuclear Powers in quantitative terms and that this trend will encourage further efforts in nuclear disarmament negotiations towards the achievement of the objectives of article VI. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 8) The Conference expresses the view that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests is one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race. The Conference reaffirms the determination expressed in the preamble of the 1963 partial test-ban treaty, and reiterated in the tenth preambular paragraph of the non-proliferation Treaty, to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 13) The Conference examines the existing situation in the light of the undertaking assumed by the parties in article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. The Conference is pleased to note that during the last few years there have been encouraging developments, namely, that the United States of America and the Russian Federation have concluded the Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), which eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, and the Treaties on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I and START II Treaties), which will further reduce a significant number of the nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles which they have excessively accumulated during the cold war period. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 15) The Conference regrets the continuing lack of progress on relevant items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular those relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear war including all related matters, the convention on the production and stockpiling of weapon-grade fissile materials, the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the production of their delivery vehicles, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the establishment of an effective internationally negotiated legally binding instrument on security assurances. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 18) With respect to article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, the Conference observes that much remains to be done before the objectives and aspirations of the Treaty are attained. The Conference notes that in some areas there has been progress in the past five years but in other significant areas there has been no progress. The Conference reaffirms the commitment of all parties to the implementation of article VI and calls upon the parties to achieve fully the objectives of the article. The Conference agrees that the achievement of the following measures at an early date is essential to the strengthening as well as the full realization and effective implementation of article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) Immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally-binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons leading to the total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 10) The Conference also stresses the important contribution that a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests would make towards strengthening and extending the international barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and that it would contribute greatly to the elimination of the grave threat to the environment and human health represented by continued nuclear testing. The Conference further stresses that adherence to such a treaty by all States would contribute substantially to the full achievement of the non-proliferation objective. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 6) A time-bound framework and a target date for the total elimination and the efforts by the NWSs to carry forward the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons will create a strong political thrust towards international efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. A statement by the Russian Federation and the United States indicating the bilateral measures they will take in the future in order to reduce their nuclear arsenals beyond the levels envisaged in the START I and II agreements, would also be a welcome initiative, together with an indication of the steps that China, France and the United Kingdom would be willing to take in light of the reductions referred to above. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.5, Para 13) The Conference examines the existing situation in the light of the undertaking assumed by the parties in article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. The Conference is pleased to note that during the last few years there have been encouraging developments, namely, that the United States of America and the Russian Federation have concluded the Treaty between the United States and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), which eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, and the Treaties on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I and START II Treaties), which will further reduce a significant number of the nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles which they have excessively accumulated during the cold war period. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 3) The Conference reiterates and reaffirms the convictions expressed in the first to third preambular paragraphs. The Conference welcomes the positive developments in the international situation since the last Review Conference, especially in the East-West context and the relations between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. In this regard, the Conference takes note of the role of the INF and the START process which will result in the reduction in nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States. The Conference urges China, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to join the process. The Conference remains convinced that proliferation of nuclear weapons both horizontally and vertically would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 3) The Non-Aligned Countries value the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a key instrument to channel international efforts to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Notwithstanding the important role of the Treaty in the maintenance of international security, it should be recognized that the Treaty has fundamental shortcomings that have become the bone of contention between NWSs and NNWSs Parties to the NPT ever since it came into being, thus eroding the perceived value of the Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/14, Para 11) A Treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation provided that such a treaty is non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable, thus constituting a part of the comprehensive efforts to ban nuclear weapons and lead to their destruction. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 1) The Conference reaffirms that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty and the regime of non-proliferation in all its aspects has a vital role in promoting international peace and security. The Conference therefore welcomes the accession of more parties to the Treaty, especially the remaining nuclear-weapon States, since the last Review Conference, and urges all States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it without delay. The Conference remains convinced that full compliance of all parties and universal adherence to the Treaty are the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 3) The Conference reiterates and reaffirms the convictions expressed in the first to third preambular paragraphs. The Conference welcomes the positive developments in the international situation since the last Review Conference, especially in the East-West context and the relations between the Russian Federation and the United States of America. In this regard, the Conference takes note of the role of the INF and the START process which will result in the reduction in nuclear arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States. The Conference urges China, France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to join the process. The Conference remains convinced that proliferation of nuclear weapons both horizontally and vertically would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/WP.9, Para 7) The Conference affirms the determination to stop the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities, and hence the ability to develop and produce nuclear weapons in a non-discriminatory manner and without hampering legitimate peaceful nuclear activities and programmes of States parties to the Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.1995/19, Para 4) As has been consistently demanded by the Movement of Non-aligned States and also stipulated in the document for the third session of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/13) submitted by Indonesia on behalf of the group of non-aligned and other States, the following measures are essential to the strengthening as well as to the full realization and effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty: (a) Immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, leading to nuclear disarmament and the attainment of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control; (b) An immediate conclusion and implementation of a universal, internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty; (c) A legally binding commitment by nuclear-weapon States on no-first use and non-use of nuclear weapons; (d) A non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; (e) A programme of action for significant reduction of nuclear weapons, leading to total elimination of such weapons and their delivery vehicles within a time-bound framework; (f) A legally binding instrument on effective, unconditional and comprehensive security assurances, both positive and negative, to non-nuclear-weapon States; (g) Facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and full adherence by all nuclear-weapon States to the instruments relating to such zones; (h) Full and unimpeded access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes for all the States parties without discrimination; (i) Application of comprehensive and strengthened IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities and facilities; (j) All efforts must be made for ensuring the universality of the Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 3) The Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The international community should work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 4) At the Cartagena summit meeting, the heads of State or Government of countries belonging to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, consistent with the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference, called upon all States and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States, to fulfil the commitments they have undertaken in their entirety, inter alia: (a) The achievement of universality of the Treaty; (b) The conclusion of legally binding instruments to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (c) A ban on fissile materials and other nuclear devices for weapon purposes; (d) The elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, which must be accorded priority; (e) The establishment of nuclear-free zones; (f) The unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States parties without exception. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 5) Significant progress has been achieved in recent years in disarmament: inter alia the conclusion and the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; adoption and the commencement of the preparatory process for the implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, adoption of an amended Protocol II and Protocol IV of the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; the conclusion of the treaties on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Southeast Asia (Bangkok Treaty) and in Africa (Pelindaba Treaty), which effectively mean that the entire southern hemisphere is covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones; and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. However, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries continues to believe that many important and significant tasks remain ahead of it, particularly on the shaping of the future agenda for nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 11) States parties should agree on a recommendation to the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapons convention. A universal and legally binding multilateral agreement should be concluded committing all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament would take into account the proposal for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons submitted by 28 members of the Conference belonging to the Group of 21 (CD/1419) as well as any other existing proposals and future initiatives in this regard. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States should adopt flexible approach, taking into account their commitment, as stated in article VI of the Treaty, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 12) The nuclear-weapon States should express their commitment to undertake a step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and a phased programme of progressive and deep reductions of nuclear weapons, and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 4) At the Cartagena summit meeting, the heads of State or Government of countries belonging to the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, consistent with the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference, called upon all States and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States, to fulfil the commitments they have undertaken in their entirety, inter alia: (a) The achievement of universality of the Treaty; (b) The conclusion of legally binding instruments to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (c) A ban on fissile materials and other nuclear devices for weapon purposes; (d) The elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, which must be accorded priority; (e) The establishment of nuclear-free zones; (f) The unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States parties without exception. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 6) The purpose of the upcoming meeting of the Preparatory Committee would be to consider ways to promote full implementation of and universal adherence to provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to make recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference. The Preparatory Committee meetings should make substantive contributions, taken into account by the 1995 decisions on "Strengthening the review process" and "Principles and objectives" in order to enable the Review Conference to evaluate the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty and identify the areas in which further progress should be sought in the future. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 7) The preparations for the 2000 Review Conference provide an opportunity for the realization of the objectives enshrined in the Treaty. For the successful outcome of the Review Conference substantive preparation should be made by the Preparatory Committee meetings in order to elaborate rolling texts to be submitted for consideration by the Conference, as basis for its final document. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 8) The States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasize the urgency and the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 9) The Preparatory Committee meetings and the Review Conference should consider ways and means to achieve the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treatyat the earliest possible date of those Statespossessing nuclear capabilities. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 11) States parties should agree on a recommendation to the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapons convention. A universal and legally binding multilateral agreement should be concluded committing all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament would take into account the proposal for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons submitted by 28 members of the Conference belonging to the Group of 21 (CD/1419) as well as any other existing proposals and future initiatives in this regard. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States should adopt flexible approach, taking into account their commitment, as stated in article VI of the Treaty, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 22) The States parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba should promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties, explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 28) Taking the above into consideration, the upcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee could be organized as follows: (a) On substantive discussions, attention should be focused on issues of concern to all States parties, utilizing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as the decisions taken in the 1995 Review and Extension Conference as the yardsticks in determining the objectives to be achieved by the Review Conference to be held in the year 2000. It should be discussed in a structured, coherent and focused manner in order to obtain the maximum results as to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, and to make recommendations thereon to the Review Conference; (b) The formulation of recommendations to be considered by the Review Conference shall not replace the evaluation of the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons since the Conference in 1995. The States parties to the Treaty should start negotiations in the first Preparatory Committee on a rolling text on the implementation of all the articles and preamble of the Treaty; (c) States parties of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons welcome the participation of non-governmental organizations, which could also make a positive contribution towards the attainment of these objectives. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 11) States parties should agree on a recommendation to the Conference on Disarmament to establish, on a priority basis, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapons convention. A universal and legally binding multilateral agreement should be concluded committing all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament would take into account the proposal for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons submitted by 28 members of the Conference belonging to the Group of 21 (CD/1419) as well as any other existing proposals and future initiatives in this regard. In this context, the nuclear-weapon States should adopt flexible approach, taking into account their commitment, as stated in article VI of the Treaty, to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 17) Nuclear material transferred from military uses to peaceful activities should be placed under IAEA safeguards. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 14) States parties support the establishment of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices in the Conference on Disarmament. It would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation provided that such a treaty is non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 17) Nuclear material transferred from military uses to peaceful activities should be placed under IAEA safeguards. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 5) Significant progress has been achieved in recent years in disarmament: inter alia the conclusion and the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; adoption and the commencement of the preparatory process for the implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, adoption of an amended Protocol II and Protocol IV of the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; the conclusion of the treaties on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Southeast Asia (Bangkok Treaty) and in Africa (Pelindaba Treaty), which effectively mean that the entire southern hemisphere is covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones; and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. However, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries continues to believe that many important and significant tasks remain ahead of it, particularly on the shaping of the future agenda for nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 3) The Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The international community should work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/WP.10, Para 14) States parties support the establishment of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices in the Conference on Disarmament. It would be a significant contribution to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation provided that such a treaty is non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 1) The States Parties believe that the Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and they will work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 3) The States Parties agree that the strict observance of the terms of Article I remainscentral to achieving the shared objectivesof preventing under any circumstancesfurther proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 4) The Nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitments to the fullest implementation of this Article and to refrain from, among themselves, with non-nuclear weapons states, and with States not party to the Treaty, nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 18) The States Parties call upon the nuclear-weapon states to refrain from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the objectives of the CTBT. They also call upon nuclear-weapon states to provide transparency on-site and other measures to build confidence on the full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty in order to meet international concern. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 19) The States Parties call upon all of the States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the States Parties called upon the nuclear-weapon states to comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 20) The States Parties note with regret that, despite the conclusion of limited agreements, the provisions of article VI and the ninth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. In this regard, the States Parties stress the need to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament, thus reaffirming their role in achieving thisobjective. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 21) The States Parties reaffirm that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of the civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. In this context, the goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, all States Parties bear responsibility, in particular those nuclear-weapon States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 23) The States Parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under article VI, in particular nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 24) The States Parties in particular the nuclear-weapon States shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 35) The nuclear-weapon-states, in conformity with their obligations under Article I of the Treaty, solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 1) The States Parties believe that the Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and they will work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 6) Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitments to the fullest implementation of this Article and to refrain from nuclear sharing with nuclear-weapon States, non nuclear-weapon States, and States not party to the Treaty for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 20) The States Parties note with regret that, despite the conclusion of limited agreements, the provisions of article VI and the ninth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. In this regard, the States Parties stress the need to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament, thus reaffirming their role in achieving this objective. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 25) The States Parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament taking into account all proposals which have been submitted by members of the Group of 2l, and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 29) The States parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba that are parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitment to promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties, explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 30) The States Parties will continue their endeavors to strengthen the review process of the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty in their entirety are being realized. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 31) The States Parties reemphasize the urgency and the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities. They will make determined efforts to achieve this goal. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 36) All States Parties, in conformity with the seventh preambular paragraph and Article 4 of the Treaty, hereby declare their commitment to exclusively prohibit the transfer of all nuclearrelated equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of knowhow or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 37) The States parties reaffirm once again, their determination to extend their fullest cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East a zone free of nuclear as well as all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 25) The States Parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament taking into account all proposals which have been submitted by members of the Group of 2l, and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 8) The States Parties call on the nuclear weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards of IAEA. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 10) The States Parties support the principles that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of a special fissionable material to non-nuclear weapon States should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance by all States Parties of full-scope safeguards; and that excess nuclear material in military stockpiles and nuclear materials removed from nuclear weapons as a result of nuclear weapons reduction agreements should be placed under IAEA safeguards. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 26) The States Parties renew their call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for a treaty banning the production and stockpiling-of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as an essential measures of nuclear disarmament as well as nonproliferation of nuclear weapons taking into account the I995 report of the Special Coordinator on that item and the views relating to the scope of the Treaty. The Treaty should be nondiscriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 21) The States Parties reaffirm that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of the civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. In this context, the goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, all States Parties bear responsibility, in particular those nuclear-weapon States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 23) The States Parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under article VI, in particular nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 24) The States Parties in particular the nuclear-weapon States shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 1) The States Parties believe that the Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and they will work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/WP.5, Para 26) The States Parties renew their call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for a treaty banning the production and stockpiling-of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as an essential measures of nuclear disarmament as well as nonproliferation of nuclear weapons taking into account the I995 report of the Special Coordinator on that item and the views relating to the scope of the Treaty. The Treaty should be nondiscriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 1) The States Parties believe that the Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and they will work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 4) The States Parties agree that the strict observance of the terms of Article I remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing under any circumstances further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 5) The Nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitments to the fullest implementation of this Article and to refrain from, among themselves, with non-nuclear-weapon states, and with States not party to the Treaty, nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 20) The States Parties call upon the nuclear-weapon states to refrain from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the objectives of the CTBT. They also call upon nuclear-weapon states to provide transparency on-site and other measures to build confidence on the full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty in order to meet international concern. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 21) The States Parties call upon all of the States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the States Parties call upon the nuclear-weapon states to comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 22) The States Parties note with regret that, despite the conclusion of limited agreements, the provisions of Article VI and the ninth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. In this regard, the States Parties stress the need to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament, thus reaffirming their role in achieving this objectives. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 23) The States Parties reaffirm that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of the civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. In this context, the goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, all States Parties bear responsibility, in particular those nuclear-weapon States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 25) The States Parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under Article VI, in particular nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 26) The States Parties in particular the nuclear-weapon States shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 39) The nuclear-weapon states, in conformity with their obligations under Article I of the Treaty, solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not in anyway to assist, encourage, or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 1) The States Parties believe that the Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and they will work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 3) The States parties agree that to ensure the effective implementation of the Treaty, and of decisions, resolutions and documents adopted at the Review Conference, an open-ended standing committee, which would work inter-sessionally to follow up recommendations concerning the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, should be established by the Treaty's 2000 Review Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 7) Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitments to the fullest implementation of this Article and to refrain from nuclear sharing with nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States, and States not party to the Treaty for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 22) The States Parties note with regret that, despite the conclusion of limited agreements, the provisions of Article VI and the ninth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. In this regard, the States Parties stress the need to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament, thus reaffirming their role in achieving this objectives. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 28) The States Parties renew their call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as an essential measures of nuclear disarmament as well as nonproliferation of nuclear weapons taking into account the 1995 report of the Special Coordinator on that item and the views relating to the scope of the Treaty. The Treaty should be nondiscriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 30) The States Parties agree that specific time should be made available at Preparatory Committee meetings to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 31) The States Parties recommend that the 2000 Review Conference establish a subsidiary body to its Main Committee I to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 33) The States Parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba that are parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitment to promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties, explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 34) The States Parties will continue their endeavors to strengthen the review process of the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty in their entirety are being realized. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 35) The States Parties reemphasize the urgency and the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities. They will make determined efforts to achieve this goal. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 40) All States Parties, in conformity with the seventh preambular paragraph and Article 4 of the Treaty, hereby declare their commitment to exclusively prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of knowhow or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 41) The States Parties reaffirm once again, their determination to extend their fullest cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East a zone free of nuclear as well as all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 42) The States Parties recommend that the 2000 Review Conference establish a subsidiary body to its Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 27) The States Parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament taking into account all proposals which have been submitted by members of the Group of 21, and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapon convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 9) The States Parties call on the nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards of IAEA. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 11) The States Parties support the principles that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of a special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require as a necessary precondition, acceptance by all States Parties of fullscope safeguards; and that excess nuclear material in military stockpiles and nuclear materials removed from nuclear weapons as a result of nuclear weapons reduction agreements should be placed under IAEA safeguards. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 28) The States Parties renew their call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as an essential measures of nuclear disarmament as well as nonproliferation of nuclear weapons taking into account the 1995 report of the Special Coordinator on that item and the views relating to the scope of the Treaty. The Treaty should be nondiscriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 26) The States Parties in particular the nuclear-weapon States shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 23) The States Parties reaffirm that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of the civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. In this context, the goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, all States Parties bear responsibility, in particular those nuclear-weapon States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 25) The States Parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under Article VI, in particular nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 1) The States Parties believe that the Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and they will work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/WP.1, Para 28) The States Parties renew their call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as an essential measures of nuclear disarmament as well as nonproliferation of nuclear weapons taking into account the 1995 report of the Special Coordinator on that item and the views relating to the scope of the Treaty. The Treaty should be nondiscriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 1) The States Parties believe that the Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and they will work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 4) The States Parties agree that the strict observance of the terms of Article I remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing under any circumstances further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 5) The Nuclear Weapon States parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitments to the fullest implementation of this Article and to refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements, among themselves, with non-nuclear-weapon states, and with States not party to the Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 20) The States Parties call upon the Nuclear Weapon States to refrain from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the objectives of the CTBT. They also call upon Nuclear Weapon States to provide transparency on-site and other measures to build confidence on the full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty in order to meet international concern. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 21) The States Parties stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT including by all the Nuclear Weapon States which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 22) The States Parties call upon all of the States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the States Parties call upon the Nuclear Weapon States to comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 23) The States Parties reiterate that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential. The States Parties express their concern over the recent negative developments with regard to the ratification of the CTBT. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 24) The States Parties note with regret that, despite the conclusion of limited agreements, the provisions of Article VI and the ninth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. In this regard, the States Parties stress the need to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament, thus reaffirming their role in achieving this objective. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 25) The States Parties reaffirm that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of the civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. In this context, the goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, all States Parties bear responsibility, in particular those Nuclear Weapon States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 26) The States Parties welcome the progress made towards the full ratification of START II and call for the full and early implementation of the Treaty by both parties as well as of the early commencement of negotiations of START III. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 27) The States Parties are concerned over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of deployment in outer space which have, inter alia, contributed to the further erosion of an international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international security. In this connection, the States Parties call upon the parties to the ABM Treaty to fully comply with its provisions. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 29) The States Parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under Article VI, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 30) The States Parties in particular the nuclear-weapon States shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 43) The Nuclear Weapon States, in conformity with their obligations under Article I of the Treaty, solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not in anyway to assist, encourage, or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 1) The States Parties believe that the Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and they will work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 3) The States parties agree that to ensure the effective implementation of the Treaty, and of decisions, resolutions and documents adopted at the Review Conference, an open-ended standing committee, which would work inter-sessionally to follow up recommendations concerning the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, should be established by the Treaty's 2000 Review Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 7) Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitments to the fullest implementation of this Article and to refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements with the Nuclear Weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States, and States not party to the Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 24) The States Parties note with regret that, despite the conclusion of limited agreements, the provisions of Article VI and the ninth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. In this regard, the States Parties stress the need to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament, thus reaffirming their role in achieving this objective. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 29) The States Parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under Article VI, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 31) The States Parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament taking into account all proposals which have been submitted by members of the Group of 21, and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapon convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 32) The States Parties renew their call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as essential measures of nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons taking into account the 1995 report of the Special Coordinator on that item and the views relating to the scope of the Treaty. The Treaty should be non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 34) The States Parties agree that specific time should be made available at Preparatory Committee meetings to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 35) The States Parties agree to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee I of the 2000 Review Conference to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 37) The States Parties and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba that are parties to the NPT reaffirm their commitment to promote the common goals envisaged in those treaties, explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 38) The States Parties will continue their endeavors to strengthen the review process of the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty in their entirety are being realized. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 39) The States Parties reemphasize the urgency and the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities. They will make determined efforts to achieve this goal. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 44) All States Parties, in conformity with the seventh preambular paragraph and Article 4 of the Treaty, hereby declare their commitment to exclusively prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 45) The States Parties reaffirm once again, their determination to extend their fullest cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East a zone free of nuclear as well as all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 46) The States Parties agree that specific time should be made available at Preparatory Committee meetings to consider proposals on the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 47) The States Parties agree to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the Review Conference to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 31) The States Parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament taking into account all proposals which have been submitted by members of the Group of 21, and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a nuclear-weapon convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 32) The States Parties renew their call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as essential measures of nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons taking into account the 1995 report of the Special Coordinator on that item and the views relating to the scope of the Treaty. The Treaty should be non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 25) The States Parties reaffirm that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of the civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. In this context, the goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, all States Parties bear responsibility, in particular those Nuclear Weapon States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 29) The States Parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under Article VI, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 26) The States Parties welcome the progress made towards the full ratification of START II and call for the full and early implementation of the Treaty by both parties as well as of the early commencement of negotiations of START III. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 1) The States Parties believe that the Treaty is a key instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and they will work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 32) The States Parties renew their call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as essential measures of nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons taking into account the 1995 report of the Special Coordinator on that item and the views relating to the scope of the Treaty. The Treaty should be non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 30) The States Parties in particular the nuclear-weapon States shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2000/WP.18, Para 27) The States Parties are concerned over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of deployment in outer space which have, inter alia, contributed to the further erosion of an international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international security. In this connection, the States Parties call upon the parties to the ABM Treaty to fully comply with its provisions. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11) In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 13) Furthermore, we are concerned that no progress has been achieved towards the realization of the United Nations Millennium Declaration in which Heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear dangers. We again call for an international conference, at the earliest possible date, with the objective of arriving at an agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time to eliminate all nuclear weapons, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction. We are also deeply concerned about the progressive erosion of multilateralism and emphasize the importance of collective international efforts to enhance and maintain international peace and security. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 3) We remain firmly convinced that the NPT is a key instrument in the effort to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, we recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference calls on the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on these issues. All of the States Parties to the NPT should work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear-Weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 7) We reiterate our long-standing principled position for the total elimination of all nuclear testing and, in this regard, wish to stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the Nuclear Weapon States which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. We note that 165 States have signed the Treaty and 90 States have ratified it thus far. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 10) The NAM States Parties to the NPT reiterate their call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the Nuclear Weapons States at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. We expect that this undertaking be demonstrated without delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to in 2000. Despite the expectation by the international community that the successful outcome of the 2000 Review Conference would lead to the fulfillment of the unequivocal undertaking given by the Nuclear Weapon States as well as the full implementation of the 13 practical steps, very little progress has, however, been made to this effect. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11) In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 15) To this end, the Prepcom should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, we wish to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called for regular reports within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process by all States Parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.” The NAM States Parties to the NPT expect that the States Parties, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, should submit reports to each PrepCom session, including this one. We expect that the reports on Article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 steps and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 16) The NAM States Parties to the NPT also believe that the PrepCom should also substantially focus on the Middle East, and further recalls that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called on all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the Nuclear Weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The NAM States Parties to the NPT expect that all States Parties to the Treaty, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, should submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 17) The NAM States Parties to the NPT further recall that specific time was made available at the 2000 Review Conference and during its preparatory process for the discussion on and consideration of proposals on the provisions in Article VI of the NPT and in paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” dealing with nuclear disarmament, as well as on the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of establishing at the 2005 Review Conference a subsidiary body to Main Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. In this regard, we furthermore underline and emphasize the need for Preparatory Committee meetings–and also at this particular meeting–to include in their programmes of work, allocations of specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament and on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 3) We remain firmly convinced that the NPT is a key instrument in the effort to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, we recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference calls on the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on these issues. All of the States Parties to the NPT should work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear-Weapon States with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11) In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 15) To this end, the Prepcom should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, we wish to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called for regular reports within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process by all States Parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.” The NAM States Parties to the NPT expect that the States Parties, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, should submit reports to each PrepCom session, including this one. We expect that the reports on Article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 steps and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 17) The NAM States Parties to the NPT further recall that specific time was made available at the 2000 Review Conference and during its preparatory process for the discussion on and consideration of proposals on the provisions in Article VI of the NPT and in paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” dealing with nuclear disarmament, as well as on the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of establishing at the 2005 Review Conference a subsidiary body to Main Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. In this regard, we furthermore underline and emphasize the need for Preparatory Committee meetings–and also at this particular meeting–to include in their programmes of work, allocations of specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament and on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 2) In accordance with the Movement’s long-standing and principled positions on nuclear disarmament, the NAM States Parties to the NPT remain fully committed to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty and the agreements reached at both the 1995 and 2000 NPT Conferences. In this regard, I wish to recall the comprehensive working paper submitted by the Movement during the 2000 Review Conference contained in document NPT/CONF.2000/18. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 5) The NAM States Parties to the NPT wish to re-emphasize the urgency and the important of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities, and resolve to make determined efforts to achieve this goal.  We reiterate our support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and to this end, we reaffirm the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus and Security Council resolutions 487 (1981) and 687 (1991). We call upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment to call on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT, nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA Safeguards and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. We recall that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA Safeguards, in realizing the goal of the universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11) In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 13) Furthermore, we are concerned that no progress has been achieved towards the realization of the United Nations Millennium Declaration in which Heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear dangers. We again call for an international conference, at the earliest possible date, with the objective of arriving at an agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time to eliminate all nuclear weapons, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction. We are also deeply concerned about the progressive erosion of multilateralism and emphasize the importance of collective international efforts to enhance and maintain international peace and security. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 17) The NAM States Parties to the NPT further recall that specific time was made available at the 2000 Review Conference and during its preparatory process for the discussion on and consideration of proposals on the provisions in Article VI of the NPT and in paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” dealing with nuclear disarmament, as well as on the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of establishing at the 2005 Review Conference a subsidiary body to Main Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. In this regard, we furthermore underline and emphasize the need for Preparatory Committee meetings–and also at this particular meeting–to include in their programmes of work, allocations of specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament and on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 18) In concluding, the Non-Aligned Movement wishes to reiterate its position, that the Review Conference, as well as the third/final PrepCom for that Conference, be chaired by representatives drawn from the Movement. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 19) Finally, we would like to request that this statement be circulated by the Secretariat as a working paper of the Preparatory Committee. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11) In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11) In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11) In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11) In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, Para 11) In this regard, allow us to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the 2000 Review Conference: (a) We remain concerned at the slow progress towards disarmament; (b) Although some progress has been made in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles still amount to many thousands; (c) There is to date no evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons; (d) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the Nuclear Weapon States to consider expanding the circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used and the countries that they could be used against; (e) We are also concerned by the recent developments that threaten the principle of irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other arms control and reduction measures; (f) The possible consequences of the decision by one of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) to withdraw from the Treaty bring new challenges to strategic stability and to the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 56/23, we emphasize the urgent need for commencement of substantive work on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The NAM States Parties to the NPT believe that the implementation of a national missile defense system could trigger an arms race and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons; (g) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT. In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty. We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (h) The continued inflexible postures of some of the Nuclear Weapon States that continue to prevent the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment as soon as possible and as the highest priority of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. In this context, we underline once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. We regret that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of five years; (i) The continued inability of the Conference of Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices taking into account both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives; and (j) The lack of progress in diminishing the role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 15) In this regard, allow us, Mr. Chairman, to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the First Session of the Preparatory Committee as follows: (a) We remain concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons; (b) Despite some progress made in the context of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons are deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various weapons programs; (c) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, we stress that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons; (d) There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons; (e) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear weapon states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (f) The possible development of new weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermines disarmament commitments; (g) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We remain concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s) and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 57/57, we emphasize the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (h) The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT.). The Movement stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all the nuclear weapon states, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 167 States have signed the Treaty and 98 States have ratified it thus far. NAM reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear weapon states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (i) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear weapon states that has prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, we reiterate our call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. NAM regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfillment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (j) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (k) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (l) The inability of the UNDC to reach a consensus document on “ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament” at its third and last substantive session in 2003. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 17) The NAM is also concerned that no progress has been achieved towards the realization of the Millennium Declaration in which Heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular, nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear dangers. We again call for an international conference, at the earliest possible date, with the objective of arriving at an agreement on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, with a specified framework of time to eliminate all nuclear weapons, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction. We are also deeply concerned about the progressive erosion of multilateralism and emphasize the importance of collective international efforts to enhance and maintaininternational peace and security. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 3) The Movement remains fully convinced that the NPT is a key instrument in the effort to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called on the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on these issues. All of the States Parties to the NPT should work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We reiterate our conviction that pending the attainment of this goal, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and a legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states should be pursued as a matter of priority. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 10) We reiterate our long-standing and principled position for the total elimination of all nuclear testing and, in this regard, wish to stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear weapon states, which inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 14) The NAM States Parties to the NPT reiterate their call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear weapon states at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. We expect that this undertaking be demonstrated without delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively toward a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to in 2000. Despite the expectation by the international community that the successful outcome of the Review Conference would lead to the fulfillment of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear weapon states as well as the full implementation of the 13 practical steps, very little progress has been made. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 15) In this regard, allow us, Mr. Chairman, to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the First Session of the Preparatory Committee as follows: (a) We remain concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons; (b) Despite some progress made in the context of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons are deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various weapons programs; (c) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, we stress that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons; (d) There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons; (e) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear weapon states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (f) The possible development of new weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermines disarmament commitments; (g) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We remain concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s) and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 57/57, we emphasize the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (h) The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT.). The Movement stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all the nuclear weapon states, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 167 States have signed the Treaty and 98 States have ratified it thus far. NAM reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear weapon states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (i) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear weapon states that has prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, we reiterate our call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. NAM regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfillment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (j) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (k) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (l) The inability of the UNDC to reach a consensus document on “ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament” at its third and last substantive session in 2003. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 19) To this end, in NAM’s view, this Session should also substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by states of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, we wish to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called for regular reports within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process by all States Parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 C of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”. It is the Movement’s expectation that States Parties to the Treaty, in particular, nuclear weapon states, should submit reports to each Session of the Preparatory Committee Session including this Session. Furthermore, the reports on Article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 practical steps agreed in the 2000 Review Conference and include specific and complete information on each of these steps. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions as well as developments in these areas. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 20) The NAM believes that the Preparatory Committee sessions should also focus substantially on the Middle East and further recalls that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference calls on all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear weapon states, the states of the Middle East and other interested states to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the 2005 Review Conference and to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the Conference, on the steps taken to promote the achievement of a NWFZ and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The NAM expects that all States Parties to the NPT, in particular, the nuclear weapon states, should submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 22) The NAM States Parties to the NPT further recall that specific time was made available at the 2000 Review Conference and during its preparatory process for the discussion on, and consideration of, proposals on the provisions in Article VI and in paragraphs 3 and 4 C of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” dealing with nuclear disarmament, as well as on the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of establishing at the 2005 Review Conference a subsidiary body to Main Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. In this regard, we furthermore underline and emphasize the need for Preparatory Committee meetings – and also at this particular meeting – and to include in its program of work, allocation of specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament and on the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and security assurances. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 3) The Movement remains fully convinced that the NPT is a key instrument in the effort to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called on the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on these issues. All of the States Parties to the NPT should work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We reiterate our conviction that pending the attainment of this goal, efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and a legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states should be pursued as a matter of priority. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 15) In this regard, allow us, Mr. Chairman, to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the First Session of the Preparatory Committee as follows: (a) We remain concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons; (b) Despite some progress made in the context of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons are deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various weapons programs; (c) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, we stress that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons; (d) There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons; (e) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear weapon states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (f) The possible development of new weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermines disarmament commitments; (g) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We remain concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s) and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 57/57, we emphasize the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (h) The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT.). The Movement stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all the nuclear weapon states, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 167 States have signed the Treaty and 98 States have ratified it thus far. NAM reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear weapon states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (i) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear weapon states that has prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, we reiterate our call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. NAM regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfillment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (j) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (k) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (l) The inability of the UNDC to reach a consensus document on “ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament” at its third and last substantive session in 2003. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 19) To this end, in NAM’s view, this Session should also substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by states of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, we wish to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called for regular reports within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process by all States Parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 C of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”. It is the Movement’s expectation that States Parties to the Treaty, in particular, nuclear weapon states, should submit reports to each Session of the Preparatory Committee Session including this Session. Furthermore, the reports on Article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 practical steps agreed in the 2000 Review Conference and include specific and complete information on each of these steps. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions as well as developments in these areas. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 22) The NAM States Parties to the NPT further recall that specific time was made available at the 2000 Review Conference and during its preparatory process for the discussion on, and consideration of, proposals on the provisions in Article VI and in paragraphs 3 and 4 C of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” dealing with nuclear disarmament, as well as on the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of establishing at the 2005 Review Conference a subsidiary body to Main Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. In this regard, we furthermore underline and emphasize the need for Preparatory Committee meetings – and also at this particular meeting – and to include in its program of work, allocation of specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament and on the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and security assurances. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 1) We are meeting at a critical juncture to reflect on the progress made in the full realization of the objectives of the Treaty as well as the commitments and undertakings given at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference. We are also mandated to make the procedural arrangements for the forthcoming review exercise. In these endeavors, the Movement will be guided by the decisions taken at the XIII Summit Meeting of NAM Heads of State or Government that was held in Kuala Lumpur last February. It is pertinent to note that the Summit, while addressing the wide-ranging ramifications of nuclear weapons and related issues, affirmed that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the UN Charter, provided the only sustainable method of dealing with the multiplicity of disarmament and international security issues. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 2) In accordance with the Movement’s long-standing and principled positions on nuclear disarmament, the NAM States Parties to the NPT remain fully committed to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty and the agreements reached at both the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences. In this regard, the NAM wishes to recall the comprehensive working paper submitted by the Movement during the 2000 Review Conference contained in document NPT/CONF.2000/18 as well as the working papers submitted to the 2002 Preparatory Committee meeting contained in documents NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2 and NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.14. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 4) The NAM States Parties to the NPT wish to reemphasize the urgency and the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities, and resolve to make determined efforts to achieve this goal. The Movement reaffirms its support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the need for its speedy establishment in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus as well as Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and paragraph 14 of the Security Council resolution 687 (1991). We call upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps toward the establishment of such a zone and, pending its establishment to call on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT, nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA Safeguards and to conduct all its nuclear related activities in conformity with the nonproliferation regime. We recall that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA Safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 5) We welcome Cuba’s accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 6) We note the decision by the DPRK to withdraw from the NPT and express the view that the parties directly concerned resolve, through dialogue and negotiations, all issues related to the withdrawal of the DPRK from the NPT as an extension of their goodwill. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 9) The Movement welcomes the ratification by Cuba of the Tlatelolco Treaty. In this connection, all the Latin American and Caribbean States are now parties to the Treaty and brought the Treaty into full force in its area of application. The NAM also welcomes the ongoing consultations between ASEAN and the nuclear weapon states on the Protocol of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty and urged the nuclear weapon states to become parties to the Protocol of the Treaty as soon as possible; likewise we welcome the decision by all five Central Asian States to sign the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty as soon as possible. The NAM has also expressed its support for the initiative of convening an international conference of States parties, ratifiers and signatories to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba to discuss and implement further ways and means of cooperation among themselves, their Treaty agencies and other interested States, at an appropriate time. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 15) In this regard, allow us, Mr. Chairman, to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the First Session of the Preparatory Committee as follows: (a) We remain concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons; (b) Despite some progress made in the context of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons are deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various weapons programs; (c) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, we stress that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons; (d) There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons; (e) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear weapon states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (f) The possible development of new weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermines disarmament commitments; (g) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We remain concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s) and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 57/57, we emphasize the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (h) The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT.). The Movement stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all the nuclear weapon states, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 167 States have signed the Treaty and 98 States have ratified it thus far. NAM reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear weapon states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (i) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear weapon states that has prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, we reiterate our call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. NAM regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfillment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (j) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (k) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (l) The inability of the UNDC to reach a consensus document on “ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament” at its third and last substantive session in 2003. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 16) These issues of concern to the Movement reflect a deepening crisis in multilateral disarmament diplomacy. Strengthening the role of the United Nations in resolving these issues is a collective responsibility. It offers the basis for developing and giving substance to a comprehensive disarmament process at all levels. Hence, we reiterate our support for the convening of the Fourth United Nations Special Session Devoted to Disarmament (SSOD IV) with the participation of all member states on the basis of the need to review and assess the implementation of the Final Document adopted by SSOD I, while reaffirming its principles and priorities. NAM welcomed the decision by the General Assembly to establish an openended working group to consider the objectives and agenda including the possibility of establishing the preparatory committee for the Special Session. In this regard, the Movement looks forward to more substantive and interactive sessions of the open-ended working group and its positive recommendations with a view to facilitating the convening of the Special session. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 17) The NAM is also concerned that no progress has been achieved towards the realization of the Millennium Declaration in which Heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular, nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear dangers. We again call for an international conference, at the earliest possible date, with the objective of arriving at an agreement on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, with a specified framework of time to eliminate all nuclear weapons, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction. We are also deeply concerned about the progressive erosion of multilateralism and emphasize the importance of collective international efforts to enhance and maintain international peace and security. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 21) The NAM States Parties to the NPT also believes that the Preparatory Committee should also substantially focus on security assurances. The 2000 Review Conference “agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear weapon states to the non-nuclear weapon states parties strengthen the Nuclear non-proliferation regime” and “calls on the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue”. The Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement reaffirmed at the recent Summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. They reiterated their conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states should be pursued as a matter of priority. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 22) The NAM States Parties to the NPT further recall that specific time was made available at the 2000 Review Conference and during its preparatory process for the discussion on, and consideration of, proposals on the provisions in Article VI and in paragraphs 3 and 4 C of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” dealing with nuclear disarmament, as well as on the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of establishing at the 2005 Review Conference a subsidiary body to Main Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. In this regard, we furthermore underline and emphasize the need for Preparatory Committee meetings – and also at this particular meeting – and to include in its program of work, allocation of specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament and on the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and security assurances. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 23) We would like to conclude by requesting that this statement be circulated by the Secretariat as a Working Paper of the Second Preparatory Committee. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 15) In this regard, allow us, Mr. Chairman, to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the First Session of the Preparatory Committee as follows: (a) We remain concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons; (b) Despite some progress made in the context of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons are deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various weapons programs; (c) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, we stress that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons; (d) There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons; (e) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear weapon states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (f) The possible development of new weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermines disarmament commitments; (g) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We remain concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s) and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 57/57, we emphasize the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (h) The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT.). The Movement stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all the nuclear weapon states, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 167 States have signed the Treaty and 98 States have ratified it thus far. NAM reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear weapon states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (i) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear weapon states that has prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, we reiterate our call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. NAM regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfillment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (j) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (k) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (l) The inability of the UNDC to reach a consensus document on “ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament” at its third and last substantive session in 2003. