1985 Third Review Conference of the NPT

Testing if this can be fixed.

1990 Fourth Review Conference of the NPT

• (Page 1, Para 3) Mindful also of the tenth preambular paragraph of the Treaty wherein the Parties recalled "the determination expressed by the Parties of the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end”,
• (Page 2, Point 4) Calls upon the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United- States of America to redouble their efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and to proceed to adopt the following concrete steps to enhance the possibility of a significant extension of the Treaty [on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] beyond 1995: a) to institute, as a provisional measure pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, an immediate moratorium on all nuclear testing;
• (Page 2, Point 4) Calls upon the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United- States of America to redouble their efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and to proceed to adopt the following concrete steps to enhance the possibility of a significant extension of the Treaty beyond 1995: … b) to support fully the Partial Test Ban Amendment Conference and to commit themselves at that Conference to pursue negotiations in good faith with a view to achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty prior to 1995, as an indispensable step towards implementing their obligations under Article VI of the Non-proliferation Treaty
• (Page 2, Point 4) Calls upon the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United- States of America to redouble their efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament and to proceed to adopt the following concrete steps to enhance the possibility of a significant extension of the Treaty beyond 1995: … c) to agree to a complete freeze on the testing, production and deployment of all nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles and to commence negotiations for such purposes early in 1991;

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT

• (Page 2, Para 9) The Conference recalls the annual appeals made in United Nations General Assembly resolutions since 1981 calling for a moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In this respect, the Conference notes the moratorium assumed by the four nuclear-weapon States and urges all the nuclear-weapon States to observe it.

1997 First Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2000 NPT Review Conference

No views on "Nuclear Testing" during this meeting

1998 Second Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2000 NPT Review Conference

• (Page 4, Art. V, Para 18) The States Parties call upon the nuclear-weapon states to refrain from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the objectives of the CTBT. They also call upon nuclear-weapon states to provide transparency on-site and other measures to build confidence on the full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty in order to meet international concern.
• (Page 4, Art. V, Para 19) The States Parties call upon all of the States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the States Parties called upon the nuclear-weapon states to comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT.

1999 Third Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2000 NPT Review Conference

• (Page 5, Art. 5, Para 20) The States Parties call upon the nuclear-weapon states to refrain from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the objectives of the CTBT. They also call upon nuclear-weapon states to provide transparency on-site and other measures to build confidence on the full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty in order to meet international concern.
• (Page 5, Art. 5, Para 21) The States Parties call upon all of the States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the States Parties call upon the nuclear-weapon states to comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT.

2000 Sixth Review Conference of the NPT

• (Page 5, Art. 5, Para 20) The States Parties call upon the Nuclear Weapon States to refrain from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the objectives of the CTBT.  They also call upon Nuclear Weapon States to provide transparency on-site and other measures to build confidence on the full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty in order to meet international concern.
• (Page 5, Art. 5, Para 21) The States Parties stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT including by all the Nuclear Weapon States which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament.
• (Page 5, Art. 5, Para 22) The States Parties call upon all of the States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT.  Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the States Parties call upon the Nuclear Weapon States to comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT.

2002 First Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2005 NPT Review Conference

• (Page 3) [The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] …wish to stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the Nuclear Weapon States which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. We note that 165 States have signed the Treaty and 90 States have ratified it thus far.
• (Page 5) The lack of progress in the entry into force of the CTBT.  In this regard, we call upon all States, in particular the Nuclear Weapon States, whose ratification is a prerequisite for the entry into force of the CTBT, to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of the Treaty.  We reiterate our belief that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential;

2003 Second Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2005 NPT Review Conference

• (Page 3, Para 10) … [the Non-Aligned Movement] reiterate[s] our long-standing and principled position for the total elimination of all nuclear testing and, in this regard, wish to stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear weapon states, which inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament.
• (Page 4, Para 15) In this regard, allow us, Mr. Chairman, to reflect on some developments of concern to the [Non-Aligned] Movement since the First Session of the Preparatory Committee as follows: The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT.). The Movement stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all the nuclear weapon states, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Movement expresses its satisfaction that 167 States have signed the Treaty and 98 States have ratified it thus far. NAM reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear weapon states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential; ...

