First Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference

Working Paper 18

• (Page 2, para 7) It will be possible to determine the success of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty only when it has been signed and ratified, in particular by the five nuclear-weapon States and by those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
• (Page 2, para 8) Early ratification of this Treaty [CTBT] by the nuclearweapon States would pave the way and encourage the remaining required countries, especially those with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify the Treaty.

First Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference

Working Paper 20

• (Page 3, para 13) …emphasizes that the Treaty does not prohibit the transfer or use of nuclear technology, equipment or material for peaceful purposes based on their “sensitivity”, and only stipulates that such technology, equipment and material must be subject to the full scope of IAEA safeguards.
• (Page 4, para 14) …emphasizes that non-proliferation control arrangements…must pursue and implement, without exception, the condition of adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a condition for supply to or cooperation with States that are not parties to the Treaty.
• (Page 5, para 20) …emphasizes that non-proliferation must be pursued and implemented, without exception, through the strict observance of, and adherence to, IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty as a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States that are not parties to the Treaty. …new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the full scope of IAEA safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
• (Page 5, para 23) …expresses its serious concern over certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes, in this regard, that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. …article III, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes”.
• (Page 6, para 24) …while stressing the importance of safeguards and the significance of maintaining the principles of confidentiality regarding safeguards, underlines the vital responsibility of IAEA in this regard. … safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way, to any party not authorized by the Agency

First Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference

Working Paper 23

• (Page 1, para 4) Commencement of negotiations on and conclusion of an international, non-discriminatory comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons which: 
  • (c) Includes a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance with the provisions of the convention.
• (Page 2, para 7) Upon entry into force of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, the following steps must be undertaken: 
  • (a) The establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance with the provisions of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons; 
  • (e) The placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision, pending the removal of special nuclear materials from those warheads; 
  • (g) The irreversible placement of nuclear fissile material transferred from military to peaceful uses by nuclear-weapon States under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
• (Page 3, para 8) Further measures for the full implementation of the comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons and of its verification regime include: 
  • (a) The elimination of all nuclear weapons in an irreversible and verifiable manner; 
  • (b) The conversion of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons to “peaceful purposes” in an irreversible and verifiable manner; 
  • (c) The placement of all nuclear material, equipment and facilities under IAEA safeguards.

First Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference

Working Paper 21

• (Page 1, para 1) …the Group underlines that the multilateral mechanism established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the most appropriate way to address verification and safeguards issues. At the same time, the Group emphasizes that the work of the Agency with regard to safeguards and verification has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.
• (Page 1, para 2) …stresses the importance of the IAEA safeguards system and urges all States that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so as soon as possible, in order to achieve the universality of the comprehensive safeguards. The 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons considered the universality of the comprehensive safeguards as a main objective in order to consolidate and enhance the verification system for the non-proliferation regime. However, in the view of the Group, additional measures related to the safeguards shall not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, which are already committed to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and have renounced the nuclear-weapon option.
• (Page 1, para 3) …emphasizes that strict observance of and adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and to the Treaty are a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not parties to the Treaty, or for any supply arrangement with such States for the transfer of source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.
• (Page 2, para 4) …calls upon all States not party to the Treaty to accede, without any further delay and any preconditions and as non-nuclear-weapon States, to the Treaty and place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA fullscope safeguards.
• (Page 2, para 5) The Group also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. This is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under this Treaty.
• (Page 2, para 6) …confirms that the obligation under article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes provides credible assurances enabling States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology for peaceful purposes, in accordance with article IV of the Treaty. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restrictions or limitations on the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and technology to States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
• (Page 2, para 7) …fully recognizes that IAEA, an independent intergovernmental, science and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguards obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear material and technology from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, …
• (Page 2, para 8) …emphasizes that it is fundamental to make a clear distinction between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and that such voluntary undertakings shall not be turned into legal safeguards obligations.
• (Page 2, para 9) With respect to financial aspects of the safeguards, the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty believes that the differentiated nature of the financial obligations undertaken by member States of IAEA should be recognized and respected by the Agency in its work.
• (Page 3, para 10) …underscores the need to strictly observe the principle of balance between the promotional and other statutory activities of the Agency, in particular verification and safeguards-related activities.
• (Page 3, para 11) …underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards, including reporting, in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements. …Hence, in the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency.
• (Page 3, para 12) …calls for the implementation of resolution GC(60)/RES/13 on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, adopted by the General Conference of the Agency at its sixtieth session, in which the General Conference, “stressing the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements”, acknowledged the concerns expressed by the Director General on the need to protect safeguards confidential information within the Secretariat and his announcement of additional measures to protect such information, accordingly urged the Director General “to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of safeguards confidential information” and requested that he “continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of safeguards confidential information”.
• (Page 3, para 13) …underlines the necessity that the reporting of IAEA on the implementation of safeguards be factual and technically based and reflect appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements, while ensuring the protection of confidential information.
• (Page 3, para 14) …stresses the need to strictly observe the provisions of the IAEA statute, including article XII, which outlines the mandate of the Agency in verifying compliance with safeguards agreements and, in particular, that any non-compliance has first to be reported by the Agency’s inspectors.
• (Page 3, para 15) …stresses the statutory role of IAEA in nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the capability of the Agency to verify nuclear disarmament agreements.
• (Page 3, para 16) …expresses its serious concern about certain unilateral politically motivated attempts to hamper exercising the inalienable rights of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and believes in this regard that interpretations in the application of safeguards shall not be used as a tool to that end. In the view of the Group, article III of the Treaty, while providing for the undertaking by each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA, is equally explicit in articulating that the implementation of such safeguards shall be “in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing”.

First Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference

Working Paper 22

• (Page 1, para 1) …reaffirms that, under article III (1) of the Treaty, each nonnuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.
• (Page 1, para 2) …also reaffirms the importance and calls for the strict observance of article III (3) of the Treaty, by which the required safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the preamble of the Treaty.
• (Page 1, para 3) …fully recognizes that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent intergovernmental, science-and technology-based organization, is the sole competent authority responsible for the verification of the fulfilment of safeguard obligations assumed by States parties under the Treaty, with a view to preventing the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, …
• (Page 1, para 4) …while supporting the verification activities of IAEA, underlines the importance of strict observance of the IAEA statute and relevant comprehensive safeguards agreements in conducting verification activities.
• (Page 2, para 5) …while stressing the importance of safeguards, underlines the essential responsibility of IAEA in maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to the implementation of safeguards in accordance with the Agency’s statute and safeguards agreements. Since the Agency is the only organization that receives highly confidential and sensitive information on the nuclear facilities of member States, and given the undesirable incidences of leaks of such information, the Group emphasizes that the confidentiality of such information shall be fully respected and that the regime, for its protection, needs to be significantly strengthened. In the view of the Group, safeguards-related confidential information should not be provided in any way to any party not authorized by the Agency. The Group recalls IAEA General Conference resolution GC(60)/RES/13, paragraph 38, in which the IAEA Director General is urged to exercise the highest vigilance in ensuring the proper protection of classified safeguards information and is requested to continue to review and update the established procedure for the protection of classified safeguards information within the secretariat.
• (Page 2, para 6) …the Group calls upon all States to avoid any pressure or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process, that could jeopardize its efficiency and credibility.
• (Page 2, para 7) …emphasizes the need to achieve worldwide application of the comprehensive safeguards system and calls upon all nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.
• (Page 2, para 8) …calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake to accept full-scope safeguards. That is to be set forth in an agreement to be concluded with IAEA in accordance with its statute, for the exclusive purpose of the verification of the fulfilment of the nuclear-weapon States’ obligations assumed under the Treaty. In the view of the Group, such agreement would be concluded with the aim of:
  • (a) Ensuring full compliance with the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty;
  • (b) Providing baseline data regarding the fulfilment of obligations on nuclear disarmament and preventing further diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
  • (c) Strictly observing the prohibition of the transfer, which is inconsistent with the provisions, object and purpose of the Treaty, of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of assistance in the nuclear scientific or technological fields to States not party to the Treaty, without exception.
• (Page 2, para 9) …mindful of the importance of article III of the Treaty in verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes, reiterates that obligations under that article provide credible assurances for States parties to engage in the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, States parties to the Treaty are called upon to refrain from imposing or maintaining any restriction or limitation on the transfer of nuclear equipment, material and technology to other States parties with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
• (Page 2, para 10) …stresses the statutory role of IAEA on nuclear disarmament, including applying safeguards on nuclear materials derived from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and recognizes the Agency’s capability of verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.
• (Page 3, para 12) In that regard, the Group supports the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material from nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Group further urges the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to examine such legally binding verification arrangements and the means of making them operational, with the aim of ensuring the realization of that objective.
• (Page 3, para 13) …recalls action 16 of the recommendations and follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference and urges the nuclear-weapon States to commit to declaring to IAEA all weapons-grade fissile material and to place such material, as soon as practicable, under the supervision of IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.