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 15) In this regard, allow us, Mr. Chairman, to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the First Session of the Preparatory Committee as follows: (a) We remain concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons; (b) Despite some progress made in the context of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons are deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various weapons programs; (c) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, we stress that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons; (d) There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons; (e) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear weapon states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (f) The possible development of new weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermines disarmament commitments; (g) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We remain concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s) and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 57/57, we emphasize the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (h) The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT.). The Movement stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all the nuclear weapon states, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 167 States have signed the Treaty and 98 States have ratified it thus far. NAM reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear weapon states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (i) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear weapon states that has prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, we reiterate our call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. NAM regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfillment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (j) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (k) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (l) The inability of the UNDC to reach a consensus document on “ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament” at its third and last substantive session in 2003. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 15) In this regard, allow us, Mr. Chairman, to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the First Session of the Preparatory Committee as follows: (a) We remain concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons; (b) Despite some progress made in the context of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons are deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various weapons programs; (c) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, we stress that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons; (d) There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons; (e) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear weapon states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (f) The possible development of new weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermines disarmament commitments; (g) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We remain concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s) and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 57/57, we emphasize the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (h) The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT.). The Movement stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all the nuclear weapon states, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 167 States have signed the Treaty and 98 States have ratified it thus far. NAM reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear weapon states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (i) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear weapon states that has prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, we reiterate our call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. NAM regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfillment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (j) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (k) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (l) The inability of the UNDC to reach a consensus document on “ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament” at its third and last substantive session in 2003. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 15) In this regard, allow us, Mr. Chairman, to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the First Session of the Preparatory Committee as follows: (a) We remain concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons; (b) Despite some progress made in the context of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons are deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various weapons programs; (c) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, we stress that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons; (d) There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons; (e) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear weapon states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (f) The possible development of new weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermines disarmament commitments; (g) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We remain concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s) and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 57/57, we emphasize the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (h) The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT.). The Movement stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all the nuclear weapon states, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 167 States have signed the Treaty and 98 States have ratified it thus far. NAM reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear weapon states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (i) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear weapon states that has prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, we reiterate our call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. NAM regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfillment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (j) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (k) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (l) The inability of the UNDC to reach a consensus document on “ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament” at its third and last substantive session in 2003. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 15) In this regard, allow us, Mr. Chairman, to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the First Session of the Preparatory Committee as follows: (a) We remain concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons; (b) Despite some progress made in the context of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons are deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various weapons programs; (c) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, we stress that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons; (d) There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons; (e) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear weapon states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (f) The possible development of new weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermines disarmament commitments; (g) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We remain concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s) and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 57/57, we emphasize the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (h) The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT.). The Movement stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all the nuclear weapon states, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 167 States have signed the Treaty and 98 States have ratified it thus far. NAM reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear weapon states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (i) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear weapon states that has prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, we reiterate our call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. NAM regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfillment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (j) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (k) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (l) The inability of the UNDC to reach a consensus document on “ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament” at its third and last substantive session in 2003. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.19, Para 15) In this regard, allow us, Mr. Chairman, to reflect on some developments of concern to the Movement since the First Session of the Preparatory Committee as follows: (a) We remain concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons; (b) Despite some progress made in the context of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons are deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various weapons programs; (c) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, we stress that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons; (d) There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons; (e) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear weapon states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (f) The possible development of new weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermines disarmament commitments; (g) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We remain concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s) and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 57/57, we emphasize the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (h) The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT.). The Movement stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all the nuclear weapon states, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 167 States have signed the Treaty and 98 States have ratified it thus far. NAM reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear weapon states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; (i) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear weapon states that has prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, we reiterate our call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. NAM regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfillment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (j) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (k) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (l) The inability of the UNDC to reach a consensus document on “ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament” at its third and last substantive session in 2003. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 17) In view of the above, the Movement would like to address some developments since the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee: (a) The Movement remains concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons continue to be deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programs; (b) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, the Movement stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons. The Movement also expresses its concerns that the non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. (c) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear-weapon-states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (d) The possible development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermine disarmament commitments; (e) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Movement remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s), the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/36, the Movement emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (f) The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 171 States have signed the CTBT and 112 States have ratified it thus far. The Movement reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon-states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential. In this regard, the Movement welcomes the recent ratification of CTBT by Afghanistan, Algeria, Belize, Eritrea, Honduras, Kuwait and Oman. However, the Movement remains concerned with the lack of progress in the early entry into force of the CTBT. (g) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon-states that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. The Movement continues to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, the Movement reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The Movement regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (h) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (i) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (j) The inability of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to reach a consensus on substantive agenda items, taking into account decision 52/492, in its 2004 session as mandated by United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/67. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 21) The Movement is also concerned that no progress has been achieved towards the realization of the Millennium Declaration in which Heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular, nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear dangers. The Movement again calls for its convening, at the earliest possible date, with the objective of arriving at an agreement on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, with a specified framework of time to eliminate all nuclear weapons, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 4) The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT emphasize the importance of the full and non-selective implementation of the Treaty in nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this context, the Movement remains fully convinced that the NPT is a key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. All of the States Parties to the NPT should work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities under the Treaty with a view to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Movement underscores that the indefinite extension of the NPT does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon-states of their nuclear weapons arsenals, and considers, in this regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security. The Movement reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Movement reiterates its conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon-states should be pursued as a matter of priority. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 13) The Movement reiterates its long-standing and principled position for the total elimination of all nuclear testing. Reiterating that nuclear tests of any kind, in addition to undermining nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, are in themselves a threat to international peace and security. In this regard, the Movement wishes to stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), including by all the nuclear-weapon-states, which inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Movement emphasizes that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the guarantees given by the nuclear-weapon-states at the time of the conclusion of the CTBT, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. The Movement calls upon all states, pending the entry into effect of the treaty, to refrain from any actions contrary to the objectives and purpose of this international instrument. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 16) The Movement reiterates its call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon-states at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. The Movement expects that this undertaking be demonstrated without delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively toward a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to in 2000. Despite the expectation by the international community that the successful outcome of the 2000 Review Conference would lead to the fulfillment of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon-states as well as the full implementation of the 13 practical steps, very little progress has been made. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 17) In view of the above, the Movement would like to address some developments since the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee: (a) The Movement remains concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons continue to be deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programs; (b) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, the Movement stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons. The Movement also expresses its concerns that the non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. (c) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear-weapon-states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (d) The possible development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermine disarmament commitments; (e) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Movement remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s), the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/36, the Movement emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (f) The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 171 States have signed the CTBT and 112 States have ratified it thus far. The Movement reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon-states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential. In this regard, the Movement welcomes the recent ratification of CTBT by Afghanistan, Algeria, Belize, Eritrea, Honduras, Kuwait and Oman. However, the Movement remains concerned with the lack of progress in the early entry into force of the CTBT. (g) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon-states that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. The Movement continues to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, the Movement reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The Movement regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (h) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (i) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (j) The inability of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to reach a consensus on substantive agenda items, taking into account decision 52/492, in its 2004 session as mandated by United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/67. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 23) To this end, in the Movement’s view, this Session should also substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by states of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, the Movement wishes to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference called for regular reports within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process by all States Parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 C of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”. It is the Movement’s expectation that States Parties to the Treaty, in particular, nuclear-weapon-states, should submit reports to each Session of the Preparatory Committee, including this Session. Furthermore, the reports on Article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 practical steps agreed in the 2000 Review Conference and include specific and complete information on each of these steps. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions as well as developments in these areas. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 24) The Movement believes that the Preparatory Committee sessions should also focus substantially on the Middle East and further recalls that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference calls on all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon-states, the states of the Middle East and other interested states to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the 2005 Review Conference and to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the Conference, on the steps taken to promote the achievement of a NWFZ and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. The Movement expects that all States Parties to the NPT, in particular, the nuclear-weapon-states, should submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 26) The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT further recall that specific time was made available at the 2000 Review Conference and during its preparatory process for the discussion on, and consideration of, proposals on the provisions in Article VI and in paragraphs 3 and 4 C of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” dealing with nuclear disarmament, as well as on the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In this context, the Movement reaffirm the importance of establishing at the 2005 Review Conference a subsidiary body to Main Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. In this regard, the Movement furthermore underlines and emphasizes the need for Preparatory Committee meetings, in particular the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee, to include in its Programme of Work, allocation of specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and security assurances. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 17) In view of the above, the Movement would like to address some developments since the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee: (a)The Movement remains concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons continue to be deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programs; (b) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, the Movement stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons. The Movement also expresses its concerns that the non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference.(c) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear-weapon-states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (d) The possible development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermine disarmament commitments; (e) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Movement remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s), the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/36, the Movement emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (f) The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 171 States have signed the CTBT and 112 States have ratified it thus far. The Movement reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon-states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential. In this regard, the Movement welcomes the recent ratification of CTBT by Afghanistan, Algeria, Belize, Eritrea, Honduras, Kuwait and Oman. However, the Movement remains concerned with the lack of progress in the early entry into force of the CTBT. (g) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon-states that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. The Movement continues to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, the Movement reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The Movement regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (h)The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (i)The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (j) The inability of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to reach a consensus on substantive agenda items, taking into account decision 52/492, in its 2004 session as mandated by United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/67. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 4) The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT emphasize the importance of the full and non-selective implementation of the Treaty in nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this context, the Movement remains fully convinced that the NPT is a key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. All of the States Parties to the NPT should work towards a fair balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities under the Treaty with a view to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Movement underscores that the indefinite extension of the NPT does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon-states of their nuclear weapons arsenals, and considers, in this regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security. The Movement reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Movement reiterates its conviction that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons efforts for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon-states should be pursued as a matter of priority. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 13) The Movement reiterates its long-standing and principled position for the total elimination of all nuclear testing. Reiterating that nuclear tests of any kind, in addition to undermining nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, are in themselves a threat to international peace and security. In this regard, the Movement wishes to stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), including by all the nuclear-weapon-states, which inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Movement emphasizes that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the guarantees given by the nuclear-weapon-states at the time of the conclusion of the CTBT, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. The Movement calls upon all states, pending the entry into effect of the treaty, to refrain from any actions contrary to the objectives and purpose of this international instrument. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 17) In view of the above, the Movement would like to address some developments since the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee: (a) The Movement remains concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons continue to be deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programs; (b) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, the Movement stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons. The Movement also expresses its concerns that the non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. (c) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear-weapon-states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (d) The possible development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermine disarmament commitments; (e) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Movement remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s), the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/36, the Movement emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (f) The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 171 States have signed the CTBT and 112 States have ratified it thus far. The Movement reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon-states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential. In this regard, the Movement welcomes the recent ratification of CTBT by Afghanistan, Algeria, Belize, Eritrea, Honduras, Kuwait and Oman. However, the Movement remains concerned with the lack of progress in the early entry into force of the CTBT. (g) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon-states that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. The Movement continues to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, the Movement reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The Movement regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (h) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (i) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (j) The inability of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to reach a consensus on substantive agenda items, taking into account decision 52/492, in its 2004 session as mandated by United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/67. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 18) These issues of concern to the Movement reflect a deepening crisis in multilateral disarmament diplomacy. The Movement is also deeply concerned about the progressive erosion of multilateralism and emphasizes the importance of collective international efforts to enhance and maintain international peace and security. In this context, the Movement reiterates its support to United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/44 on promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. Strengthening the role of the United Nations in resolving these issues is a collective responsibility. It offers the basis for developing and giving substance to a comprehensive disarmament process at all levels. The Movement recognizes the important role that the United Nations disarmament machinery plays in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Movement reiterates its commitment to adopting measures to strengthen that role. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 26) The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT further recall that specific time was made available at the 2000 Review Conference and during its preparatory process for the discussion on, and consideration of, proposals on the provisions in Article VI and in paragraphs 3 and 4 C of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” dealing with nuclear disarmament, as well as on the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In this context, the Movement reaffirm the importance of establishing at the 2005 Review Conference a subsidiary body to Main Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. In this regard, the Movement furthermore underlines and emphasizes the need for Preparatory Committee meetings, in particular the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee, to include in its Programme of Work, allocation of specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and security assurances. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 13) The Movement reiterates its long-standing and principled position for the total elimination of all nuclear testing. Reiterating that nuclear tests of any kind, in addition to undermining nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, are in themselves a threat to international peace and security. In this regard, the Movement wishes to stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), including by all the nuclear-weapon-states, which inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Movement emphasizes that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the guarantees given by the nuclear-weapon-states at the time of the conclusion of the CTBT, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. The Movement calls upon all states, pending the entry into effect of the treaty, to refrain from any actions contrary to the objectives and purpose of this international instrument. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 17) In view of the above, the Movement would like to address some developments since the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee: (a) The Movement remains concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons continue to be deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programs; (b) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, the Movement stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons. The Movement also expresses its concerns that the non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. (c) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear-weapon-states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (d) The possible development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermine disarmament commitments; (e) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Movement remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s), the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/36, the Movement emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (f) The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 171 States have signed the CTBT and 112 States have ratified it thus far. The Movement reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon-states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential. In this regard, the Movement welcomes the recent ratification of CTBT by Afghanistan, Algeria, Belize, Eritrea, Honduras, Kuwait and Oman. However, the Movement remains concerned with the lack of progress in the early entry into force of the CTBT. (g) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon-states that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. The Movement continues to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, the Movement reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The Movement regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (h) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (i) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (j) The inability of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to reach a consensus on substantive agenda items, taking into account decision 52/492, in its 2004 session as mandated by United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/67. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 2) In these endeavours, the Movement will be guided by the decisions taken at the XIII Conference of Heads of State or Government of NAM that was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia during February 2003 and the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of NAM at the 58th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York in September 2003. It is pertinent to note that the Summit, while addressing the wide-ranging ramifications of nuclear weapons and related issues, affirmed that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the UN Charter, provided the only sustainable method of dealing with the multiplicity of disarmament and international security issues. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 3) The Movement reaffirms its long-standing and principled positions on nuclear disarmament and remains fully committed to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty and the agreements reached at both the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences. In this regard, the Movement wishes to recall its comprehensive working papers submitted during the 2000 Review Conference, the First and Second Sessions of the Preparatory Committee in 2002 and 2003 respectively as contained in documents NPT/CONF.2000/18, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.2, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/WP.14 and NPT/CONF.2005/PCII/WP.19. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 6) The Movement wishes to re-emphasise the urgency and importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities, and resolve to make determined efforts to achieve this goal. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 9) The Movement welcomes the accession of Timor Leste to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Movement notes the decision by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to withdraw from the NPT and expresses the view that the parties directly concerned resolve, through dialogue and negotiations, all issues related to this withdrawal as an expression of their goodwill. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 12) The Movement has also expressed its support for the initiative of convening an international conference of States parties, ratifiers and signatories to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba in order to support the common objectives established in these treaties and to discuss and implement further ways and means of cooperation among themselves, their Treaty agencies and other interested States as soon as possible. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 14) The Movement reaffirms the importance of achieving the universal application of IAEA’s Safeguards system and urges all states which have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible. This has been considered by the 2000 Review Conference, as one main objective, to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. The Movement stresses the importance of IAEA’s Safeguards system, including comprehensive safeguards agreements and also the Model Additional Protocols. In this regard, the Movement welcomes the ratification of the State of Kuwait to the Additional Protocols and the signing of the Protocols by Cuba, Iran, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger, Panama and Togo. However, the Movement does not desire to see international efforts towards achieving universality of comprehensive safeguards to wither away in favour of pursuing additional measures and restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon-states, which are already committed to non-proliferation norms, and which have renounced the nuclear-weapons option. The Movement also expresses its strong rejection of attempts by any member state to use the IAEA’s technical cooperation program as a tool for political purposes in violation of its Statute. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 17) In view of the above, the Movement would like to address some developments since the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee: (a) The Movement remains concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons continue to be deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programs; (b) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, the Movement stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons. The Movement also expresses its concerns that the non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. (c) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear-weapon-states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (d) The possible development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermine disarmament commitments; (e) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Movement remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s), the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/36, the Movement emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (f) The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 171 States have signed the CTBT and 112 States have ratified it thus far. The Movement reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon-states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential. In this regard, the Movement welcomes the recent ratification of CTBT by Afghanistan, Algeria, Belize, Eritrea, Honduras, Kuwait and Oman. However, the Movement remains concerned with the lack of progress in the early entry into force of the CTBT. (g) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon-states that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. The Movement continues to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, the Movement reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The Movement regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (h) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (i) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (j) The inability of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to reach a consensus on substantive agenda items, taking into account decision 52/492, in its 2004 session as mandated by United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/67. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 18) These issues of concern to the Movement reflect a deepening crisis in multilateral disarmament diplomacy. The Movement is also deeply concerned about the progressive erosion of multilateralism and emphasizes the importance of collective international efforts to enhance and maintain international peace and security. In this context, the Movement reiterates its support to United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/44 on promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. Strengthening the role of the United Nations in resolving these issues is a collective responsibility. It offers the basis for developing and giving substance to a comprehensive disarmament process at all levels. The Movement recognizes the important role that the United Nations disarmament machinery plays in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Movement reiterates its commitment to adopting measures to strengthen that role. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 19) The Movement reiterates the importance of addressing the challenges and problems by strictly abiding to the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law and, in this context, the Movement emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 20) The Movement reiterates its support for the convening of the Fourth United Nations Special Session Devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-IV) with the participation of all member states on the basis of the need to review and assess the implementation of the Final Document adopted by SSOD-I, while reaffirming its principles and priorities. The Movement welcomes the decision by the General Assembly to establish an open-ended working group to consider the objectives and agenda including the possibility of establishing the preparatory committee for the Special Session. The Movement contributed actively in the open-ended working group and despite the lack of consensus in the working group, the Movement underlines the need for that issue to be referred back to the General Assembly for its consideration. In this regard, the Movement emphasizes the need to reconvene the open-ended working group on SSOD-IV. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 21) The Movement is also concerned that no progress has been achieved towards the realization of the Millennium Declaration in which Heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular, nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear dangers. The Movement again calls for its convening, at the earliest possible date, with the objective of arriving at an agreement on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, with a specified framework of time to eliminate all nuclear weapons, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 25) The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT also believes that the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee should also substantially focus on security assurances. The 2000 Review Conference “agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon-states to the non-nuclear-weapon-states parties strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime” and “calls on the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue”. In view of the Decision at the 2000 Review Conference that this Preparatory Committee is to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on the issue of security assurances and in view of the NAM Heads of State or Government’s principled position on this issue, the Movement calls for specific time to be allocated in the Programme of Work at this Session of the Preparatory Committee for the consideration of security assurances and for the establishment of a subsidiary body at the 2005 Review Conference for further work to be undertaken. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 26) The Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT further recall that specific time was made available at the 2000 Review Conference and during its preparatory process for the discussion on, and consideration of, proposals on the provisions in Article VI and in paragraphs 3 and 4 C of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” dealing with nuclear disarmament, as well as on the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In this context, the Movement reaffirm the importance of establishing at the 2005 Review Conference a subsidiary body to Main Committee I to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, as well as a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. In this regard, the Movement furthermore underlines and emphasizes the need for Preparatory Committee meetings, in particular the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee, to include in its Programme of Work, allocation of specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and security assurances. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 17) In view of the above, the Movement would like to address some developments since the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee: (a) The Movement remains concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons continue to be deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programs; (b) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, the Movement stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons. The Movement also expresses its concerns that the non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. (c) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear-weapon-states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (d) The possible development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermine disarmament commitments; (e) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Movement remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s), the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/36, the Movement emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (f) The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 171 States have signed the CTBT and 112 States have ratified it thus far. The Movement reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon-states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential. In this regard, the Movement welcomes the recent ratification of CTBT by Afghanistan, Algeria, Belize, Eritrea, Honduras, Kuwait and Oman. However, the Movement remains concerned with the lack of progress in the early entry into force of the CTBT. (g) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon-states that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. The Movement continues to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, the Movement reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The Movement regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (h) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (i) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (j) The inability of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to reach a consensus on substantive agenda items, taking into account decision 52/492, in its 2004 session as mandated by United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/67. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 17) In view of the above, the Movement would like to address some developments since the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee: (a) The Movement remains concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons continue to be deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programs; (b) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, the Movement stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons. The Movement also expresses its concerns that the non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. (c) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear-weapon-states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (d) The possible development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermine disarmament commitments; (e) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Movement remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s), the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/36, the Movement emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (f) The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 171 States have signed the CTBT and 112 States have ratified it thus far. The Movement reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon-states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential. In this regard, the Movement welcomes the recent ratification of CTBT by Afghanistan, Algeria, Belize, Eritrea, Honduras, Kuwait and Oman. However, the Movement remains concerned with the lack of progress in the early entry into force of the CTBT. (g) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon-states that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. The Movement continues to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, the Movement reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The Movement regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (h) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (i) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (j) The inability of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to reach a consensus on substantive agenda items, taking into account decision 52/492, in its 2004 session as mandated by United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/67. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 17) In view of the above, the Movement would like to address some developments since the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee: (a) The Movement remains concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons continue to be deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programs; (b) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, the Movement stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons. The Movement also expresses its concerns that the non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. (c) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear-weapon-states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (d) The possible development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermine disarmament commitments; (e) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Movement remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s), the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/36, the Movement emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (f) The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 171 States have signed the CTBT and 112 States have ratified it thus far. The Movement reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon-states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential. In this regard, the Movement welcomes the recent ratification of CTBT by Afghanistan, Algeria, Belize, Eritrea, Honduras, Kuwait and Oman. However, the Movement remains concerned with the lack of progress in the early entry into force of the CTBT. (g) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon-states that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. The Movement continues to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, the Movement reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The Movement regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (h) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (i) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (j) The inability of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to reach a consensus on substantive agenda items, taking into account decision 52/492, in its 2004 session as mandated by United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/67. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.24, Para 17) In view of the above, the Movement would like to address some developments since the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee: (a) The Movement remains concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions, thousands of these weapons continue to be deployed and their numbers are unconfirmed, given the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programs; (b) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, the Movement stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. There is to date no further evidence of agreed measures to reduce the operational status of these weapons. The Movement also expresses its concerns that the non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. (c) Strategic defense doctrines continue to set out rationales for the use of such weapons, as demonstrated by the recent policy review by one of the nuclear-weapon-states to consider expanding the circumstances under which these weapons could be used and the countries against whom they could be used; (d) The possible development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes further undermine disarmament commitments; (e) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Movement remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s), the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/36, the Movement emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space; (f) The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 171 States have signed the CTBT and 112 States have ratified it thus far. The Movement reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon-states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential. In this regard, the Movement welcomes the recent ratification of CTBT by Afghanistan, Algeria, Belize, Eritrea, Honduras, Kuwait and Oman. However, the Movement remains concerned with the lack of progress in the early entry into force of the CTBT. (g) The continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon-states that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, from establishing an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament. The Movement continues to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In this regard, the Movement reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. The Movement underlines once again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The Movement regrets that no progress has been made in the fulfilment of this obligation despite the lapse of almost seven years. (h) The continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives; (i) The lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination; and (j) The inability of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to reach a consensus on substantive agenda items, taking into account decision 52/492, in its 2004 session as mandated by United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/67. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 1) The States parties to the Treaty emphasize the importance of the full and nonselective implementation of the Treaty in the areas of nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The State parties remain fully convinced that the Treaty is a key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. States parties to the Treaty should work towards a fair balance between mutual obligations and responsibilities under the Treaty, with a view to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 5) The States parties underscore that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals, and consider, in this regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 6) The States parties agree that strict observance of the terms of article I remainscentral to achieving the shared objectivesof preventing, under any circumstances, further proliferation of nuclear weapons and of preserving the Treaty’s vital contribution to peace and security. The States parties recall that the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to transfer to any recipients nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, directly or indirectly, and not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon States to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. The States parties call upon them to adhere to this commitment. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 7) The nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty reaffirm their commitments to the fullest implementation of this article and to refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements, among themselves, with non-nuclear-weapon States and with States not party to the Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 23) The States parties stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all nuclear-weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 24) The States parties reaffirm the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The States parties call upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Pending its entry into force, the States parties call upon the nuclear-weapon States to comply with its letter and spirit and to refrain from any actions that run contrary to the objectives and purposes of this international instrument. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 25) The States parties reiterate that if the objectives of the Treaty are to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament is essential. The States parties express their concern at the recent negative developments with regard to the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 27) The States parties reaffirm the need for nuclear-weapon States to fully comply with all their obligations and commitments under article VI, including the 13 practical steps, to which they agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, with a view to accomplishing the total elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 28) The States parties reaffirm that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. Halting and reversing the nuclear arms race in all its aspects is essential in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the task of achieving nuclear disarmament, all States parties bear responsibility, in particular those nuclear-weapon States possessing the most important nuclear arsenals. The States parties remain alarmed by the threat posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of dangers of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security, as well as for the economic and social advancement of all peoples. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 29) While noting the signing of the Moscow Treaty on 24 May 2002, the States parties stress that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. The States parties express their concern that the non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 32) The States parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under article VI, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 33) The States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 37) The States parties call for the full implementation of the unequivocal commitment given by the nuclear-weapons States at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament. They expect that that commitment will be demonstrated without delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapons-free world, as agreed to in 2000. They regret that, despite the expectation of the international community that the successful outcome of the 2000 Review Conference would lead to the fulfilment of the unequivocal commitment given by the nuclear-weapon States, as well as of the full implementation of the 13 practical steps, very little progress has been made. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 38) The States parties express serious concern that the development of new types of nuclear weapons are being considered by one nuclear-weapons State, and reiterated that the provision for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States is in contravention of the security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapons States. They reiterate that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is in contravention of the commitments provided by the nuclear-weapons States at the conclusion of the CTBT, ensuring that the Treaty would prevent improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 49) The nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their obligations under article I of the Treaty, solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, to Israel, and further undertake not to assist, encourage or induce Israel in any way to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty reiterates its call for a full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. That undertaking should be demonstrated without delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions. The Group is also concerned by the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, whose exact number remains unconfirmed, owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes. While noting the signing of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reduction on 24 May 2002, the Group stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot take the place of irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. The non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. In that regard, the Group calls for the application of the principles of irreversibility and increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States regarding nuclear disarmament and nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons also believes that the possible development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes as well as the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has called for the establishment of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believes that the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by the five nuclear-weapon States, would contribute towards the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore towards the enhancement of international peace and security. The Group also believes that if the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the five nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament, would be essential. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified by the five nuclear-weapon States and the remaining countries in Annex 2. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regrets the fact that one nuclear-weapon State has taken the decision not to proceed with the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification by nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining countries listed in Annex 2 to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, especially the three States with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for the development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the nonproliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining their voluntary moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that moratoriums do not take the place of the signing, ratification and entry into force of the latter. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the guarantee given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision by a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalls that the thirteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries expressed serious concern that the development of new types of nuclear weapons was being considered, and reiterated that the provision for the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States was in contravention of the negative security assurances that had been provided by the nuclear-weapon States. The Group also recalls that the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries also restated that the development of new types of nuclear weapons contravened the assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the safeguards system and proposes that nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute and the IAEA safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19, Para 22) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their obligations under article I of the Treaty, solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not in anyway to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 28) The States parties reaffirm that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankindand to the survival of civilization. Halting and reversing the nuclear arms race in all its aspects is essential in order toavert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the task of achieving nuclear disarmament, all States parties bear responsibility, in particular those nuclear-weapon States possessingthe most important nuclear arsenals. The States parties remainalarmed by the threat posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of dangers of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security, as well as for the economic and social advancement of all peoples. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 30) The States parties remain deeply concerned at strategic defence doctrines that set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons. The States parties are concerned at the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of deployment in outer space, which have, inter alia, contributed to the further erosion of an international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international security. The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 32) The States parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under article VI, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 59/65, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 29) While noting the signing of the Moscow Treaty on 24 May 2002, the States parties stress that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. The States parties express their concern that the non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 30) The States parties remain deeply concerned at strategic defence doctrines that set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons. The States parties are concerned at the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of deployment in outer space, which have, inter alia, contributed to the further erosion of an international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international security. The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions. The Group is also concerned by the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, whose exact number remains unconfirmed, owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes. While noting the signing of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reduction on 24 May 2002, the Group stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot take the place of irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. The non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. In that regard, the Group calls for the application of the principles of irreversibility and increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States regarding nuclear disarmament and nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 59/65, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 1) The States parties to the Treaty emphasize the importance of the full and nonselective implementation of the Treaty in the areas of nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The State parties remain fully convinced that the Treaty is a key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. States parties to the Treaty should work towards a fair balance between mutual obligations and responsibilities under the Treaty, with a view to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 3) The States parties underscore that the Treaty rests on three pillars — nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful nuclear cooperation — and agree that these pillars represent a set of interrelated and mutually reinforcing obligations and rights of State parties. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 5) The States parties underscore that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals, and consider, in this regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 35) The States parties renew their call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.17, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty furthermore calls on the Review Conference to: (a) Consider the further strengthening or enhancement of the review process, including with regard to new institutions of the Treaty; (b) The further strengthening or enhancement of the regular reporting mechanism provided for in accordance with the Final document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; (c) Consider the steps and other actions that could be undertaken to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, with particular reference to the Treaty; (d) Support the recommendation of the third session of the Preparatory Committee regarding the participation of non-governmental organizations. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the Treaty is a key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 5) The Group remains concerned by the continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. In this context, the Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years. The Group is also concerned by attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty as contained in the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, which was endorsed at both the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 2000 Review Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for the development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the nonproliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 20) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 38) The States parties express serious concern that the development of new types of nuclear weapons are being considered by one nuclear-weapons State, and reiterated that the provision for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States is in contravention of the security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapons States. They reiterate that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is in contravention of the commitments provided by the nuclear-weapons States at the conclusion of the CTBT, ensuring that the Treaty would prevent improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 59/65, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons also believes that the possible development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes as well as the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons welcomes the signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by 175 States and its ratification by 120 States. The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons that would pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for the development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the nonproliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the guarantee given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision by a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalls that the thirteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries expressed serious concern that the development of new types of nuclear weapons was being considered, and reiterated that the provision for the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States was in contravention of the negative security assurances that had been provided by the nuclear-weapon States. The Group also recalls that the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries also restated that the development of new types of nuclear weapons contravened the assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 4) The States parties agree that, in order to ensure the effective implementation of the Treaty and of decisions, resolutions and documents adopted at the Review Conference, an open-ended standing committee, which would work intersessionally to follow up recommendations concerning implementation of the Treaty should be established by the 2005 Review Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 9) Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty reaffirm their commitment to the full implementation of this article and to refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements with the nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States and States not party to the Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 26) The States parties note with regret that, despite the conclusion of limited agreements, the provisions of article VI and the ninth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. The States parties stress the need to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament, thus reaffirming their role in achieving that objective. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 32) The States parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under article VI, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 34) The States parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, as soon as possible and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, taking into account all proposals that have been submitted by members of the Group of 21 and the five ambassadors, and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 35) The States parties renew their call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 39) The States parties agree to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee I of the 2005 Review Conference to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 42) The States parties recall that the States parties and signatories to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba that are parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment to promote the common goals envisaged in those Treaties and to explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. The States parties welcome the convening of the international conference of States parties and signatories to the treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in Tlatelolco, Mexico, held from 26 to 28 April 2005. The States parties continue to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as positive steps towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 43) The States parties will continue their endeavours to strengthen the review process of the operation of the Treaty, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty in their entirety are being realized. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 45) The States parties note the decision by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty, and express the view that the parties directly concerned should resolve, through dialogue and negotiations, all issues related to that withdrawal, as an expression of their goodwill. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 51) The States parties reaffirm once again their determination to extend their full cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts, with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear as well as all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 52) The States parties agree that specific time should be made available at meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference to review the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 53) The States parties agree to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2005 Review Conference to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.17, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalls that the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference was mandated and tasked to undertake the following: (a) Consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and decisions 1 and 2, as well as the resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences, including developments affecting the operation and purpose of the Treaty. (Final document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons); (b) At its third and, as appropriate, fourth session, the Preparatory Committee, taking into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference. (Final document of the 2000 Review Conference); (c) The States parties agreed that the procedural arrangements for the Review Conference should be finalized at the last session of the Preparatory Committee. (Final document of the 2000 Review Conference); (d) The Conference agrees that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The Conference calls upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue. (Final document of the 2000 Review Conference); (e) The establishment of such subsidiary bodies would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference in relation to the specific objectives of the Review Conference. (Final document of the 2000 Review Conference and decision 1, “Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty” adopted in 1995) 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.17, Para 2) In the context of the above-mentioned tasks and mandates, the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty calls for: (a) An agreement on item 16 of the provisional agenda of the Review Conference, which would be as follows: “Review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, taking into account the Decisions and the Resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final documents of the 1975, 1985 and 2000 Review Conferences”; (b) An agreement on the establishment of subsidiary bodies, in accordance with rule 34 of the draft rules of procedure for the 2005 Review Conference, to consider, respectively, issues related to nuclear disarmament, security assurances and regional issues, with particular reference to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.17, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty furthermore calls on the Review Conference to: (a) Consider the further strengthening or enhancement of the review process, including with regard to new institutions of the Treaty; (b) The further strengthening or enhancement of the regular reporting mechanism provided for in accordance with the Final document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; (c) Consider the steps and other actions that could be undertaken to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, with particular reference to the Treaty; (d) Support the recommendation of the third session of the Preparatory Committee regarding the participation of non-governmental organizations. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should commence without delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has called for the establishment of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 19) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalls that the thirteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries expressed serious concern that the development of new types of nuclear weapons was being considered, and reiterated that the provision for the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States was in contravention of the negative security assurances that had been provided by the nuclear-weapon States. The Group also recalls that the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries also restated that the development of new types of nuclear weapons contravened the assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 23) In keeping with the above-mentioned position and in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has called for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to be undertaken to consider legally binding security assurances by nuclear-weapon States. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty has also expressed its support for the initiative of convening an international conference of States parties and signatories of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba in order to support the common objectives established in those treaties and to discuss and implement further ways and means of cooperation among themselves, their Treaty agencies and other interested States as soon as possible. In this context, the Group welcomes the outcome of the Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, which was held in Mexico City from 26 to 28 April 2005. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the ratification by Kuwait and Cuba of the Additional Protocols and the signing of the Protocols by Iran (Islamic Republic of), the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, the Niger, Panama and Togo. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19, Para 23) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the seventh preambular paragraph and article IV of the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to exclusively prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. The States Parties express their serious concern over the continuing development whereby Israeli scientists are provided access to the nuclear facilities of one nuclear-weapon State. This development will have potentially serious negative implications on security in the region as well as the reliability of the global non-proliferation regime. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19, Para 24) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms once again the determination of the Parties to extend their fullest cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear as well as all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19, Para 25) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty agrees that specific time should be made available at Preparatory Committee meetings of the 2010 Review Conference to review the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19, Para 26) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty agrees to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2005 Review Conference to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19, Para 27) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a Standing Committee composed of members of the Bureau of the 2005 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally the implementation of the recommendations concerning the Middle East, in particular Israel’s prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, and report to the 2010 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 34) The States parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, as soon as possible and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, taking into account all proposals that have been submitted by members of the Group of 21 and the five ambassadors, and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should commence without delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 35) The States parties renew their call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 5) The Group remains concerned by the continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. In this context, the Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years. The Group is also concerned by attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty as contained in the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, which was endorsed at both the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 2000 Review Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty commends IAEA for the extensive verification activities it has undertaken since its inception and expresses full support for its ongoing efforts. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.19, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the safeguards system and proposes that nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute and the IAEA safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 33) The States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.8, Para 30) The States parties remain deeply concerned at strategic defence doctrines that set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons. The States parties are concerned at the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of deployment in outer space, which have, inter alia, contributed to the further erosion of an international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international security. The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. 