2004 Third Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2005 NPT Review Conference

• (Page 4, Para 13) The [Non-Aligned] Movement reiterates its long-standing and principled position for the total elimination of all nuclear testing.  Reiterating that nuclear tests of any kind, in addition to undermining nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects, are in themselves a threat to international peace and security.  In this regard, the Movement wishes to stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), including by all the nuclear-weapon-states, which inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament.  The Movement emphasizes that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the guarantees given by the nuclear-weapon-states at the time of the conclusion of the CTBT, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons.  The Movement calls upon all states, pending the entry into effect of the treaty, to refrain from any actions contrary to the objectives and purpose of this international instrument.
•  (Page 6, Para 17) The [Non-Aligned] Movement expresses its satisfaction that 171 States have signed the CTBT and 112 States have ratified it thus far.  The Movement reaffirms that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon-states, to nuclear disarmament would be essential. In this regard, the Movement welcomes the recent ratification of CTBT by Afghanistan, Algeria, Belize, Eritrea, Honduras, Kuwait and Oman. However, the Movement remains concerned with the lack of progress in the early entry into force of the CTBT.

2005 Seventh Review Conference of the NPT

• (Page 6, Art. 5, Para 22) The [Non-Aligned Movement] States parties [to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] call upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from conducting all types of tests, in conformity with the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. They also call upon nuclear-weapon States to provide transparency on site and other confidence-building measures in the full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty in order to meet international concerns.
• (Page 8, Art. 6, Para 38) The States parties reiterate that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is in contravention of the commitments provided by the nuclear‑weapons States at the conclusion of the CTBT, ensuring that the Treaty would prevent improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons.

• (Page 3, Para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believes that the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by the five nuclear-weapon States, would contribute towards the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore towards the enhancement of international peace and security. The Group also believes that if the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the five nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament, would be essential.
• (Page 3, Para 14) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty regrets the fact that one nuclear-weapon State has taken the decision not to proceed with the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
• (Page 4, Para 15) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty  recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for the development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.
• (Page 4, Para 16) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining their voluntary moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that moratoriums do not take the place of the signing, ratification and entry into force of the latter.
• (Page 4, Para 17) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the guarantee given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision by a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern…

2007 First Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2010 NPT Review Conference

• (Page 1, Para 2) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stresses that the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by the five nuclear-weapon States, would inter alia, contribute towards the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore towards the enhancement of international peace and security. The Group also believes that if the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the five nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament, would be essential.
• (Page 1, Para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified by the five nuclear-weapon States and the remaining countries in Annex 2.
• (Page 2, Para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms that one of the most significant factors in facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT is the ratification of the treaty by the nuclear-weapon States, as they bear a special responsibility in this regard. Positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification by nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining countries listed in Annex 2 to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, especially the three States with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and by not supporting the preparatory commission of the CTBTO through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty’s verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.
• (Page 2, Para 5) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear test explosions for the development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.
• (Page 2, Para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining their voluntary moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that moratoriums do not take the place of the signing, ratification and entry into force of the latter.
• (Page 2, Para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasizes that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the guarantee given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision by a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern.

2008 Second Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2010 NPT Review Conference

No views on "Nuclear Testing" during this meeting

2009 Third Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2010 NPT Review Conference

• (Page 3, Rec. 11) To realize the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the commitment to nuclear disarmament of all States signatories, especially the five nuclear-weapon States, is essential. The five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in making the test ban a reality.
• (Page 7, Rec. 37) To stress the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, requiring its ratification by the remaining annex 2 States, including, in particular, by two nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and towards the enhancement of international peace and security.
• (Page 8, Rec. 38) To ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by nuclear States with all expediency. Positive decisions by nuclear-weapon States would have a beneficial impact towards the ratification of the Test-Ban-Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to encourage progress on the entry into force of the Test-Ban-Treaty. These actions would encourage annex 2 States, in particular those which have not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Test-Ban-Treaty.

2010 Eighth Review Conference of the NPT

• (Page 2, Para 4) Immediate commencement of concurrent negotiations on and early conclusion of:  … (b) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on: ( i) Termination of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons through agreements on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests (ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, starting with the nuclear-weapon States), the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the closure of all nuclear weapons test sites.