(NPT/CONF.2005/WP.18, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 59/65, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.5, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty commends IAEA for the extensive verification activities it has undertaken since its inception and expresses full support for its ongoing efforts. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.5, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls on all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group proposes that nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its Statute and the IAEA safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States non-parties to the Treaty without exception. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8, Para 5) The Group remains concerned by the continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. In this context, the Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years. The Group is also concerned by attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty as contained in the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, which was endorsed at both the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 2000 Review Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.9, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that one of the most significant factors in facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT is the ratification of the treaty by the nuclear-weapon States, as they bear a special responsibility in this regard. Positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification by nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining countries listed in Annex 2 to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, especially the three States with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and by not supporting the preparatory commission of the CTBTO through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty’s verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.5, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls on all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group proposes that nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its Statute and the IAEA safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States non-parties to the Treaty without exception. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.5, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their obligations under article I of the Treaty, solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not in any way to assist, encourage or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty reiterates its call for a full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. That undertaking should be demonstrated without delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions. The Group is also concerned by the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, whose exact number remains unconfirmed, owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes. While noting the signing of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reduction on 24 May 2002, the Group stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot take the place of irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. The non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. In that regard, the Group calls for the application of the principles of irreversibility and increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States regarding nuclear disarmament and nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons also believes that the possible development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes as well as the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has called for the establishment of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.9, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stresses that the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by the five nuclear-weapon States, would inter alia, contribute towards the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore towards the enhancement of international peace and security. The Group also believes that if the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the five nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament, would be essential. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.9, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified by the five nuclear-weapon States and the remaining countries in Annex 2. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.9, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that one of the most significant factors in facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT is the ratification of the treaty by the nuclear-weapon States, as they bear a special responsibility in this regard. Positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification by nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining countries listed in Annex 2 to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, especially the three States with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and by not supporting the preparatory commission of the CTBTO through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty’s verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.9, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for the development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.9, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining their voluntary moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that moratoriums do not take the place of the signing, ratification and entry into force of the latter. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.9, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the guarantee given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision by a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.10, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalls that the fourteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries reiterated that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the United States Nuclear Posture Review contravene the security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States. They further reaffirmed that these improvements as well as the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weaponsemphasizes that the Treaty is a key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8, Para 5) The Group remains concerned by the continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to resume its negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. In this context, the Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years. The Group is also concerned by attempts to limit the scope of the negotiations on a fissile material treaty as contained in the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, which was endorsed at both the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 2000 Review Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.9, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for the development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.10, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.7, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty demands on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards according to Security Council resolution 487 (1981), and to conduct its nuclear-related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime. It expresses great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel, which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States, and condemns Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. The Group reaffirms that stability cannot be achieved in a region where massive imbalances in military capabilities are maintained, particularly through the possession of nuclear weapons, which allow one party to threaten its neighbours, and the region. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 61/58, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons also believes that the possible development of new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes as well as the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.9, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons welcomes the signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by 177 States and its ratification by 138 States. The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the Treaty, which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions, and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons that would pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.9, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for the development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.9, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the guarantee given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision by a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.10, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalls that the fourteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries reiterated that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the United States Nuclear Posture Review contravene the security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States. They further reaffirmed that these improvements as well as the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.7, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty, in conformity with the seventh preambular paragraph and article IV of the Treaty, hereby declares its commitment to exclusively prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.7, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms once again the determination of the Parties to extend their fullest cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.7, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty requests that specific time be made available at Preparatory Committee meetings of the 2010 Review Conference to review the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.7, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty requests the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2010 Review Conference to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.7, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for the establishment of a Standing Committee composed of members of the Bureau of the 2010 Review Conference to follow up intersessionally the implementation of the recommendations concerning the Middle East, in particular Israel’s prompt accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, and report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should commence without delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has called for the establishment of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament to focus on the issue of fulfilment of the obligations under article VI. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.10, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalls that the fourteenth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries reiterated that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the United States Nuclear Posture Review contravene the security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States. They further reaffirmed that these improvements as well as the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.10, Para 6) In keeping with the above-mentioned position and in accordance with the decision at the 2000 Review Conference, the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work to be undertaken to consider legally binding security assurances by nuclear-weapon States. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.11, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty notes with satisfaction the convening of the First Conference of the States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, held in Tlatelolco, Mexico, from 26 to 28 April 2005, and in this context, calls on the States parties and signatories to the Treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones to implement further ways and means of cooperation among themselves, their treaty agencies and other interested States. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.12, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty welcomes the ratification by Afghanistan, Haiti, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Turkmenistan and Uganda of the Additional Protocols and the signing of the Protocols by Belarus, Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Malaysia, Senegal, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia and Viet Nam. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should commence without delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible, and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 61/58, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty remainsdeeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons despite some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions. The Group is also concerned by the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, whose exact number remainsunconfirmed, owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes. While noting the signing of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reduction on 24 May 2002, the Group stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot take the place of irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. The non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference.In that regard, the Group calls for the application of the principles of irreversibility and increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States regardingnuclear disarmament and nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 61/58, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believes that the abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 61/58, the Group emphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention. It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 3) The Non-Aligned Movement proposes a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame that includes the following concrete steps and measures, as a basis for consideration by the Review Conference. The list of measures in each phase is indicative rather than exhaustive, and the order in which they are mentioned does not necessarily reflect their priority. Nevertheless, it should be understood that, in any nuclear disarmament programme, all steps and measures are inextricably linked. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of: (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 5) Full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those agreed at the 2000 Review Conference; acceleration of the negotiation process, in accordance with article VI, and implementation of the 13 practical steps. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 6) Conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START) 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 7) Moratorium on the production of fissile materials, pending conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 8) Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 9) Formal declaration of the decade 2010-2020 as the “Decade for nuclear disarmament” and realization of its objectives. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 10) Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the: (a) Separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; (b) Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads; (c) Transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to “peaceful purposes”. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 11) Preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 12) Progressive and balanced reduction of missiles intended for carrying nuclear warheads. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 13) Recommendation by the 2020 Review Conference to declare 2020 as the “Decade for the total elimination of nuclear weapons”. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention. It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 3) The Non-Aligned Movement proposes a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame that includes the following concrete steps and measures, as a basis for consideration by the Review Conference. The list of measures in each phase is indicative rather than exhaustive, and the order in which they are mentioned does not necessarily reflect their priority. Nevertheless, it should be understood that, in any nuclear disarmament programme, all steps and measures are inextricably linked. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of: (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 5) Full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those agreed at the 2000 Review Conference; acceleration of the negotiation process, in accordance with article VI, and implementation of the 13 practical steps. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 6) Conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START) 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 7) Moratorium on the production of fissile materials, pending conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 8) Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 9) Formal declaration of the decade 2010-2020 as the “Decade for nuclear disarmament” and realization of its objectives. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 10) Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the: (a) Separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; (b) Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads; (c) Transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to “peaceful purposes”. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 11) Preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 12) Progressive and balanced reduction of missiles intended for carrying nuclear warheads. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 13) Recommendation by the 2020 Review Conference to declare 2020 as the “Decade for the total elimination of nuclear weapons”. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention. It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of: (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 10) Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the: (a) Separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; (b) Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads; (c) Transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to “peaceful purposes”. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 3) The Non-Aligned Movement proposes a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame that includes the following concrete steps and measures, as a basis for consideration by the Review Conference. The list of measures in each phase is indicative rather than exhaustive, and the order in which they are mentioned does not necessarily reflect their priority. Nevertheless, it should be understood that, in any nuclear disarmament programme, all steps and measures are inextricably linked. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of: (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 5) Full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those agreed at the 2000 Review Conference; acceleration of the negotiation process, in accordance with article VI, and implementation of the 13 practical steps. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 6) Conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START) 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 7) Moratorium on the production of fissile materials, pending conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 8) Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 9) Formal declaration of the decade 2010-2020 as the “Decade for nuclear disarmament” and realization of its objectives. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 10) Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the: (a) Separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; (b) Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads; (c) Transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to “peaceful purposes”. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 11) Preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 12) Progressive and balanced reduction of missiles intended for carrying nuclear warheads. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 13) Recommendation by the 2020 Review Conference to declare 2020 as the “Decade for the total elimination of nuclear weapons”. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 8) Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 10) Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the: (a) Separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; (b) Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads; (c) Transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to “peaceful purposes”. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 1) Although there have been some positive signals and developments in the area of nuclear disarmament, the world is still faced with unresolved challenges. The recent statements by some nuclear-weapon States about their intention to pursue actions in achieving a world free of nuclear weapons are positive. However, urgent and concrete actions by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their multilaterally agreed commitments to achieve general and complete disarmament remain essential. Unless the role of nuclear weapons in the context of security is delegitimized and existing nuclear doctrines are abandoned, there will always be a threat of a nuclear arms race and an escalation of nuclear threats. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 1) Although there have been some positive signals and developments in the area of nuclear disarmament, the world is still faced with unresolved challenges. The recent statements by some nuclear-weapon States about their intention to pursue actions in achieving a world free of nuclear weapons are positive. However, urgent and concrete actions by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with their multilaterally agreed commitments to achieve general and complete disarmament remain essential. Unless the role of nuclear weapons in the context of security is delegitimized and existing nuclear doctrines are abandoned, there will always be a threat of a nuclear arms race and an escalation of nuclear threats. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention. It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 5) Full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those agreed at the 2000 Review Conference; acceleration of the negotiation process, in accordance with article VI, and implementation of the 13 practical steps. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of: (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 6) Conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START) 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention. It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 12) Progressive and balanced reduction of missiles intended for carrying nuclear warheads. 

(NPT/CONF.2010/WP.47, Para 4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of: (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 11) The Group expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should begin without further delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, and recalls action 6 of the action plan, in which all States agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 29) The Group notes with concern the lack of agreement on a number of its key priorities, including beginning negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, and expresses its determination to continue collective efforts in pursuing the realization of those priorities in the 2015 review process of the Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A2) To achieve the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States need to implement the unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000. The 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI should be fully implemented in accordance with the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility. The nuclear-weapon States should be urged to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of their nuclear weapons within a specified time framework, including a nuclear weapons convention. It should also be recalled that there is a unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A3) The Non-Aligned Movement proposes a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame that includes the following concrete steps and measures, as a basis for consideration by the Review Conference. The list of measures in each phase is indicative rather than exhaustive, and the order in which they are mentioned does not necessarily reflect their priority. Nevertheless, it should be understood that, in any nuclear disarmament programme, all steps and measures are inextricably linked. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of: (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A5) Full implementation by the nuclear-weapon States of their disarmament obligations and commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including those agreed at the 2000 Review Conference; acceleration of the negotiation process, in accordance with article VI, and implementation of the 13 practical steps. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A6) Conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START). 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A7) Moratorium on the production of fissile materials, pending conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A8) Placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A9) Formal declaration of the decade 2010-2020 as the “Decade for nuclear disarmament” and realization of its objectives. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A10) Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the: (a) Separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; (b) Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads; (c) Transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to “peaceful purposes”. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A11) Preparation, under international auspices, of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A12) Progressive and balanced reduction of missiles intended for carrying nuclear warheads. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A13) Recommendation by the 2020 Review Conference to declare 2020 as the “Decade for the total elimination of nuclear weapons”. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A14) Full implementation of the treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and of its verification regime through the: (a) Elimination of all nuclear weapons; (b) Conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes”; (c) Placement of nuclear facilities under safeguards, on a universal basis. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 2) While underlining the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly calls for immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear-weapon test sites. In this regard, the Group is of the firm view that all States parties that have not yet done so shall close and dismantle, as soon as feasible and in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear-test explosions and their associated infrastructure, and prohibit completely nuclear weapons research and development, and also refrain from conducting nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, nuclear-weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, which would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification of this Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and by not supporting the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty’s verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group proposes that the nuclear-weapon States undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency’s capability to verify nuclear disarmament agreements. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls on all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency’s capability to verify nuclear disarmament agreements. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly believes that, in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, those States shall undertake further efforts to verifiably reduce and eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group supports furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide nuclear disarmament and the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives devices. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), which, by its action 16, stipulates that the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to IAEA all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls on the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls action 17, which stipulates that, in the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes. The Group urges the Conference to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means to make them operational, in the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 13) The Group remains concerned by the continued inability of the Conference to resume its negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, including all practical measures to eliminate in an irreversible manner the past production and existing stockpiles of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. In this context, the Conference is urged to agree on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 17) The Group also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status are no substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons, and accordingly calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to such cuts and to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States under action 4 of the action plan to the full implementation of New START and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A10) Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including such measures as the: (a) Separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; (b) Placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads; (c) Transfer of nuclear materials, including fissile materials and delivery vehicles, to “peaceful purposes”. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A14) Full implementation of the treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons and of its verification regime through the: (a) Elimination of all nuclear weapons; (b) Conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes”; (c) Placement of nuclear facilities under safeguards, on a universal basis. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 3) In the context of the above-mentioned tasks and mandates, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for: (a) An agreement on the provisional agenda of the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference, which would include “Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII (3) of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference”, as well as the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty; (b) Recalling that the 2000 Final Document states clearly that “each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences”, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that this Preparatory Committee should deal with all the procedural issues necessary to take its work forward as well as with matters of substance as was decided at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Conferences; (c) To this end, the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty wishes to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I-IV)) called for regular reports within the framework of the Treaty’s strengthened review process by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. The Group recalls the stipulation of section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that: “The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to report the undertakings [under that section] to the Preparatory Committee at 2014 (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI.” In this connection, the Group expects that the States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should submit reports to each Preparatory Committee session, including this one, unless otherwise decided by the Review Conference. In the view of the Group, the reports on article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 practical steps and undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps and follow-on actions. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas; (d) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also believes that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and the full opportunity for all speakers to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 Review Conference, in its Final Document, requested all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, as well as the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group expects that all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document; (e) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the stipulation of the 2010 Review Conference that “The Conference reaffirms that all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the States in the region, should continue to report on steps taken to implement the 1995 Resolution, through the United Nations Secretariat, to the President of the 2015 Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference” and that “The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings”. The Group accordingly emphasizes the importance of and calls for submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, to the current and upcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference. The Group wishes to refer to its working paper on the topic “Regional issues: Middle East” which stipulates its substantive position in this regard; (f) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for an agreement to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the 2015 Review Conference to deliberate on issues related to nuclear disarmament, in particular the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as the undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; on the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the practical steps on the Middle East, in particular implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; and a legally binding international instrument on unconditional security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group emphasizes the need for the Preparatory Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and security assurances; (g) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty furthermore calls on the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference to: (a) Consider the further strengthening or enhancement of the review process of the Treaty; (b) Further strengthen or enhance the regular reporting mechanism provided for in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; (c) Consider the steps and other actions that could be taken to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, with particular reference to the Treaty; (d) Support participation of non-governmental organizations in the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference meetings. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls that, in successive conferences of heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries and the ministerial conferences of the Non-Aligned Movement, it has been reiterated that improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient unilateral statements made by each of the nuclear-weapon States. They have further reaffirmed that these improvements and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the only way to rid the world of the threat or use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. In this regard, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and, therefore, cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and thereby constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group expresses grave concern at the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and refrain from any other action that would defeat the object, and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament, would be essential. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Group is of the firm belief that the early achievement of the goal of the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, through accession of the only non-parties to this instrument, would be essential to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification of this Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and by not supporting the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty’s verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear-test explosions for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining their voluntary moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that moratoriums do not take the place of the signing, ratification and entry into force of the Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.26, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls on all States not parties to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group proposes that the nuclear-weapon States undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not parties to the Treaty, without exception. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls on all nuclear-weapon States and all States not parties to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. The Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as the prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly believes that, in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, those States shall undertake further efforts to verifiably reduce and eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group supports furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide nuclear disarmament and the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives devices. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), which, by its action 16, stipulates that the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to IAEA all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes. The Group calls on the Conference to conduct an in-depth evaluation of the fulfilment of these commitments through the establishment of a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the action, which should be made mandatory for the nuclear-weapon States. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 13) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty further recalls action 17, which stipulates that, in the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes. The Group urges the Conference to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means to make them operational, in the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 1) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that the Treaty recognizes the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, which the Group considers to be a contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Group is, however, of the firm belief that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for the legal obligations of and unequivocal undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.28, Para 5) The Group reiterates that, in the context of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, it is essential that the nuclear-weapon States provide unconditional, non-discriminatory and specific legal assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zone concerned. In this regard, the Group strongly calls for the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that are incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties. The Group further calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations with a view to achieving the objectives of the treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and their protocols. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 6) The Group reiterates its strong call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, which was also reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference. That undertaking should be demonstrated without further delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and the full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, and in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, which reaffirmed the continued validity of that undertaking. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 7) The Group recalls that, in pursuit of the full, effective and urgent implementation of article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and building upon the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the 2010 Review Conference agreed on an action plan on nuclear disarmament that includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls for the prompt and full implementation of that action plan. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 8) The Group recalls that, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States have committed themselves to undertaking further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group calls for full compliance by the nuclear-weapon States with such undertakings. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 9) In this connection, the Group emphasizes in particular the prime importance of and the urgent need for full and prompt implementation of the commitments by the nuclear-weapon States under action 5 of the action plan. In this context, the Group further recalls that the nuclear-weapon States committed themselves to accelerating concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, inter alia, by: (a) rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons; (b) addressing the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process; (c) further diminishing the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (d) discussing policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons; (e) considering the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security; (f) reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and (g) further enhancing transparency and increasing mutual confidence. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 10) Moreover, the Group calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to submit comprehensive substantive reports about their undertakings under action 5 of the action plan to the Preparatory Committee in 2014, in order to enable the 2015 Review Conference to take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 11) The Group expresses deep concern at the continued lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament, which could undermine the object and purpose of the Treaty. The Group also deeply regrets the continued inflexible postures of some nuclear-weapon States that have prevented the Conference on Disarmament from establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention, is necessary and should begin without further delay. In that regard, the Group reiterates its call to establish, as soon as possible and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, and recalls action 6 of the action plan, in which all States agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 15) The Group remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions notwithstanding. Any such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. To comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, and with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and the 2010 action plan, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities. The Group is also concerned by the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, the exact number of which remains unconfirmed owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 16) In this connection, the Group, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), confirms the validity of its position delivered at the time of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 65/61 on bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations. The Group further expresses concern that domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of this treaty undermine the minimal reductions agreed upon therein. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 17) The Group also stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status are no substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons, and accordingly calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to such cuts and to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, thus contributing to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations and facilitating the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons at the earliest date. The Group also recalls the commitment by the Russian Federation and the United States under action 4 of the action plan to the full implementation of New START and strongly urges them to adopt all required measures to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals in realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 19) The Group also believes that the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons and new targeting options to serve aggressive counter-proliferation purposes and the lack of progress in diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies further undermine disarmament commitments. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 20) The Group underlines the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty strongly believes that, in implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, those States shall undertake further efforts to verifiably reduce and eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, as well as their nuclear weapon-related materials, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group supports furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide nuclear disarmament and the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives devices. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.27, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 8) The Group recalls that, in implementing their unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States have committed themselves to undertaking further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures. In this regard, the Group calls for full compliance by the nuclear-weapon States with such undertakings. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 15) The Group remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons, some reports of bilateral and unilateral reductions notwithstanding. Any such reductions are undermined by the modernization of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and related infrastructure by the nuclear-weapon States. To comply with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, and with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and the 2010 action plan, the nuclear-weapon States must immediately cease their plans to further invest in modernizing, upgrading, refurbishing or extending the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities. The Group is also concerned by the existence and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, the exact number of which remains unconfirmed owing to the lack of transparency in various nuclear weapons programmes. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 16) In this connection, the Group, while noting the conclusion and entry into force of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), confirms the validity of its position delivered at the time of the adoption of General Assembly resolution 65/61 on bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations. The Group further expresses concern that domestic commitments to nuclear weapon modernization in exchange for ratification of this treaty undermine the minimal reductions agreed upon therein. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para 18) The Group believes that the abrogation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems has brought new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group remains concerned that the deployment of national and strategic missile defence systems could trigger an arms race or arms races, the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/27, the Group emphasizes the urgent need to begin substantive work, at the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of: (a) A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the negotiations being conducted on the basis of the Shannon mandate, as endorsed at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference; (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: (i) the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites; (ii) measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems, including the prohibition of nuclear weapon research and development; (c) Review by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear postures in order to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies; (d) A multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument that is universal and unconditional, to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (e) A convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; (f) An international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame, including, in particular, a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons convention); (g) Full implementation of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Central Asia and of Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, including signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States and other States, of relevant protocols to those Treaties, and the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones; (h) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, in order to fully realize its goals and objectives; (i) Clear and verifiable declarations by States of their stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable material and agreement on a multilateral mechanism to monitor reductions by nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals individually, bilaterally or collectively; (j) Reduction of the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.36, Para A6) Conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START). 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.22, Para 3) In the context of the above-mentioned tasks and mandates, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty calls for: (a) An agreement on the provisional agenda of the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference, which would include “Preparatory work for the review of the operation of the Treaty in accordance with article VIII (3) of the Treaty, in particular, consideration of principles, objectives and ways to promote the full implementation of the Treaty, as well as its universality, including specific matters of substance related to the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference”, as well as the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty; (b) Recalling that the 2000 Final Document states clearly that “each session of the Preparatory Committee should consider specific matters of substance relating to the implementation of the Treaty and the Decisions 1 and 2, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995, and the outcomes of subsequent Review Conferences”, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that this Preparatory Committee should deal with all the procedural issues necessary to take its work forward as well as with matters of substance as was decided at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Conferences; (c) To this end, the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in the reports by the States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty wishes to recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I-IV)) called for regular reports within the framework of the Treaty’s strengthened review process by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. The Group recalls the stipulation of section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that: “The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to report the undertakings [under that section] to the Preparatory Committee at 2014 (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). The 2015 Review Conference will take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI.” In this connection, the Group expects that the States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, should submit reports to each Preparatory Committee session, including this one, unless otherwise decided by the Review Conference. In the view of the Group, the reports on article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 practical steps and undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference and should include specific and complete information on each of these steps and follow-on actions. These reports should also address, inter alia, current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas; (d) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also believes that the Preparatory Committee should substantially focus on the Middle East by devoting sufficient time within the indicative timetable and the full opportunity for all speakers to thereby engage in a substantive debate. The Group further recalls that the 2000 Review Conference, in its Final Document, requested all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, as well as the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of the Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of such zone and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. The Group expects that all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would submit reports in this regard as agreed in the 2000 Final Document; (e) Moreover, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the stipulation of the 2010 Review Conference that “The Conference reaffirms that all States Parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the States in the region, should continue to report on steps taken to implement the 1995 Resolution, through the United Nations Secretariat, to the President of the 2015 Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference” and that “The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings”. The Group accordingly emphasizes the importance of and calls for submitting required reports by all States parties to the Treaty, in particular the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, as well as the facilitator of the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, to the current and upcoming meetings of the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference. The Group wishes to refer to its working paper on the topic “Regional issues: Middle East” which stipulates its substantive position in this regard; (f) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also calls for an agreement to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the 2015 Review Conference to deliberate on issues related to nuclear disarmament, in particular the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as the undertakings under section B on “Disarmament of nuclear weapons”, in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; on the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the practical steps on the Middle East, in particular implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, contained in the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the 2010 Review Conference; and a legally binding international instrument on unconditional security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group emphasizes the need for the Preparatory Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and security assurances; (g) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty furthermore calls on the Preparatory Committee and the 2015 Review Conference to: (a) Consider the further strengthening or enhancement of the review process of the Treaty; (b) Further strengthen or enhance the regular reporting mechanism provided for in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference; (c) Consider the steps and other actions that could be taken to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education, with particular reference to the Treaty; (d) Support participation of non-governmental organizations in the Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference meetings. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.23, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and considers, in that regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.24, Para 21) In this regard, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the strong call by the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty that all States parties shall ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated particularly in its articles I, II and III, and with the decision on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty. 

(NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.25, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Group is of the firm belief that the early achievement of the goal of the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, through accession of the only non-parties to this instrument, would be essential to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.