   

• (Page 4, Rec. 16) To realize the objective of the CTBT, the commitment to nuclear disarmament of all States signatories, especially the five NWS, is essential. The five NWS have a special responsibility to take the lead in making the test ban a reality. 
• (Page 11, Rec. 61) To stress the significance of achieving the entry into force of the CTBT, requiring its ratification by the remaining annex 2 States, including, in particular, by two nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and towards the enhancement of international peace and security. 
• (Page 12, Rec. 62) To ratify the CTBT by NWS with all expediency. Positive decisions by NWS would have a beneficial impact towards the ratification of the CTBT. NWS have a special responsibility to encourage progress on the entry into force of the CTBT. These actions would encourage annex 2 States, in particular those, which have not acceded to the NPT and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the CTBT.

2012 First Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2015 NPT Review Conference

Working Paper 25

• (Page 1, para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and thereby constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group expresses grave concern at the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and refrain from any other action that would defeat the object, and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force.
• (Page 2, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
• (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament, would be essential.
• (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. 
• (Page 2, para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification of this Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and by not supporting the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty’s verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.
• (Page 2, para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear-test explosions for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons.
• (Page 3, para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining their voluntary moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that moratoriums do not take the place of the signing, ratification and entry into force of the Treaty.
• (Page 3, para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern.

2013 Second Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2015 NPT Review Conference

Working Paper 15

• (Page 2, para 5) It has further been reaffirmed that these improvements  and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Working Paper 17

• (Page 1, para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and thereby constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group expresses grave concern at the nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons systems as well as the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and refrain from any other action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force.
• (Page 2, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on negative security assurances provided by the nuclear weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
• (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States Signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament, would be essential.
• (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
• (Page 2, para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification of this Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and its not supporting the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear -Test -Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty’s verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.
• (Page 3, para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting any type of nuclear tests for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the nonproliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.
• (Page 3, para 10) The Group of Non -Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the importance of the five nuclear -weapon States maintaining and observing their unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear -Test -Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that those moratoriums do not substitute the entry into force of the Treaty and its ratification.
• (Page 3, para 11) The Group of Non -Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear - weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear -Test -Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear -weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear - Test -Ban Treaty has been envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament. The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear -Test -Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern.

2014 Third Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2015 NPT Review Conference

Third Preparatory Committee to the 2015 Review Conference

Working Paper 3

• (Page 1, para 3) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and thereby constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group expresses grave concern at the nuclear weapon tests in alternative ways and the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons systems, as well as the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and refrain from any other action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force.
• (Page 2, para 4) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on negative security assurances provided by the nuclear weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
• (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclearweapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States Signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament, would be essential.
• (Page 2, para 7) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
• (Page 2, para 8) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms that positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification of this Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and its not supporting the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty’s verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.
• (Page 3, para 9) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices, as well as nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. In that regard, the Group calls upon those States to continue to refrain from conducting any type of nuclear tests for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. The Group wishes to re-emphasize the principles of the non-proliferation regime, both vertically and horizontally.
• (Page 3, para 10) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining and observing their unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that those moratoriums do not substitute the entry into force of the Treaty and its ratification.
• (Page 3, para 11) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In this context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 Review Conference agreements. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament.

Working Paper 15

• (Page 6, para 28) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the significance of achieving the universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and realizing its entry into force through its ratification by the remaining States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, including, in particular, by two nuclear weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and the enhancement of international peace and security. The Group underlines that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in this regard.

Working Paper 16

• (Page 2, para 5) It has further been reaffirmed that these improvements and the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Working Paper 17

• (Page 6, recommendation 29) To stress the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, through its ratification by the remaining States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, including, in particular, by two nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and towards the enhancement of international peace and security.
• (Page 6, recommendation 30) To stress that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in realizing the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to underline in this regard the commitments of the nuclear-weapon States under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps, and accordingly calls for the early ratification of this Treaty, in particular by the remaining nuclear-weapon States and those that are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
• (Page 7, recommendation 32) To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from conducting nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear-weapon tests in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, as they would undermine the object and purpose of both the NonProliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2015 Ninth Review Conference of the NPT

2015 Review Conference Working Paper 2

• (Page 2, para 5)…recalls that at successive conferences of Heads of State or Government of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and ministerial conferences of the Movement, it has been reiterated improvements in existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, such as those envisaged in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America, contravene the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2015 Review Conference Working Paper 7

• (Page 1, para 4)…recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions… the Group expresses grave concern regarding the conducting of nuclear weapon tests in alternative ways and the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems, as well as the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which are in contravention of the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and would undermine its effectiveness and contradict the commitments undertaken at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences by nuclear-weapon States. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and refrain from any other action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force.
• (Page 2, para 5)…stresses that the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
• (Page 2, para 6)…stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclear-weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament.
• (Page 2, para 8)…further believes that the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, but also because, owing to their position, they are expected to lead in ratifying it and making the ban on nuclear tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
• (Page 3, para 9)…reaffirms that the early ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.
• (Page 3, para 10)…recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that it would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation… The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions.
• (Page 3, para 11)…underscores the importance for the five nuclear-weapon States to maintain and observe their commitments to unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that those moratoriums do not substitute for the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its entry into force.
• (Page 3, para 12)…emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.…pending its entry into force, States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose. In that context, the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of some nuclear-weapon States to modernize their nuclear weapons. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums as well as the commitments under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament.

2015 Review Conference Working Paper 24

• (Page 7, recommendation 33) To stress the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, through its ratification by the remaining States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, including, in particular, by two nuclear-weapon States, thus contributing to the process of nuclear disarmament and towards the enhancement of international peace and security.
• (Page 7, recommendation 34) To stress that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
• (Page 7, recommendation 36) To stress that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to take the lead in realizing the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to underline in this regard the commitments of the nuclear-weapon States under the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps, and accordingly calls for the early ratification of that Treaty, in particular by the remaining nuclear-weapon States and those that are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
• (Page 8, recommendation 39) To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from conducting nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear-weapon tests in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapons system, as they are in contravention of the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and would undermine its effectiveness and contradict the commitments undertaken at the Review Conferences of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by nuclear-weapon States.

2017 First Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2022 NPT Review Conference

First Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference

Working Paper 18

• (Page 3, para 10) …underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining and observing their unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes those moratoriums do not substitute for then entry into force of the Treaty and its ratification.
• (Page 3, para 11) …the Group is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear -weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference. It is the view of the Group that such decisions undermine the validity of the commitment to declared moratoriums…

First Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference

Working Paper 18

• (Page 1, para 2) While underlining the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Group …strongly calls for immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear weapon test sites. …all States parties that have not yet done so should close and dismantle, as soon as feasible and in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear test explosions and their associated infrastructure, and should prohibit completely nuclear weapons research and development and also refrain from conducting nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as from the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems, which would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
• (Page 1, para 3) …recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions…the Group expresses grave concern about nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities…
• (Page 2, para 5) The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the [CTBT], which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
• (Page 2, para 6) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclearweapon States
• (Page 2, para 7) …believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality.
• (Page 2, para 8) The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty, and its not supporting the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty’s verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.
• (Page 2, para 9) The nuclear -weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. …the Group calls upon those [nuclear-weapon] States to continue to refrain from conducting any type of nuclear test for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons. 
• (Page 3, para 10) …underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining and observing their unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that those moratoriums do not substitute for the entry into force of the Treaty and its ratification. 
• (Page 3, para 11) …is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclearweapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference. 
• (Page 3, para 12) …the Group acknowledges the existence of a special responsibility towards the affected people and areas, including those in the former United Nations trust territories who have been adversely affected as a result of nuclear weapon tests conducted in the past

First Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference

Working Paper 18

• (Page 1, para 1) …the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament and, therefore, cannot substitute for the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
• (Page 1, para 2) While underlining the significance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Group…strongly calls for immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear weapon test sites. …the Group is of the firm view that all States parties that have not yet done so should close and dismantle, as soon as feasible and in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, any remaining sites for nuclear test explosions and their associated infrastructure, and should prohibit completely nuclear weapons research and development and also refrain from conducting nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, or nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as from the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems, which would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
• (Page 1, para 3) …expresses grave concern about nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and to refrain from any other action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pending its entry into force.
• (Page 2, para 4) …stresses that improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons…by the nuclear-weapon States…violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
• (Page 2, para 5) …welcomes the signature of the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty by 183 States and its ratification by 166 States. In this context, the ratifications of Angola, the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Myanmar, Niue and Swaziland are welcomed. The Group, in accordance with its long-standing and principled position in favour of the total elimination of all forms of nuclear weapons, supports the objectives of the [CTBT], which is intended to enforce a comprehensive ban on all nuclear test explosions and to stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons in order to pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
• (Page 2, para 6) …stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclearweapon States... The Group reiterates that if the objectives of the [CTBT] were to be fully realized, the continued commitment to nuclear disarmament of all States signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, would be essential.
• (Page 2, para 7) …believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and by those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
• (Page 2, para 8) …reaffirms that positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification of this Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclear-weapon State to ratify the Treaty [CTBT], and its not supporting the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty’s verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.
• (Page 2, para 9) …recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices and of nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions.
• (Page 3, para 10) …underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining and observing their unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that those moratoriums do not substitute for the entry into force of the Treaty and its ratification.
• (Page 3, para 11) …emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, namely that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Pending the entry into force of the [CTBT], States should refrain from any actions contrary to its objectives and purpose.
• (Page 3, para 11) …the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was envisaged as the first of 13 practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament
• (Page 3, para 11) The lack of progress in the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty also remains a cause for concern.

First Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference

Working Paper 18

• (Page 1, para 3) …recalls and reaffirms once again the commitment of all States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to ending all nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions…the Group expresses grave concern about nuclear weapon test explosions in alternative ways, as well as the use of new technologies for upgrading existing nuclear weapons systems and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which may result in the resumption of tests and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. Accordingly, the Group strongly calls on the nuclear-weapon States to put an immediate end to such activities and to refrain from any other action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban treaty pending its entry into force.
• (Page 2, para 4) …stresses that improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons contravene even the mere and still conditional, very limited and insufficient statements on negative security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violate their commitments undertaken at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear -Test-Ban Treaty.
• (Page 2, para 6) …stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all the nuclearweapon States, which inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament.
• (Page 2, para 7) …believes that the five nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty, not only because they are among the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the Treaty, but also because, on account of their position, they are expected to lead in making the ban on tests a reality. It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States…
• (Page 2, para 8) …positive decisions by the nuclear-weapon States would have the desired impact on facilitating the progress towards entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Early ratification of this Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty. The failure of one major nuclearweapon State to ratify the [CTBT], and its not supporting the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization through rejection of one of the main elements of the Treaty’s verification regime, is undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing.
• (Page 2, para 9) …recalls the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ensure that the Treaty would halt both vertical and horizontal proliferation, thereby preventing the appearance of new types of nuclear devices and of nuclear weapons based on new physical principles. The nuclear-weapon States stated at that time that the only steps to be followed would be to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing weapons, which would not involve nuclear explosions. …the Group calls upon those [nuclear-weapon] States to continue to refrain from conducting any type of nuclear test for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons.
• (Page 3, para 10) …underscores the importance of the five nuclear-weapon States maintaining and observing their unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests since the opening for signature of the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty. However, the Group believes that those moratoriums do not substitute for the entry into force of the Treaty and its ratification.
• (Page 3, para 11) …the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given by the five nuclearweapon States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty, namely, that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. …seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear-weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference.
• (Page 3, para 12) The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty underlines the need for increased attention to the problems of safety and contamination related to the discontinuation of nuclear operations formerly associated with nuclear weapons programmes, including, where appropriate, the safe resettlement of any displaced human populations and the restoration of economic productivity to affected areas. In this regard, the Group acknowledges the existence of a special responsibility towards the affected people and areas, including those in the former United Nations trust territories who have been adversely affected as a result of nuclear weapon tests conducted in the past.

2018 Second Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2022 NPT Review Conference

No views on "Nuclear Testing" during this meeting

2019 Third Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2022 NPT Review Conference

No views on "Nuclear Testing" during this meeting

2022 Tenth Review Conference of the NPT

No views on "Nuclear Testing" during this meeting

2023 First Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2026 NPT Review Conference*

No views on "Nuclear Testing" during this meeting